



April 2, 2004

Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20551
Re: Docket No. R-1181

Dear Ms. Johnson

Subject: Proposed **Revisions** to the Community Reinvestment Act Regulations

I **am** writing to **you** to communicate my support for the federal **bank** regulatory agencies' (agencies) proposal to **expand** the number of **banks** and saving **associations** that will be examined under the **small** institution Community Reinvestment Act (**CRA**) examination. The agencies are proposing to increase the **asset** threshold from \$250 million to \$500 million **and** to eliminate any consideration of **whether** the small institution is **owned** by a **holding company**. **This proposal** reflects a **more** appropriate implementation of the **Community Reinvestment Act** and is clearly a major step toward **reducing** the regulatory burden on those institutions who would **be made** eligible for the **small** institution examination, **and I strongly support this proposal.**

When the **CRA** regulations were rewritten in 1995, the banking industry recommended that community banks of **at** least \$500 million be eligible for a less burdensome small institution examination. The **most** significant improvement in the new regulations **was** the **addition** of the **small** institution **CRA** examination, which actually did what the **act** required

- It had **examiners** look **at** each bank's loans **and assess** whether the **bank was** helping to meet the credit needs **of the bank's** entire **community**.
- It did not impose **an** investment requirement **on** small banks, **since** the act is about credit, **not** investment.
- It added no **data** reporting requirements **on** small **banks**, fulfilling the promise! of the **act's** **sponsor**, Senator Proxmire, that there would be **no** additional paperwork or recordkeeping burden on banks if the act passed.
- And it created a simple, **understandable assessment test** of the **bank's** record of providing credit **in its community**: the **test considers** the institution's loan-to-deposit ratio; the percentage of loans **in** its assessment **areas**; **its** record of lending to **borrowers** of different income levels and **businesses and farms** of different sizes; the **geographic** distribution of its **loans**; and its record of taking **action**, if warranted, in response to **written** complaints about its performance in helping to **meet** credit needs **in** its assessment areas.

Since then, **the** regulatory burden on **small banks** has been increasing. Examples include recent, **massive** new requirements under HMDA, **the USA Patriot Act**, the privacy and information security provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, **and** recent amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. **But the nature** of community banks **has not changed**. **When a community bank must** comply with the requirements of the large institution CRA data reporting and **CRA examination**, the costs to **and** burdens on that community bank increase dramatically,

The transition **from a small bank** to a large bank for purposes of CRA imposed a very large additional burden to my bank here in Alaska. Due to the loan data collection and reporting requirements, the requirements to document investments **and** services, and the time required for **CRA exam** preparation, the **CRA Officer** position increased from **25%** to **100%** of a full-time employee's job. In addition, **the Chief Financial Officer** has spent countless hours working **on** the details of complex **community development** investments to try to meet the unspecified and **arbitrary** "qualified investment" threshold. **As a large bank**, we have experienced **CRA** examiners arbitrarily assigning lower levels of qualified value to **the community development** donations **and** investments on which the bank **has** spent **numerous hours and** financial resources. This imposes a dramatically higher regulatory burden that drains both money and personnel **away from** our **staff** being able to help meet **the** credit needs of **our communities**.

I believe that it is **as** true today **as it was** in 1995, and in **1977** when Congress originally enacted CRA, that **a community bank's** role is to meet the credit needs of its community **by making a** certain amount of **loans** relative to its deposits. **A community bank's** operations are typically not complex; it's basically taking in deposits **and** making loans. Its business activities **are** usually focused on small, defined geographic **areas** where the **bank is known** in the community. **The small institution examination** accurately captures the information necessary for **examiners** to assess whether a community **bank is helping to** meet the **credit** needs **of** its community, **and** I believe that nothing more should be required to satisfy the act.

As **the agencies** state *in* their proposal, raising the small institution CRA examination threshold to \$500 million **would** make a larger number of **community banks** eligible for the **small bank** status. However in reality, raising the **asset** threshold to \$500 million while **also** eliminating the holding **company** limitation **would** mean that the percentage of industry assets that would be subject to the large **retail institution test would only** decline: **slightly—from** a little **more** than 90% to a little less than 90%. **That** decline, though slight, would **more closely align** the current distribution of **assets** between small and large **banks** with the distribution that was anticipated when the agencies **adopted the** definition of "small institution." Thus, the agencies, in **revising** the CRA regulation, are really **just** preserving the *original intent* of the regulation, which **has been** altered by a significant decline in **the** total number of **U. S.** banks, inflation, **and an** enormous increase in the size of large banks. I believe that the agencies need to provide greater relief to community banks than **just** preserving the *status quo* of this regulation.

While the small institution test was **the most** significant improvement of the revised CRA, it **was** not appropriate to limit its application **only** to banks with less than **\$250** million in **assets**, **because** it deprived many community banks **from** any **regulatory** relief. **Currently**, a bank with more than **\$250** million in **assets** faces significantly more requirements that substantially increase **regulatory** burdens without consistently producing additional benefits **as** contemplated by the Community Reinvestment Act. In today's banking market, even a **\$500** million **bank** **often** **has** **only** a handful of branches,

Therefore, I **recommend** raising the **asset** threshold for the small institution examination to **at least \$1** billion. **Raising** the limit to \$1 billion is appropriate for two reasons. **First**, keeping the **focus** of smaller institutions on lending, which the **small** institution examination does, would **be** entirely consistent with the **original** **purpose** of the Community Reinvestment Act (which was to ensure that the **agencies** evaluate **how** banks **are** helping to meet the credit **needs** of the communities they serve),

Second, raising the limit to \$1 billion will have **only a small** effect on the amount of total **industry assets** covered under the more comprehensive **large** bank test. According to the **agencies'** own findings, **raising** the limit from **8250** to \$500 million would reduce total industry **assets** covered by the **large** bank test by less than one percent. According to December 31, 2003, Call **Report** data, raising the limit to \$1 billion will reduce the **amount** of assets subject to the much more burdensome large institution test by only **4%** (to about **85%**). Yet, the **additional** relief provided would, **again**, be **substantial**, reducing the compliance **burden** on more than 500 additional banks and **savings** associations (**compared** to a \$500 million limit). I **urge** the agencies to raise the limit to **\$1 billion**, providing significant regulatory relief while, to quote the agencies in the proposal, not diminishing "in **any way** the obligation of all **insured** depository institutions subject to CRA to help meet the credit needs of **their** communities. Instead, the changes are meant **only** to address the **regulatory** burden associated with evaluating institutions under CRA."

In conclusion, I **strongly** support increasing the **asset-size** of banks eligible for the small bank streamlined CRA examination process **as** a vitally important step in improving the CRA regulations and in **reducing** regulatory burden on our nation's smaller banks. I **also** support eliminating the separate holding company qualification for the small institution examination, since it places small community banks that are **part** of a larger holding company **at a disadvantage** to their peers and has no legal basis in the act. Community banks will still **will** be **examined** under **CRA** for their record of helping to **meet** the credit needs of their communities; however, **this** change will eliminate some of the most problematic and burdensome elements of the current **CRA** regulation faced by community banks now drowning in regulatory red-tape.

Sincerely,



R. Marc Langland
Chairman, President, and CEO
Northrim Bank