Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20551
Docket No. R–1430; RIN No. 7100–AD87
Docket No. R–1442; RIN No. 7100–AD87

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
250 E Street, S.W., Mail Stop 2-3
Washington, DC 20219
Docket ID OCC-2012-0008
Docket ID OCC-2012-0009

Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary
Attention: Comments/Legal ESS
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20429
FDIC RIN 3064–AD95
FDIC RIN 3064–AD96


Dear Sir or Madam:

The Executive Council of State Community Bankers Associations (CCBA) is an organization that represents independent state community bankers associations across the country. The members of CCBA are the chief executives of independent state banking associations that represent thousands of community banks from all across the country. CCBA and its members exclusively represent community bankers and promote the interests and advancement of community banking in cooperation with the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) in the promotion and enactment of beneficial federal banking laws and regulations for the advancement of community banking.

Therefore, in accordance with CCBA’s mission and purpose, we, the undersigned, submit these comments in response to the requests for comments in the notices of proposed rulemaking (NPR) on minimum regulatory capital and the standardized approach for risk-weighted assets titled: Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt Corrective Action; and Regulatory Capital Rules:
Community banks should be exempt

The Basel III proposals were intended for large, sophisticated financial institutions competing with others of a similar scale across the globe. We are troubled that our own U.S. regulatory authorities would include community banking in this complex new capital scheme. These new capital proposals are an unnecessary and costly regulatory burden that will result in damaging unintended consequences, including, but not limited to further consolidation of the industry.

Community bankers recognize the importance of appropriate levels of capital as a key component of a safe and sound bank and banking system. Community banks have a vested interest in a healthy banking system. Required maintenance of adequate levels of capital is good for all banks and the country as a whole and community banks are already leaders in maintaining high quality capital. Our concern is the burdensome process and consequences of instituting complex new rules on community banks. Community bankers don’t believe it is necessary or appropriate to redefine capital adequacy for all banks, regardless of size or risk profile, to accomplish the goal of adequate capital.

For the very reason that the agencies have proposed these rules—the safety and soundness of the industry—community banks should be exempt from these proposals and allowed to continue to measure capital according to present methodology.

Problems with the proposals

Compliance with the spate of current and upcoming regulations is and will be taxing community banks for years to come. The ever-increasing level of regulatory burden has community bank resources stretched to the limits. These burdens cause us to wonder how big a bank must be to absorb the increasing cost of compliance to survive. These additional new and costly burdens should be a call to the regulatory community that they should be assisting the community banking community in dealing with the regulatory burden rather than piling on additional burdens.

Lawmakers, regulators, and the public all agree that community banks didn’t participate in nor profit from the bad behavior that contributed to the financial meltdown. However, the “cure” is making life difficult, if not impossible, for community banks to survive. If these proposals are applied to community banks, many will decide that the barrage of federal law and regulatory overkill has rendered their time-tested business unsustainable.

The ongoing and complex collection and reporting of information on various asset categories required by the proposed rules will further tax the limited resources of community banks.
(These proposals are so complex that the regulators provided further information through live meetings, conference calls, an extension of the comment period, and an estimation tool.) The added cost and time needed to comply with these provisions—without benefit to the bank or the public—are reasons enough to exempt community banks from this proposal.

The agencies’ attempts to modify the capital landscape by applying a one-size-fits-all approach for all banks undermines the fact that community banks operate under a very different business model from the larger banks. When reviewing the size, complexity, and scope of community banks, it should be very clear to the regulators that community banks do not have the appropriate resources to be viewed as a large mega bank creating a new series of regulatory burdens in addition to what already exists today.

**Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI).** The historically low interest rate environment has created issues for a number of our banks. Banks will eventually face potentially significant unrealized losses in their securities portfolios. This could easily create scenarios in which a formerly well-capitalized bank could face severe sanctions due solely to market rate movements. Further, the “mark to market” requirement will require banks to hold more capital to compensate for inevitable swings in interest rates, thus hindering growth and lending opportunities. Community banks can’t effectively hedge interest rate risk in their portfolios.

Community banks invest in issuances of their local governmental entities. The cost of borrowing for these public entities will likely increase as banks will be reluctant to hold longer maturity securities for fear of rate-driven capital degradation. This could result in significant negative impact on infrastructure development at the state and local level as well as harm to projects that create jobs locally.

Community banks are long-term investors, and do not actively trade their securities portfolio; therefore, inclusion of unrealized gains or losses in the securities portfolio is only meaningful in a liquidation scenario. The proposed changes, incorporating market rate swings into Common Equity Tier 1 capital, will result in banks moving to shorter maturities, giving up precious and dwindling earnings opportunities, experiencing limited flexibility in managing their portfolio, sacrificing liquidity by moving securities to the “Held to Maturity” bucket, limiting loan growth, and forgoing expansion.

We must remember that the inclusion of AOCI on the balance sheet is driven by accounting rules that provide for fair value measurement. However, community banks manage fair value risk (namely, interest rate risk) on an economic basis through robust asset-liability management with heavy regulatory oversight. In addition to the increased volatility, adding one piece of the asset-liability equation to regulatory capital without fully considering the entire mix of assets and liabilities provides a false sense of capital adequacy. In addition, community banks will need to allocate additional capital to the investment portfolio to ensure that the risks associated with increased volatility are properly covered through additional cushions.
To mitigate the volatility caused by changes in AOCI, some community banks will be forced to hold their investment securities with an amortized cost designation for accounting purposes. Due to the complexity of the accounting rules surrounding these investments, they can never be sold except in the rarest of circumstances without jeopardizing their ability to hold these investments at amortized cost in the future. This action will further decrease available liquidity for the institution while adversely impacting demand for investment securities for all market participants.

**Risk Weighting will be challenging, expensive, and a disincentive to mortgage lending:**
Assigning proper risk-weightings to various assets will be an expensive and time-consuming undertaking, which will require additional staff and expensive software. This will serve as a disincentive to mortgage and real estate lending at community banks, especially loans kept “in-portfolio” as is common in the community banking model. Particularly harmful to community banks is the punitive impact of changes to balloon mortgage loans and all second liens including home equity lines. These loans provide solid financing alternatives to home loan borrowers in underserved and rural communities and play a large role in shaping the local economies of the communities in which the loans are originated. Additionally, community bank lending, which focuses on tailoring loan products to the specific needs of the customer, is a powerful force in small business formation and growth that fuels job creation. As relationship-based lenders, community banks possess the local expertise needed to complete quality underwriting for these loan products and provide forms of financing that larger banks will not offer. Further, the introduction of “High Volatility Commercial Real Estate” (HVCRE), with a 150% risk weighting and limited exemptions, will in our assessment also limit a bank’s willingness to make these loans and raise borrowing costs in this already challenged market. Further depressing residential and commercial real estate lending will result in additional harm to an already shaky rural real estate lending market.

Where does the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses fit into the mix? Specific allocations of capital are made for higher risk, classified, past due and non-accrual loans. However, the proposal does not allow for adequate inclusion of the allowance in the determination of regulatory capital. We must remember that the allowance represents the first line of defense against harmful credit loss and it properly represents an allocation of capital to meet that objective. Yet the proposal continues to cap the allowance while ignoring its importance by not elevating at least some component as higher tier capital. It appears that with the additional capital requirements, perhaps there will be adjustments in the way this important risk management tool is utilized by banks and evaluated by the regulators.

From a macro perspective, this particular point in the economic cycle would appear to be perhaps the worst time possible for regulatory policies that result in disincentives for banks to fund properly underwritten real estate loans. While apparently well-intentioned from all appearances, many of these changes will limit choices and raise costs for the consumer. Further, the resultant increased market share and concentration of residential real estate mortgage loans in the largest institutions is simply not healthy for our economy.
Trust Preferred Securities (TruPS) is specifically allowed by Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank allows entities with under $15 Billion in assets to count TruPS as Tier 1 capital (the “Collins Amendment”). This sensible amendment was a major legislative victory for community banks, and they use this regulator-approved hybrid capital vehicle. The proposal appears to directly contradict the will of Congress.

While economic conditions have impacted earnings and ROE potential, much of the challenges community banks face in raising additional capital are a direct result of regulatory and legislative actions. Diminished expectations for earnings results in more difficulty attracting additional capital for our banks, dilutes existing shareholders and makes any capital acquisition significantly more costly. The proposal should follow federal law and allow those entities with under $15 Billion in assets to allow their TruPS to continue to qualify for tier 1 capital and follow their original scheduled maturities.

Mortgage servicing asset deductions from capital could impact mortgage availability. Mortgage servicing assets (in excess of 10% of Common Equity Tier 1) will face new deductions from capital. Further, capital would be required against assets with credit enhancing representations and warranties, including mortgages sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and third party aggregators. As previously discussed, this is one more potential hurdle and expense that could impact the cost and availability of mortgages. Additionally, this severe penalty is an attack on the high-quality nature of community bank servicing that ignores the fact that community bank servicers work diligently with borrowers to resolve payment problems to achieve a more favorable outcome for the customer.

Capital treatment of deferred tax assets, goodwill, and pension accounts. There are new complex restrictions and limitations on capital treatment of deferred tax assets, goodwill and pension accounts. Further, a proposed financial accounting standard requirement to capitalize certain operating leases would increase risk weighted assets, and thus the level of required capital. There have been concerns raised that these proposals “change the rules”, and could prove problematic.

Conclusion

The community banking industry is overwhelmed by government regulation, and this proposal unnecessarily piles on additional regulatory burdens. Ultimately, these burdens will lead to higher borrowing costs and diminished availability of both credit and bank services to consumers, small businesses, and local governments. Though this proposal is counterintuitive regardless of the state of the national economy, the current tenuous state of the national economy makes it especially counterintuitive.
The logical thing to do is to exempt all but those complex international banking institutions considered “systemically important” from these burdensome, elaborate, and counterproductive capital rules. Community banks should be allowed to continue using the current Basel I risk weightings as they have and will continue to serve banks, customers, and regulators very well.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these proposals.

Sincerely,

[Signatures]
Independent Bankers Association of New York State

Community Bankers Association of Ohio

Community Bankers Association of Oklahoma

Pennsylvania Association of Community Bankers

Independent Banks of South Carolina

Independent Community Bankers of South Dakota

Independent Bankers Association of Texas

Virginia Association of Community Banks

American National Bank Ardmore, Oklahoma