



October 30, 2013

**By Electronic Submission**

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Regulations Division  
Office of General Counsel  
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451 7<sup>th</sup> Street, S.W., Room 10276  
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Re: **Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Credit Risk Retention**  
SEC (File No. S7-14-11); FDIC (RIN 3064-AD74); OCC (Docket No. OCC-  
2013-0010); FRB (Docket No. R-1411); FHFA (RIN 2590-AA43); HUD (RIN  
2501-AD53)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Babson Capital Management LLC (“Babson Capital”) is pleased to submit these comments in response to the joint Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 57928 (Sept. 20, 2013; originally released Aug. 28, 2013) (“FNPRM”), concerning risk retention and the implementation of Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).

## **I. Overview**

Babson Capital submits these comments to address how the agencies' proposed regulations would adversely affect CLOs and the commercial loan market, how features of CLOs already provide extensive and adequate incentives that align CLO managers' interests with those of CLO investors, and how, if regulation is deemed necessary, other alternatives would protect investors without causing extensive harm to CLOs, credit markets, and competition.

In particular, we are very concerned that the regulations proposed by the agencies would significantly and adversely affect the formation and continued operation of CLOs, along with the support they provide to the commercial loan market. Open Market CLOs present none of the risks presented by the originate-to-distribute model that Section 941 was designed to address, and a range of incentives ensure that their managers act consistently with investors' interests. CLO performance during the recent financial crisis confirms the robustness of these incentives, as does the subsequent resurgence of the CLO market that demonstrates investors' confidence that their interests are fully protected. For these reasons, additional regulation requiring CLO managers to retain more credit risk would produce no benefits and would substantially harm competition and the public. This result would be especially unfortunate because various alternatives are available to the agencies that would far better advance the public interest.

## **II. Our Experience with CLOs and Commercial Loan Markets<sup>1</sup>**

Babson Capital is a global institutional asset manager with \$183 billion in assets under management as of June 30, 2013, managing portfolios for a broad range of global institutional investors. With over \$42 billion in assets across the global high yield markets (loans, bonds and CLOs), Babson Capital is one of the largest managers of high yield instruments globally. In particular, the U.S. commercial loan market has long been a core part of our business. Our U.S. loan team originated in Charlotte, North Carolina in 2002 and has since developed into one of the nation's largest bank loan managers, with a team of 44 investment professionals. The loan team currently manages over 20 CLOs and also handles loan portfolios for both institutional and retail investors.

In addition to our CLO management business, Babson Capital has a structured credit team based in Springfield, Massachusetts that specializes in managing portfolios consisting of debt and equity tranches of CLOs issued by a diverse set of collateral managers. This unique team of 13 investment professionals has been participating in the CLO market for more than 15 years and currently manages over \$12 billion in assets with \$10.7 billion directly invested in CLO securities. Over this period we have been significantly involved as an investor in CLOs. We have helped to drive improvements in CLO structures based on our real experiences with CLO managers and investment banks. We believe that active involvement and healthy competition among asset management firms, who are registered investment advisors, has also significantly contributed to the improvement of CLO structures. These structures were severely tested during the financial crisis and performed well. Importantly, we believe the most

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<sup>1</sup> Data includes Babson Capital Management LLC and its subsidiaries as of June 30, 2013

significant driver of performance has been asset manager capability. As investors, we now have a significant performance history that enables us to judge manager performance. The proposed rules may reduce the number of available CLO managers, thereby dampening the competition that has helped to drive structural improvements.

Many of our structured credit team clients are institutional investors, domestic and foreign, who would not otherwise invest in leveraged loans without the credit enhancement provided by CLO structures and the professional credit management provided by asset managers. The CLO market has allowed many global investors the opportunity to benefit from the credit expertise of U.S. based asset managers and CLO structures. This in turn has reduced the cost of capital to U.S. based businesses.

Whereas many other structured vehicles lost all value during the financial crisis, CLOs have performed very well. The historical cumulative impairment rate of CLOs has been de minimus – less than 1.5%.<sup>2</sup> Unlike the originate-to-distribute securitization model that spawned the financial crisis, CLOs are carefully and actively managed. As a CLO manager, we have an inherent alignment of interest with our investors due to the nature of the compensation structure. Our investors have appreciated and benefited from this alignment of interest. From the perspective of our structured credit team, as a major CLO investor, we have always sought to invest in CLOs with managers that carefully consider both debt and equity tranche investors interests. We believe the CLO fee structure has served us well.

Our market role and experience, both as a manager of CLOs and as an investor in this market, provides us with a clear understanding of the current CLO market, CLOs' performance during and since the recent financial crisis, and the likely adverse effects of the proposed regulations.

### **III. The Proposed Rules Would Adversely Affect Us, Other Open Market CLO Managers, Commercial Lending, Borrowers, and Investors**

Our experience in the CLO market leaves us with no doubt that the proposed rules would significantly and adversely affect the formation and scope of future CLOs.

The requirement that Open Market CLO managers retain five percent of the face value of the CLO's assets – in addition to the very significant credit risks already assumed through the CLO managers' compensation structure – would very adversely affect CLO formation. Many CLO managers are too small to secure or devote funds of that magnitude for positions that cannot be disposed or hedged – no matter what the competing business opportunities or demands. For other CLO managers that might have the financial capacity to hold such a significant position, including us, doing so would require a restructuring of current business models and anticipated returns – making a once viable business much less profitable, requiring that managers instead devote those funds to other, more productive uses.

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<sup>2</sup> Source: Moody's Investors Service; data from January 1996 to May 2012

While Babson Capital's product offerings have diversified over time to serve investors seeking access to the loan market through both separate accounts and commingled funds, CLOs still comprise over one third of our global high yield business. Babson Capital's involvement in the CLO market has been a stabilizing force, which played a role in enabling our firm to successfully weather the financial crisis. Since the financial crisis Babson Capital has launched four CLOs and, absent the proposed risk retention regulation, would expect to continue to launch at least two or three CLOs per year. However, the significant capital requirements mandated by the proposed risk retention rules would greatly reduce the number of CLOs Babson Capital would be able to launch. Babson Capital, like many CLO managers, does not have a substantial amount of cash on its balance sheet. Any capital needed to meet the risk retention requirements would have to be redeployed from other business areas thereby forcing Babson Capital to support its CLO management business at the cost of another business unit.

Our market assessment is that the proposed rules would cause a dramatic decrease in the size and functioning of the CLO market as a whole. A recent survey of CLO managers indicated that the decrease in CLO offerings is anticipated to be in the order of 75 percent.<sup>3</sup> We are also aware of the broad range of comments and record evidence that establish that the proposed rules would adversely affect the formation and continued operation of the CLO market.<sup>4</sup> We agree with the factors identified in those comments and assess that those factors will contribute to the magnitude of the decrease in CLO formation identified in the LSTA survey. Indeed, the agencies themselves anticipate these adverse effects on CLOs and competition.<sup>5</sup>

Our experience also indicates that this resulting decrease in the formation and scope of CLOs would have profoundly negative implications for the loan market. CLOs currently provide more than 50% of funding in the institutional loan primary market.<sup>6</sup> As such, CLOs are vital to supporting the loan market and to providing liquidity necessary to the efficient functioning of many of the most important sectors of the commercial loan market. If the proposed rules were implemented and adversely affected CLOs in the manner we anticipate, then borrower costs would increase, many borrowers would be shut out of the loan market altogether, the secondary market would become considerably less liquid, and many investors would be denied a valuable and attractive set of investment opportunities. Competition in the provision of loans and investment product would decrease. Those adverse results pose broad risks to the efficient functioning of the loan markets, and the adverse effects on borrowers would have further adverse effects on production efficiency, innovation, employment, and consumer prices.

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<sup>3</sup> See LSTA Letter Comment, July 29, 2013 at 3–6.

<sup>4</sup> See LSTA Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 14–17; LSTA Letter Comment, Apr. 1, 2013 at 14–16; LSTA Letter Comment, July 29, 2013 at 3–9; SIFMA Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 70; American Securitization Forum Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 137; JP Morgan Chase & Co. Letter Comment, July 14, 2011 at 50; Financial Services Roundtable Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 32; Bank of America, Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 29–30; Wells Fargo Letter Comment, July 28, 2011 at 29; White & Case Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 2.

<sup>5</sup> See 78 Fed. Reg. 57962.

<sup>6</sup> Source: S&P LCD Leveraged Lending Review – 3Q13; data provided for January 1, 2013 to September 30, 2013

Babson Capital has been proud to offer a diverse set of investors access to the U.S. loan market. Our clients include life insurance companies, public pension plans, community banks, local colleges, healthcare systems, and religious organizations. These institutions find that the loan market offers a great opportunity to diversify their portfolios due to the floating rate nature of loans, their low correlation to many other asset classes, and their senior secured status in the capital stack. The proposed regulations would significantly damage the U.S. loan market and deny these institutions a valuable investment opportunity.

#### **IV. Additional Regulation of Open Market CLOs Is Inappropriate and Unnecessary**

##### **A. Commercial and Regulatory Factors Already Align the Interests of Open Market CLO Managers and CLO Investors**

The proposed credit risk retention rules fail to account for the very significant factors that already ensure that Open Market CLO managers select and manage CLO assets prudently and in investors' interests. Open Market CLO managers do not employ the "originate-to-distribute" model of securitization that contributed to the financial crisis and prompted Congress to enact Section 941. The nature of Open Market CLOs, and their role in the loan market and in the provision of securities to investors, ensures that they operate independently and that managers' interests are aligned with CLO investors' interests. This alignment of interests, and related lack of any need for risk retention regulation to further align those interests, arises from the following characteristics of Open Market CLOs.

First, Open Market CLO managers act independently of loan originators and exercise independent judgment in selecting among loans originated by unaffiliated entities. They are free from potential conflicts and disincentives related to the originate-to-distribute model and attract investors based in large measure on this independence and the resulting quality of asset selection. This provides a strong incentive for continued selection of higher-quality assets.

Second, CLO managers bear significant risk through their deferred, contingent compensation structure that has been shaped and ratified by the market. CLO managers receive their primary sources of compensation only if they deliver for their investors: they are compensated principally as the most subordinated CLO investors secure their returns, and a large component of their compensation is received only after the CLO has performed well over most of its life for all classes of investors, including those whose securities are most at risk. CLO managers' compensation structure places a premium on careful selection and management of assets, aligning their interests with investors' interests. Indeed, investors and the competitive process have shaped and ratified the compensation structure. In this very fundamental sense, CLO managers already have skin in the game – and creating that interest, which already exists for CLOs, is the entire point of the proposed regulations. The agencies have recognized and acknowledged this alignment of investor and manager interests created by the compensation structure.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See 78 Fed. Reg. 57963.

Third, almost all Open Market CLO managers are registered investment advisors, with associated fiduciary duties – and potential liabilities – to their investors. This status triggers a separate and quite effective regulatory and supervisory regime that also provides incentives for careful selection and management of assets.

Fourth, the assets selected by Open Market CLO managers have been evaluated through multiple layers of underwriting and market decisions. These include the loan arrangers' decisions in underwriting the loans, the market's evaluation in pricing and syndicating the loans, and the CLO manager's decisions in selecting the loans for the CLO to purchase. Often, the assessments reflected in secondary market pricing also contribute to the selection of high-quality assets.

Fifth, CLO managers actively manage their loan portfolios for much of the life of a CLO. This active role is unlike that for many other ABSs, and further protects investors. CLO managers can limit losses and secure additional gains based on the additional performance information provided for the particular loans and by the secondary market. In this management role, the CLO manager exercises independent judgment and has every incentive to act only in the best interest of CLO investors.

Finally, CLO managers select – and CLO investors demand – commercial loans with features that protect investors. Prominently, CLO managers select senior secured loans. This often ensures complete or very substantial recovery and loss protection even in the event of default, and is an important reason why CLOs protected investors so well during the recent financial crisis.

## **B. CLO Performance Confirms the Adequacy of Existing Incentives and Investor Protections**

The historically strong performance of CLOs demonstrates the concrete and practical results of these unique features of CLOs. Despite the massive financial crisis that resulted in widespread losses among other asset classes, CLOs performed exceptionally well. Although CLOs experienced ratings downgrades, the vast majority of CLO notes that were originally rated AAA retained ratings of AA or higher during the crisis.<sup>8</sup> And most significantly, CLOs experienced *de minimis* events of default and even lower rates of financial loss.<sup>9</sup> The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve has acknowledged the low default rate among CLOs during the financial crisis, which it attributed in part to the incentive alignment mechanisms inherent to CLOs.<sup>10</sup>

We are aware of numerous comments submitted in this rulemaking that confirm the

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<sup>8</sup> See LSTA Letter Comment, August 1, 2011 at 7.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

<sup>10</sup> See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Report to Congress on Risk Retention 62, Oct. 2010.

strong performance of CLOs during the financial crisis.<sup>11</sup> Our experience as direct participants in the industry accords with these views. We believe that this record of performance demonstrates that the existing safeguards and incentive alignments in the CLO industry more than adequately meet the goals of Section 941.

**C. In Light of These Incentives and Performance History, Additional Regulation Would Provide No Public Interest Benefits**

Because existing commercial and regulatory incentives fully align the interests of CLO managers and CLO investors, additional risk retention requirements would not redress any market failure or further align those interests. Because Open Market CLO managers select assets independently of loan originators, and do not operate as part of an “originate-to-distribute” model, the operations of Open Market CLOs present none of the risks to investors that Section 941 was designed to address. As set out above, the recent performance of CLOs confirms that no additional risk retention requirements are needed.

We agree with other commenters that have analyzed the language and purpose of Section 941 and have shown that Congress did not intend to impose risk retention requirements on Open Market CLO managers.<sup>12</sup> Presumably, Congress did not intend to do so precisely because Open Market CLOs present none of the problems Section 941 was designed to fix. Because Open Market CLO managers facilitate the CLOs’ purchase of assets, they do not directly or indirectly sell or transfer assets to the CLO – and are thus not within the scope of the statutory definition of “sponsor” as the agencies incorrectly assert.<sup>13</sup>

We also agree with commenters that, in light of the high costs and absence of benefits arising from imposing credit risk retention requirements on Open Market CLO managers, the agencies should exercise their statutory powers to exempt those managers from the credit risk

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<sup>11</sup> See LSTA Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 7; LSTA Letter Comment, April 1, 2013 at 19; LSTA Letter Comment, July 29, 2013 at 2 and Appendix A; American Bar Association Business Law Section Letter Comment, July 20, 2011 at 90-93; American Securitization Forum Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 134-135; SIFMA Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 69; Morgan Stanley Letter Comment, July 27, 2011 at 18; Bank of America Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 23; Wells Fargo Letter Comment, July 28, 2011 at 29; The Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness of the United States Chamber of Commerce Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 4; Cong. Himes and other Members of Congress Letter Comment, July 29, 2011 at 2.

<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., LSTA Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 7-14; LSTA Letter Comment, Apr. 1, 2013 at 17-19; LSTA Letter Comment, July 29, 2013 at 9-10; American Bar Association Business Law Section Letter Comment, July 20, 2011 at 93-95; SIFMA Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 68-69; American Securitization Forum, June 10, 2011 at 135-136; JP Morgan Chase & Co. Letter Comment, July 14, 2011 at 53-60; The Financial Services Roundtable Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 31-32; Morgan Stanley Letter Comment, July 27, 2011 at 21; Bank of America Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 23-30; Wells Fargo Letter Comment, July 28, 2011 at 26-29; White & Case Letter Comment, June 20, 2011 at 1-7; Cong. Himes and other Members of Congress Letter Comment, July 29, 2011 at 1-2.

<sup>13</sup> Compare 78 Fed. Reg. 57962.

retention requirements – assuming that those requirements even apply.<sup>14</sup> If the agencies believe that certain types of CLOs pose a risk to investors, or that further restrictions on which CLO managers can qualify for an exemption are appropriate, a commercially sensible set of “ring-fencing” qualifications has been proposed in the comments.<sup>15</sup>

## **V. Other Regulatory Alternatives Would Be Preferable to the Agencies’ Proposed Approach**

Although we believe that the intended scope of Section 941 and the facts surrounding the operation of CLOs indicate that it would be a significant mistake to impose credit risk retention requirements on Open Market CLOs, alternative regulatory approaches would meet the agencies’ objectives while causing far less harm to CLOs and commercial loan markets.

For example, the LSTA has proposed that CLO managers could retain credit risk, consistent with the statutory requirements, by holding a set of securities that embody the compensation structure currently endorsed by the market and purchasing an interest in the CLO’s equity.<sup>16</sup> Both the securities and the equity interest would confirm the alignment of interests between the CLO manager and the CLO investors. The cash outlay for the proposed equity interest would be manageable for most CLO managers. We endorse that approach as far preferable to the agencies’ proposed regulations. We also believe that the standard CLO compensation structure aligns our interests with those of our investors, and that the proposed purchase of an equity interest is workable and should remove any doubt that appropriate incentives apply to CLO managers’ asset selection decisions.

Similarly, we endorse proposals that would reduce any risk retention requirement on a *pro rata* basis to the extent that a CLO’s assets are comprised of higher-quality loans. A material portion of the loans that we and other CLO managers select are higher-quality loans under any commercially reasonable definition, present very limited risks to investors, and should be taken into account in setting the amount of any credit risk that the CLO manager must retain.

In addition, we are aware that various commenters are proposing that parties associated with the CLO manager be able to retain credit risk in a manner that would satisfy Section 941’s requirements. We endorse those proposals. Often, key investors or market participants work with a CLO manager in initiating the CLO and may play an advisory or other role in the selection of CLO assets. Having such parties, rather than the CLO manager, retain credit risk

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<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., LSTA Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 17–19; LSTA Letter Comment, Mar. 9, 2012; LSTA Letter Comment, Apr. 1, 2013 at 23; American Bar Association Business Law Section Letter Comment, July 20, 2011 at 93–95; SIFMA Letter Comment, June 10, 2011 at 71–72; American Securitization Forum, June 10, 2011 at 138–139; The Financial Services Roundtable Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 33; Bank of America Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 30; Wells Fargo Letter Comment, July 28, 2011 at 29; Loan Market Association Letter Comment, Aug. 1, 2011 at 2.

<sup>15</sup> See LSTA Letter Comment, Mar. 9, 2012 at Appendix A.

<sup>16</sup> See LSTA Letter Comment, Apr. 1, 2013.

makes considerable sense in terms of the agencies' objectives and the effect on the CLO market (the agencies' recently proposed alternative related to loan arrangers' holding risk similarly relies on a third party's retention of credit risk). Because parties coordinating with the CLO manager may contribute to the selection of assets, having them retain credit risk advances the agencies' goal of improving incentives related to asset selection. Such parties often have investment, rather than investment management, as their core business, making it more appropriate that they retain the requisite interest. In addition, they may do so without causing the disincentives and adverse impacts that arise when the CLO manager is required to retain a comparable economic interest.

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Babson Capital appreciates the agencies' consideration of these comments and would be pleased to provide additional information or assessments that might assist the agencies' decision-making. Please feel free to contact the undersigned at [sfrancis@babsoncapital.com](mailto:sfrancis@babsoncapital.com) or (704) 805-7311 in the event you have questions regarding these observations and conclusions.

Sincerely,  
  
Sheldon Francis  
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Babson Capital Management LLC