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REPORT ON THE AUDIT OF THE BOARD’S INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
REPORT ON THE AUDIT OF THE BOARD’S
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551 |
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL |
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September 25, 2007
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Washington, DC 20551
Dear Members of the Board:
The Office of Inspector General is pleased to present its Report on the Audit of
the Board’s Information Security Program. We performed this audit
pursuant to requirements in the Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA), Title III, Public Law 107-347 (December 17, 2002), which requires each
agency Inspector General (IG) to conduct an annual independent evaluation of
the agency’s information security program and practices. Our specific audit
objectives, based on the legislation’s requirements, were to evaluate the
effectiveness of security controls and techniques for selected information
systems and to evaluate compliance by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board) with FISMA and related information security policies,
procedures, standards, and guidelines. We conducted our audit from December
2006 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
To evaluate security controls and techniques, we reviewed controls over three
Board applications and followed up on the open issues from our 2006 application
control reviews. We also recently began a review of controls provided by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (FRB Boston) for applications the Reserve Bank
maintains in support of the Board’s supervision and regulation function. We
performed our application control testing based on controls identified in the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication
800-53, Revision 1, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information
Systems (SP 800-53). The controls are divided into “families” (such as
access controls, risk assessment, and personnel security) and include controls
that can be categorized as system-specific or common (that is, applicable
across agency systems). Consequently, although our focus was on evaluating
specific applications, we also assessed some of the broader security controls
that affect most, if not all, applications.
Our control tests identified areas where controls need to be strengthened.
Because some of the issues we identified are more significant—either alone or
in combination with other weaknesses—we have classified several of our findings
as “control deficiencies.” Given the sensitivity of the issues involved with
these reviews, we will provide the specific results to management in separate
restricted reports. Follow-up work on our 2006 application control reviews
allowed us to close several of the outstanding recommendations.
To evaluate the Board’s compliance with FISMA and related policies and
procedures, we followed up on open recommendations from prior information
security audit reports issued pursuant to FISMA’s requirements1.
Because FISMA authorizes the IGs to base their annual evaluations in whole or
in part on existing audits, evaluations, or reports relating to programs or
practices of the agency, we also incorporated the results from, and actions
taken on, (1) our 2005 audit of efforts by the Federal Reserve System (System)
to implement FISMA’s requirements for applications operated by the Reserve
Banks in support of the Board’s delegated S& R function; (2) our 2005 review
of the Board’s implementation of software security reviews; and (3) our 2006
audit report related to electronic authentication (e-authentication)2.
In addition, we compiled information on, and reviewed the Board’s processes
related to, areas for which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requested
a specific response as part of the agency’s annual FISMA reporting; our
response will be provided to OMB by the Chairman under separate cover. Areas we
reviewed include security awareness and training, certification and
accreditation (C&A), remedial action monitoring, incident response,
configuration management, controls over personally identifiable information
(PII), and privacy impact assessment (PIA) processes.
Overall, we found that the Board’s information security program continues to
evolve and mature. The Board has made additional progress toward implementing a
structured information security program as outlined by FISMA and has taken
action to address open audit recommendations. Specifically, we found that the
Board revised its information security program to incorporate guidance and
standards recently issued by NIST. The Board also updated many of its
information security policies and guidance, continued to certify and accredit
information systems, and provided training to system owners and developers on
their security-related responsibilities. Despite this progress, however, the
Board still has work remaining to fully implement its information security
program for all systems on the application inventory; consequently, three of
our audit recommendations remain open or partially closed.
Based on our security-related fieldwork over the past year, we are not making
any new recommendations in this report. In our opinion, the primary challenge
going forward for the Board’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Information
Security Officer (ISO) is to ensure that all aspects of the revised information
security program are fully and consistently implemented across the systems
supporting divisions and offices—as well as for third-party applications
supporting Board programs and operations—and that controls are implemented
correctly, working as intended, and producing the desired results. We will
continue to review the qualitative aspects of the program as part of future
FISMA audits and evaluations.
Appendix 1 contains our analysis of the Board’s progress in implementing key
FISMA requirements. Appendix 2 lists the ten prior OIG audit recommendations
related to information security that were not fully closed as of the beginning
of our 2007 information security audit and their status based on our current
audit work. As discussed in appendix 1, we determined that the Board’s actions
over the past year were sufficient to close seven of these recommendations. In
appendix 1, we also summarize the work that we believe remains for each FISMA
requirement and the reasons why audit recommendations, or portions of
recommendations, remain open.
We provided our draft report to the director of the Division of Information
Technology (IT), in her capacity as CIO for FISMA, and discussed the report’s
content with her and the Board’s ISO at our closing meeting. During the
meeting, the director generally agreed with the report’s contents. She and the
ISO also discussed ongoing and planned activities to further enhance the
Board’s information security program. Because our report does not contain any
new recommendations, we did not request separate written comments.
The principal contributors to this report are listed in appendix 3. We are
providing copies of this audit report to Board management officials. In
addition, the Chairman will provide the report to the director of OMB, as
required by FISMA. The report will be added to our publicly-available web site
and will be summarized in our next semiannual report to the Congress. Please
contact me if you would like to discuss the audit report or any related issues.
Sincerely,
/signed/
Elizabeth A. Coleman
Inspector General
Attachments
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Mr. Stephen Malphrus
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Ms. Maureen Hannan |
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Mr. Roger Cole |
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Mr. Peter Purcell |
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Mr. Raymond Romero |
APPENDIXES
Appendix 1 – OIG Analysis of the Board’s Progress in Implementing Key
FISMA Requirements
Policies and Procedures
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Requirement:
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Information security policy is an essential component of an information
security program. An agency’s information security policies should be based on
a combination of appropriate legislation, such as FISMA; applicable standards,
such as NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and guidance; and
internal agency requirements. Supporting guidance and procedures on how to
implement specific controls effectively across the enterprise should be
developed to augment an agency’s security policy. To ensure that information
security does not become obsolete, agencies should implement a review and
revision process for its policies and procedures.
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Progress to Date:
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Our 2006 information security audit work found that the ISO had
developed or revised guidance to help implement the Board’s information
security program and that the ISO had worked with Board staff in divisions and
offices to implement the guidance for systems under their control. However, we
also noted that key guidance was in draft and that additional training for
information and information system owners would help to ensure the program’s
effective implementation. We recommended that the CIO enhance the security
program by finalizing security-related policies and providing additional
training focused on the information security program and associated Board
policies and NIST guidance.
During the past year, the ISO has continued to enhance the Board’s information
security program. In March 2007, the ISO updated the overall information
security program document. The ISO also updated guidance for categorizing
information and systems, conducting risk assessments, and developing security
plans. In addition, the ISO finalized guides for certifying and accrediting
systems, training personnel with significant responsibilities for information
security, and handling security incidents. The Board is also finalizing
procedures for handling PII which will supplement the policies outlined in the
Board’s recently issued Information Classification and Handling Guide.
Earlier this year, the IT security staff provided training sessions on the
updated information security program to system development staff and system
owners. The sessions included a review of the Board’s information security
processes and discussed the security-related roles and responsibilities
associated with each process. The ISO plans to offer additional training. As a
result of the actions taken to update and finalize the security-related
policies and to provide associated training, we are closing our 2006 audit
recommendation.
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Work to Be Done:
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An agency will always need to update and refine its information security
program and the related policies and procedures as the program evolves and as
NIST and OMB issue new guidance. To achieve this objective, agencies should
implement a review and revision process for their policies and procedures to
ensure that information security does not become obsolete and that the policies
and procedures are working effectively to produce the desired results. We will
continue to review the need for additional guidance as part of our ongoing work
related to information security. Given the programmatic changes over the past
year, the CIO and ISO will also need to remain vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the program’s requirements and in evaluating the requirement
for refresher training.
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Application Inventory
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires the head of each agency to develop and maintain an
inventory of major information systems operated by or under the control of the
agency. The inventory forms the basis for meeting the FISMA periodic testing
requirement and should identify interfaces between each system and all other
systems or networks. The inventory should also identify system criticality and
risk levels. OMB expects agencies to have an inventory that is based on work
completed in developing an enterprise architecture.
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Progress to Date:
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Our 2005 information security audit report contained a recommendation
that the Board identify all information and information systems supporting its
operations and assets, including those at Reserve Banks and other third
parties, and ensure full and timely compliance with FISMA legislative
requirements and related information security policy and guidance. Work
completed as part of our 2006 information security audit closed the first part
of this recommendation, since the CIO had issued an inventory guide to provide
additional guidance for classifying systems, and the ISO had worked with
divisions to implement the guidance. During the past year, the ISO updated the
guide and issued additional procedures for determining system types, bundling
applications where appropriate, and documenting security requirements. In our
opinion, the guidance provides a systematic approach for identifying and
classifying systems to ensure that all Board information assets are properly
identified and achieve the appropriate level of security as established by the
Board’s information security program. The Board also continues to report
progress in certifying and accrediting information systems on the inventory.
During the past year, for example, the Board completed a certification of the
IT general support system (GSS). As part of the certification, the IT security
staff completed a baseline control matrix for each component of the GSS (such
as Windows Active Directory, UNIX, and the mainframe).
Our 2006 information security audit report also noted that the Board’s inventory
guide contained guidance to help the System identify and organize information
assets operated by Reserve Banks under delegated authority from the Board.
During the past year, we reviewed the System’s progress for identifying and
grouping applications, and believe that sufficient work has been done to close
the open inventory-related recommendation from our September 2005 report, Audit
of the Supervision and Regulation Function’s Efforts to Implement Requirements
of the Federal Information Security Management Act.
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Work to Be Done:
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As noted in several areas below (risk assessments, security plans, and
certification and accreditation), the Board still has work remaining to fully
implement the Board’s security program’s requirements for all systems on the
inventory; therefore, we are leaving the second part of our 2005 recommendation
open until this work is completed. As the ISO continues to review the inventory
and further implement the bundling guidance, we will evaluate the
appropriateness of any revisions to the Board’s application inventory. As minor
systems are bundled into a GSS or major application, the ISO will also need to
ensure that controls are properly documented, implemented, and tested to
provide the appropriate level of security.
As we reported last year, our 2005 information security audit report also
contained a recommendation that the Board establish full-time, independent CIO
and ISO positions that have the authority to direct and enforce FISMA
compliance for all information and information systems that support Board
operations and assets, including those provided by the Reserve Banks and other
third parties. In responding to our recommendation, the Board’s previous CIO
for FISMA stated that the Board will continue to evaluate and make changes as
appropriate to the organizational structure in light of the final inventory and
any additional developments from OMB. Until the work discussed above is
completed, we will continue to hold this recommendation open and will reassess
its status at that time.
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Periodic Risk Assessments
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of the
harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems
that support the operations and assets of the agency.
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Progress to Date:
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Our 2006 information security audit work found that the director of IT
had issued a policy on risk assessments, including a standard template, to
assist divisions and offices in performing the assessments. The risk assessment
guide and template were updated in 2007, and system owners must complete a risk
assessment in preparing for a system C& A.
Our March 2006 Report on the Audit of the Board’s Implementation of Electronic
Authentication Requirements included a recommendation that the CIO: (1)
finalize electronic authentication (e-authentication) guidance, to include
providing additional guidance regarding assurance levels; (2) ensure that all
applications meeting e-authentication requirements are identified and properly
assessed; and (3) ensure that procedures are in place to include the validation
and periodic reassessment of assurance levels as part of the Board’s revised
information security program. Last year, we partially closed the recommendation
because the ISO had included e-authentication guidance as part of the risk
assessment guide. Since that time, we have reviewed e-authentication
assessments completed as part of updated system risk assessments and believe
that sufficient action has been taken to close the remaining portion of this
recommendation.
During 2005, we conducted a review of the Board’s implementation of software
security reviews and recommended that the CIO develop guidance to ensure that
single purpose software and other software products are evaluated as part of a
GSS; as part of an application security review; or on an individual basis, as
appropriate. Subsequently, the ISO developed a template for completing software
security reviews for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, and IT staff
conducted several reviews during the year. In addition, as part of the Board’s
security-related training, the ISO developed a set of frequently asked
questions, which includes questions and responses related to implementation of
software security reviews for COTS products. We believe sufficient work has
been completed to close this recommendation.
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Work to Be Done:
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Full implementation of the new risk assessment process will not occur
until all systems have been through a C&A. As noted above, the ISO updated
bundling guidance for determining system types and documenting security
requirements. Systems bundled under a major application must be included in the
risk assessment for the major application. For minor applications bundled under
a GSS, the guidance requires that system owners complete a risk assessment and
certify to the ISO that the controls have been successfully implemented (either
by the GSS or by the application itself). If certain controls have not been
satisfied, the owners must either accept the residual risk or describe the risk
mitigation process. As system owners implement the bundling guidance, the ISO
will need to ensure that all systems are appropriately assessed for risk and
for the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and
information systems that support the operations and assets of the Board.
The first two security control reviews that we conducted this year identified
areas where we believe the ISO needs to provide additional guidance for
completing risk assessments, and we are providing our recommendation to the ISO
under separate restricted cover. We will continue to review implementation of
the risk assessment process as part of our future application control reviews.
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Security Plans
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires that agencies develop security plans for each system in
the inventory. The system security plans should be based on the agencywide
plan, provide an overview of the system’s specific security requirements, and
describe the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.
System security plans should delineate the responsibilities, expected behavior,
and training requirements for all individuals who access the system, and
describe appropriate controls for interconnection with other systems.
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Progress to Date:
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Last year, we noted that the ISO had developed new security plan
templates for major applications, general support systems, and subsystems, and
had required system owners to complete the appropriate template in preparation
for certifying and accrediting their systems. During the past year, the ISO
updated the security plan guidance and issued a revised control baseline
template that includes all NIST SP 800-53 controls. The control baseline also
includes suggested responses for each control in order to facilitate the system
owner’s completion of the baseline; however, every control must be reviewed to
ensure that the suggested answers are correct, or are appropriately adjusted,
and accurately describe how the control is implemented in the context of the
specific system. As part of the IT GSS certification process, IT staff
completed baselines for various components of the IT GSS which will provide a
foundation for reliance by applications bundled under the general support
system.
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Work to Be Done:
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Full implementation of the new security plan will not occur until all
systems have been through a C&A. As minor systems are bundled into a GSS or
major application, the ISO will need to ensure that security plans accurately
describe the controls in place for all components within the GSS or major
application, and that the certification provides the appropriate level of
testing and verification to ensure that controls are in place and operating as
intended. We will review completed security plans during future security
control tests.
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Periodic Testing and Evaluation
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of
an agency’s information security policies, procedures, and practices. The
evaluation includes testing of the management, operational, and technical
controls for each system identified in the agency’s inventory and should be
performed on a risk-based frequency, but not less than annually. Each system
must also undergo a periodic certification and accreditation to ensure that the
individual responsible for the system has guaranteed that security controls are
commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction
of information contained in the system. A C& A should be completed before a
system is initially placed into operation, and every three years thereafter,
unless the system undergoes a significant change.
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Progress to Date:
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During the past year, the ISO finalized the Board’s C& A guidelines.
The guidance identifies roles and responsibilities for the C& A process,
describes the required documentation, and discusses the various process phases.
The guidance notes the importance of the post-accreditation phase, which
includes configuration management and change control processes, continuous
control monitoring (at both the information system and infrastructure levels),
and annual security reviews. To help improve the Board’s continuous monitoring
processes, the ISO has documented the Board’s vulnerability scanning
environment (that is, the roles and responsibilities, and scanning tools
currently used) and plans to further enhance scanning capabilities through
automated tools. The ISO is also tracking the requirement for systems to
undergo an annual security review in any year when the system is not subject to
a C& A.
The table below shows the total number of Board general support systems, major
applications, and third-party systems, and the number of systems that were
certified and accredited as of September 20, 2007. The C& A process has been
a high priority for the Board over the past year. As the table shows, the Board
reports that most systems have completed C& As, and the ISO expects all but
6 systems to receive full authorizations to operate by the end of September.
(The Board’s inventory includes an additional 119 minor applications and
subsystems; the inventory indicates that 62 of these additional systems have
also completed the C& A process. Going forward, however, these systems will
be included in the C& A for the GSS or major application under which they
reside.)
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Accreditation Status |
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Type of System |
Total Number of Systems |
Certification Completed |
Full Authorization to Operate |
Interim Authorization to Operate |
No Accreditation Decision |
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Board General Support Systems |
5 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
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Board Major Applications |
15 |
14 |
8 |
1 |
5 |
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Third-Party Systems |
43 |
42* |
16 |
26 |
0 |
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Work to Be Done:
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During the past year, the OIG conducted an evaluation of the Board’s
C& A process and identified several areas of concern; we will provide our
evaluation results to the CIO and ISO in a separate restricted report. In
addition, as part of our security control review of a major application earlier
this year, we reviewed the application’s completed C& A package and
identified weaknesses we believe should have been identified during the C& A
process. Our ongoing security control review at FRB Boston will allow us to
review the C& A work completed for third-party applications and evaluate the
level of testing conducted as part of that process. As we complete other
control reviews during the year, we will continue to compare our evaluation
results with completed C& A packages, and we will provide the ISO with any
additional recommendations for improving the Board’s C&A process. We will also
review implementation of the annual testing requirement for third-party systems
(outside of the C& A process) so that we can close the remaining
recommendation from our September 2005 report, Audit of the Supervision and
Regulation Function’s Efforts to Implement Requirements of the Federal
Information Security Management Act.
Our security control review work to date has also identified concerns with the
Board’s configuration management process. We recognize, however, that the ISO
is evaluating enhanced automation capabilities which we believe will improve
this process. We will also monitor the Board’s progress in enhancing
configuration management processes as part of follow-up work on last year’s
control review reports.
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Planning, Implementing, Evaluating, and Documenting Remedial Actions
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires agencies to establish a process for addressing any
deficiencies in information security policies, procedures, and practices. To
implement this requirement, OMB has issued guidance requiring agencies to
prepare and submit Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) for all programs and
systems where an information technology security weakness has been found. The
POA& Ms should include all security weaknesses found during any review done
by, for, or on behalf of the agency, including Government Accountability Office
audits, financial statement audits, and critical infrastructure vulnerability
assessments. In addition, program officials should regularly update the CIO on
their progress in implementing corrective actions to better enable the CIO to
monitor agencywide remediation efforts and provide the agency’s quarterly
POA& M update to OMB.
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Progress to Date:
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Our 2006 information security audit work found that the ISO had provided
divisions and offices with additional guidance regarding the tracking and
reporting of security-related issues, but that division-level reporting of
performance metrics on outstanding issues was not always consistent from
quarter-to-quarter. We noted that this issue could affect the roll-up of
division-level information to the overall Board POA& M which the CIO
provides to OMB. During this past year, we found that divisions have more
accurately tracked outstanding issues from one quarter to the next. Based on
the guidance issued and the generally enhanced quality of the POA& Ms
completed during the 2007 FISMA cycle, we are closing our recommendation.
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Work to Be Done:
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The ISO should continue to ensure that divisions accurately update their
division-level information so that the POA& M functions effectively as an
agencywide vehicle for tracking security-related issues and monitoring
agencywide remediation efforts. We will continue to review quarterly
submissions by the divisions to the ISO, as well as the ISO’s submission to
OMB.
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Security Awareness Training/Training Personnel with Significant
Security Responsibilities
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires that an agency’s information security program include
security awareness training to inform all personnel, including contractors and
other users of information systems that support the agency’s operations and
assets, of the information security risks associated with their activities, as
well as their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and
procedures. FISMA also requires that the CIO train and oversee personnel with
significant responsibilities for information security.
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Progress to Date:
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As part of security awareness and training, the Board continues to post
security-related articles on its internal website. During the past year, these
articles have covered password requirements and encrypting data on USB drives.
IT’s intranet website related to information security also includes links to
security awareness articles from the past ten years. In addition, the Board
administers an online security awareness quiz covering security articles posted
during the year; the quiz also provides a mechanism for staff to provide
feedback to the ISO. As noted earlier, the IT security staff conducted training
sessions on the Board’s information security program for development staff and
system owners.
Our 2006 information security audit work identified individuals who we believed
should have been designated as having significant security responsibilities and
who, in our opinion, had not received the proper level of training. We
recommended that the CIO provide additional guidance for designating
individuals with significant security responsibilities and identify specific
training requirements. During the past year, the ISO issued guidance for
designating individuals with significant security responsibilities. The
guidance, which is an appendix to the Board’s information security program
document, includes categories of individuals that meet the definition of having
significant security responsibilities and identifies the levels of knowledge
appropriate for each category. This action is sufficient to close the
recommendation.
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Work to Be Done:
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Given the volume of updated guidance issued over the past year, the ISO
should evaluate the need for additional training over the coming year. As NIST
and OMB issue new guidance, and the Board incorporates this guidance into its
information security program, the ISO will need to consider refresher training
on a regular basis. In addition, the ISO will also need to monitor actions
taken in response to the recent guidance for designating individuals with
significant security responsibilities to ensure that the guidance is
implemented consistently for Board staff, and that Reserve Bank staff
responsible for systems supporting delegated functions meet comparable
requirements. As with other areas contained in the FISMA legislation, we will
review the Board’s progress in identifying and providing training to
individuals with significant security responsibilities as part of our future
security control reviews.
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Detecting, Reporting, and Responding to Security Incidents
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires agencies to develop procedures for detecting, reporting,
and responding to security incidents. The procedures should include steps to
mitigate risks from security incidents before substantial damage is done, and
to notify and consult with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT), appropriate law enforcement agencies, and relevant OIGs. US-CERT has
also established requirements for incident reporting, which include priority
levels for categories of incidents and the timeframes for reporting each
priority level. 3
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Progress to Date:
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Our 2004 information security audit work found that the ISO was not
reporting all levels of incidents that are required to be reported to the
US-CERT; our audit report included a recommendation that the CIO expand the
Board’s reporting of security incidents to include all five incident priority
levels, as well as incidents that occur at the Reserve Banks and other
third-party contractors. Earlier this year, the ISO issued a new Information
Security Incident Handling Policy that includes requirements to report
all levels of incidents. Over the past year, we have reviewed incidents
reported by the ISO to US-CERT and found that the reports include incidents at
the Board and the Reserve Banks. To inform employees of their responsibilities,
the ISO has also posted articles on this topic on the Board’s website as part
of security awareness training. We believe sufficient action has been taken to
close the recommendation.
To comply with new OMB privacy-related requirements, the Board’s Legal Division
(Legal) has drafted a data breach notification policy and is finalizing PII
procedures. The ISO has also identified applications on the Board’s inventory
that contain PII and sensitive data. To supplement the Board’s policy, the
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation (BS&R) and the Division of
Consumer and Community Affairs issued additional guidance for safeguarding and
reporting a loss of confidential information that includes PII. Earlier this
year, we began an inspection with the objective of evaluating policies,
procedures, practices, and controls to safeguard PII that is collected during
examinations conducted by Federal Reserve Banks under the Board’s delegated
authority. We will provide the results of our inspection to Board management
once our fieldwork is completed.
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Work to Be Done:
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This year’s OMB reporting requirements ask the IGs to evaluate their
agency’s processes related to PIAs. Our initial work in this area found that
the Board has completed four assessments and posted the documents to its public
web page. The security control baseline issued earlier this year contains a
requirement for system owners to either complete a PIA as part of the planning
process or obtain a determination from Board Legal that a PIA is not required.
However, guidance for completing the assessment is still in draft. Legal staff
also informed us that BS&R is performing a Systemwide review of systems
supporting the supervision and regulation function to identify additional
systems that may require an assessment (although BS&R is determining whether
similar systems may be combined under one umbrella assessment). In addition,
our control review of one major application found that a PIA had not been
completed, although the system owners are presently working with Legal to
comply with the assessment requirement. As we complete the fieldwork necessary
to respond to OMB’s reporting requirement, we will report any additional areas
of concern to appropriate officials.
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Continuity of Operations Plans and Procedures
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Requirement:
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FISMA requires that agency information security programs include plans
and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that
support the agency’s operations and assets. OMB’s FISMA reporting guidance also
indicates that contingency planning is a requirement for certification and
accreditation, with annual contingency plan testing required thereafter.
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Progress to Date:
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The Board continues to conduct semiannual contingency testing. Divisions
participate in the semiannual contingency tests and the ISO uses the Board’s
application inventory to track which systems have been tested. The Board
recently expanded the contingency testing to include a separate, full-day
senior management exercise at the Board’s contingency site. In addition,
divisions were requested to supplement their contingency planning documents to
address the avian flu threat. As part of that update process, the Staff
Director for Management requested that divisions review and confirm critical
business functions and evaluate technical requirements, such as remote access
capabilities.
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Work to Be Done:
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We shared our observations from prior contingency tests with IT
management and offered suggestions for enhancing the testing. Our suggestions
included reviewing required recovery timeframes, coordinating backup tape
delivery, and developing after-action reports. To help ensure that the
contingency tests continue to provide value to the Board, the CIO and ISO (in
conjunction with Board staff responsible for contingency planning) will need to
ensure that the tests do not become too “routine” or that participants do not
become complacent. We will continue to monitor the contingency tests as part of
our ongoing FISMA work, and anticipate performing focused audit or evaluation
work in this area over the coming year.
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Appendix 2 – Updated Status of Prior OIG Information Security Audit
Recommendations
The following tables list the recommendations that were not fully closed at the
time of our 2007 audit. The first column lists the original recommendation(s)
from each report cited. In the status column, we note the current status of
each recommendation as discussed in appendix 1.
2004 Audit of the Board’s Information Security Program
|
Original Recommendation |
Status |
| We recommend that the CIO
enhance the process for prioritizing, tracking, and managing security
performance gaps by (1) providing additional guidance on the level of detail
that should be reported on Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) and (2)
ensuring that all security-related tasks are monitored through the Board’s
POA& M process. |
Closed (see discussion in appendix 1,
page 13) |
| We recommend the CIO expand the
Board’s reporting of security incidents to include all five incident priority
levels as well as incidents that occur at the Reserve Banks and other
third-party contractors.4 |
Closed (see discussion in appendix 1,
page 15) |
2005 Audit of the Board’s Information Security Program
|
Original Recommendation |
Status |
| We recommend that the Board
identify all information and information systems supporting its operations and
assets, including those at Reserve Banks and other third parties, and ensure
full and timely compliance with FISMA’s legislative requirements and related
information security policy and guidance. |
Partially Closed (see discussion in
appendix 1, page 8) |
| We recommend that the Board
establish full-time, independent Chief Information Officer (CIO) and
Information Security Officer (ISO) positions that have the authority to direct
and enforce compliance with FISMA’s requirements for all information and
information systems that support Board operations and assets, including those
provided by the Reserve Banks and other third parties. |
Open (see discussion in appendix 1,
page 9) |
2005 Audit of the Supervision and Regulation Function’s Efforts to Implement Requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act
|
Original Recommendation |
Status |
| We recommend that the CIO provide guidance for developing an inventory of S&R-related applications and ensure that the guidance is implemented consistently across the System. |
Closed (see discussion in appendix 1, page 9) |
| We recommend that the CIO issue guidance for conducting information security reviews that includes specific requirements for control testing. |
Partially Closed (see discussion in appendix 1, page 13) |
2005 Review of the Board’s Implementation of Software Security Reviews
|
Original Recommendation |
Status |
| We recommend the CIO develop guidance to ensure that single purpose software and other software products are evaluated as part of a general support system, as part of an application security review, or on an individual basis as appropriate. |
Closed (see discussion in appendix 1, page 10) |
2006 Report on the Audit of the Board’s Implementation of Electronic Authentication Requirements
|
Original Recommendation |
Status |
| We recommend that the CIO: (1) finalize e-authentication guidance, to include providing additional guidance regarding assurance levels; (2) ensure that all applications meeting e-authentication requirements are identified and properly assessed; and (3) ensure that procedures are in place to include the validation and periodic reassessment of assurance levels as part of the Board’s revised information security program. |
Closed (see discussion in appendix 1, page 10) |
2006 Audit of the Board’s Information Security Program
|
Original Recommendation |
Status |
| We recommend that the Chief Information Officer (CIO) enhance the Board’s security program by finalizing security-related policies and by providing additional training focused on the revised information security program and associated Board policies and NIST guidance. |
Closed (See discussion in Appendix 1, page 7) |
| We recommend that the CIO provide additional guidance for designating individuals with significant security responsibilities and identify specific training requirements. |
Closed (see discussion in appendix 1, page 14) |
Appendix 3 – Principal Contributors to this Report
Peter Sheridan, Senior IT Auditor and Auditor-in-Charge
Richard Allen, IT Auditor
Robert McMillon, Senior IT Auditor
Satynarayana-Setty Sriram, IT Auditor
William Mitchell, Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Attestations
Footnotes
1. See the following OIG reports: Audit of the Board’s Information Security Program, dated September 2004; Audit of the Board’s Information Security Program, dated October 2005; and Audit of the Board’s Information Security Program, dated September 2006. Return to text
2. See the following OIG reports: Audit of the Supervision and Regulation Function’s Efforts to Implement Requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act, dated September 2005; Review of the Board’s Implementation of Software Security Reviews, dated May 2005; and Report on the Audit of the Board’s Implementation of Electronic Authentication Requirements, dated March 2006. Return
to text
* The ISO has also performed a review of the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 70 report for the Federal Reserve System’s outsourced contractor for retirement and benefit plan administration. Return to
text
3. US-CERT established the incident categories and reporting timeframes to enable improved communications between and among agencies. The categories range from category 1 (unauthorized access) which should be reported within one hour of discovery or detection, to category 5 (scans, probes, and attempted access) which should be reported on a monthly basis. Return to text
4. At the time of our audit recommendation in 2004, US-CERT had established only four priority levels. During 2005, US-CERT revised their reporting guidelines to be consistent with NIST and established five reportable categories. We have updated our recommendation wording to reflect this change. Return to
text
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