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# MONETARY AGGREGATES AND MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS 

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee

## By the Staff

board of governors of the federal reserve system

MONE TARY AGGREGATES AND
MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS

## Recent developments

(1) Following an increase in $M_{1}$ at a 7.3 per cent annual rate in June, growth in July now appears likely to be at a rate a little over 5 per cent. $M_{1}$ growth for the June-July target period thus is estimated at about $6 \frac{1}{4}$ per cent, well within the range of tolerance set by the Committee at its last meeting. $M_{2}$ growth is also expected to decelerate between June and July, with the June growth rate at $9 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent and the July projection at about 7 per cent. The 2 -month growth rate is expected to be about $8 \frac{3}{4}$ per cent, a little below the top of the range of tolerance. RPD growth, on the other hand, is projected at about a 15 per cent rate for the 2 -month target period, above the top of its range of tolerance, as $C D$ growth was stronger than expected.

Growth of Monetary Aggregates and RPD's
in June-July Target Period

| Reserve and Monetary Aggregates (Growth at SAAR in per cent | Range of Tolerance | Latest Estimates |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $M_{1}$ | 33-73/2 | 6.2 |  |
| $\mathrm{M}_{2}$ | $5 \frac{1}{2}-8 \frac{1}{2}$ | 8.3 |  |
| RPD's | 10-13 | 15.1 |  |
| Memo: <br> Federal funds rate (per cent per annum) | 114-113 ${ }^{\text {(/ }}$ | Avg. for statement week ending |  |
|  |  | June 19 | 11.85 |
|  |  | June 26 | 11.97 |
|  |  | July 3 | 13.55 |
|  |  | July 10 | 13.34 |

[^1](2) Growth in the bank credit proxy over June and July is
expected to average close to 10 per cent, a less rapid expansion than in other recent months. Business loan expansion, while weak in early June, spurted from mid-June to early July, particularly at large banks. An important share of this borrowing reflects a shift of financing demands to banks that would ordinarily have been met in the commercial paper market
or by the issuance of corporate securities. Some firms that lack the highest credit rating have been prevented from tapping the commercial paper market because of investor unwillingness to buy their paper, In the market for corporate and municipal securities a number of issues--especially by public utilities--were canceled due to rapidly rising interest rates and reluctance on the part of underwriters to make bids in the atmosphere of rate uncertainty. In this enviroment, there has been some market discussion of possible capital controls, which may have also contributed to recent borrowing at banks.
(3) In June deposit growth at nonbank thrift institutions (including interest credited) strengthened to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent from the depressed April-May level. This improvement is probsbly temporary; partial data for early July indicate large outflows at both New York savings banks and large California S\&L's following the mid-year interest crediting.
(4) Most short- and long-term interest rates have risen sharply since the last meeting of the Committee. In the short-term area conmercial paper, $C D$ 's, and bankers' acceptances increased by around 1 percentage point to levels ranging from $12 \frac{1}{4}-12 \frac{3}{4}$ per cent in the 3 -month area. Bank prime rates generally have been increased to 12 per cent, but this level is low relative to currently prevailing short-term rates. In contrast, short-term Treasury bill rates have declined somewhat on balance, for three main reasons: the prime quality characteristic of bills, active demands from foreign and small investors, and recent Large seasonal debt repayment by the Treasury. Corporate
and municipal bond yields have increased by ahout 90 basis points since mid-June; even larger increases in these rates were forestalled by cancelations and withdrawals of new issues. Treasury bond rates were subject to much less upward pressure. As rates have adjusted upwards, the ability of a number of borrowers with less than the highest quality credit ratings to obtain funds in accustomed financial markets has been impaired-including some industrial and real estate comercial paper issuers, utilities, and bank holding companies. In addition, a few regional commercial banks are experiencing problems in rolling over $C D^{\prime \prime} s$, especially in the national market, and some banks are reported to be having difficulty placing their acceptances. Thus, yield spreads representing risk differentials have widened markedly.
(5) During the first statement week following the June Committee meeting the Federal funds rate edged up slightly to 11.97 per cent. Thereafter, the funds rate jumped to record highs, averaging 13.55 per cent in the week of July 3 and 13.34 per cent in the week of July 10 . The rise in the funds rate was influenced by churning around the mid-year statement date and the July 4 holiday, uncertainties in both domestic and international financial markets, the increasingly sensitive state of $C D$ and commercial paper markets, and perhaps a desire on the part of lenders to obtain a risk premium on some of their placements. In this environment, banks became more cautious in managing their money positions, and some city banks--despite the high cost of Federal funds-apparently wanted to stay out of the discount window in order to establish a clean record in the case of future borrowing recdo ohowid liquidity pressures grow still more intense. The reluctance of banks to borrow at the window became evident in the week ending July 10 , when member
bank borrowing, other than emergency borrowing, declined to a level of $\$ 1.3$ billion despite the record Federal funds rate. Excess reserves in early July also were somewhat higher than they have been recently, although this was in large part influenced by statement date windowdressing.
(6) At the time of the telephone conference of the FOMC on July 5, chances seemed good that the funds rate would recede with a continuation of normal reserve-supplying operations. On the basis of the discussion at that meeting, the Desk continued to resist the high Federal funds rate without injecting an unusually large amount of reserves. Subsequently, however, the funds rate remained well above 13 per cent, and a majority of the members concurred in the Chairman's recommendation of July 10 that System operations be undertaken promptly with a view to reducing the average funds rate to 13 per cent, on the understanding that the rate would be permitted to decline to the neighborhood of 12 per cent should money market factors work in that direction. Despite large reserve-supplying operations, the funds rate remained about: $13 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent on Thursday and Friday, but if reserve projections turn out to be right it should decline somewhat after the weekend.
(7) The table on the next page shows (in percentage annual rates of change) selected monetary and financial flows over various recent time periods. Appendix table III compares money supply growth rates computed on a quarterly-average basis with those computed on a last-month-of-quarter basis. Projected figures on the two bases are shown in appendix table IV for the three alternatives presented in the next section.


1/ Other than interbank and U.S. Government.
2/ Based on month-end figures. Includes loans sold to affiliates and branches.
NOTE: All items are based on average of daily figures, except for data on total loans and investments of commercial banks, commercial paper, and thrift institutions--which are derived from either end-of-month or last Wednesday-of-month figures. Growth rates for reserve measures in this and subsequent tables are adjusted to remove the effect of discontinuities from breaks in the series when reserve requirements are changed.

## Prospective developments

(8) Specifications for alternative suggested policy stances are summarized below for Comittee consideration (with more detailed figures shown in the table on $p .7 a$ ).

A1t. A
Targets (3rd\& 4th qtrs. combined)

| $M_{1}$ | 7 | 52 | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $M_{2}$ | 8 | 62 | 5 |
| Credit proxy | 9 | 731 | 6 |
| Associaced ranges for Ju?.y-August |  |  |  |
| $M_{1}$ | 4\% -6\% | 4-6 | 31 $\frac{1}{4}-5 \frac{1}{4}$ |
| $\mathrm{M}_{2}$ | 63-832 | 5 $\frac{1}{2}-7 \frac{1}{2}$ | 43 $-6 \frac{3}{4}$ |
| RPD | 1031-123 | 93-113 | 9-11 |
| Feajeral funds rate fange (inter-meeting period) | 10-12 | 11-13 | 12-14 |

Associaced ranges for Ju'. y-August
$M_{1}$
4
4-6 3立-5
$M_{2}$
RPD
Feajeral funds rate tange (inter-meeting period)

Alt. B
Alt. C
Targets (3rd $\& 4$ th qtrs.
combined)
(9) Of the alternatives presented, alternative $B$ represents continuation of the longer-run target path for $M_{1}$ adopted at the last Committee meeting, In that alternative, the annual growth rate for the second half of 1974 is $5 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This is slightly above the $5 \frac{1}{4}$ per cent rate adopted at the last meeting simply because the June level for $M_{1}$ turned out to be slightly lower than estimated at that time; the level set for December is unchanged from the previous meeting.
(10) The specifications of alternative $B$ would contemplate a Federal funds rate in an 11-13 per cent range between now and the next Committee meeting, and $M_{1}$ growth for July-August in a $4-6$ per cent annual

## MONEY SUPPLY AND LONGER RUN TARGET PATH


-7a-
Alternative Longer-Run Targets for Key Monetary Aggregates

## 1974 June <br> July Aug: Dec.

| $\mathrm{M}_{1}$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Alt. A | Alt. B | Alt.C |
| 280.9 | 280.9 | 280.9 |
| 282.2 | 282.1 | 282.0 |
| 283.6 | 283.2 | 282.9 |
| 285.2 | 288.4 | 283.8 |
| 290.9 | 288.8 | 286.6 |

Quarters:
1974 3rd Q. 4th Q.
$\begin{array}{lll}6.1 & 5.0 & 4.1 \\ 8.0 & 6.2 & 3.9\end{array}$
3.9

July
Aug.

| $\mathrm{M}_{2}$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Alt. A | Alt. B | Alt. $\mathbf{C}$ |
| 597.4 | 597.4 | 597.4 |
| 601.2 | 601.0 | 600.9 |
| 605.0 | 604.0 | 603.2 |
| 608.9 | 606.8 | 605.2 |
| 621.7 | 616.7 | 612.3 |

Rates of Growth

| 7.7 | 6.3 | 5.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 8.4 | 6.5 | 4.7 |


| 7.6 | 7.2 | 7.0 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 7.6 | 6.0 | 4.6 |


|  | Total Reserves |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| A1t. A | A1t. B | A1t. $\mathbf{C}$ |
| 36,723 | 36,723 | 36,723 |
| 37,416 | 37,396 | 37,376 |
| 37,120 | 37,082 | 37,044 |
| 37,416 | 37,304 | 37,208 |
| 38,821 | $3 R, 1,85$ | 38,121 |

38,82
,, 85

| $\mathrm{M}_{3}$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Alt. A | Alt. B | Alt. C |
| 930.9 | 930.9 | 930.9 |
| 936.1 | 935.8 | 935.7 |
| 941.0 | 939.5 | 938.4 |
| 946.6 | 943.5 | 941.0 |
| 963.6 | 956.4 | 949.8 |


| 6.7 | 5.4 | 6.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 7.2 | 5.5 | 3.5 |



| RPD |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A1te | Alt. B | Al |
| 34,790 | 34,790 | 34,790 |
| 35,151 | 35,131 |  |
| 35,451 | 35,413 | 35,375 |
| 35,738 | 35,626 | 35,5 |
| 6,615 | 36,286 | 35,9 |

## Quarters:

1974 3rd Q.

| Adjusted Credit Proxy |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Alt. $A$ | Alt. B | Alt. C |
| 483.0 | 483.0 | 483.0 |
| 485.7 | 485.6 | 485.4 |
| 490.1 | 489.4 | 488.6 |
| 494.6 | 493.1 | 491.5 |
| 505.4 | 501.6 | 497.1 |

7.5
15.0
22.7
22.0
-10.1
21.4
-10.7

| 10.9 | 9.5 | 8.5 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 9.8 | 7.4 | 4.5 |
|  |  |  |
| 12.5 | 11.8 | 11.1 |
| 10.2 | 9.6 | 9.0 |

rate range. The funds rate centers on 12 per cent, which would represent an easing from the money market conditions prevailing over the past two weeks. Such a funds rate would probably lead to some relaxation in pressures on short- and long-term markets, partly because investors and borrowers would come to believe that monetary policy was a little less restrictive than had appeared to be the case in the most recent weeks. Any drop in market rates is likely to be modest in size and short-lived, however, given the inflationary environment, continued strong credit demands, and the forthcoming Treasury, Federal Financing Bank, and Agency financings (both to raise cash and to refund maturing issues). Large demands for U.S. securities by foreign official accounts, of course, could modify this rate outlook appreciably in particular market sectors.
(11) On July 31, the Treasury will announce the terms on which it will refund $\$ 4.4$ billion of publicly held securities maturing in midAugust. A modest amount of new cash may also be raised in early August, and looking ahead to September, the Treasury will probably have to raise about $\$ 3$ billion of additional new cash. Private credit demands are also expected to be substantial in both short- and long-term markets. With markets increasingly cautious-and yield spreads between low and high quality issues widening further--a sizable part of the market demand may be diverted to banks as less than prime grade borrowers are forced to fall back on credit lines. Thus, pressures on banks are likely to remain intense.
(12) The ability of banks to finance additional loan demands is expected to be relatively limited, though. With growth in demand deposits and consumer-type time deposits constrained, banks will be
under pressure to issue new CD's. However, except for the prime names, market receptivity to $C D$ 's is in some question. In general, the recent concern with liquidity exposure, on the part of both banks and investors, will probably reduce the pace at which new CD's will be offered. As a result, bank credit growth under alternative B is projected at around an $8 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent annual rate over the third quarter, substantially less than in the first half of the year. This rate of expansion would probably mean that banks will have to cut back sharply on acquisitions of securities, particularly municipal and Federal agency issues. Thus, interest rates in intermediate and longer-term markets would likely come under renewed upward pressure as time goes on. The bank prime loan rate would probably also rise somewhat further.
(13) Under alternative B pressures on thrift institutions would be expected to be somewhat greater than during the second quarter. Growth in deposits at mutuals and savings and loan associations is expected to drop slightly to about a $3 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent annual rate, making no allowance for Citicorp and similar issues--the timing, terms, and volume of which are still unknown. Rough estimates based on the terms originally announced suggested that about half the funds for the $\$ 850$ million Citicorp issue would come out of thrift institutions, about a quarter out of banks, and a quarter from other market instruments. For a one-month period, this would represent a reduction in deposits at thrift institutions by $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent at an annual rate and in consumer-type time deposits at banks by $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent at an annual rate.
(13) Alternatives A and C specify faster and slower rates of growth in monetary aggregates, respectively, than alternative $B$. Alternative $C$ contemplates little change from the Federal funds rate that has come to prevail in recent weeks, and this would be expected to lead to a slowing in the growth rate of $M_{1}$ to around 4 per cent over the second half of this year. The market is currently in process of adjusting to a funds wate in the 13 per cent area, although the process of adjustment does not appear to be complete. Under this alternative, interest rates would likely rise further in the weeks immediately ahead, and would rise by more than under alternative $B$ over the longer run. Between now and the next Committee meeting, the 3 -month commercial paper rate might move up to the 13 per cent area, the CD rate would adjust upward, and upward pressures on the prime loan rate would be very strong given these still higher market rates. Inflows to thrift institutions would be further curtailed, and the mortgage market--apart from Government support--would come under even greater constraint than at present.
(14) Under alternative A--which contemplates $M_{1}$ growth at a 7 per cent annual rate over the second half of the year--the Federal funds rate would be expected to decline to around 11 per cent between now and the next Committee meeting, probably stimulating a fairly marked decline of interest rates over a broad maturity spectrum. Interest rate declines would be intensified in the short run as market attitudes with respect to monetary policy shift and as Government security dealers begin to cover short positions. However, given the size of prospective borrowing demands and the concern over inflation, rate declines would
not be likely to cumulate. For example, recently postponed municipal and corporate offerings would probably be re-offered shortly under the circumstances, and this would tend to moderate downward rate pressures. The position of banks and thrift institutions would ease under this alternative, though remaining on the tight side as crmpared with historical experience, since an 11 per cent Federal funds rate implies a structure of market rates still quite attractive relative to present Regulation $Q$ ceilings. (15) The possibility of a credit crunch in financial markets cannot be ignored, especially under alternative $C$. Such a development could be triggered by a series of failures of financial or industrial concerms, here or abroad. This could lead to sharply higher rates and a drying up of credit flows in markets where there is perceived to be heightened credit risk and to lower rates in safe markets, such as the Treasury securities market. Many borrowers would not be able to obtain credit, and some bank and other institutional lenders would not be able to tap their usual sources of funds. Under the circumstances, remedial action by the System would be expected, either through the market or through the discount window. As a result, whatever specifications are adopted by the Committee would very likely have to be superseded, at least temporarily, by other operating criteria. It should be recognized in any event that the various specifications presented are more uncertain than usual since the situation in financial markets and the economy is unprecedented in the postwar period.

## Proposed directive language

(16) Presented below are three alternative formulations for the operational paragraph of the directive, which are intended to correspond to the similarly lettered policy alternatives discussed in the preceding section. For all three alternatives, it is proposed to include a reference to Treasury financing because the regular August refunding will be announced on July 31.

## Alternative A

To implement this policy, while taking account of THE FORTHCOMING TREASURY REFUNDING AND OF developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Committee seeks to maintain-abeut-the-prevaizing-restrietive ACHIEVE BANK RESERVE AND money market conditions;-previded-that CONSISTENT WITH GROWTH IN the monetary aggregates AT ABOUT THE RATES PREVAILING OVER RECENT MONTHS appear-te-be-grewing-aE-rates-within-the speeified-ranges-of-teteranee.

## Alternative B

To implement this policy, while taking account of THE FORTHCOMING TREASURY REFUNDING AND OF developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Comittee seeks to maintain-abeut-the-prevaiłing-restrietive ACHIEVE BANK RESERVE AND money market conditions--previded-that-the THAT WOULD MODERATE GROWTH IN monetary aggregates OVER THE MONTHS AHEAD appear-te-be-grewing-at-rates-withinithe-spetified-ranges-of Eeteranee.

## Alternative C

To implement this policy, while taking account of THE FORTHCOMING TREASURY REFUNDING AND OF developments in domestic and international financial markets, the Comittee seeks to maintain-about-the-prevatiting-restritetive ACHIEVE BANR RESERVE AND money market conditions;-provided-that-the THAT WOULD SLOW APPRECIABLY THE GROWTH IN monetary aggregates OVER THE MONTHS AHEAD appear-to-be-growing-at-rates-within-the-speexfifed-ranges of-toterance.
(17) In the event that the Committee again wishes to couch the operational paragraph of the directive in terms of prevailing money market conditions, the specifications of alternative $C$ might be associated with the language used in the directive adopted at the last meeting-namely, that ". . .the Committee seeks to maintain about the prevailing restrictive money market conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates appear to be growing at rates within the apecified ranges of tolerance."

## RESERVES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT PRIVATE NONBANK DEPOSITS


*Break in Series Actual Level of RPD After Changes in Reserve Requirements

## MONETARY AGGREGATES



## MONETARY AGGREGATES



TOTAL RESERVES


GHART 4
MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS AND INTEREST RATES




NOTE: DATA SHOWM IN PARENTHESES ARE CURRENT PROJECTIONS. AT THE FOMC MEETING QF JUNE 16.1974
THE COMAITTEE AGREED ON A RPD RANGE OF 10.0 TC 13.5 PERCENT FOR THE JUNE-JULY PERIOD.


TABLE 3

RESERVE EFFECTS OF
OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS AND OTHER RESERVE FACTORS (Millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted)

l/ Represents change in System's portfolio from end-of-period to end-of-period; includes redemptions in regular bill auctions.
$\frac{\overline{2}}{2} /$ Represents change in daily average level for preceding period.
3/ Includes matched sale-purchasc transactions as well as RP's
4/ Sum of changes in vault cash, currency in circulation, Treasury operations, F.R. float, gold and foreign accounts, and other F.R. accounts.
$\underline{\underline{5}} /$ Restrves to support private nonhank deposits. Target chatge for June and July reflects the target adopted at the June 18 , 1974 FomC meeting.
Target change for previous months reflects the bluebook patterns that are consistent with target ranges that were adopted during the month.

| Period | U.S. Govt. Security Dealer Positions |  | Dealer Positions |  | Member Bank Reserve Positions |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | CorporateBonds Bonds | Municipal Bonds | Excess*\% Reserves | Borrowing at FRB ${ }^{\text {c* }}$ |  | Basic. Reserve Deficit |  |
|  | Bills | Coupon Issues |  |  |  | Total | Seasonal | 8 New York | 38 Others |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| 1973 -- Hıgh | 3,796 | 1,299 | 197 | 384 | 631 | 2,561 | 163 | -5,243 | -10,661 |
| Low | 897 | -301 | 0 | 36 | -240 | 688 | 3 | -1,831. | - 4,048 |
| 19/1 -- High | 3,238 | 2,203 | 253 | 371 | 394 | 3,605 | 142 | -5,911 | -12,826 |
| Low | -289 | -145 | 0 | 43 | -83 | 776 | 13 | -2,447 | - 8,711 |
| 19,3 -- June | 2,281 | 562 | 33 | 120 | 234 | 1,851 | 75 | -3,507 | - 6,443 |
| July | 1,425 | 265 | 24 | 139 | 285 | 1,953 | 155 | -2,460 | - 6,106 |
| Aug. | 1,690 | 39 | 0 | 70 | 177 | 2,165 | 163 | -2,689 | - 4,940 |
| Sept. | 2,745 | 395 | 6 | 80 | 216 | 1,852 | 148 | -3,173 | - 5,355 |
| Oct. | 2,565 | 484 | 44 | 226 | 227 | 1,476 | 126 | -3,814 | - 6,090 |
| Nov | 2,804 | 793 | 90 | 148 | 239 | 1,393 | 84 | -4,469 | - 8,186 |
| Dec | 3,441 | 973 | 105 | 276 | 307 | 1,298 | 41 | -4,682 | - 9,793 |
| 1974-- Jan. | 3,102 | 540 | 114 | 254 | 162 | 1,051 | 18 | -4,753 | -10,893 |
| Feb. | 2,436 | 1,619 | 120 | 263 | 184 | 1,162 | 17 | -5,262 | -10,769 |
| Mar | 1,986 | 583 | 68 | 239 | 134 | 1,314 | 32 | -5,030 | -11,058 |
| Apr. | 1435 | 99 |  |  |  | 1,736 | 40 | -3,952 | -11,603 |
| May | 408 | 85 | 142 | 83 | 178 | 2,590 | 102 | -3,171 | - 9,091 |
| June | *580 | *9 | 66 | 124 | 192p | 3,006p | 135p | -4,445 | - 9,920 |
| 1974 -- May 1 | 810 | -15 | 7 | 153 | 177 | 2,157 | 74 | -2,967 | - 9,712 |
| 8 | 616 | -17 | 37 | 129 | 213 | 1,617 | 82 | -3,423 | - 9,102 |
| 15 | 305 | 384 | 40 | 96 | 176 | 1,977 | 94 | -4,002 | - 9,091 |
| 22 | 94 | 8 | 117 | 131 | 129 | 3,090 | 112 | -2,858 | - 9,329 |
| 29 | 333 | 19 | 136 | 211 | 179 | 3,606 | 114 | -2,447 | - 8,711 |
| June 5 | 1,031 | 12 | 50 | 98 | 225 | 3,054 | 131 | -3,521 | - 9,361 |
| 12 | 1,110 | 76 | 185 | 100 | 131 | 2,729 | 136 | -5,052 | -10,333 |
| 19 | + 778 | * 29 | 29 | 127 | 258p | 3,223p | 142p | -4,803 | - 9,946 |
| 26 | *-289 | *-45 | 0 | 171 | 104p | 2,788p | 133p | -4,394 | - 9,347 |
| July 3 | \% 75 | *-76 | 0 | 50 | 298p | 3,434p | 126p | -3,850p | - 9,726p |
| 10 17 | * 26 | *-145 | 70p | $95 p$ | 242p | 2,642p | 137p | -4,301p | -10,089p |
| 17 24 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

NOTE: Government security dealer trading positions are on a commitment basis. Trading positions, which exclude Treasury bills financed by repurchase agreethents maturing in 16 days or more, are indicators of dealer holdings avallable for sale over the near-term. other security dealer positions are debt issues still in syndicate, excluding trading positions. The basic reserve deficit is excess reserves less borrowing at Federal Reserve less net Federal funds purchases. Weekly data are daily averages for statement weeks, except for corporate and municipal issues in syndicate which are Friday figures.

* STRICTLY CONFidential
** Monthly averages for excess reserves and borrowings are weighted averages of statement week figures.

Table 5

SELECTED INTEREST RATES
Per cent


sorg: Reserve Requirements on Burodoliar borrowings are included beginning october 16, 1969, and requirements on bank-related - Preilainery. paper are included beginning october 1, 1970 .

Resonally adjusted, billiona of dollere)

 compercisi paper are inciuded besinhing october 1, 1970. Adjusted credit proxy includes mainily total member bank depoaite
 lafiy aversges for statewent veeks. Monthly data are daily averagea except for nothank commercial paper flgures which are for

- Preiliminary.


## Appendix Table III

Growth Rate in Money Supply (Per cent change at an annual rate)

$\bar{M}=$ Annual rates of growth calculated from average levels in the final months of the quarters.
$\psi=$ Annual rates calculated from dverage levels in all cĭ.ee moncins of the quarters.

## Appendix Table IV

Growth Rates in Money Supply for Alternatives


Alt. A

| 1974 | III |
| ---: | :--- |
|  | IV |
|  | III \& IV Combined |


| 6.1 | 6.2 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 8.0 | 7.5 |
| 7.0 | 6.8 |


| 7.7 | 7.8 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 8.4 | 8.2 |
| 8.0 | 7.5 |


| 6.7 | 6.7 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 7.2 | 7.1 |
| 7.0 | 6.9 |

Alt. B
1974 III
$5.0 \quad 5.4$
6.25 .8

III \& IV Combined
5.65 .6

| 6.3 | 7.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 6.5 | 6.4 |
| 6.4 | 6.7 |


| 5.4 | 6.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 5.5 | 5.4 |
| 5.5 | 5.7 |

## A1t. C

$\begin{aligned} 1974 & \text { III } \\ & \text { IV } \\ & \text { III \& IV Combined }\end{aligned}$

| 4.1 | 5.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 3.9 | 4.0 |
| 4.0 | 4.5 |

$5.2 \quad 6.5$
4.35 .4
$4.7 \quad 4.6$
$3.7 \quad 3.7$
4.04 .5
$5.0 \quad 5.5$
4.0
4.5
$\begin{aligned} M= & \text { Annual rates of growth calculated from average levels in last } \\ & \text { montha of the quarters. } \\ Q= & \text { Annual rates calculated from average levels in all three months } \\ & \text { of the quarters. }\end{aligned}$



[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic format. All scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced tilting) and lightly cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other blemishes caused after initial printing).
    ${ }^{2}$ A two-step process was used. An advanced optical character recognition computer program (OCR) first created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive, staff checked and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and tables were not reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.

[^1]:    1/ Range shown is that set at the June 18 meeting of the Committee. In a telephone conference on July 5, the Committee agreed that for the time being the Desk should not press hard to reduce the funds rate, which had averaged 13.55 per cent in latest statement week, in view of the likelihood that the high level was primarily a consequence of technical factors which might well prove temporary. Subsequently, a majority of members concurred in the Chairman's reconmendation of July 10 that System operations be undertaken promptly to reduce the average funds rate to 13 per cent, on the understanding that the rate would be permitted to decline to the neighborhood of 12 per cent should money market factors work in that direction.

