#### Meeting Between Staff of the Federal Reserve Board and The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. June 30, 2016

**Participants:** Kevin Littler, Adam Trost, Dafina Stewart, Adam Cohen, Brian Chernoff, and Josh Strazanac (Federal Reserve Board)

Rajashree Datta, Robin Vince, and Kyle Russ (Goldman Sachs)

**Summary:** Staff of the Federal Reserve Board met with representatives of Goldman Sachs to discuss the notice of proposed rulemaking to establish the Net Stable Funding Ratio in the United States. Specifically, Goldman Sachs' representatives discussed the treatment of derivatives and the available stable funding factors assigned to certain liabilities in the proposed rule. Goldman Sachs' representatives also discussed the requirement in the proposed rule that intercompany transactions not count towards a firm's available stable funding.

Attachment

## Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)

June 30, 2016

**Net Stable Funding Ratio** 

# Derivatives – Zero Funding Value of High Quality Securities Collateral Held

A firm's funding requirement on a derivatives receivable can vary significantly depending on the type of collateral received and collateral management strategy used

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4
Derivative NPV	\$1.0bn	\$1.0bn	\$1.0bn	\$1.0bn
Collateral <sup>1</sup>	\$1.0bn USD cash	\$1.0bn USD cash	\$1.0bn UST	\$1.0bn UST
Use of Collateral Received	Invest in \$1.0bn UST	Reverse in \$1.0bn UST	Hold UST	Repo UST for Cash with a financial counterparty for <6 months
Implied RSF	5%	10%	100%	100%
Balance Sheet Treatment	<ul> <li>Derivative Receivable on B/S: \$0</li> <li>UST Firm Inventory on B/S: \$1.0bn</li> </ul>	Derivative Receivable on B/S: \$0 Reverse Repurchase Agreement (with a financial counterparty) on B/S: \$1.0bn	<ul> <li>Derivative Receivable on B/S: \$1.0bn</li> <li>Unencumbered USTs off B/S: \$1.0bn</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Derivative Receivable on B/S: \$1.0bn</li> <li>Cash on B/S: \$1.0bn</li> <li>Repurchase agreement on B/S: \$1.0bn</li> </ul>

### Example – Derivatives Collateral Received on a zero threshold CSA

USTs given no funding value under Leverage Ratio netting in Scenarios 3 & 4

- It is prudent collateral management practice to convert cash collateral received into securities to minimize credit risk from cash balances that would be placed at agent banks, resulting in inconsistent RSF factors for similar risk scenarios
- The same portfolio and nearly identical liquidity risk, result in different RSF

<sup>1</sup> Examples ignore collateral haircuts

<b>Non-Affiliate Brokered Sweep Deposits Conder the NPR, 90% ASF is given to fully-insured, affiliate brokered sweep deposits and 50% ASF to non-affiliated brokered sweep deposits (regardless of depositi nisuance contractual preforential treatment to non-affiliated banks to many cases, broker dealers provide contractual preforential treatment to non-affiliated banks to the mary cases, broker dealers provide or the program Statictors are withdrawn. <b>In mary cases, broker dealers provide contractual preforential treatment to non-affiliated banks to the program Statictors are withdrawn. <b>Instrative Example Proposed result interaction to non-affiliated banks. <b>Deposit Feature Deposit Feature</b></b></b></b>	Net Stat Deposits	Net Stable Funding Deposits	ng Ratio		
Under the NPR, 90% ASF is given to f sweep deposits (regardless of deposit In many cases, broker dealers provide For example, a bank placed near the certain percentage of the program's ba <b>Illustrative Example</b>	Non-Affiliate	Brokered Swe	ep Deposits		
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Proposal: Apply 90% ASF, regardless no deposits outflows from the program		oker Dealer's Total Program Priority 1: Bank A Priority 2: GS Priority 3: Bank B Priority 3: Bank B Priority 3: Dis			
	14	oply 90% ASF, regard		to fully insured deposits where a e broker program balances are w	. bank's structural priority ithdrawn

Net Stable Funding Ratio	g Ratio
Brokered Certificates of Depc	Brokered Certificates of Deposits with Contractual Maturities Greater than 1 Year
<ul> <li>Under the NPR, a 90% risk factor is</li> <li>This is inconsistent with the Base</li> <li>Should contractual certainty func</li> <li>Term deposits have specific contract</li> </ul>	Under the NPR, a 90% risk factor is given to term retail deposits maturing greater than 1 year <ul> <li>This is inconsistent with the Basel rule that explicitly recognized 100% ASF for term deposits &gt;1 year</li> <li>Should contractual certainty funding with remaining maturity &gt; 1 year receive 100% ASF?</li> </ul> Term deposits have specific contractual features that are not susceptible to franchise or reputation risks
Proposed requirements for CDs to o 100% ASF	qualify for Deposit Feature
<ul> <li>Contractual Restrictions</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Contractual specification that do not allow early withdraws prior to maturity (except for estate features)</li> <li>Additionally, contractual specification that document brokers are not required to maintain a secondary market for the deposits, thus clients have no expectation that the firm will redeem the deposit prior to contractual maturity date</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Historical Evidence</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Firm must prove that it does not allow a client to redeem a brokered CD early (other than estate features), even during a period of stress</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Proposal: Deposits with &gt; 1 year terr two criteria</li> </ul>	<u>Proposal:</u> Deposits with > 1 year term should receive 100% ASF, consistent with Basel NSFR, subject to meeting the above two criteria

Ratio	
Funding	iderations
: Stable I	<b>Entity Considerations</b>
Vet	egal E

### **Calculation of Excess ASF**

- The NPR allows a consolidated company to include "excess" ASF from subsidiaries only to the extent a subsidiary can transfer the ASF taking into account restrictions (e.g., statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory restrictions)
- The NPR states that the excess ASF calculation should not include intercompany transactions
- Clarification is required on how a firm should treat intercompany transactions in the NPR

#### Illustrative Examples:

	Bank Subsidiary (excluding intercompany transactions)	Consolidated Firm		Bank Subsidiary (including intercompany transactions)	Consolidated Firm
Capital ASF	100	200	Capital ASF	100	200
Deposit ASF	500	500	Deposit ASF	500	500
Non-deposit ASF		100	Non-deposit ASF		100
Intercompany Funding ASF (e.g. repo)			Intercompany Funding ASF (e.g. repo)	ο	
Total ASF	600	800	Total ASF	600	800
Intercompany Assets RSF (e.g. reverses)			Intercompany Assets RSF (e.g. reverses)	50	
All other RSF	400	550	All other RSF	400	550
Total RSF	400	550	Total RSF	450	550
NSFR Ratio (before Trapped ASF)	150%	145%	NSFR Ratio (before Trapped ASF)	133%	145%
"Excess" ASF (ASF - RSF)	200		"Excess" ASF (ASF - RSF)	150	
23A Capacity	50		23A Capacity	50	
Trapped ASF (ASF - RSF - 23A Capacity)	AND STREET	150	Trapped ASF (ASF - RSF - 23A Capacity)		100
NSFR Ratio (after Trapped ASF)		118%	NSFR Ratio (after Trapped ASF)		127%