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Semiannual Report to Congress Other format: PDF (4 MB) (Download Accessible PDF Plug-in) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Semiannual Report to Congress
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Dear Chairman Greenspan: We are pleased to present our Semiannual Report to Congress which summarizes the activities of our office for the reporting period April 1 through September 30, 2003. The Inspector General Act requires that you transmit this report to the appropriate committees of Congress within thirty days of receipt, together with a separate management report and any comments you wish to make. Sincerely, /signed/ Barry R. Snyder Enclosure Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Semiannual Report to Congress
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Return to table of contents The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG), as prescribed by the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended), requires that we
Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), as amended, requires us to review failed financial institutions supervised by the Board that result in a material loss to the bank insurance fund (BIF) and to produce, within six months of the loss, a report that includes suggestions for improving the Board's banking supervision practices. Further, through an agreement with other financial institutions regulatory agency Inspectors General charged with the same legislative requirement, we will address any relationship of Board-regulated holding companies to material losses to the fund from failed financial institutions supervised by any of these agencies. We currently perform our duties and responsibilities under three major program areas - audits, investigations, and management advisory services - as shown in the organizational chart that follows.
Goals and Objectives Return to table of contents Goal 1: Provide Value-Added Customer Service to the Board Our strategic objectives within this changing environmental context are to
Goal 2: Enhance Coordination and Information Sharing with the Congress,
IG Community and Others Our strategic objectives within this goal are to
Goal 3: Enhance the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Internal Operations
Our strategic objectives within this goal are to
Projects Completed during this Reporting Period
Return to table of contents Audit of the Board's Information Security Program To test security controls and techniques, we selected four applications for review and evaluation and followed up on the status of the recommendations made in our prior control reviews. Our control tests of the four applications did not identify any major security control weaknesses, although we found several areas where controls needed to be strengthened. Our follow-up work on recommendations made during the prior year's control reviews found that sufficient actions had been taken to close all recommendations. We provided our test results in restricted follow-up letters to management. We plan to follow up on implementation of our recommendations as part of our future audit and evaluation activities related to the Board's information security program. To evaluate the Board's compliance with FISMA and related policies and procedures, we followed up on the open recommendations in our prior evaluations of the Board's information security program and practices. These recommendations were designed to help bring the Board into compliance with GISRA's requirements and further enhance the Board's information security program. Since FISMA contains most of the requirements and provisions set forth by GISRA, implementing our prior recommendations would also bring the Board into compliance with the new information security legislation. Our follow-up work showed that the Board continues to make progress in developing a structured information security program as envisioned by the previous and current security-related legislation. Notwithstanding this progress, however, the Board has not achieved full compliance with FISMA's requirements and issues remain open related to five of the seven recommendations from our original 2001 information security report. These issues pertain to properly positioning the CIO and the Information Security Officer to effectively carry out their responsibilities, finalizing the Boardwide security program document and the application inventory, conducting security control reviews, developing a comprehensive information security awareness program, and identifying control weaknesses and documenting corrective actions. We continue to believe that fully implementing these recommendations is essential for the Board to firmly establish the necessary managerial responsibilities, oversight structure, and clear, consistent guidance related to the Board's information security program; to bring itself into compliance with the security legislation's requirements; and to establish the organization and programmatic framework that is intended by the legislation. To help the Board achieve these objectives, we updated our prior recommendations using the concepts, terms, and requirements contained in FISMA. In his response to our report, the Staff Director who serves as the Board's CIO, noted that the Board, like other small federal agencies, is challenged by the prescriptive standards contained in FISMA which he believes were written for the large, cabinet-level agencies. Nevertheless, the Staff Director indicated that he plans to strengthen the Boardwide emphasis regarding FISMA and look for alternative methods for meeting policy, compliance, and review responsibilities. The Staff Director stated the Boardwide security program is in final draft and efforts are underway to ensure FISMA's requirements, including the identification of all information systems, are met regarding contractors, the Reserve Banks, and other organizations supporting the Board's operations. In addition, additional security awareness measures are already in progress and the process of prioritizing, tracking, and managing security performance gaps will continue to be enhanced. We will evaluate actions taken in response to our recommendations as part of our continued work related to information security. Evaluation of the Board's E-Government Initiatives During this reporting period, we issued our Report on the Evaluation of the Board's E-Government Initiatives. The report identified sixty-six E-Gov projects, some of which have been recognized for government E-Gov excellence awards. About two-thirds of these projects are primarily intended to improve internal efficiency and effectiveness. The remaining one-third can be categorized as government-to-citizen, government-to-business, or government-to-government initiatives, which are the principal focus areas of the federal government's E-Gov efforts. Our report identified several challenges to maximize the potential benefits
of E-Gov for the Board and suggested that the Board take the following actions:
This audit was performed to document and obtain an understanding of the retirement process for Board employees; assess the effectiveness of processes for monitoring vendor contracts and vendor performance; evaluate automated system controls and confirm the accuracy of employee data; determine whether Board employees and other key stakeholders are generally satisfied with the customer service provided; and obtain an understanding and evaluate the effectiveness of the governance structure for the retirement plan. Our review of the retirement process and vendor contract management, as well as our data verification and pension benefit recalculations, did not identify any significant control weaknesses, data discrepancies, or systemic processing errors. We found that staff in the Management Division (MGT) have worked with the Office of Employee Benefits (OEB) and the outsourcing contractor over the past two years to improve the accuracy of pension-related information, and to help the contractor become more familiar with aspects of the retirement plan. Our testing identified three minor discrepancies in pension benefit amounts for the retirees in our sample. We provided this information to the MGT staff and the necessary adjustments have been made. In addition, our customer satisfaction surveys showed that Board staff was generally satisfied with the retirement process and the accuracy of information received. However, we received several comments related to the availability and communication of retirement plan information which we included in a separate management letter report. Although we did not identify any significant weaknesses or systemic errors, we believe that opportunities exist to strengthen the retirement plan administration and oversight. Our report contains four recommendations describing policy decisions that the Board, either internally or through representation on other System oversight committees, needs to make to strengthen oversight and administration of the retirement plan. The four recommendations address
As part of our recommendation regarding the allocation of OEB expenses, we classified $585,630 as questioned costs in expenses paid, or expected to be paid, by the Board in 2003 for benefits programs in which the Board is not participating. We also classified $1.726 million as funds for better use. The figure represents projected savings for 2003 through 2005 that would result from the implementation of our recommendation to change the allocation methodology from a salary liability basis to an allocation based on staffing levels. We provided our report to the Staff Director for Management for comment. The Staff Director concurred with recommendations 1 and 3, partially concurred with recommendation 2, and did not concur with recommendation 4. The director of the Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems also provided a written response addressing part of recommendation 2 and recommendation 4. The director's response generally parallels the Staff Director's response. Audit of the Federal Reserve System's Surveillance Function Overall, our work helped us develop a working understanding of the content, interrelationships, and uses for Board and Reserve Bank surveillance data. In doing so, we learned that Reserve Bank staff view surveillance data received from the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation's (BS&R) Analysis and Surveillance Section as reliable, timely and useful. We developed and shared with key BS&R staff a detailed internal summary that provided our understanding of surveillance data and tools, as well as an overview and diagram of the Board's core surveillance program, a description of the surveillance activities impact banking supervision. In August 2003, we issued a letter to the director of BS&R informing him that our work had not surfaced any surveillance issues where we believe additional audit work would be worthwhile at this time. We explained that this conclusion was influenced substantially by the fact that surveillance is not managed as a separate program and, as such, we believe that some issues we identified, with respect to efficiency and effectiveness, should be evaluated in a larger context. We understand that the System is working to address these issues and we plan to monitor these efforts and then decide what future audit work we might perform. Evaluation of the Board's Emergency Preparedness During this reporting period, we completed a scoping review of the Board's emergency preparedness efforts aimed at (1) gaining an understanding of the Board's management and control structure for emergency preparedness and (2) identifying and determining the status of the Board's efforts to prevent, detect, mitigate, and respond to emergencies. Using this information, we selected and prioritized specific aspects of the Board's emergency preparedness for the next phase of our work-a series of more focused audits, reviews, and inspections. Follow-Up on the Audit of the Federal Reserve's Background Investigation
Process Our follow-up work determined that a new suitability policy, which includes
a proposed policy on background investigations, was drafted in May 2003
and is currently under review by Board officials. The issuance of this
new policy is an essential element to addressing our three recommendations
because it establishes the framework for using background investigations
for judging the suitability of prospective and current employees and contractors.
We are leaving our three recommendations open pending final issuance and
dissemination of the policy document. Congress passed the Government Performance Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) as part of a legislative framework to instill performance-based management in the federal government. Although not statutorily subject to GPRA, the Board decided, in July 1997, to voluntarily comply with the act's substance. Our July 2001 Report on the Board's Efforts to Implement Performance Management Principles Consistent with the Results Act observed that the Board had not achieved its objective of incorporating the performance management concepts of strategic planning and performance measurement into its planning and budgeting process. Specifically, our report recommended that the Board
Our follow-up work determined that the Board is current with the reporting requirements as a result of issuing its Government Performance and Results Act Strategic Planning Document, 2001-05 in December 2001, and the Government Performance and Results Act Biennial Performance Plan 2002-2003 and Government Performance and Results Act Performance Report 2001-01 in December 2002. The issuance of these documents also represents a necessary first step to systematically building performance plans, budgets, and performance measures around the achievement of strategic goals and outcomes. In that regard, the current planning and budgeting process for 2004-2005 is the first opportunity for the Board to fully implement the report's recommendations. Consequently, we are leaving our recommendations open at this time but will review actions taken once the current planning and budgeting process is completed. Investigative Activity Return to Cross-References
to the Inspector General Act On September 8, 2003, Mr. Ebersole was sentenced to seventy-eight months imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $708,000. According to the U. S. Attorney overseeing this prosecution, "Not only did Mr. Ebersole steal from this country at its most vulnerable time, but by supplying such ill-trained bomb dogs and handlers, he deliberately endangered the lives of many government workers, the public in general and his own employees." Shortly after September 11, 2001, and continuing through May 2002, Mr. Ebersole provided bomb detection dogs and handler services to several government agencies, including the Board. Mr. Ebersole offered to have his bomb detection teams patrol the perimeters of the buildings so as to protect the employees working there. In proposals that Mr. Ebersole submitted in order to obtain government contracts, he made a series of false statements about DDADE, its training procedures, and the qualifications of its dogs and handlers. DDADE dogs failed explosive detection tests administered on five different occasions. There were additional prosecutorial actions pursued against Mr. Ebersole. In August 2003, Mr. Ebersole pleaded guilty to charges of causing explosives to be transported by air and witness tampering in the Western District of Virginia. The maximum sentence that Mr. Ebersole faces as a result of these charges is fifteen years in prison and a fine of $500,000. In April 2003, Mr. Ebersole was also tried for perjury by the Commonwealth of Virginia. He allegedly perjured himself before a Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services hearing. Evidence for the perjury charge was obtained during the federal investigation. The jury was deadlocked and the judge declared a mistrial. The Commonwealth of Virginia dropped the charges after Mr. Ebersole was convicted in U. S. District Court. The investigation of Mr. Ebersole had begun as an administrative investigation into alleged procurement irregularities. As the criminal merits of the case progressed, we closed the administrative investigation. The investigation into Mr. Ebersole's activities was conducted by a task force of special agents from our office and the Offices of Inspector General of Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury IG for Tax Administration, Department of Transportation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Of the remaining three closed cases, one case involved a monitoring effort by the OIG of the failure of the Oakwood Deposit and Banking Company, a state member bank. During a bank examination exit conference with staff from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRB Cleveland), the former Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Mark Steven Miller, admitted to an FRB Cleveland examiner that he had embezzled approximately $40,000,000 from Oakwood by using cash received from certificates of deposit and funneling it to Stardancer Casino boats, a ferry boat enterprise. Mr. Miller also admitted to altering bank records to make it appear that the bank had less money than it actually had. It was this discrepancy that initially alerted the FRB Cleveland examination team that Oakwood had problems with the amount of assets it claimed. FRB Cleveland staff then contacted the local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office, whose agents arrested Mr. Miller on February 1, 2002. On February 27, 2002, the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, indicted Mr. Miller on three counts: bank embezzlement; money laundering; and, forfeiture of cash. On December 17, 2002, a superseding indictment against Mr. Miller was issued for two more counts-one for embezzlement and the other for wire fraud. On May 16, 2003, Mr. Miller pled guilty to bank embezzlement and money laundering. On September 6, 2003, Mr. Miller, was sentenced in the U. S. District Court in Toledo, Ohio, to fourteen years in prison, as well as court ordered restitution of $48.7 million for his role in the failure of Oakwood. Our investigators assisted the receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's OIG, the lead investigative agency, the FBI, in conjunction with the U. S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Ohio, and other law enforcement agencies in their request for records, assistance, and analysis. In addition, we closed a fourth case that involved a request for our assistance from the U. S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler, Texas. We participated with special agents of the FBI, Internal Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation Division, and U. S. Customs Service, in a multiagency task force in the investigation by a federal grand jury of various financial crimes, including potential bank fraud, loan fraud, obstruction of bank examination(s) and other issues related to a state member bank of the Federal Reserve System. Our investigative activity curtailed when allegations of criminal and civil wrongdoing by the FRB examination staff, or bank officials in the financing of aircraft loans, were unsubstantiated. The fifth closed investigation involved potentially threatening telephone calls to two Board switchboard operators. With the assistance of the FBI Washington Field Office's Joint Terrorism Task Force, our investigators identified the perpetrator and resolved the potential security threat. The investigative findings in one of our seven active cases involved the alleged violation of the Board's internet access service and other ethics violations by an employee. We referred it to a local prosecutor who declined prosecution in favor of administrative action. This matter is currently under review by the Board pending management action. At the end of this reporting period, we had seven active cases. Our summary statistics on investigations are provided in the table that follows: Summary Statistics on Investigations for the Period April 1 through
September 30, 2003
Hotline Operations In addition to the hotline complaints, the investigative services program received forty-three allegations that were referred to the OIG from Board program staff and other sources. As a result of those allegations, the OIG opened three investigations. In addition, we are continuing our review of fictitious instrument fraud complaints. Fictitious instrument fraud schemes are those in which promoters promise very high profits based on fictitious instruments they claim are issued, endorsed, or authorized by the System or a well-known financial institution. Our summary statistics of the hotline results are provided in the table that follows: Summary Statistics on Hotline Results for the Period of April 1 through September 30, 2003
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency Participation As Vice Chair of the ECIE, the Board's IG provides leadership, vision, direction, and initiatives for the ECIE on behalf of the Council Chair (Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget). Collectively, the members of the ECIE have continued to work with the members of the PCIE to help improve government programs and operations. October 2003 marks the 25th anniversary of the Inspector General Act of 1978. Recognizing the significance of this milestone, the ECIE collaborated with the PCIE to reflect on the IG concept and identify possible legislative and other enhancements to strengthen the community and chart new directions for the future. The 25th anniversary provided an excellent opportunity to inform and educate others-the Congress, the agencies, and the public-about our mission, roles, and objectives in addressing the numerous challenges facing the federal government today and in the near future. Review of Legislation and Regulations Return to Cross-References to the Inspector General Act Ongoing Projects Return to table of contents Audit of the Board's Outsourcing Efforts Review of Internal Control Assessments Performed During Community
Bank Examinations Review of the Board's Fine Arts Program We have two major objectives for this review. First, we will assess the
organizational placement of this program. Second, we will assess the adequacy
of the program's internal controls, including the policies, procedures,
and processes for securing and preserving the Board's art collection,
valuing the collection for insurance and financial reporting purposes,
and receiving and disbursing contributions.
Appendix 2 - Audit
Reports Issued with Recommendations that Funds be Put to Better Use for
the Period April 1 through September 30, 2003 Return
to table of contents Return to Cross-References
to the Inspector General Act
Appendix 3 - OIG Audit
Reports With Outstanding Recommendations Return
to table of contents  Return to Cross-References
to the Inspector General Act
Appendix 4 - Cross-References to the Inspector General Act Return to table of contents Indexed below are the reporting requirements prescribed by the
Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, for the reporting period:
Footnotes 1. A recommendation is closed if (1) the corrective action has been taken; (2) the recommendation is no longer applicable, or (3) the appropriate oversight committee or administrator has determined, after reviewing the position of the OIG and division management, that no further action by the Board is warranted. A recommendation is open if (1) division management agrees with the recommendation and is in the process of taking corrective action or (2) division management disagrees with the recommendation and we have referred it to the appropriate oversight committee or administrator for a final decision Return to text
Inspector General Hotline Report: Fraud, Waste or Mismanagement You may also write the: |
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