



January 14, 2024

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Attention: Comments/Legal OES (RIN 3064-AF29) and (RIN 3064-AF86)
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Re: Regulatory Capital Rule: Large Banking Organizations and Banking Organizations With Significant Trading Activity, OCC: [Docket ID OCC-2023-0008], Federal Reserve: [Docket No. R-1813, RIN 7100-AG64], FDIC: [RIN 3064-AF29]

Regulatory Capital Rule: Risk-Based Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies; Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15), Federal Reserve: [Docket No. R-1814, RIN 7100-AG65]

Long-Term Debt Requirements for Large Bank Holding Companies, Certain Intermediate Holding Companies of Foreign Banking Organizations, and Large Insured Depository Institutions, OCC: [Docket ID OCC-2023-0011], Federal Reserve: [Docket No. R-1815, RIN 7100-AG66], FDIC: [RIN 3064-AF86]

To whom it may concern:

Americans for Tax Reform (ATR)¹ appreciates the opportunity to comment on three proposed rulemakings affecting the allocation and distribution of capital in the U.S. banking sector.² Each of these proposed rules is referred to as “the Proposal” according to its respective section in the comment letter. The interconnectedness

¹ ATR is a nonprofit, 501(c)(4) taxpayer advocacy organization that opposes all tax increases and supports limited government, free market policies. In support of these goals, ATR opposes heavy regulation and taxation of financial services. ATR was founded in 1985 at the request of President Ronald Reagan.

² Regulatory Capital Rule: Large Banking Organizations and Banking Organizations With Significant Trading Activity, OCC: [Docket ID OCC-2023-0008], Federal Reserve: [Docket No. R-1813, RIN 7100-AG64], FDIC: [RIN 3064-AF29], <https://www.fdic.gov/news/board-matters/2023/2023-07-27-notice-dis-a-fr.pdf>.

Regulatory Capital Rule: Risk-Based Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies; Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15), Federal Reserve: [Docket No. R-1814, RIN 7100-AG65], <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-09-01/pdf/2023-16896.pdf>.

Long-Term Debt Requirements for Large Bank Holding Companies, Certain Intermediate Holding Companies of Foreign Banking Organizations, and Large Insured Depository Institutions, OCC: [Docket ID OCC-2023-0011], Federal Reserve: [Docket No. R-1815, RIN 7100-AG66], FDIC: [RIN 3064-AF86], <https://www.fdic.gov/news/board-matters/2023/2023-08-29-notice-dis-a-fr.pdf>.

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of each of these rules necessitates a singular comment letter to understand the aggregated effects of these rules on the broader U.S. economy.

REGULATORY CAPITAL RULE: Large Banking Organizations and Banking Organizations With Significant Trading Activity

The Federal Reserve (Fed), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) are proposing to heighten regulation on banks with at least \$100 billion in consolidated assets. The origins of these regulations stem from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)—a consortium of central banks from around the world, including the Federal Reserve. The Proposal would force large banks to build up more capital through retained earnings and additional stock issuances without any input from Congress.

These new rules will make borrowing more expensive, hamper dividends and share repurchases,³ and reduce the availability of credit cards and mortgage loans.

The BCBS's influence in bank regulation across the globe has created a regulatory structure that circumvents Congress. This is evidenced by the Proposal's direct repudiation of the bipartisan *Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act* (P.L. 115-174).⁴ The Proposal eliminates and replaces the tailored regulation from P.L. 115-174 by applying uniform regulations to all banks with more than \$100 billion in assets. For example, the Proposal expands inclusion of accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) for available-for-sale (AFS) securities to capital calculations for Category III and IV banks. Category III and IV banks would also be required to calculate their capital based on both the new expanded risk-based approach and the existing standardized approach, "and then measure compliance based on the more stringent of the two ratios."⁵ The supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) and the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) would also be expanded to apply to Category IV banks. The blanket application of these requirements defeats the purpose of P.L. 115-174. Congress did not intend for all banks with more than \$100 billion in assets to be subjected to the same rules uniformly. The application of these new rules is a direct rejection of congressional intent. According to the FDIC Vice Chairman, the proposal is a "repudiation of the intent and spirit of" P.L. 115-174.⁶

This Proposal is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and exceeds the statutory bounds with which the regulators are supposed to operate.⁷ Regulators may not expand their authority merely because they believe their "preferred approach would be better policy."⁸ The regulators claim to have broad statutory authority to amend capital requirements at will. However, Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."⁹ Congress made it clear in P.L. 115-174 that there needs to be a regulatory structure that is best tailored to banks with different operations and structures. The Proposal dismisses Congress's intent and moves ahead anyway.

The Proposal's insistence on applying uniform rules to all banks with more than \$100 billion in assets contravenes P.L. 115-174 and is inconsistent with previous rules. Other rules have been vacated because the agency "failed adequately to justify departing from its own prior interpretation."¹⁰

³ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-stock-buybacks-basel-endgame-50fb9e7c>.

⁴ <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2155>.

⁵ <https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2023/08/01/cleary-gottlieb-discusses-proposed-capital-requirement-increases-for-banks/>.

⁶ <https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2023/spjul2723b.html>.

⁷ <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/01/act-pl79-404.pdf>.

⁸ *Virginia Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs.*, 678 F.3d 918, 400 U.S. App. D.C. 319 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

⁹ *Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).

¹⁰ *Goldstein v. S.E.C.*, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Regulators are justifying the uniform application of capital regulations to banks in Category I, II, III, and IV by referring to “recent events” or the collapses of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank (Signature), and First Republic Bank (FRB).¹¹ However, these bank failures cannot and should not be attributed to all U.S. banks with more than \$100 billion in assets.

The capital requirements dictated by the regulators have not been condoned by Congress and are arbitrary and capricious under the *Administrative Procedure Act* (APA).

The U.S. government is implementing regulations for U.S. banks that are based on a framework designed by a coalition of global regulators. It is concerning that U.S. regulators are taking international guidelines and imposing them on banks and ultimately the American public. Consumers will have to pay higher costs that are passed down through more expensive borrowing or banking services more generally. The executive branch hijacked the rulemaking process by circumventing Congress. The executive branch enforces the law, it does not create it. In this case, the Biden Administration is ignoring checks and balances to notch a win.

The Proposal is a classic example of the government intervening in the operations of private companies by mandating how they must organize their balance sheets. If finalized, the Proposal has the potential to reduce the availability, or increase the cost of credit for auto loans, credit cards, and mortgages. One paper describes how the regulators’ unbridled quest for more stringent capital requirements can make capital allocation more expensive. According to the paper, “[a]ll else equal, making regulated banks less risky may actually raise their cost of capital—with consequent implications for investment, growth, and the development of a shadow banking sector.”¹²

Internal Models

The Proposal arbitrarily, and without direction from Congress, removes the usage of internal models for calculating credit and operational risk for Category I and II banks. The Proposal “would remove the use of internal models to set credit risk and operational risk capital requirements (the so-called advanced approaches) for banking organizations subject to Category I or II capital standards.”¹³

The Proposal would also “revise the calculation of single-counterparty credit limits by removing the option of using a banking organization’s internal models to calculate derivatives exposure amounts and requiring the use of the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk for this purpose.”¹⁴

Banks may use internal models for calculating market risk, but the models may only be used by “trading desks for which a banking organization has received approval from its primary Federal supervisor.”¹⁵ Additionally, banks have to show that their models are “acceptable” otherwise they would have to use a standardized approach.¹⁶ This provides the regulators with seemingly unlimited discretion to critique internal models. Regulators would still control the internal models that banks may continue to use.

The Proposal has not determined through quantitative analysis that the benefits of standardizing these models would outweigh the cost to banks and broader economy from resultant higher capital requirements. Standardized models, instead of internal bank models, hands more power to regulators to determine the quantity and breadth of capital banks must hold.

¹¹ 88 FR 64032

¹² https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/Wurgler_Paper_78db6340-ae41-4630-8e25-d990b547171b.pdf.

¹³ 88 FR 64031

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ 88 FR 64032

¹⁶ Id.

Burdens of the Proposal

The Proposal, in some cases, is stricter than the final Basel III framework. For example, the Proposal uses more punitive calculations for residential mortgages held by banks. The calculations are 20 percent higher than Basel III even though the proposal contains no “evidence to support the sizing of the surcharge.”¹⁷ These burdensome requirements could weaken U.S. bank competitiveness with foreign-owned banks, or force banks to look for merger opportunities to offset increases in cost.

The Urban Institute published a paper highlighting how the new rules harm minority homeowners trying to acquire a mortgage from a bank.¹⁸ According to the report, the capital requirements are too high across the board for single-family residential mortgages. The enhanced regulations are especially burdensome for low-and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers with loans exhibiting high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The report estimates that “[o]n a \$200,000 mortgage with an LTV ratio from 90 to 100 percent,” borrowers would pay “an extra \$33 a month.”¹⁹

The competitive nature of the U.S. banking sector is what makes lending costs so sensitive to increased capital requirements. One study found that if a bank is “forced to adopt a capital structure that raises its cost of funding relative to other intermediaries” by as little as 0.2% then it may “become much less profitable” or “lose most of its business.”²⁰

The Proposal also imposes stringent leverage evaluations for banks that previously did not have to comply. The new mandate will force banks to limit funding for credit cards or reduce exposure to securitizations that fund auto loans and mortgages. One paper from Columbia Business School found that relaxing, instead of expanding, the SLR would allow banks to expand credit “during economic downturns.”²¹

Bill Dudley stated in an opinion piece that “[e]quity costs more than deposits or subordinated debt, so banks and their securities units will pass that on in the form of higher lending rates, higher trading costs and reduced market liquidity.”²² Dudley went on to say there are other ways to enhance stability. For example, “[b]etter and more timely supervision could have prevented the failure of Silicon Valley Bank: Supervisors identified the risks well ahead of time, but simply failed to act quickly or forcibly enough.”²³

Regulators are unilaterally harnessing more power to control how banks construct their capital structure. The new rules could force banks out of some activities and into other activities. Such as when mortgage lending shifted to nonbanks. This is a prime example of the federal government distorting the allocation of capital.

Regulators are imbedding short-term securities’ valuations in capital requirements even though almost all of SVB’s bond portfolio consisted of long-term securities.²⁴ Simple accounting tweaks, such as marking-to-market all of a bank’s securities can offer transparency to bank shareholders, bondholders, and depositors without the need to account for unrealized gains and losses on short-term securities in bank capital.²⁵ SVB’s depositor base combined with the Fed’s lackluster monetary policy put it in a unique position to fail.

¹⁷ <https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2023/spjul2723c.html>.

¹⁸ <https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/Bank%20Capital%20Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rulemaking.pdf>.

¹⁹ Id.

²⁰ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708173.

²¹ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3798714.

²² <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-09-11/the-fed-s-bank-capital-proposal-isn-t-the-right-answer?smd=undefined&embedded-checkout=true>.

²³ Id.

²⁴ <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/financial-accounting/bank-capital-revamp-avoids-long-term-asset-issue-that-felled-svb>.

²⁵ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-todays-banking-crisis-echoes-of-the-80s-thrift-dclayed-recognition-risk-taking-deposit-insurance-svb-signature-cfdd2b37>.

According to Allan Meltzer, in the past increasing reserve requirements would result in a “steep monetary contraction.”²⁶ Reserve requirements require banks to hold onto a certain amount of “liquid assets.”²⁷ Similarly, capital requirements require banks to hold onto a certain amount of retained earnings, or issue new stock to absorb potential losses. The Proposal amends the parameters for assets banks can hold, which will constrain the amount of investments or financing banks can make, whether it is in bonds, mortgages, or credit cards. This directly affects American households and consumers. The government should be limited in its ability to mandate how banks should structure their balance sheets. Enhancing regulatory authority, as proffered in the Proposal, would only further entrench the federal government’s foothold in banks—forcing them to operate as quasi-governmental entities.

Stress Capital Buffer Duplication

The Fed has not previously issued stress capital buffer (SCB) models for public comment. However, the models and scenarios should be released for public notice and comment because of how the SCB intertwines with the Proposal. Conducting the formal notice and comment process for stress test models is more important now that the Proposal would expand the SCB to be applied to risk-based capital ratios calculated under the expanded risk-based approach.²⁸ The SCB would now apply to all banks with more than \$100 billion in assets. Additionally, operational risk will be double counted since it is already included in the SCB. The Proposal is requiring Category III and IV banks to newly account for legal and cybersecurity risk by itself and within the SCB. This duplicative requirement is unnecessary and burdensome.

Impact on Trading Activity/Market Risk

The Proposal will allow banks to use internal models to set market risk capital requirements, but “[t]he proposal would limit the use of models to only those trading desks for which a banking organization has received approval from its primary Federal supervisor.”²⁹

The rule offers no substantive empirical evidence on how it will affect trading activity. However, the Proposal admits that “higher capital requirements on trading activity may also reduce banking organizations’ incentives to engage in certain market making activities and may impair market liquidity.”³⁰ At the same time the rule states that empirical studies relating capital requirements to trading activity is “limited” and “mixed.”³¹ The rule concludes that higher capital requirements on trading and market liquidity “remains a research question needing further study.”³² It remains to be seen how the regulators can justify increasing capital ratios for trading activity when they clearly admit that they are unsure of the effect it may have on capital markets. Regulators are putting the cart before the horse.

Pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies will be negatively affected by new capital charge for market and credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk. These costs get passed down to college savings plans, pension plans, and defined contribution plans. Moreover, smaller banking organization could be subject to the newly revised market risk capital rule if its trading assets and trading liabilities are at least \$5 billion or at least 10 percent of its total assets.³³ The claim that only banks with more than \$100 billion in assets would be affected by the Proposal is erroneous.

²⁶ <https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo3634061.html>.

²⁷ <https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/publications/economic-commentary/2020/ec-202005-evolution-bank-capital-requirements>.

²⁸ 88 FR 64031

²⁹ 88 FR 64032

³⁰ 88 FR 64170

³¹ Id.

³² 88 FR 64171

³³ 88 FR 64032

In general, the Proposal would make it more difficult for banks to hold assets on their balance sheets. The colossal issuance of Treasury bonds to fund the exorbitant federal government spending and service current debt issuances is hard for the market to absorb.³⁴ Regulations, and the stringent capital requirements in the Proposal, will “make it more expensive for banks to intermediate in government bond markets.”³⁵ As a result, hedge funds are performing “basis trades,” or buying Treasuries and selling futures contracts with underlying Treasury bonds by “borrowing in the repo market to finance the trade and provide leverage”³⁶—all in order to earn the difference on the bid-ask spread.³⁷ This is the market’s reaction to a government-imposed restriction on banking activity. U.S. debt needs investors or else the federal government will not be able to fulfill its current debt obligations and make discretionary and mandatory payments in defense in nondefense sectors.

Now, regulators are scrutinizing hedge funds for finding innovative ways to make money off Treasury bond trades for their investors.³⁸ If regulators take away incentives for hedge funds and broker-dealers to buy U.S. debt, then it is less likely these entities will want to actively trade Treasury bonds or repurchase agreements. Adding more “margin requirements and fees” by requiring more Treasury bonds to be centrally cleared will likely deter investment to some extent or “inadvertently increase system-wide risks.”³⁹ The provisions in the Proposal coupled with the new central clearing of Treasury bonds, and the overall scrutiny of basis trades is putting the U.S. Treasury market between a rock and a hard place. The Proposal could put taxpayers at risk of higher costs and result in less liquidity in the Treasury bond market.⁴⁰

Held-to-maturity (HTM) securities made up most of SVB’s portfolio.⁴¹ In March 2022, SVB’s “HTM portfolio represented roughly 46 percent of its total assets.”⁴² The aggressive increase in interest rates plunged the value of the HTM securities. Additionally, SVB’s weak “corporate governance and risk management” ultimately led to its demise.⁴³ However, the Proposal is requiring Category III and IV banks “to include all AOCI components in common equity tier 1 capital, except gains and losses on cash-flow hedges where the hedged item is not recognized on a banking organization’s balance sheet at fair value.”⁴⁴ SVB’s HTM securities “would not have been affected” by this requirement.⁴⁵ It is hard to imagine how this new capital requirement would offer any perceived benefit to the banking sector when it is the accounting classification of HTM securities that masked the true nature of SVB’s financial situation. Instead, accounting adjustments that more clearly reflect the mark-to-market value of every bank security could prove to be a less onerous yet more viable option for stemming deposit outflows.⁴⁶

³⁴ <https://www.wsj.com/finance/why-treasury-auctions-have-wall-street-on-edge-8385f15e?st=qf25y3k5sy5k6kl>.

³⁵ <https://www.ft.com/content/41209996-35b0-49cd-bf4e-b7c39b651701>.

³⁶ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/recent-developments-in-hedge-funds-treasury-futures-and-repo-positions-20230830.html>.

³⁷ <https://www.ft.com/content/927aba63-eff3-44c4-a5df-a5872e988720>.

³⁸ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-16/fed-s-barr-joins-chorus-warning-about-hedge-funds-basis-trades>.

³⁹ <https://www.ft.com/content/948bd246-7c05-4b52-8865-a680f107319c>.

⁴⁰ https://www.secc.gov/news/statement/peirce-statement-rules-improve-risk-management-12-13-23#_ftnref4.

⁴¹ <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47855#:~:text=capital%20ratio%20%3D%20capital%20ris%EF%BF%BD,RWA%20to%20be%20well%2Dcapitalized.>

⁴² <https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/board-material-loss-review-silicon-valley-bank-sep2023.pdf>.

⁴³ Id.

⁴⁴ 88 FR 64036

⁴⁵ <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47855#:~:text=capital%20ratio%20%3D%20capital%20ris%EF%BF%BD,RWA%20to%20be%20well%2Dcapitalized.>

⁴⁶ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-todays-banking-crisis-echoes-of-the-80s-thrift-dclayed-recognition-risk-taking-deposit-insurance-svb-signature-cfdd2b37>.

Securitizations

Bankruptcy remoteness prevents the special purpose vehicle (SPV) sponsors from afflicting investors if the sponsor happens to collapse.⁴⁷ It appears that all asset classes for securitizations are treated the same under the Proposal:

*asset-backed commercial paper, auto loans/leases, RMBS, credit cards, commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized loan obligations, collateralized debt obligations squared, small and medium enterprises, student loans, other retail, and other wholesale*⁴⁸

The risk weights for the securitizations are multiplied by 8 percent. This is ignoring the fact that securitizations of these assets have different risk exposures. Moreover, there is a lack of empirical evidence to treat these securitizations uniformly. This arbitrary requirement is questionable.

Private Credit

Private credit funds are a market solution to a government-imposed headache. Private funds filling the financing void is just an example of the free market working to solve the problem the government created in the first place.⁴⁹ Government regulation in the form of Basel frameworks and the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act* started to force banks to offload assets from their balance sheets to comply with government rules.⁵⁰ We are seeing this happen again now that the regulators have proposed even stricter capital requirements. For example, it was reported that JPMorgan Chase is securitizing its loan portfolio to comply with the new rules.⁵¹ Government regulation is distorting the market by shifting assets to different corners of the financial markets. The full spectrum of costs, benefits, and circumstances should be considered before finalizing a rule of this magnitude.

Credit Risk

The proposal wrongly eliminates the use of internal credit risk models and creates the new expanded standardized approach without any empirical evidence to justify the changes.

Reinsurance Credit Risk Transfers

Credit insurance is a private-sector option that allows banks to alleviate capital burdens. Allowing banks to participate in credit risk transfers (CRTs) to ameliorate the burdensome effects of higher capital requirements is a step in the right direction.

Under the Proposal banks should be explicitly authorized to use insurance and reinsurance CRTs to offload asset risk and alleviate the burden of the new capital requirements. The Proposal should allow insurance and reinsurance contracts to be considered as “eligible guarantees” while reinsurers should be considered “eligible guarantors.”

The Proposal should not erect regulatory barriers that would prevent banks from using insurance or reinsurance as an option. For example, lowering the risk weight for corporate exposures or even exempting reinsurance from the 100 percent risk weight could be an alternative option.⁵² One paper discusses the potential benefits of expanding government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) CRT exposure to reinsurance.⁵³ The same benefits could be afforded to the banking sector, if the regulatory framework adequately authorizes it.

⁴⁷ https://irathene.q4cdn.com/886888837/files/doc_presentations/2022/Understanding-Structured-Credit_FINAL.pdf.

⁴⁸ 88 FR 64265

⁴⁹ <https://www.wsj.com/finance/fed-rate-hikes-lending-banks-hedge-funds-896cb20b>.

⁵⁰ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf>.

⁵¹ <https://www.ft.com/content/5612cba3-1580-4003-a0ac-6623cbe28ee6>.

⁵² 88 FR 64053, 64054

⁵³ <https://us.milliman.com/en/insight/In-it-for-the-long-haul-A-case-for-the-expanded-use-of-the-GSEs-reinsurance-CRT-executions>.

Other countries already allow their banks to use insurance and reinsurance CRTs, putting banks in the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.

Consumers, taxpayers, and banks do not need another financial crisis that results in another era of taxpayer-funded bank bailouts. They need tailored regulation that reduces risk and volatility, and gives consumers access to affordable capital—all of which the private sector can bring to bear.

The Proposal should abide by the statutory mandates in P.L. 115-174 by tailoring regulations and ensuring that banks have the option to use private-sector alternatives to mitigate capital burdens while also enhancing capital allocation to all reaches of the U.S. economy.

In general, the Proposal wrongly favors public company exposure over private business exposure. The Proposal bases this on the fact that public securities are subject to more “enhanced transparency and market discipline.”⁵⁴ This would unnecessarily discourage exposure to small businesses and divert capital to larger publicly traded companies. The Proposal’s economic analysis lacks any discussion of the diversion of capital that would occur due to government intervention. Regulators should remove any provisions that would make it more difficult for banks to provide capital to small businesses and privately-owned businesses.

Operational Risk

The Proposal adds a standardized calculation for determining operational losses.⁵⁵ This differs from the status quo, which allows banks to use internal models to determine operational risk. Calculating operational risk will include factors such as interest income, income and expenses from fees and commission business (e.g., interchange fees, fiduciary fees, fees and commission from securities brokerage, underwriting fees, wire transfer fees, charges on deposit accounts, annuity sales, and underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities).⁵⁶ Insurance income is counted here even though it is not counted in the Basel framework.⁵⁷ The SCB also includes operational risk and CVA risk, which is duplicating risk charges. The duplicative nature of the operational risk charges and the fact that it deviates from the Basel framework exposes the arbitrary and capricious nature of operational risk charges. In fact, regulators have previously “indicated that the standardized approach implicitly considers operational risk in the calibration of risk weights for credit risk.”⁵⁸

From an accounting standpoint operational risk is fundamentally duplicative and unnecessary. For example, when conducting a quality of earnings report during pre-sale due diligence an accountant would categorize a lawsuit as a non-recurring event that is “unlikely to repeat” and “can be removed from the financial statements.”⁵⁹ Consequently, this calls into question the validity of operational risk charges.

New capital charges for credit cards could reduce credit utilization, which will negatively affect consumers’ credit scores⁶⁰ and potentially increase borrowing costs. Higher capital charges may result in a reduction in credit allocation, which in turn would reduce consumption, and consequently diminish interchange fee revenue that is used to fund rewards programs and consumer privacy protections, such as tokenization.

⁵⁴ 88 FR 64054

⁵⁵ 88 FR 64082

⁵⁶ 88 FR 64084, n. 184

⁵⁷ <https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2023/07/overhaul-of-regulatory-capital-requirements-proposed-by-us-banking-regulators#ThirtyFour>.

⁵⁸ <https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2023/07/overhaul-of-regulatory-capital-requirements-proposed-by-us-banking-regulators>, n. 33.

⁵⁹ <https://www.mossadams.com/articles/2023/07/quality-of-earnings-report>.

⁶⁰ <https://www.wsj.com/buyside/personal-finance/credit-utilization-ratio-91eaf804>.

Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 121 would require banks to treat crypto assets held in custody as a liability on their balance sheet, with a corresponding asset.⁶¹ Since banks have to hold capital against any assets on their balance sheets, the capital requirements, even as they exist today, would make it prohibitively expensive to custody these assets. The Proposal would worsen this by imposing an operational risk capital charge that is based on a bank's income, rather than assets, including fee-related income. Any fees generated from custodial services for all assets (including crypto assets) would increase a bank's operational risk capital charge. To the extent a bank is able to profitably custody crypto assets despite the operation of SAB 121, the Proposal's operational risk charge would erode or eliminate this profitability. Regulators should not hamstring new business opportunities that offer inherently safe and sound services that could benefit households or institutions.

Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) Risk

All banks above \$100 billion in assets must quantify CVA risk, unless the derivatives or securities financing transaction is centrally cleared. Regional banks would no longer be able to calculate derivatives exposure using an internal model—it must be calculated using the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR). However, the Proposal offers no empirical evidence to suggest this would eminently improve the derivatives market.

The airline industry may be negatively impacted by these rule changes. The Proposal “would make it more expensive for banks to do clearly useful things, like helping airlines”⁶² use derivatives to hedge jet fuel prices:

Airlines have a distinctive operating cost structure in which jet fuel accounts for about 30%–40% of operating expenses resulting in significant financial risk exposure. Any fluctuations in jet fuel prices can lead to distressing financial repercussions for airlines, also because substantial competition with low cost carriers prevents simply passing on cost increases to customers. Historically, airlines deployed financial hedging to manage the risk exposure of jet fuel prices' volatility. Financial derivatives such as future contracts or options can enable airlines to attain future jet fuel requirements at a fixed prearranged price, lessening risk vulnerability to instabilities in jet fuel market spot prices.⁶³

Agricultural end-users are also likely to be harmed by the Proposal. The requirements for derivatives clearing may limit the services provided to the U.S. agricultural sector. One report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated “that 94 percent of futures trading by farmers, and 87 percent of options trading, was on corn and soybean contracts.”⁶⁴ Corn and soybean farmers should not have to absorb the cost increases that will result from the Proposal.

Supplementary Leverage Ratio

The supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) would be applied to Category IV banks without any empirical evidence and quantitative analysis to justify this change.

Countercyclical Capital Buffer

Under the Proposal, the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) would apply to Category IV banks without any empirical evidence and quantitative analysis to justify this change. In the event CCyB is raised from zero percent, new capital charges that apply to the biggest banks will now equally apply to all banks with more than \$100 billion in assets. This change should not be made without the proper data to justify that the benefits outweigh the costs.

⁶¹ <https://www.sec.gov/oca/staff-accounting-bulletin-121>.

⁶² <https://www.semafor.com/article/01/11/2024/big-banks-mull-the-unthinkable-suing-the-fed>.

⁶³ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0967070X18305651>.

⁶⁴ <https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/99518/eib-219.pdf>.

Output Floor

The Proposal restricts the benefits of using internal models for calculating risk. According to the Proposal, the output floor is 72.5 percent.⁶⁵ This number is the summation of a bank's risk-weighted assets (RWAs) under the expanded standardized approach, operational RWAs, and CVA RWAs, plus RWAs calculated using the standardized measure for market risk.⁶⁶ The calculation subtracts out "adjusted allowance for credit losses that is not included in tier 2 capital and any amount of allocated transfer risk reserves."⁶⁷ The output floor is designed to restrict banks' usage of internal models for market risk calculations, even though the banks would better understand their own market exposure.⁶⁸ The Proposal offers no substantive justification for the limits on internal models. Based on some academic literature, the variability in internal models appears to be mixed.⁶⁹ The uncertainty in variability does not justify the elimination of internal models to calculate risk charges.

The Proposal states that removing the usage of banks' internal models for certain calculations "would increase capital requirements in the aggregate."⁷⁰ According to the Proposal, the regulators' economic analysis finds that the benefits of higher capital requirements outweigh the costs. However, the economic analysis conducted in the Proposal is incomplete and fails to adequately prove that the benefits outweigh the costs. This is underscored by the fact that in October 2023 the regulators began accepting new data on the potential impact on higher capital requirements.⁷¹ Without inputting this new data into its analysis, the Proposal's determination that benefits outweigh the costs is presumptuous and erroneous.

Small Businesses

The Proposal claims that the regulators do not have to conduct an analysis of the effects on small entities. However, under federal statute, small entities are broadly defined, and are not restricted to small banking organizations.⁷² Under Section 3 of the *Small Business Act*, a small business concern is defined as "including but not limited to enterprises that are engaged in the business of production of food and fiber, ranching and raising of livestock, aquaculture, and all other farming and agricultural related industries, shall be deemed to be one which is independently owned and operated, and which is not dominant in its field of operation."⁷³ In the code of federal regulations, a small business concern is defined as "a concern, including its affiliates, that is independently owned and operated, not dominant in the field of operation in which it is bidding on Government contracts, and qualified as a small business under the criteria in 13 CFR Part 121 and size standards in this solicitation."⁷⁴ The broad definitions could imply that the regulators need to determine the significant economic impact of higher capital requirements on small business lending. The Proposal does not provide a quantitative analysis of the economic impact on small business lending.

Banks with less than \$100 billion in assets could see costs go up because market risk could apply to them because of the boundary between the trading book and banking book. Additionally, smaller banks rely on larger banks for services that will be subjected to increased operational risk charges. These new costs may be passed down to smaller banks.

⁶⁵ 88 FR 64034

⁶⁶ Id.

⁶⁷ Id.

⁶⁸ <https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2023/07/overhaul-of-regulatory-capital-requirements-proposed-by-us-banking-regulators#TwentyFour>.

⁶⁹ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3879379#.

⁷⁰ 88 FR 64030

⁷¹ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20231020b.htm>.

⁷² [https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=\(title:5%20section:601%20edition:prelim\)%20OR%20\(granuleid:USC-prelim-title5-section601\)&f=tree&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:5%20section:601%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid:USC-prelim-title5-section601)&f=tree&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true).

⁷³ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1834/pdf/COMPS-1834.pdf>.

⁷⁴ https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6faac0fcffbd719cd27dca2b6f6c070&term_occur=2&term_src=1&title=48:Chapter:1:Subchapter:H:Part:52:Subpart:52.2:52.219-8.

Some community banks rely on larger banks to issue credit cards. For example, “many community banks that offer credit cards do so through an agent relationship with an issuing bank. For many that is TCM Bank, operated by the Independent Community Bankers of America.”⁷⁵ If costs to issue revolving credit go up this could negatively impact community bank customers.

Under the Proposal, the new 65% risk-weight for “investment-grade” corporate debt only applies to publicly traded companies.⁷⁶ Private companies are excluded from the relaxed risk weights. This makes it more expensive, and less likely, for banks to extend credit to private businesses. Small private businesses do not have access to capital markets like publicly traded companies. This is a quintessential example of the federal government picking winners and losers.

Consumer Finance

The provisions in the Proposal are already forcing banks to rethink how they will allocate credit to consumers. According to the *Financial Times* at least one bank has already threatened to end revolving lines of financing for “credit card customers.”⁷⁷

In aggregate, potential federal regulations on the credit card market could devastate access to short term lines of credit for millions of Americans. Higher capital requirements for credit cards in conjunction with new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regulations on credit card late fees,⁷⁸ and threats from Congress to further regulate credit card routing,⁷⁹ aim to enervate the credit card market to a point where the product will be significantly more expensive for small businesses and consumers to access lines of credit. These regulations are not considered in aggregate in the Proposal’s economic analysis. In fact, the costs the Proposal will impose on credit card lending is not discussed at all. The economic analysis only observes lending services as a whole. This falls short of what is necessary to provide an apt assessment of the implications of higher capital requirements on the credit card market.

Other Jurisdictions

The opaque construction of the Basel III Endgame framework has resulted in a patchwork of regulation around the world.⁸⁰ The Proposal is aiding European banks over U.S. banks. According to one article, “European regulators estimate that the region’s banks would only need an extra €600 million of capital, versus more than \$170 billion that the Fed figures U.S. lenders will need to add.”⁸¹ The Proposal fails to explain why the “gold-plated” provisions are necessary. Moreover, the Proposal does not explicate how costs from this competitive disadvantage could hamper U.S. capital markets, pension fund investments, and defined contribution plans.

Economic Analysis

The Proposal lacks a substantive cost-benefit analysis. Ignoring costs contravenes court precedent that found “[n]o regulation is “appropriate” if it does significantly more harm than good.”⁸² The Proposal’s economic analysis fails to justify the heightened capital requirements. According to the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, “[w]hile the analysis acknowledges that the Proposed Rule’s capital increases could reduce banks’ lending and capital markets activities, it does not quantify those reductions or the resulting economic costs. Nor does the analysis substantiate or quantify the Proposed Rule’s

⁷⁵ <https://thefinancialbrand.com/news/banking-trends-strategies/durbin-2-0-threat-banks-credit-unions-brace-for-significant-impact-154844/#:~:text=Merchant%20groups%20have%20hailed%20the,largely%20funded%20by%20interchange%20fees.>

⁷⁶ 88 FR 64053

⁷⁷ [https://www.ft.com/content/b6d22697-40dd-46e7-bc07-e6c9caafb21e.](https://www.ft.com/content/b6d22697-40dd-46e7-bc07-e6c9caafb21e)

⁷⁸ [https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-proposes-rule-to-rein-in-excessive-credit-card-late-fees/.](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-proposes-rule-to-rein-in-excessive-credit-card-late-fees/)

⁷⁹ [https://www.atr.org/letter/atr-organizes-coalition-letter-opposing-credit-card-competition-act-of-2023/.](https://www.atr.org/letter/atr-organizes-coalition-letter-opposing-credit-card-competition-act-of-2023/)

⁸⁰ [https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/uk-lenders-face-smaller-impact-basel-rules-than-rivals-boe-says-2023-12-12/#:~:text=LONDON%2C%20Dec%2012%20\(Reuters\),European%20Union%20and%20U.S.%20peers.](https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/uk-lenders-face-smaller-impact-basel-rules-than-rivals-boe-says-2023-12-12/#:~:text=LONDON%2C%20Dec%2012%20(Reuters),European%20Union%20and%20U.S.%20peers.)

⁸¹ <https://www.semafor.com/article/01/11/2024/big-banks-mull-the-unthinkable-suing-the-fed.>

⁸² *Michigan v. Ewitt, Prot. Agency*, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 192 L. Ed. 2d 674, 25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 523, 83 U.S.L.W. 4620 (2015)

purported benefits for financial stability.”⁸³ The Proposal also fails to adequately explicate the potential increase in costs for activities such as “custody and asset management.”⁸⁴ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that:

if regulators raise risk weights to be higher than is commensurate with the activity’s actual risk, then banks would be too disincentivized to engage in an activity, and economic efficiency would fall (or the activity would migrate out of the banking system).⁸⁵

Economic impact data should have been collected and analyzed prior to issuing the Proposal. Collecting the economic data during the comment period⁸⁶ and then releasing the results for comment after the comment period has closed is not in line with the APA notice and comment process. In fact, “[t]he process of notice and comment rulemaking is not to be an empty charade. It is to be a process of reasoned decision-making. One particularly important component of the reasoning process is the opportunity for interested parties to participate in a meaningful way in the discussion and final formulation of rules.”⁸⁷

The knock-on effects of increasing the amount of capital banks must hold are a significant increase in prices throughout the economy. Businesses “tend to pass on cost increases far more quickly than cost reductions.”⁸⁸ As the cost of borrowing increases, or services cease to exist, due to government-mandated capital controls, businesses will likely pass down these costs to consumers. This effect that “[o]utput prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases” is widely observed in the producer and consumer goods markets.⁸⁹ The Proposal has not analyzed the cumulative effects of new capital requirements on the broader economy at a granular level. The dearth of a proper economic analysis using quantifiable data is grounds for the withdrawal of the Proposal because it fails to conform with the provisions outlined in the APA.

The analysis admits that it does not consider the Proposal’s effect on the SCB. The SCB maintains a floor of 2.5 percent of RWA, which would consequently rise because the Proposal increases RWAs. The full analysis is incomplete and needs further evaluation before any rule can be finalized.

The Proposal fails to show the calculations and methodology used to determine certain estimates in the economic analysis.⁹⁰ For example, the Proposal estimates that RWAs “associated with banking organizations’ lending activities would increase by \$380 billion for holding companies subject to Category I, II, III, or IV capital standards.”⁹¹ The Proposal claims that the benefits will outweigh the costs and cites a few academic papers.⁹² However, the papers do not specifically analyze the provisions of the Proposal and how they would affect bank lending activity.

The burdens of the Proposal would “would slightly decrease marginal risk-weighted assets attributable to retail and commercial real estate exposures.”⁹³ Limiting retail exposure would potentially include a situation where banks limit offerings or increase costs for certain consumer finance products such as auto loans, credit cards, bank accounts, money transfers, and student loans. The provisions in the Proposal would require banks to hold more capital to account for RWA exposure to retail and commercial real estate exposure. Banks could either hold onto these exposures or release them and let a nonbank service these products. Either way, the federal government is distorting the market for retail lending and commercial real estate.

⁸³ <https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-register-publications/2023/2023-regulatory-capital-rule-large-banking-organizations-3064-af29-c-123.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Id.

⁸⁵ <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47855#:~:text=capital%20ratio%20%3D%20capital%20ris%1%BD,RWA%20to%20bc%20well%2Dcapitalized.>

⁸⁶ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20231020b.htm>.

⁸⁷ *Conn. Light and Power Co. v. Nuc. Reg. Com’n*, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

⁸⁸ <https://www.cuna.org/content/dam/cuna/advocacy/priorities/documents/True-Impact-of-Interchange-Regulation-CornerstoneAdvisors-June-2023.pdf>.

⁸⁹ <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/262126>.

⁹⁰ https://punchbowl.news/wp-content/uploads/FILE_5283.pdf.

⁹¹ 88 FR 64169

⁹² Id., n. 469

⁹³ 88 FR 64170

The Proposal fails to incorporate an economic analysis of trading activity that would justify the higher capital requirements. The evidence of benefits is few and far between. The analysis states that “existing empirical studies on the relationship between capital requirements and market liquidity are limited and empirical evidence on causal effects of higher capital requirements on liquidity is mixed.”⁹⁴ Additionally, more stringent “capital requirements on market making activity and market liquidity remains a research question needing further study.”⁹⁵ This does not prove that the benefits of the Proposal outweigh the costs. In fact, “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”⁹⁶ The analysis is incomplete and thus deviates from the appropriate notice and comment process in the APA.

The regulators need to tread carefully or risk exposing their arbitrary Proposal to future litigation. The Proposal is economically significant and needs clear Congressional authorization pursuant to the major questions doctrine.⁹⁷

REGULATORY CAPITAL RULE: Risk-Based Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies; Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15)

The regulators are also proposing to make changes to the global systemically important bank holding company (GSIB) surcharge.⁹⁸ This requirement to hold extra equity capital only applies to Category I banks.

The Proposal is expanding the definition of “financial institution” to include “savings and loan holding companies, private equity funds, asset management companies, and exchange-traded funds.”⁹⁹ The arbitrary decision to add these entities to the expanded definition could deter investment in small businesses and limit the availability of funding through private credit vehicles. Committing capital to private funds would increase a GSIB surcharge and require banks to hold more capital. Although footnote twenty-three states that private equity fund portfolio companies would not be included in the new definition unless it meets the definition of “financial institution,” the fact that private equity funds are roped into the definition could deter GSIBs from committing capital to private credit funds,¹⁰⁰ or other funds dedicated to managing small private companies. Ultimately, pension funds and their beneficiaries will feel the reverberations of reduced returns if deals fail to execute due to GSIB’s reluctance to commit capital.

All exchange-traded funds (ETFs), except bond ETFs are added to the new definition of “financial institution.” This will reduce bank capital investment in ETFs managed by other asset management firms, but also stymie investment in a GSIB’s own ETF portfolio. Ultimately, this reduces liquidity in capital markets. The Proposal fails to offer a substantive and empirical assessment for why the definition needs to be expanded to include ETFs.

With regard to asset management, the Proposal disregards the concept of bankruptcy remoteness for management of assets held in a special purpose vehicle (SPV). It also could have a detrimental effect on the efficacy and returns for bank loan funds offered by asset management firms. Bank loan funds have proven to pose as a durable hedge against the Fed’s interest rate hikes. According to Morningstar, “[o]ver a 12-month trailing period ending Aug. 9, the average bank-loan fund has returned 7.1% while the overall bond market has lost 2.9%.”¹⁰¹

The Proposal also wants to amend the calculation to include the agency model, or a GSIB’s guarantee of a client performance during over the counter (OTC) derivatives transactions. This may deter GSIBs from acting as derivatives clearing intermediaries under the agency model.

⁹⁴ Id.

⁹⁵ 88 FR 64171

⁹⁶ *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

⁹⁷ *West Virginia v. EPA*, No. 20-1530 (U.S. Jun. 30, 2022).

⁹⁸ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-09-01/pdf/2023-16896.pdf>.

⁹⁹ 88 FR 60391

¹⁰⁰ <https://www.ft.com/content/c3c3d1f3-0cbc-4199-b650-1562c8c7c8a4>.

¹⁰¹ <https://www.morningstar.com/markets/5-top-performing-bank-loan-funds>.

Inclusion of securities not listed on an exchange or registered with the SEC would negatively impact investment in private companies. Small businesses with less than 500 employees that are private would be impacted. Moreover, the number of private companies far outstrips the number of public companies in the U.S.¹⁰² In fact, 87 percent of U.S. businesses with more than \$100 million “in revenue are private.”¹⁰³

Certificates of deposit (CDs) are low risk and pose little redemption risk because of the penalty depositors face if they withdraw their funds before the maturity date.¹⁰⁴ Even transferable CDs pose little risk and offer “higher returns.”¹⁰⁵ The justification for including of any type of CD in a GSIB’s surcharge calculation is tenuous at best.

Applying derivatives to the calculation for cross-jurisdictional activities would likely include credit-linked notes (CLNs). This is noted by the Proposal when it states that the omission of derivatives from this calculation may “present opportunities for a banking organization to use derivatives to structure its exposures in a manner that reduces the value of its systemic indicators without reducing the risks the indicator is intended to measure.”¹⁰⁶ However, the Proposal fails to highlight that the regulators’ proposed increase in capital requirements is what is forcing banks to lean on CLNs “to reduce regulatory capital charges on the loans they make.”¹⁰⁷

Moreover, the Proposal dismisses the structural benefits of CLNs and other synthetic securitizations. In some cases, these instruments utilize SPVs, which maintain the advantage of bankruptcy remoteness. The Fed pointed out that “a Board-regulated institution transfers the risk of a reference portfolio of on-balance sheet exposures to a special purpose vehicle using a guarantee or credit derivative. The special purpose vehicle issues credit-linked notes to investors, and the Board-regulated institution takes the cash proceeds of the notes as collateral supporting the special purpose vehicle’s performance on the guarantee or credit derivative.”¹⁰⁸ The Fed has even admitted that directly issuing CLNs “is similar to practices commonly used for mitigating credit risk that the Board recognizes in its capital rule.”¹⁰⁹ The Fed goes on to say that “[t]hrough a directly issued credit-linked-note transaction, firms can, in principle, transfer a portion of the credit risk on the referenced assets to the credit-linked-note investors at least as effectively as the synthetic securitizations that qualify under the capital rule.”¹¹⁰ The Proposal should explicitly authorize the usage of capital markets-based tools to mitigate credit risk.

The Proposal includes reciprocal or “sweep” deposits in the short-term wholesale funding indicator.¹¹¹ This would hamper the usage of reciprocal deposits, which offers a service to spread deposits around to various participating banks, including community banks, to ensure depositors’ funds stay under the \$250,000 deposit insurance limit. Reciprocal deposits should be removed from the short-term wholesale funding indicator because they are fundamentally different from brokered deposits.

Additionally, the vilification of short-term wholesale funding is unwarranted. In 2021 the Fed published a study showing how “[g]lobal banks mainly use” short-term wholesale funding “to finance liquid, near risk-free arbitrage positions.”¹¹²

The Proposal admits the cost of compliance would compound the increase in capital requirements found in the regulatory capital rule. The provisions in the Proposal would amount to a “\$13 billion aggregate increase in the risk-based capital requirements of domestic GSIBs.”¹¹³

¹⁰² <https://www.hamiltonlane.com/en-us/insight/staying-private-longer>.

¹⁰³ Id.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.investopedia.com/pros-and-cons-of-cds-5223947>.

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.cnbc.com/select/what-are-brokered-cds/>.

¹⁰⁶ 88 FR 60394

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.wsj.com/finance/banking/bank-synthetic-risk-transfers-basel-endgame-62410f6c>.

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/reg-q-frequently-asked-questions.htm>.

¹⁰⁹ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/reg-q-frequently-asked-questions.htm>.

¹¹⁰ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/reg-q-frequently-asked-questions.htm>.

¹¹¹ 88 FR 60395

¹¹² <https://www.federalreserve.gov/cconres/feds/files/2021032pap.pdf>.

¹¹³ 88 FR 60397

The arbitrary and capricious nature of the Proposal calls its validity and legality into question.

LONG-TERM DEBT PROPOSAL: Long-Term Debt Requirements for Large Bank Holding Companies, Certain Intermediate Holding Companies of Foreign Banking Organizations, and Large Insured Depository Institutions

The regulators are proposing that non-GSIB bank holding companies (banks) “issue and maintain minimum amounts of long-term debt.”¹¹⁴ Ostensibly, this would mitigate the risk of uninsured deposits withdrawing from banks that rely on their deposits.¹¹⁵ However, this would also leverage banks and propagate bank instability.¹¹⁶ A new government-imposed “substantial layer of liabilities” ahead of uninsured deposits would further subject banks to more regulatory oversight and scrutiny.¹¹⁷ Imposing LTD on banks is also akin to additional deposit insurance¹¹⁸ because it introduces a new moral hazard for uninsured depositors.¹¹⁹ If the LTD reduces “the likelihood” of uninsured depositors from withdrawing it would not only increase a bank’s debt load but also signal to all depositors that their funds will be safe even if bank management takes greater risks.¹²⁰ Introducing a new moral hazard would increase bank instability, not mitigate it.

The Proposal “provides a means for *de facto* extending deposit insurance through regulation.”¹²¹ The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have discussed how deposit insurance enhances instability. With deposit insurance, “banks are encouraged to finance high-risk, high-return projects. As a result, deposit insurance may lead to more bank failures and, if banks take on risks that are correlated, systemic banking crises may become more frequent.”¹²² LTD is no different. LTD acts as a form of insurance for depositors that could propagate moral hazard concerns, amplify regulatory scrutiny, and exacerbate bank instability.

The Proposal further entrenches regulators’ control of banks. This is evidenced by the Proposal’s admission that the Fed “reserve[s] the authority” to increase or lower a bank’s LTD.¹²³ The Fed is also allowed to regulate whether a bank may repurchase its LTD¹²⁴ and what type of debt securities may be included in LTD.¹²⁵ Additionally, the Proposal prohibits banks from issuing external short-term debt without any consideration of the costs versus the benefits.¹²⁶ The increase in regulatory control of the banks covered under this Proposal has not been proven to improve the overall stability of the banking sector.

The LTD minimums provided in the Proposal are effectively meaningless. Apart from the notice and opportunity for a bank to respond, an agency has seemingly unlimited discretion to raise or lower LTD minimums and add or subtract debt securities that qualify as eligible LTD.¹²⁷

The Credit Suisse debacle is a perfect example of the legal risk associated with mandating banks to issue LTD. The terms and conditions of the new UBS AT1s combined “with the legislative framework give the Swiss authority the capability to determine whether a viability event has occurred, even if the capital ratio threshold has not been breached.”¹²⁸ In a lawsuit filed in Japan, investors are suing the brokers that sold them the Credit Suisse AT1 bonds, claiming that they “did not mention

¹¹⁴ 88 FR 64526

¹¹⁵ 88 FR 64527

¹¹⁶ <https://www.finregrag.com/p/bank-resilience-equity-capital-versus>.

¹¹⁷ 88 FR 64527

¹¹⁸ <https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2023/08/long-term-debt-requirements-proposed-for-us-regional-banks>.

¹¹⁹ 88 FR 64528

¹²⁰ 88 FR 64527

¹²¹ <https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2023/08/long-term-debt-requirements-proposed-for-us-regional-banks>.

¹²² https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629183.

¹²³ 88 FR 64530

¹²⁴ *Id.*

¹²⁵ 88 FR 64531

¹²⁶ 88 FR 64542

¹²⁷ 88 FR 64533

¹²⁸ <https://www.ft.com/content/d8a4dc31-ac20-4bac-8167-c32e3e282bcb>.

the viability provision in a brochure typically provided to buyers of foreign securities.”¹²⁹ Forcing banks to issue LTD ironically opens banks up to more operational risk, which would be held accountable under the more stringent operational risk charges in the Proposal. Although the Proposal prevents banks from offering external LTD that can be converted into equity prior to a bank entering resolution, it does not prohibit conversion to equity during resolution. Moreover, “U.S. intermediate holding companies (IHCs) of foreign banking organizations”¹³⁰ would be required to issue internal LTD with a conversion trigger that would give the Federal Reserve the authority to require the “IHC to convert or exchange all or some of the eligible internal LTD into common equity tier 1 capital on a going-concern basis.”¹³¹

The Proposal’s goal is for banks to issue external LTD to institutional investors, not retail investors. However, demand for LTD is uncertain following the collapse of Credit Suisse.

The Proposal would fundamentally alter the structure of the debt liabilities held by banks. The economic analysis assumes there will be demand for LTD from institutional investors. However, the Proposal admits that academic “literature on subordinated bank debt does not always find historically that price signals from such debt led such banks to limit their growth or take action to improve their safety and soundness.”¹³² The benefits of LTD are unclear. In fact, there is a “potential lack of understanding and experience among market participants with LTD-based protection for deposits.”¹³³

The Proposal claims that new LTD will save \$800 million per year in assessments.¹³⁴ However, the regulators admit that the Proposal “does not consider whether, or to what extent, deposit insurance assessments, or a change in the level of deposit insurance assessments, could have indirect effects on estimated costs and benefits of this proposal.”¹³⁵ Additionally, “the size of the estimated LTD needs and costs presented in this section do not account for either of these potential effects of the Basel III proposal.”¹³⁶ Without analyzing the compounding effects of additional capital requirements, it is likely that the costs of implementing new LTD would be higher than anticipated.

Costs will go up as a result of the Proposal. The regulators admit that, “LTD is generally more expensive than the short-term funding banking organizations could otherwise use, the proposal is likely to raise funding costs in the long run.”¹³⁷ Additionally, regional banks will see income decline. Category IV banks will see “a twelve-basis point permanent decline in NIMs.”¹³⁸ The banks may have to increase “interest rates on new loans” to offset the cost of LTD.¹³⁹

Additionally, the size and scope of the new LTD requirements could “strain the market capacity to absorb the full amount of such issuance if issuance volume exceeds debt market appetite for LTD instruments.”¹⁴⁰

Members of Congress led a letter questioning the unnecessary uniformity of the Proposal as it applies to Categories II, III, and IV banks—all with varying asset sizes that should be treated differently.¹⁴¹ This is one example of the regulators circumventing Congress and P.L. 115-174. The Proposal highlights how it believes issuing LTD will enable more market discipline, but it also states that “scope for these effects is uncertain for a number of reasons including but not limited to potential lack of

¹²⁹ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-04/credit-suisse-at1-fallout-widens-in-japan-with-more-lawsuits>.

¹³⁰ 88 FR 64526

¹³¹ 88 FR 64540

¹³² 88 FR 64551

¹³³ Id.

¹³⁴ Id.

¹³⁵ 88 FR 64551, n. 95

¹³⁶ 88 FR 64551, n. 97

¹³⁷ 88 FR 64552

¹³⁸ 88 FR 64553

¹³⁹ Id.

¹⁴⁰ Id.

¹⁴¹ <https://twitter.com/RepLimmons/status/1727418546941026718>.

understanding and experience among market participants with LTD-based protection for deposits.¹⁴² So, it calls into question whether any empirical analysis has been conducted to determine whether the desired effects would materialize.

Instead of relying on additional leverage and heightened interest rates on loans to save losses to the DIF, policies expanding the usage of reciprocal deposits should be considered. Understanding how monetary policy affects bank stability should also be more carefully observed. Some academics have questioned whether quantitative easing contributed to the surge in uninsured deposits in recent years.¹⁴³

The Proposal claims that the collapses of SVB, Signature, and FRB changed the dynamic of the banking sector such that it justifies the implementation of LTD requirements for banks. However, each of these banks harbored foibles that ultimately led to their downfall.

Silicon Valley Bank

The Proposal claims that the collapses of SVB, Signature, and FRB changed the dynamic of the banking sector such that it justifies the implementation of LTD requirements for banks. However, each of these banks harbored foibles that ultimately led to their downfall. Some of these shortcomings include, deficient risk management, failing to account for higher interest rates, and concentrating their deposits with technology firms.

Since 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been sounding the alarm over the federal financial regulators' reluctance to elevate supervisory actions when it is necessary to stymie irresponsible bank behavior. This is relatively concrete evidence that the recent bank failures were not, as the self-evaluation from the Fed asserted, a result of bipartisan legislation enacted in 2018 that tailored bank regulation.¹⁴⁴ Rather, the bank failures are a result of the regulators' continued failure to enforce regulations that are already on the books.

In the past, Congress has passed legislation that has further subjected the banking sector to a dizzying array of federal regulations. Fortunately, in 2018, Congress passed the bipartisan *Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act* (EGRRCPA) to support regional and midsize banks so that they were not subjected to the same stringent rules as the largest banks in the U.S.

In the wake of the 2023 bank failures, the EGRRCPA and the prior Administration's alleged disempowerment of supervisors were immediately blamed for the failures. However, SVB was already well-regulated. For example:

- SVB was already subject¹⁴⁵ to various enhanced prudential standards under the Fed's Regulation YY, including a requirement to perform internal liquidity stress tests and maintain a contingency funding plan to address potential runs by its depositors.¹⁴⁶ The fact is that SVB failed its internal liquidity stress test for a 30-day stress period and Fed examiners failed to follow up adequately.
- SVB was already required to have a risk committee and a chief risk officer to report and resolve any "risk-management deficiencies in a timely manner."¹⁴⁷ SVB had neglected to fill the chief risk officer position for a period of eight months, and by the Fed's own admission, Fed staff could have issued a violation citing Regulation YY, but they chose not to.¹⁴⁸ Clearly, regulations were not the problem; rather, it was the failure to enforce the rules already on the books that led to SVB's receivership.

¹⁴² 88 FR 64551

¹⁴³ <https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/did-fed-contribute-svbs-collapse>.

¹⁴⁴ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2023-03-23_fsc_majority_-_letter_to_frbsf_and_frboard_final_v2.pdf.

¹⁴⁶ <https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-II/subchapter-A/part-252>.

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/12/252.22>.

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/svb-silicon-valley-bank-collapse-chief-risk-officer-f6e1fcfd>.

- SVB was not subjected to the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), but it was required to undergo quarterly internal liquidity stress tests. The Fed was aware of these tests and had access to the results but failed to act appropriately. Even if SVB was subject to the LCR, it would have resulted in SVB holding even more high-quality liquid assets (HQLA), such as Treasury bonds. However, it is difficult to see how holding more HQLA would have saved SVB when it faced a substantial liquidity crisis caused by the losses associated with its inventory of devalued Treasury bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities.
- It is worth noting the market value of SVB’s bond portfolio declined because of the Fed’s rapid interest rate hikes. This exposed SVB to substantial interest rate risk (IRR), which ultimately put SVB in a position where it could not liquidate enough assets to fulfill its customers’ deposit withdrawals. As outlined in SVB’s annual SEC filing, the bank was required to submit annual comprehensive capital analysis and review plans to the Fed and undergo stress testing every other year.¹⁴⁹ FDIC regulations also required SVB to submit a resolution plan. SVB submitted a plan in December 2022.

The real source of SVB’s demise was the Fed’s failure to promptly supervise and enforce rules on SVB. According to the GAO’s preliminary report on SVB and Signature, the GAO warned the FDIC and the Fed about issues with properly escalating “supervisory concerns” as early as 2011.¹⁵⁰ The prompt corrective action framework, “which was designed in 1991 to improve regulators’ ability to identify and promptly address deficiencies at depository institutions and minimize losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund—did not result in consistent actions to elevate concerns.”

In 2011, the Federal Reserve’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also released a report highlighting the Fed’s inadequate escalation of supervisory actions.¹⁵¹ The report examined the failures of state member banks from 2009 to 2011. The OIG determined that “examiners identified key safety and soundness risks, but did not take sufficient supervisory action in a timely manner to compel the Boards of Directors and management to mitigate those risks. In many instances, examiners eventually concluded that a supervisory action was necessary, but that conclusion came too late to reverse the bank’s deteriorating condition.”¹⁵² The OIG also pointed out how the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago was too slow in escalating its supervisory actions against Irwin Union Bank and Trust (IUBT).

In a 2015 report, GAO critiqued regulators again.¹⁵³ The 2015 report found that “regulators could have provided earlier and more forceful supervisory attention to troubled institutions” in the 1980s savings and loan crisis and the 2008 financial crisis.

The Fed was making the same mistakes several years prior to the passage of EGRRCPA. Supervisory failures contributed to SVB’s collapse, not tailoring bank regulation. Even the most recent OIG report pointed out that the EGRRCPA’s impact was significantly more limited.¹⁵⁴

Lastly, the Fed did not prioritize supervision of the actual financial risks embedded in SVB’s IRR. The Fed’s report on SVB admits that the Fed deferred an IRR exam “to the third quarter of 2023 in order to prioritize governance and liquidity exams.” The report goes on to say that the Fed “should have conducted comprehensive IRR and investment portfolio reviews, with adequate resources, and communicated findings through [matters requiring immediate attention].”

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¹⁴⁹ <https://ir.svb.com/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx>.

¹⁵⁰ <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106736.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/Cross_Cutting_Final_Report_9-30-11.pdf.

¹⁵² Id.

¹⁵³ <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-15-365>.

¹⁵⁴ https://www.davispolk.com/insights/client-update/silicon-valley-bank-failure-different-view-federal-reserve-oig-report?utm_source=vuture&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2023-10-18%20silicon%20valley%20bank%20failure%20c%2080%93%20a%20different%20view%20of%20the%20federal%20reserve%20oig%20report.

ATR appreciates the opportunity to comment on these three proposed rulemakings. If you have any questions or need any additional information, please contact Bryan Bashur at bbashur@atr.org.

Sincerely,

Americans for Tax Reform