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October 21, 2013

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**Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  
Legislative and Regulatory Affairs Division  
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  
400 7<sup>th</sup> Street, S.W.  
Suite 3E-218  
Mail Stop 9W-11  
Washington, DC 20219**

**Federal Reserve Board of Governors  
Mr. Robert de V. Frierson  
Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  
20<sup>th</sup> Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20551**

**Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
Mr. Robert E. Feldman  
Executive Secretary  
Attention: Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
550 17<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W  
Washington, DC 20429**

**Re: Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions (the "Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards").**

MetLife recognizes the substantial effort and consideration that the collective agencies have dedicated to ensuring a more resilient banking system by increasing leverage standards for the largest and most interconnected U.S. banking organizations. Further, MetLife appreciates the

opportunity to comment on the Proposed Revisions to Strengthen the Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards issued collectively by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (collectively, the agencies), which constitutes an important component of the overall regulatory framework for the Banking sector.

MetLife, Inc. is the holding company of the MetLife family of insurance companies. The MetLife organization is a leading provider of insurance, annuities and employee benefit programs, serving 90 million customers globally. MetLife holds leading market positions in the United States (where it is the largest life insurer based on insurance in force), Japan, Latin America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. MetLife, Inc. is a public company with securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange and registered under the United States Securities Act of 1934.

The MetLife insurance companies are licensed and regulated in jurisdictions where they are domiciled and conduct business. Such regulations govern the business conduct and financial aspects of the insurance business, including standards of solvency, statutory reserves, reinsurance and capital adequacy.

### **Increase Capital or Reduce Exposure**

As a participant in the fixed income markets and an end user of financial derivatives, MetLife, along with similarly situated investors, relies upon the nation's largest banks to provide liquidity in these important markets. The proposed Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards would apply to all "globally important banking organizations" ("G-SIBs") in the United States. Currently, US G-SIB assets, combined with US domiciled Advanced Approach Bank Holding Company assets comprise approximately 65% of the overall US banking and securities industry assets<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, these entities contribute substantially to the market making activities in the US Treasury and Derivatives markets. The proposed Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards impose a threshold of 5% to 6% supplementary leverage ratio ("SLR") on all G-SIBs in order for these institutions to be deemed "well capitalized." While capital requirements are typically risk weighted and can be used to influence a bank's holdings in certain asset classes, leverage ratios are not risk sensitive and cannot, as a policy tool, be used with any degree of precision to encourage or discourage the composition of a bank's asset holdings. Financial industry studies have calculated that the effect of the 5%-6% SLR would compel G-SIBs to collectively increase capital by approximately \$69 Billion or reduce exposure by \$1.2 Trillion<sup>2</sup>. Similar industry studies have also indicated that that the reduction in exposure by these banks would be concentrated around low margin and capital intense businesses such as Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions, US Treasury securities market making activities, and Derivatives

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<sup>1</sup> *Assessing the Supplementary Leverage Ratio*. Tech. N.p., 20 Sept. 2013. Web. <[www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f=075287](http://www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f=075287)>.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*

transactions<sup>3</sup>. MetLife agrees with this market analysis and is concerned that the proposed Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards will have a negative impact on the costs and liquidity in the US Treasury and Derivatives markets.

### **Repurchase Transactions and Market Making Activities**

MetLife believes that any potential scaling back of Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase activities will have a profound, negative impact on the financial markets that depend on these transactions for short and intermediate term financing. Specifically, we believe that the imposition of the proposed SLR will drastically reduce the depth and liquidity of these markets; increase the costs of short and intermediate term financing by increasing the bid-ask spreads for these transactions; and ultimately, reduce the liquidity in the fixed income markets for the securities underlying these financing transactions, specifically the market for US Treasury Securities.

Moreover, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions strengthen the US Treasury Securities market by significantly deepening the liquidity of Treasury securities by allowing brokers to efficiently fulfill their roles as primary dealers while maintaining appropriate levels of inventory. We believe that the SLR would likely discourage dealers from cooperating with each other in reallocating inventory of US Treasury Securities, thereby hindering their ability to ensure that the best sources of assets are routed to the best uses of those assets. Dealers reduced willingness to facilitate transactions may result in decreased liquidity and widening of bid/ask spreads on highly liquid assets (such as US Treasuries) and, may further trigger second-order effects of volatility in bond yields across the broader fixed income markets.

### **Spill Over Impact Treasury Market**

The US Treasury has \$11 Trillion of debt outstanding. The daily trading volume of US Treasuries is over \$500 Billion, making it one of the deepest and most liquid sectors in the marketplace. Furthermore, U.S. Treasury Securities have proven to be the safest and soundest asset class during a crisis period. Since these assets have proven to ensure market stability in times of crisis, regulations that would effectively contract the market for US Treasury Securities should be discouraged.

The proposed SLR would act as a disincentive for financial Intermediaries to hold high quality liquid assets (HQLA), such as US Treasuries, and potentially dissuade Primary Dealers from participating in US Treasury market auctions. This could result in a shift in the depth and breadth of the US Treasury and potentially have broader consequences for the global financial markets. Individually, MetLife would be negatively impacted by any increased costs or loss of liquidity in these markets, as we rely on US Treasury Securities to manage the liquidity and duration of our investment portfolio, for investment purposes, for asset liability management needs and to fulfill collateral requirements.

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<sup>3</sup> Roever, Alex, Teresa Ho, and Chong Sin. *Short Term Fixed Income Markets Research Note Q&A About Leverage Ratios*. Rep. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. <[www.morganmarkets.com](http://www.morganmarkets.com)>.

### **Derivatives Transactions.**

MetLife additionally believes that the SLR will negatively impact the liquidity and costs associated with executing transactions in the Derivatives markets, in particular, cleared and OTC Interest Rate Swaps and Credit Derivatives on Corporate Bonds.

MetLife regularly uses derivative instruments (including Credit Derivatives) to responsibly and effectively hedge the risks associate with our investment portfolio and insurance and annuity product liabilities. MetLife's continued ability to manage and hedge financial risk through the use of derivatives is an essential component of our risk management program. To the extent that MetLife's costs of hedging the market risk inherent in its insurance and retirement liabilities increases, a portion of such costs are likely to be passed on to our customers in the form of higher premiums. To the extent that MetLife is unable to appropriately hedge the financial risk in certain products or if the costs of hedging certain products becomes prohibitive, MetLife may, in some instances, be forced to discontinue offering certain insurance or retirement products altogether.

### **Compounding Effect When Combined with BCBS Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework.**

In addition to viewing the proposed SLR in isolation, MetLife has also considered this proposal in the context of the Consultative Document issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) outlining the Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework. We believe that the Enhanced Supplemental Leverage Ratio Standards would further exacerbate several negative unintended market consequences of the Basel III Revised Leverage Ratio Framework, in the event that the collective agencies subsequently adopt both the SLR and the BCBS Revised Leverage Ratio Framework. To the extent that both of these proposals were to be adopted, the cumulative impact would require G-SIBs to increase capital by \$202 Billion or reduce exposure by \$3.7 Trillion.<sup>4</sup>

The table below summarizes what we believe are the cumulative market impacts from the BCBS' proposed changes. Assuming the proposed Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio is later adopted by the collective agencies, we believe the negative market impacts will be further magnified due to the Enhanced Supplemental Leverage Ratio Standards. For your reference we have attached the comment letter which was provided to the BCBS by the American Council of Life Insurers which explains our concerns regarding this proposed leverage ratio framework in greater detail.

Market Sector	Exposure Measure Driver	Expected Market Impact
SFTs	No recognition of netting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Reduced depth and liquidity</li><li>▪ Wider bid-ask spreads</li><li>▪ Spill over impact to all fixed income markets where market</li></ul>

<sup>4</sup> *Assessing the Supplementary Leverage Ratio*. Tech. N.p., 20 Sept. 2013. Web. <[www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f=075287](http://www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f=075287)>.

		liquidity depends on an efficient and liquid financing market (e.g. Government security and derivatives markets)
Derivatives	Inclusion of cash collateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduced depth and liquidity</li> <li>▪ Wider bid-ask spreads</li> <li>▪ At odds with global derivatives reform requirements</li> </ul>
Credit Derivatives	Limited netting of written credit derivatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduced depth and liquidity</li> <li>▪ Wider bid-ask spreads</li> </ul>


**Proposed Modifications.**


We understand that the SLR is intended to restrict an inappropriate level of leverage in the banking sector, which can work to destabilize the broader financial markets. However, as described above, we believe that this proposal will significantly impair market functionality, liquidity and transaction costs in markets on which MetLife, and similarly situated investors, rely. Accordingly, we respectfully suggest that the regulators consider suspending the implementation of any Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for G-SIBs until such time that the BCBS has completed its work on the Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework. As indicated above, MetLife believes that the proposed SLR and the BCBS Leverage Ratio Framework each impair the financial markets for US Treasury Securities, short to intermediate term financing and Derivatives. Implementation of the proposed SLR either independently of, or in concert with, the BCBS Leverage Ratio Framework would result in significant disruptions to the US financial markets.

**Conclusion**

MetLife would like to reiterate our appreciation for the efforts that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have taken regarding the Proposed Revisions to Strengthen the Supplementary Leverage Ratio. We are pleased to be able to continue to participate through the comment process and respectfully submit that certain aspects discussed above have the potential to unintentionally reduce market liquidity, increase costs in the fixed income and derivative markets and unnecessarily increase costs to all fixed income market participants.

Respectfully,

  
Jason P. Manske

  
Kevin Budd



**Carl B. Wilkerson**

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Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
Bank for International Settlements  
CH-4002 Basel  
Switzerland

SUBMITTED via E-MAIL: baselcommittee@bis.org

September 20, 2013

Re: BCBS Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework

The American Council of Life Insurers (“ACLI”) is a national trade association with 300 members that represent more than 90 percent of the assets and premiums of the life insurance and annuity industry. In addition to providing life insurance, annuity and employee benefit programs on a global basis, many of our members are large participants in the fixed income markets, including U.S. Treasury securities, as well as repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements. Our members manage asset and liability risks by hedging with derivatives instruments.

We respectfully submit our comments on the Consultative Document issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision outlining the Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework<sup>1</sup> (the “Revised Leverage Ratio Framework”), an important component of the overall regulatory framework for the Banking sector. Life insurers are among the financial end users affected by the leverage ratios under consideration in the Consultative Document. Life insurers have actively participated in the global dialogue concerning the regulation of derivatives. We greatly appreciate your attention to our views

**I. Summary of Position**

ACLI recognizes the substantial effort and consideration that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has dedicated to introducing a transparent, supplementary measure to the Risk Based Capital (“RBC”) requirements for Banks. Further, the ACLI fully recognizes the important implications for ensuring a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. However, the Revised Leverage Ratio Framework, as written, has the potential of creating several negative market consequences in its attempt to mitigate broader systemic risks.

In particular, we are concerned about the potential impact to the fixed income and derivative markets. Specifically, we believe that large portions of the fixed income and derivatives markets will be impacted from proposed changes to the netting of Securities Financing Transactions (SFTs). Additionally, the Derivatives markets will also suffer a negative impact from the inclusion of cash collateral in the Exposure Measure. Finally, we believe that the Credit Derivatives markets are likely to be adversely affected from more restrictive off-sets for purchased credit derivatives.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf>

**II. Discussion**

The table below summarizes what we believe are the market impacts from the proposed changes:

Market Sector	Exposure Measure Driver	Expected Market Impact
SFTs	No recognition of netting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduced depth and liquidity</li> <li>▪ Wider bid-ask spreads</li> <li>▪ Spill over impact to all fixed income markets where market liquidity depends on an efficient and liquid financing market (e.g. Government security and derivatives markets)</li> </ul>
Derivatives	Inclusion of cash collateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduced depth and liquidity</li> <li>▪ Wider bid-ask spreads</li> <li>▪ At odds with global derivatives reform requirements</li> </ul>
Credit Derivatives	Limited netting of written credit derivatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduced depth and liquidity</li> <li>▪ Wider bid-ask spreads</li> </ul>

**(A) Securities Financing Transactions (SFTs)**

The Revised Leverage Ratio Framework proposes the inclusion of STF's on a gross basis, with the removal of accounting netting. We strongly believe that dis-allowing exposure netting for SFTs will have a profound negative impact on the financial markets that depend on these types of transactions, including Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions, for short and intermediate term financing. Specifically, we believe that this proposed change to the Revised Leverage Ratio will drastically reduce the depth and liquidity of these markets, increase the costs of short and intermediate term financing by increasing the bid-ask spreads for these transactions and ultimately reduce the liquidity in the fixed income markets for the securities underlying these financing transactions, specifically the market for U.S. Government Securities.

SFT's strengthen the Government Securities markets by significantly deepening the liquidity of those securities and allowing brokers to efficiently fulfill their role as primary dealers while cost effectively maintaining a lower level of inventory in these securities. The proposed removal of exposure netting would discourage dealers from engaging in these SFTs of Government Securities with each other, thereby disrupting the efficient allocation of these resources to the best uses. The result of this proposed modification would be a dramatically reduced dealer willingness to facilitate SFT transactions, causing a drop in liquidity and a widening of bid/ask spreads on highly liquid assets (such as U.S. Treasuries). Moreover, reducing the liquidity for these securities will ultimately increase the volatility in bond yields across the broader fixed income markets.

It is worth noting that the U.S. Treasury has \$11Tn of debt outstanding. The daily trading volume of U.S. Treasuries is over \$500Bn, making it one of the deepest and most liquid sectors in the marketplace. Further, U.S. Treasuries have proven to be the safest and soundest asset class during a crisis period. The proposed treatment of SFTs and the resulting penalization for holding high quality liquid assets (HQLA) is at odds with Basel III liquidity framework's Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), which is designed to ensure that banks maintain a resilient liquidity risk profile and hold an adequate stock of unencumbered HQLA

The liquidity impact on the broader fixed income markets would be negative to the core investment holdings of ACLI members. U.S. Treasury securities are used by insurers for a myriad of reasons including core investments, the management of liquidity and duration in their portfolio, asset liability management and fulfillment of collateral requirements for borrowing and hedging activities. The proposed treatment of SFTs discourages financial intermediaries from holding HQLA such as Treasuries, and potentially dissuades Primary Dealers from participating in Treasury market auctions. This could result in a shift in the depth and breadth of the U.S. Treasury market resulting in wider bid/ask spreads, a reduction in liquidity and potentially broader consequences for the global financial markets.

### **(B) Derivatives**

The Revised Leverage Ratio includes cash collateral obtained in respect of derivatives transactions in the Exposure Measure. The ACLI believes that the exchange of high quality collateral (particularly cash) in connection with derivatives transactions is systemically risk reductive and should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Including cash collateral in the Exposure Measure creates a strong disincentive for derivatives market making activities because the associated capital charges will become prohibitive, thereby impacting the liquidity in these markets. This condition will likely increase the costs of hedging by end-users, or potentially force them to abandon the appropriate use of derivatives to prudently hedge market risks. Further, including cash collateral in the Exposure Measure may lead to a reduction of the use of cash collateral to satisfy margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. Reduced liquidity in the Treasury markets combined with the inclusion of cash collateral in the Exposure Measure will lead to increased costs for market participants.

ACLI members regularly use derivative instruments (including Credit Derivatives) to responsibly and effectively hedge the risks associated with their investment portfolios and insurance and annuity product liabilities. The insurance industry's continued ability to manage and hedge financial risk through the use of derivatives is an essential component of its risk management program.

### **(C) Credit Derivatives**

The Revised Leverage Ratio stipulates a number of requirements that need to be met in order for a Financial Institution to be able to offset credit derivative positions referencing the same entity. Among these, the requirement that the purchased credit default swap must be longer in maturity than the remaining maturity of the written credit default swap appears to be particularly onerous. A purchased credit default swap that is shorter in maturity than a sold credit default swap referencing the same entity provides significant risk reduction, though not 100%, especially in the event of a default of the reference entity. The additional requirements of the proposal targeting credit derivatives would likely have the effect of widening bid-ask spreads and reducing liquidity in that market for buy-side participants.

ACLI members use credit derivatives to manage the credit risk of their investment portfolios. Having the ability to use credit derivatives to manage credit risk is a central component of their overall investment portfolio strategies. The inability to proportionally net written and purchase credit derivatives exposure by derivatives market makers will ultimately decrease liquidity in this market and increase costs which will impair ACLI members' ability to execute their portfolio strategies.

### III. Proposed Modifications

The ACLI understands that the Basel III reform introducing a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio is intended as a credible supplementary measure to RBC requirements. We also understand that the leverage ratio is intended to restrict the inappropriate build-up of leverage in the banking sector, which can destabilize the broader financial markets. However, as described above, we believe that certain aspects of the proposal will significantly impair market functionality, liquidity and transaction costs in markets that the insurance industry relies upon. Accordingly, we respectfully suggest that the Committee consider the following modifications:


- Continued allowance of netting for Securities Financing Transactions when the underlying securities consist of Government Securities;
- Exclusion of cash collateral posted or received in connection with derivatives transactions; and
- Recognition of maturity mismatches on a proportional basis in respect of credit derivatives.

### IV. Conclusion

The ACLI would like to reiterate our appreciation for the thoughtful approach that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has taken regarding the Leverage Ratio calculation. We are pleased to be able to continue to participate through the comment process and respectfully submit that certain aspects discussed above have the potential to unintentionally reduce market liquidity and increase costs in the fixed income and derivative markets. We believe that failure to modify the items listed above will unnecessarily increase costs to ACLI members and their customers.

We greatly appreciate your attention to our views. If any questions develop, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Carl B. Wilkerson