

**Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs
Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.**

Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?

Yi Che, Yi Lu, Justin R. Pierce, Peter K. Schott, and Zhigang Tao

2016-039

Please cite this paper as:

Che, Yi, Yi Lu, Justin R. Pierce, Peter K. Schott, and Zhigang Tao (2016). “Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-039. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, <http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.039>.

NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.

Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?*

Yi Che[†]

Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Yi Lu[‡]

National University of Singapore

Justin R. Pierce[§]

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Peter K. Schott[¶]

Yale School of Management & NBER

Zhigang Tao^{||}

University of Hong Kong

First Draft: September 2015

This Draft: April 2016

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on U.S. Congressional elections. We find that U.S. counties subject to greater competition from China via a change in U.S. trade policy exhibit relative increases in turnout, the share of votes cast for Democrats and the probability that the county is represented by a Democrat. We find that these changes are consistent with Democrats in office during the period examined being more likely than Republicans to support legislation limiting import competition or favoring economic assistance. (JEL Codes: F13; F16; D72) (Keywords: China; Voting; Elections; Import Competition; Normal Trade Relations; World Trade Organization)

*We thank participants at the 2015 NBER China meeting for helpful comments. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Board of Governors or its research staff.

[†]tccheyi2005@hotmail.com

[‡]justinly6@gmail.com

[§]justin.r.pierce@frb.gov.

[¶]peter.schott@yale.edu.

^{||}ztao@hku.hk

1 Introduction

International trade has long been a contentious issue in U.S. elections. During the 2000s, the U.S. trade deficit with China emerged as a focus of particular attention, and recent research establishes a link between growing U.S. imports from China and the sharp loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs after the year 2000. Autor et al. (2013), for example, find that 25 to 50 percent of the manufacturing job loss in the United States between 2000 and 2007 is due to rising Chinese imports, while Pierce and Schott (2016) show that this relationship is associated with a change in U.S. trade policy – the U.S. granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China – which eliminated the threat of substantial tariff increases on Chinese imports. This heightened exposure to Chinese import competition may affect voters’ preferences through several channels, including employment, wages, profits and goods prices.

This paper examines the impact of increased exposure to competition from China on elections for the U.S. House of Representatives as well as the legislative activity of those elected to Congress. In the first part of our analysis, we show that U.S. counties with greater exposure to the change in U.S. trade policy exhibit larger increases in turnout as well as the share of votes cast for Democrats and the probability that a Democrat represents the county. The second part of our analysis documents a rationale for this change in voting behavior by showing that Congressional Democrats are, in fact, more likely to support policies that place restrictions on imports and that provide economic assistance that might mitigate the impact of import competition.

Our measure of exposure to increased competition from China arises from the U.S. granting of PNTR to China in October 2000. Prior to this change in U.S. trade policy, U.S. imports from China faced the risk, each year, that tariffs on a subset of products would rise from the low NTR tariff rates offered to WTO members to the substantially higher non-NTR rates set in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These potential tariff increases created a disincentive for U.S. firms to take advantage of production in China and for Chinese firms to expand into the U.S. market. By eliminating the possibility of these future tariff increases, PNTR removed these disincentives.

We examine voting in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives because House members serve two-year terms and are expected to maintain close personal contact with constituents. As a result, House members may be more responsive to the demands of voters than elected officials with longer terms such as Senators or Presidents.¹ We examine voting at the *county* rather than Congressional district level in order to track changes *within* constant geographic areas over time. That approach is not possible at the district level because the borders of Congressional districts change substantially during the period we examine (1992 to 2010) as a result of redistricting after the 2000

¹Karol (2012) finds that Senators and Presidents are more likely to support policies (like free trade) that are in the long-run interests of the country as a whole, even if they run counter to the short-run passions of voters. Conconi et al. (2014) show that Senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than Representatives, but that the result does not hold for Senators facing elections within the next two years.

Census. County borders, by contrast, are stable over this period. One potential additional benefit of focusing on counties is that they are smaller than Congressional districts in terms of both area and population, allowing us to capture greater variation in both exposure to Chinese import competition and residents' demographic characteristics.

Our difference-in-differences empirical strategy examines whether counties more exposed to the change in U.S. policy (first difference) experience differential changes in voting for Democrats after the policy is implemented (second difference). Across specifications that are either unweighted or weighted by counties' initial population, coefficient estimates suggest that moving a county from the 25th to the 75th percentile in terms of exposure to the change in U.S. trade policy is associated with a 1 to 2 percentage point increase in the share of votes cast for Democrats, representing a 3 to 4 percent increase relative to the across-county average share of votes for Democrats in the 2000 Congressional election, the closest Congressional election to the change in U.S. trade policy. Coefficient estimates from similar specifications indicate that the probability of a switch in representation for a county from a Republican to a Democrat Representative increases by 2 to 3 percentage points.

We allow for the potential influence of spillovers from nearby areas by controlling for changes in exposure to China experienced by neighboring counties that are part of the same labor market. Results from these specifications are qualitatively similar to the baseline specifications but somewhat larger in magnitude: moving a county from the 25th to the 75th percentile in terms of both own exposure to the policy change and neighboring counties' exposure is associated with a 4.4 percent increase in the share of votes won by the Democrat relative to the average share of votes won by Democrats in the year 2000 election, versus 3.7 percent in the baseline specification.

We also document other related evidence supportive of a role for PNTR in U.S. election outcomes. First, we find that the increase in the share of votes cast for Democrats associated with PNTR is also present for Presidential and Gubernatorial elections, indicating effects for electoral contests besides the U.S. House of Representatives. Second, we find that counties more exposed to PNTR's trade liberalization exhibit larger increases in voter turnout after the policy change, relating to the political science literature on the effect of economic conditions on voter turnout (e.g. Schlozman and Verba 1979).

The second part of our analysis examines Representatives' Congressional votes on legislation during the 1990s and 2000s using a regression discontinuity identification strategy that compares the voting of Democrats and Republicans who win office by small margins. The analysis indicates that Democrats during this period are more likely to take positions that restrict trade and that offer economic assistance that may benefit those adversely affected by trade, providing a rationale for the change in voting documented in the first part of the paper. We find that the tendency for Democrats to support such legislation is stronger after implementation of PNTR.

Together, the results in the first and second parts of the paper suggest that voters who perceive themselves as being disadvantaged by trade are more likely to vote for

politicians that might restrict imports. An interesting topic for future research is the extent to which PNTR contributes to the strong performance of candidates proposing to restrict trade or alter trade agreements among both Republicans and Democrats during the 2016 Presidential primaries.

This paper relates to literatures on voting in both political science and economics, and also complements the large literature examining the impact of international trade on worker outcomes.² A closely related paper in the voting literature is Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), which examines the effect of Congressional-district-level economic shocks from Chinese imports – using the approach in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) – on the roll-call behavior of legislators and electoral outcomes. They find that legislators from districts experiencing larger increases in Chinese import competition become more protectionist in their voting on trade-related bills, and that incumbents are able to insulate themselves from electoral competition via this voting behavior. Another closely related paper is Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth (2016), which finds that votes for presidential candidates’ incumbent parties rise with expanding U.S. exports and fall with rising U.S. imports.

Using data from German labor markets, Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015) find that higher imports from Eastern Europe and China are associated with an increase in the share of votes for far right parties.³ And in research examining the relationship between immigration and elections, Mayda, Peri and Steingress (2016) find that the share of votes cast for Republicans in U.S. elections responds to the level of immigration, with the effect varying based on the share of naturalized migrants and non-citizen migrants in the population.

This paper also relates to a literature that examines the role of trade on legislators’ voting activity. Conconi et al. (2012) examine the impact of district-level trade competition on Representatives’ votes to grant U.S. Presidents Fast Track Authority *vis a vis* the negotiation of trade agreements, and Conconi et al. (2015) examine the role of skilled labor abundance in Representatives’ votes on trade and immigration bills. Blonigen and Figlio (1998) find that legislators’ votes for bills related to trade protection are positively associated with direct foreign investment.

We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the growth of U.S.-China trade. Section 3 describes our data sources. Sections 4 and 5 present our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.

²A substantial body of research documents a negative relationship between import competition and U.S. manufacturing employment, e.g., Freeman and Katz (1991), Revenga (1992), Sachs and Shatz (1994) and Bernard et al. (2006). More recently, a series of papers link Chinese imports to employment outcomes in the United States and other developed or developing countries, e.g., Autor et al. (2013), Bloom et al. (2015), Ebenstein et al. (2014), Groizard, Ranjan and Rodriguez-Lopez (2012), Mion and Zhu (2013) and Utar and Torres Ruiz (2013). Increasingly active areas of research examine links between international trade and health (McManus and Schaur 2015a,b and Pierce and Schott 2016), crime (Dix-Carneiro et al. 2015 and Che and Xu 2015), and the provision of public goods, (Feler and Senses 2015 and Che and Xu 2015).

³Scheve and Slaughter (2001) show that individuals’ trade policy preferences are affected by skill level and homeownership status.

2 China’s Growth as a U.S. Trade Partner

In the past thirty-five years China jumped from being an insignificant contributor to world GDP to the world’s second-largest economy and largest trading state. In 2007 it became the United States’ largest source of imports, accounting for 17 percent of all imports versus just 3 percent in 1990. As illustrated in Figure 1, U.S. imports from China accelerated after China’s receipt of PNTR in 2000. U.S. exports to China also grew substantially over this period, but less rapidly, with the result that by 2007 the United States trade deficit with China exceeded \$250 billion U.S. dollars, or 1.7 percent of GDP, up from 0.3 percent of GDP in 1990.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the United States’ growing imports from China coincide with a sharp, 18 percent decline in U.S. manufacturing employment from 2001 to 2007, with more than 80 percent of the decline occurring between 2001 and 2004. Pierce and Schott (2016) show that this decline was steeper in industries more exposed to the U.S. granting of permanent normal trade relations to China, while Autor et al. (2013) show that commuting zones with industrial structures more similar to U.S. imports from China experienced greater declines in manufacturing employment. Beyond manufacturing employment, Pierce and Schott (2015) show that counties more exposed to PNTR experience both relatively higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of labor force participation during the 2000s. Related adjustment costs for workers who switch industries or occupations as a result of these trends, and which might be influential in driving voting preferences, are highlighted in Artuc et al. (2010), Ebenstein et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Caliendo et al. (2015).

Growth in the U.S. trade deficit with China has motivated U.S. legislators at various levels of government to propose restricting imports from China. As discussed in Pierce and Schott (2016), Congress demonstrated substantial resistance to the renewal of normal trade relations for China during the 1990s. Then, after the extension of PNTR and China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham repeatedly introduced legislation in the U.S. Senate to impose tariffs on U.S. imports from China based on allegations that China manipulates its exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar (Lichtblau 2011). Calls for such action generally increase during elections. Indeed, in a move the New York Times referred to as “election year politics over a loss of American jobs” (Sanger and Chan 2010), the House of Representatives in 2010 granted President Obama expanded authority to impose tariffs on a wide range of Chinese goods. The 2012 Presidential election and the lead-up to the 2016 election have also featured sharp dialogue relating to trade with China from both Republicans and Democrats.⁴

⁴For example, Donald Trump has called for a 45 percent tariff on U.S. imports from China (Haberman 2016) and Bernie Sanders proposes “Reversing trade policies like NAFTA, CAFTA and PNTR with China that have driven down wages and caused the loss of millions of jobs” (www.berniesanders.com/issues/income-and-wealth-inequality/). Recent media coverage has focused on the role of these trade positions in support for Trump and Sanders, e.g. Stromberg (2016). For additional examples, see Brower and Lerer (2012) for the 2012 election, and Collinson (2015) for the

3 Data

This section describes the data used to measure election outcomes, exposure to competition from China, and other trade-related variables that may affect election outcomes.

3.1 Election Results and Demographics

Data on county-level election outcomes from 1992 to 2010 are from *Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*.⁵ These data track the number of votes received by Democratic and Republican candidates for Congress in each county in each election year, as well as the number of registered voters.⁶

Figure 3 reports the distribution of the Democrat vote share across counties over the sample period. As indicated in the figure, the average county experienced a decline in Democrat vote share during the 1990s and early 2000s, followed by a rebound in 2006 and 2008, and then a decline in 2010. The mean Democrat vote share in the 2000 Congressional election is 40 percent, with a standard deviation of 23 percentage points.

We match the voting data to county-level demographic data from the 1990 Decennial Census that have been found to be important correlates of voting behavior in the political science and economics literatures on voting.⁷ These data are summarized in Table 1.

3.2 Counties' Exposure to PNTR

We make use of the structure of the U.S. tariff schedule to define a measure of each industry's – and in turn, each county's – exposure to PNTR. The tariff schedule has two basic sets of tariffs: *NTR tariffs*, which average 4 percent across industries and are applied to goods imported from other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and *non-NTR tariffs*, which were set by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 and are typically substantially higher than the corresponding NTR rates, averaging 37 percent across industries. While imports from non-market economies, such as China, generally are subject to the higher non-NTR rates, U.S. tariff law allows the President to grant such countries access to NTR rates on an annually renewable basis, subject to approval by Congress.

2016 election cycle.

⁵For details on data collection, see www.uselectionatlas.org.

⁶County boundaries are substantially more stable than those of Congressional districts, whose borders change after each decennial census. During our sample period, there are only three changes: South Boston, VA (county code 51780) joined Halifax County (51083) on July 1, 1995; Dade County, FL (12025) was renamed as Miami-Dade FL (12086) on November 13, 1997; and Skagway-Yakutat-Angoon, AK (2231) was changed to Skagway-Hoonah-Angoon Census Area, AK (2232) on September 22, 1992, and then to Hoonah-Angoon Census Area, AK on June 20, 2007. In each case, we aggregate the noted counties for the entire sample period.

⁷See, for example, Baldwin and Magee (2000), Gilbert and Oladi (2012), Kriner and Reeves (2012), Wright (2012) and Conconi et al. (2012).

U.S. Presidents granted China such a waiver every year starting in 1980, but annual re-approval of the waiver became politically contentious following the Chinese government’s crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Re-approval remained controversial throughout the 1990s, especially during other flashpoints in U.S.-China relations including China’s transfer of missile technology to Pakistan in 1993 and the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis in 1996. Importantly, if annual renewal of the waiver had failed, U.S. tariffs on imports from China generally would have risen substantially from the temporary NTR level to the much higher non-NTR rates.

The possibility of tariff increases each year served as a disincentive for firms considering engaging in U.S.-China trade.⁸ Pierce and Schott (2016) provide anecdotes indicating that this threat both discouraged U.S. firms from making investments in China and suppressed investments by Chinese firms considering exporting to the United States, thereby reducing import competition for U.S. producers.

PNTR, which was passed by Congress in October 2000 and took effect upon China’s entry to the WTO in December 2001, permanently locked in U.S. tariffs on imports from China at the low NTR rates, eliminating these disincentives.⁹ As documented in Pierce and Schott (2016), the industries and products most affected by the policy change experienced larger declines in U.S. manufacturing employment, as well as larger increases in imports from China – including related-party imports – and larger increases in exports to the United States by foreign-owned firms in China.¹⁰

We compute counties’ exposure to PNTR in two steps. The first step is to calculate exposure for U.S. industries. We follow Pierce and Schott (2016) in defining the industry-level impact of PNTR as the increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods that would have occurred in the event of a failed annual renewal of China’s NTR status prior to PNTR,

$$NTR\ Gap_j = Non\ NTR\ Rate_j - NTR\ Rate_j. \quad (1)$$

We refer to this difference as the NTR gap, and compute it for each four-digit SIC industry j using *ad valorem equivalent* tariff rates provided by Feenstra et al (2002) for 1999, the year before passage of PNTR. As illustrated in Figure 4, NTR gaps vary widely across industries, with a mean and standard deviation of 33 and 15 percentage points, respectively. As noted in Pierce and Schott (2016), 79 percent of the variation in the NTR gap across industries is due to non-NTR rates, set 70 years prior to passage

⁸Intuition for these incentives can be derived, in part, from the literature on investment under uncertainty (e.g., Pindyck 1993 and Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen 2007), which demonstrates that firms are more likely to undertake irreversible investments as the ambiguity surrounding their expected profit decreases. Handley (2014) introduces these insights to firms’ decisions to export.

⁹The passage of PNTR followed the bilateral agreement in 1999 between the U.S. and China regarding China’s eventual entry into the WTO.

¹⁰Feng, Li and Swenson (2016) discuss the effect of PNTR on entry and exit patterns of Chinese exporters, as well as changes in export product characteristics; Heise et al. (2015) describe the effect of PNTR on the structure of supply chains; and Handley and Limao (2014) discuss its implications for trade.

of PNTR. This feature of non-NTR rates effectively rules out reverse causality that would arise if *non-NTR rates* were set to protect industries with declining employment or surging imports. Furthermore, to the extent that *NTR rates* were raised to protect industries with declining employment prior to PNTR, these *higher* NTR rates would result in *lower* NTR gaps, biasing our results away from finding an effect of PNTR.¹¹

We compute U.S. counties' exposure to PNTR as the employment-share weighted average NTR gap across the sectors in which they are active,

$$NTR\ Gap_c = \sum_j \left(\frac{L_{jcb}}{L_{cb}} NTR\ Gap_j \right), \quad (2)$$

where L_{jcb} is the base-year b employment of SIC industry j in county c and L_{cb} is the overall employment in county c in base year b .¹²

County-industry-year employment data are from the U.S. Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP). We use $b = 1990$ for the base year to mitigate a potential relationship between counties' industrial structure and the year 2000 change in U.S. trade policy. Given that services comprise a large share of employment, the distribution of *county-level NTR Gap_c* is shifted leftwards relative to the distribution of manufacturing and other *industries* for which the *NTR Gap_j* is defined: the mean and standard deviation of the county-level NTR gap are 7.3 and 6.5 percentage points, as displayed visually in Figure 5. The difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles is 8.3 (=10.6-2.3) percentage points.

We also compute counties' exposure to PNTR via the average NTR gap of surrounding counties in the same commuting zone, a geographic area roughly analogous to a local labor market.¹³ The correlation of own- and commuting-zone NTR gaps across counties, 0.58, is displayed visually in Figure 6.

3.3 Other Controls for Exposure to Import Competition

Our analysis includes controls for counties' average NTR rate and their exposure to the phasing out of textile and clothing quotas under the global Multi-Fiber Arrangement (Khandelwal et al. 2013).

We compute counties' exposure to U.S. import tariffs and the MFA phase-outs as the employment-share weighted average of their tariff rates and exposure to MFA, i.e., as in equation 2. Following Brambilla et al. (2009) and Pierce and Schott (2016),

¹¹Cross-industry variation in the NTR rate explains less than 1 percent of variation in the NTR gap.

¹²NTR gaps can only be calculated for products subject to import tariffs, such as manufacturing, agriculture and mining products. NTR gaps for services, which are not subject to import tariffs are, by definition, zero.

¹³We use the U.S. Census Bureau definition of commuting zones as of 1990 and the concordance of counties to commuting zones provided by Autor et al. (2013). The 3113 counties in our sample are distributed across 741 commuting zones, with the number of counties per commuting zone ranging from 1 to 19 (the Washington DC area).

we measure the extent to which industry quotas were binding under the MFA as the import-weighted average fill rate of the textile and clothing products that were under quota in that industry, where fill rates are defined as the actual imports divided by allowable imports under the the quota. Industries with higher average fill rates faced more binding quotas and are therefore more exposed to the end of the MFA. Products not covered by the MFA have a fill rate of zero.

4 Trade Liberalization with China and Voting in U.S. Congressional Elections

This section explores the link between the U.S. granting of PNTR to China in 2000 and outcomes of U.S. Congressional elections.

4.1 Identification Strategy

Our baseline estimation examines the link between the share of votes cast for the Democratic candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in county c in even election year t from 1992 to 2010, a period that straddles the year 2000 change in U.S. trade policy. We use a difference-in-differences (DID) specification that asks whether counties with higher NTR gaps (first difference) experience differential changes in voting after the change in U.S. trade policy (second difference),

$$\begin{aligned} DemVote_{ct} = & \theta PostPNTR_t \times NTRGap_c \\ & + PostPNTR_t \times \mathbf{X}'_c \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{X}'_{ct} \boldsymbol{\beta} \\ & + \boldsymbol{\delta}_c + \boldsymbol{\delta}_t + \alpha + \varepsilon_{ct}, \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The dependent variable is the percent of votes received by the Democrat in county c in year t . The first term on the right-hand side is the DID term of interest, an interaction of a post-PNTR (i.e., $t > 2000$) indicator with the (time-invariant) county-level NTR gap, as defined in the preceding section.

\mathbf{X}_c represents a vector of initial period county demographic attributes taken from the 1990 Census that are found to be important in the economics and political science literatures on voting. These attributes are median household income, share of population achieving higher education, the share of non-white population, the share of veterans and the share of voters over 65. Including interactions of these attributes with the $PostPNTR_t$ indicator allows the relationship between these demographic characteristics and voting outcomes to differ before and after passage of PNTR. \mathbf{X}_{ct} represents a matrix of time-varying policy attributes including the average U.S. import tariff rate associated with each county's mix of industries as well as the county's exposure to the phasing out of the MFA. $\boldsymbol{\delta}_c$ and $\boldsymbol{\delta}_t$ represent county and year fixed effects.

One advantage of this DID identification strategy is its ability to net out characteristics of counties that are time-invariant, while also controlling for aggregate shocks that affect all counties identically in a particular year, such as whether the election occurs during a presidential versus non-presidential election year.¹⁴ We consider both unweighted regressions (Tables 2 to 4), which are representative of the relationship for the average county, and regressions for which observations are weighted by counties' initial population (Table 5), making them representative of the average individual.

Figure 7 plots the average Democrat vote share (left panel) and probability of Democrat victory (right panel) for two groups of counties: those with own- and surrounding-county NTR gaps above, versus below, the median of these gaps across all counties. The vertical line in each figure represents the year in which PNTR was passed. As indicated in the figures, the Democrat vote share and probability of Democratic representation tend to be higher for high NTR gap counties in both the pre- and post-PNTR periods. Importantly, in each case, trends in outcomes prior to the change in U.S. policy are similar, consistent with the parallel trends assumption inherent in difference-in-differences analysis. Among those counties with both NTR gaps above the median, there is movement towards relatively higher Democrat vote shares in 2002 and 2008 and higher probability of Democrat victory in 2008. Estimation of Equation 3 examines the extent to which there is a statistically significant shift toward higher Democrat vote shares and a higher probability of Democratic victory for more exposed counties in the post-PNTR period.

4.2 Exposure to PNTR and Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives

The first three columns of Table 2 summarize the results of estimating equation (3) via OLS for 1992 to 2010. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level are reported below each estimate. As indicated in the first column of the table, we find no relationship between PNTR and voting for Democrats in a simple specification that includes only the DID term of interest and the fixed effects. The results in columns two and three, by contrast, indicate a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the DID term once the time-invariant and time-varying county attributes found to be important in the voting literature are added. The point estimate in the third column, 0.18, implies that a county moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile NTR gap (from 2.3 to 10.6 percent) is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the share of votes won by the Democratic candidate, or 3.7 percent of the average 40 percent share of the vote for Democrats in the 2000 Congressional election (as displayed in the final row of the table).¹⁵

¹⁴One disadvantage is that the long sample period renders it susceptible to biased standard errors associated with serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2003).

¹⁵Note that the 40 percent share of votes cast for Democrats in the 2000 House of Representatives elections is an average across counties. Overall, the Democratic candidate received 46,595,202 votes (46.8 percent of total) in the 2000 House of Representatives elections, while the Republican candidate

Columns four through six of Table 2 examine the relationship between PNTR and three other election outcomes: an indicator variable for whether the Democrat wins the county, an indicator for whether the election results in a switch to a Democrat representing the county, and an indicator for whether the election results in a switch to a Republican representing the county.¹⁶ For the latter two regressions the sample is restricted to observations in which the prior office holder was a Republican, or Democrat, respectively.

As indicated in the table, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between exposure to PNTR and the probability of both Democrat victory and a switch to a Democratic Representative. By contrast, we find a statistically significant decline in the probability of a switch to a Republican Representative. The point estimate for Democrat victory in column four, 0.2282, indicates that a county moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile NTR gap is associated with a 1.9 percentage point increase in the probability of victory, or 5.4 percent of the probability of victory in the year 2000. Similar exercises indicate an estimated increase in the probability of switching to Democrat of 1.9 percentage points, and an estimated decrease in the probability of switching to a Republican of -2.2 percentage points. These estimated changes represent approximately 27 and -17 percent of the average probabilities of such switches occurring in the year 2000 (7 and 13 percent, respectively).

Estimates for the remaining covariates included in the regression suggest that voters with a college degree and at least some graduate education are more likely to support Democrats after 2000, while those over 65 are less likely to do so.

The final column of Table 2 examines the relationship between exposure to PNTR and voter turnout, defined as the number of people voting in the election divided by the number of registered voters.¹⁷ As indicated in the table, we find that higher exposure to PNTR is associated with a statistically and economically significant increase in voter turnout. The point estimate for the DID term, 0.14, suggests that a county moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in terms of exposure is associated with a 1.18 percentage point increase in turnout, or 1.8 percent of the average turnout across counties in the year 2000 (65 percent).

To the extent that the median voter is injured by increased import competition in the more heavily-affected counties, this result is in line with a political science literature arguing that economic adversity can increase voter turnout (e.g. Schlozman and Verba 1979). This result differs from Dippel, Gold and Heblich's (2015) finding that higher imports have no relationship with election turnout in Germany. The difference may stem, in part, from U.S. voters directing votes toward a major party in response to trade

received 46,738,619 votes (47.0 percent of total) and candidates from other parties received 6,125,773 votes (6.2 percent of total). See Federal Election Commission (2001).

¹⁶Because counties are reallocated to Congressional districts over time, we emphasize that this analysis does not directly examine victories in House elections, but rather examines the probability that a Representative from a particular party represents a county.

¹⁷Turnout data are missing from *Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections* for 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2008.

competition, whereas Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015) show that import competition in Germany is associated with an increase in votes for far-right parties.

4.3 Exposure to PNTR via Neighboring Counties Within Commuting Zones

In this section we examine whether voters in one county might be influenced by economic conditions in neighboring counties that are part of the same labor market. The specification we consider is similar to that considered in the previous section but it is augmented with an additional difference-in-differences term, an interaction of the post-PNTR indicator variable with the average NTR gap across other counties in the same commuting zone (z).

As illustrated in Table 3, the estimated coefficients for both own and external commuting zone NTR gaps are positive for all five outcome variables: the Democrat vote share, the probability of Democrat victory, the probability of a switch towards a Democrat or away from a Republican, and turnout. Though estimates for the two DID terms are not individually significant, they are jointly significant in all cases, as indicated by the F-test p-values reported in the third-to-last row of the table.

In terms of economic significance, the coefficient estimates in the first column suggest that a county moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile NTR gap (from 2.3 to 10.6 percent) is associated with a 1.8 percentage point increase in the share of votes won by the Democrat candidate, representing 4.4 percent of the average 40 percent share of the vote for Democrats in the year 2000. Point estimates in the third column indicate that moving a county from the 25th to the 75th percentile NTR gap boosts the probability of Democrat victory by 6.3 percent compared to the average probability of victory across counties in the year 2000. For switching to a Democrat, switching to a Republican and turnout, the comparable percentages are 28, -32 and 1.25 percent, respectively. These magnitudes are all somewhat larger than those reported in the baseline results indicating that counties' voting outcomes are also affected by spillovers from neighboring counties in the same labor market.

4.4 Exposure to PNTR and the Democrat Vote Share for Other Offices

In this section we examine the relationship between PNTR and the Democrat vote share for three other offices: Presidential, Senatorial and gubernatorial. Presidential and gubernatorial elections occur every four years, but unlike Presidential elections, the latter do not all occur in the same year for all states. Senatorial elections occur every six years, with approximately one third of Senators up for election in any given election year.

Results are reported in Table 5. We find positive and statistically significant relationships between the change in U.S. trade policy and the share of votes won by

Democrats in both Presidential and gubernatorial elections. The DID point estimates for President and governor suggest that moving a county from the 25th to the 75th percentile in terms of exposure to PNTR is associated with increases in the Democrat vote share of 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points, or 1 and 2.5 percent of the average share of votes won by Democrats for these offices across counties in the year 2000. We also find a positive relationship between PNTR and the share of votes won by Democrats in Senatorial elections, but this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The observed effects on Presidential and gubernatorial outcomes provide further evidence consistent with the role of PNTR's trade liberalization on elections.

4.5 Weighting Counties by Population

The coefficient estimates reported in the previous three sections are based on unweighted regressions, and therefore are representative of the relationship between PNTR and voting behavior for the average county. In this section we consider the effect of weighting by initial (1990) population, which provides estimates representative of the average individual.

As indicated in Table 2, we continue to find positive and statistically significant relationships between PNTR and the share of votes won by Democrats, the likelihood of a switch to a Democrat Representative and turnout. We no longer find statistically significant relationships between counties' exposure to the change in U.S. trade policy and the likelihood of either Democrat victory or a switch to a Republican Representative.

The point estimates in the first, third and fifth columns indicate that moving a county from the 25th to the 75th percentile NTR gap increases the Democrat vote share, the probability of a switch to a Democrat Representative and turnout by 2.8, 18.9 and 3.3 percent relative to their levels in the year 2000. The first two of these magnitudes are somewhat lower than those implied by the estimates in Table 3 (3.7 and 27, respectively), while the estimated effect for turnout is higher (1.8 in Table 3).

5 Party Affiliation and Legislator Voting Behavior

The previous section establishes that voters in counties facing larger increases in competition from China are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. One explanation for this result is that workers displaced by Chinese imports sought to elect officials that would either protect U.S. workers from international trade or soften the effect of this competition by promoting economic assistance programs. This section investigates whether Congressional Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1990s and 2000s were more likely to vote for legislation along these lines. We use a regression discontinuity approach to examine whether Republicans' and Democrats' votes differ on trade-related and economic assistance-related bills. We begin by discussing the classification of bills as being either for or against free trade or economic assistance and then describe our identification strategy before presenting the results.

5.1 Classification of “Trade” and “Economic Assistance” Bills

House members’ votes from 1993 to 2011 (from the start of the 103rd to part of the 112th Congresses) are obtained from the website www.govtrack.us. Data on the set of bills considered by the House during this period are from the Rohde/PIPC House Roll Call Database, maintained and generously provided by David Rohde of Duke University. We adopt Rohde’s classifications of bills related to trade and economic assistance programs, and then classify bills as pro- versus anti-free trade and pro-versus anti- economic assistance using ranking data from the National Journal. We describe each of these steps in turn.

5.1.1 Trade Bills

The Rohde/PIPC House Roll Call Database assigns each bill a code summarizing its content.¹⁸ We follow Rohde in considering bills to be trade-related if they fall into the following categories: “Japanese trade” (540), “Federal trade commission” (542), “un-fair trading practices” (543), “export controls” (544), “compensation to U.S. business and workers” (545), “Export-Import Bank” (546), “tariff negotiations” (547), “import quotas-tariffs” (548), and “miscellaneous” (549). We classify trade-related bills as pro-versus anti-free trade based on the National Journal’s rankings of the “economic liberalness” of the bills’ sponsors.¹⁹ A ranking of $r \in (0, 100)$ indicates that the sponsor is more “liberal” in their voting than r percent of House members. Bills whose primary sponsor’s ranking exceeds 50 are coded as anti-free-trade. The remaining bills are coded as pro-free-trade. One drawback of this approach is its reliance on a ranking system based exclusively on a principle component analysis of members’ votes on economic issues. A major benefit of the approach, in addition to its simplicity, is the independence of the rankings. We note that the results discussed below are also robust to the authors’ qualitative classification of bills as either pro- or anti-free trade.

5.1.2 Economic Assistance Bills

We consider bills to be related to economic assistance if they fall into the following categories of the Rohde database: “jobs” (code 810 of the database), “welfare benefits/social services” (code 811), “job training” (code 816), “nutrition programs” (code 831), “family assistance” (code 832), “homeless” (code 835), “unemployment assistance” (code 962), and “minimum wage” (code 966). As above, we use the National Journal rankings to classify bills as pro- versus anti- economic assistance according to whether the bills’ sponsors’ economic liberalness rankings are above or below 50.

¹⁸The complete list of codes can be found at <http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/>.

¹⁹Further detail on these rankings is available at <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-vote-ratings/how-the-vote-ratings-are-calculated-20140206>.

5.2 Identification Strategy

We examine the relationship between House members' votes on trade and economic assistance bills and their party affiliation using the following specification,

$$y_{dh} = \alpha + \beta Democrat_{dh} + \mathbf{X}_{dh}'\theta + \delta_s + \delta_h + \varepsilon_{dh}, \quad (4)$$

where d and h denote Congressional districts and the particular two-year Congress during which Representatives serve.²⁰ The dependent variable y_{dh} represents the share of anti-free trade or pro-economic assistance bills supported by a particular representative during a particular Congress. The dummy variable $Democrat_{dh}$ takes the value 1 if the Representative is a Democrat and zero otherwise. \mathbf{X}_{dh} represents a matrix of district-Congress attributes, including the demographic characteristics of the district and personal attributes of the Representative.²¹ δ_s and δ_h represent state and Congress fixed effects, and ε_{dh} is the error term. As noted in the introduction, Congressional district boundaries change substantially over the sample period as a result of redistricting. We are therefore unable to include district fixed effects in equation 4.

In this specification, identification of β requires that Representatives' party affiliation be uncorrelated with the error term. As there may be several reasons why this assumption is violated, we follow Lee (2008) in identifying the causal effect of party affiliation on voting behavior using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach.²² Specifically, we make use of the principle that the probability of a Democrat winning a congressional election disproportionately increases at the point where they receive a larger share of votes than the Republican competitor.

Formally, define the assignment variable

$$Margin_{dh} \equiv VoteShare_{dh}^{Democratic} - VoteShare_{dh}^{Republican}$$

as the difference in voting share between the Democratic and Republican candidates in the Congressional district d for election to Congress h . As illustrated in Figure 8, the probability of a Democratic candidate winning an election conditional on the margin of victory has a discontinuity at the cutoff 0. That is, this probability is substantially near 1 for values of m just above zero compared with values of m just below zero.²³ Hahn et al. (2001) show that when $E[\varepsilon_{dh}|Margin_{dh} = m]$ is continuous in m at the

²⁰For example, $h = 110$ represents the 110th Congress, which met from January 3, 2007 to January 3, 2009.

²¹Data on House members' age, gender, party affiliation and other characteristics used in the second part of our analysis are obtained from Wikipedia.

²²Lee et. al (2004) uses RD to investigate the effect of party affiliation on legislators' right-vs-left voting scores.

²³Note that there are cases in which a third party won the election even though the Democratic candidate received more (less) votes than the Republican party. As a result, $\Pr[Democratic_{d,t} = 1|Margin_{d,t} = m] \neq 1$ when $m > 0$.

cutoff 0, β in equation (4) can be identified as

$$\hat{\beta}_{RD} = \frac{\lim_{m \downarrow 0} E[y_{dh} | \text{Margin}_{dh} = m] - \lim_{m \uparrow 0} E[y_{dh} | \text{Margin}_{dh} = m]}{\lim_{m \downarrow 0} E[\text{Democrat}_{dh} | \text{Margin}_{dh} = m] - \lim_{m \uparrow 0} E[\text{Democrat}_{dh} | \text{Margin}_{dh} = m]} \quad (5)$$

Lee and Lemieux (2010) show that $\hat{\beta}_{RD}$ is essentially an instrumental variable estimator. Specifically, the first stage of the instrumental variable estimation is

$$\text{Democrat}_{dh} = \gamma I\{\text{Margin}_{dh} \geq 0\} + g(\text{Margin}_{dh}) + \mu_{dh},$$

while the second stage is

$$y_{dh} = \alpha + \beta \text{Democrat}_{dh} + f(\text{Margin}_{dh}) + \varepsilon_{dh},$$

where $I\{.\}$ is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the argument in brackets is true and 0 if it is false, and where $g(.)$ and $f(.)$ are flexible functions of the assignment variable that control for the direct effect of the strength of the Democratic versus Republican parties on the outcome variable y_{dh} . Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest both nonparametric and parametric approaches to estimate $\hat{\beta}_{RD}$. We pursue both approaches, with details provided in Section B of the online appendix.

The identifying assumption of our RD estimation – that $E[\varepsilon_{dh} | \text{Margin}_{dh} = m]$ is continuous in m at the cutoff 0 – implies that the election outcome at the cutoff point is determined by random factors, i.e., no party or candidate can fully manipulate the election.²⁴ To provide quantitative support for this assumption, we perform two checks suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). First, if there were full manipulation at the cutoff point 0, the distribution of district characteristics on the two sides of the cutoff point would be different, and a mixture of district-level discontinuous densities would imply that the aggregate distribution of assignment variable is discontinuous at the cutoff point. We check the density distribution of the assignment variable using the method developed by McCrary (2008). As shown in Figure A.1 of the online appendix, we do not find any discontinuity in the density distribution of the assignment variable at the cutoff point 0, and hence fail to reject the hypothesis that our identifying assumption is satisfied.

The second check directly examines pre-determined characteristics between Congressional districts in the neighborhood of the cutoff point. If there were full manipulation at the cutoff, districts on the margin would not be balanced and these

²⁴Using RD to investigate the incumbent advantage, Lee (2008) argues:

“It is plausible that the exact vote count in large elections, while influenced by political actors in a non-random way, is also partially determined by chance beyond any actor’s control. Even on the day of an election, there is inherent uncertainty about the precise and final vote count. In light of this uncertainty, the local independence result predicts that the districts where a party’s candidate just barely won an election—and hence barely became the incumbent—are likely to be comparable in all other ways to districts where the party’s candidate just barely lost the election.”

pre-determined district characteristics would show discontinuities in their distribution at the cutoff point. Figures A.2 to A.10, reported in the appendix reveal that none of the distributions of district attributes used in our analysis exhibit discontinuities at the cutoff 0, indicating that our hypothesis of a valid RD setting cannot be rejected.

5.3 Results

We start with a visual presentation of the relationship between Democrats' margin of victory, $Margin_{dh}$, and the districts' subsequent votes for trade and economic assistance bills, y_{dh} , across the 103rd (January 1993 through January 1995) to the 112th (January 2011 to January 2013) Congresses. Figures 9 and 10 show that the share of districts' pro-free trade votes drops discontinuously at the cutoff point $Margin_{dh} = 0$, while their share of pro-economic assistance votes rises discontinuously at this cut off. Given that the chance of winning the election jumps discontinuously at the same point (see Figure 8), these outcomes reveal that Democratic Representatives during this period were more likely to take anti-free trade positions and pro-economic assistance positions than their Republican colleagues. Our regression analysis estimates these differences where the margin of Democrat victory equals zero.

Formal estimation results for the effect of party affiliation on districts' voting for pro-free trade and pro-economic assistance bills, $\hat{\beta}^{RD}$, are reported in Tables 6 and 7. The first column of each table reports results using OLS, while columns two and three report results for the non-parametric and parametric RD estimations, respectively. As noted in the tables, estimates are negative and statistically significant in all three columns for pro-free trade bills, and positive and statistically significant in all three columns for pro-economic assistance bills, consistent with Figures 9 and 10. The results in Tables 6 and 7 are also robust to variation in the bandwidth of our nonparametric estimation as well as alternative polynomial expansions.²⁵

In terms of economic significance, the 2SLS coefficient estimates reported in the third column of each table indicate that a Democratic affiliation is associated with a 16 percent reduction in the share of votes for pro-free trade legislation and a 27 percent increase in the share of votes for pro-economic assistance bills, relative to Republican affiliation. These results therefore provide a rationale for the voting results reported in Section 4.

Moreover, comparison of legislators' votes over time indicates even sharper differences between parties after the change in U.S. trade policy. Table 8 compares results for the final specifications reported in Tables 6 and 7 for the pre- versus post-PNTR time periods. As indicated in the table, we find that for both types of legislation, Democrats are less likely to support pro-free trade and more likely to support pro-economic assistance legislation in Congresses after 2000 versus before.

²⁵See Section B of the online appendix for further discussion.

6 Conclusion

This paper examines the effect of increased import competition from China on U.S. political outcomes. Our primary measure of exposure to competition from China comes from the U.S. granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations to China, and we examine its effect in a differences-in-differences specification.

We find that U.S. counties more exposed to increased competition from China experience increases in the share of votes cast for Democrats in Congressional elections, along with increases in the probability that a Democrat represents a county and the probability of a county switching from a Republican to a Democrat Representative. The results are also economically significant – we find that moving a county from the 25th to the 75th percentile of exposure to China increases the Democrat vote share in Congressional elections by 1.5 percentage points, or a 3.7 percent increase relative to the average share of votes won by Democrats in the 2000 Congressional election. Moreover, we find that the effect of the increase in import competition on voting is slightly larger once we account for the exposure of other counties in the same labor market, and that increased import competition is associated with higher voter turnout and a higher share of votes cast for Democrats in Presidential and gubernatorial elections.

The second half of our analysis investigates potential links between these voting outcomes and the policy choices of legislators in Congress. We use a regression discontinuity approach to examine differences between Democrats’ and Republicans’ voting on bills related to trade and economic assistance programs. We find that Democrats are more likely to support policies that limit import competition and that provide economic assistance that may benefit workers adversely affected by trade competition, providing an explanation for the voting behavior documented in the first part of our paper.

Our results suggest that voters who perceive themselves as being disadvantaged by trade are more likely to vote for politicians that might restrict imports or promote economic assistance. A potentially fruitful avenue for further research is to investigate a link between PNTR and the success of Republican and Democrat candidates proposing to alter trade agreements during the 2016 Presidential primaries.

References

- [1] Acemoglu, Daron, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Brendan Price. 2013. Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s. Working Paper.
- [2] Artuc, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren. 2010. “Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach.” *American Economic Review*, 100(3): 1008-45.

- [3] Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States. *American Economic Review*, 103(6): 2121-2168.
- [4] Baldwin, Robert E. and Christopher S. Magee. 2000. Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills. *Public Choice*, 105: 79-101.
- [5] Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, and Peter K. Schott. 2006. "Survival of the Best Fit: Exposure to Low-Wage Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of US Manufacturing Plants." *Journal of International Economics* 68(1): 219-237.
- [6] Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275, February.
- [7] Bloom, Nick, Stephen Bond and John Van Reenen. 2007. "Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics." *Review of Economic Studies* 74: 391-415.
- [8] Blonigen, Bruce A. and David N. Figlio. 1998. Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislative Behavior? *American Economic Review*, 88(4): 1002-1014.
- [9] Brambilla, Irene, Amit K. Khandelwal and Peter K. Schott. 2009. "China's Experience Under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)." In *China's Growing Roll in World Trade*, edited by Robert Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Forthcoming.
- [10] Brower, Kate Anderson and Lisa Lerer. 2012. China-Bashing as Campaign Rhetoric Binds Obama to Romney. *Bloomberg Business* <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-04/china-bashing-binds-obama-to-romney-with-trade-imbalance-as-foil>.
- [11] Caliendo, Lorenzo, Maximiliano Dvorkin, and Fernando Parro. 2015. The Impact of Trade on Labor Market Dynamics. NBER Working Paper No. 21149.
- [12] Che, Yi and Xu, Xun. 2015. The China Syndrome in US: Import Competition, Crime, and Government Transfer. Mimeo, University of Munich.
- [13] Collinson, Stephen. 2015. 2016 Candidates Take Aim at China. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/28/politics/rubio-walker-clinton-china-policy/>
- [14] Conconi, Paola, Giovanni Facchini, and Maurizio Zanardi. 2014. Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections. *Journal of International Economics*, 94: 102-118.

- [15] Conconi, Paola, Giovanni Facchini, and Maurizio Zanardi. 2012. Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 4(3): 146-189.
- [16] Conconi, Paola, Giovanni Facchini, Max F. Steinhardt and Maurizio Zanardi. 2015. The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Working Paper.
- [17] Dippel, Christian, Robert Gold and Stephan Heblich. 2015. Globalization and its (Dis-)Content: Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior. Mimeo, UCLA.
- [18] Dix-Carneiro, Rafael, Rodrigo R. Soares and Gabriel Ulyssea. 2015. "Local Labor Market Conditions and Crime: Evidence from the Brazilian Trade Liberalization." Mimeo.
- [19] Ebenstein, Avraham, Ann Harrison, Margaret McMillan, and Shannon Phillips. 2014. Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers using the Current Population Surveys. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 96(4): 581-595.
- [20] Federal Election Commission. 2001. Federal Elections 2000. Available online at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/preface.htm>.
- [21] Feenstra, Robert C., John Romalis and Peter K. Schott. 2002. "U.S. Imports, Exports and Tariff Data, 1989-2001." NBER Working Paper 9387.
- [22] Feler, Leo and Mine Z. Senses. 2015. "Trade Shocks and the Provision of Local Public Goods." Unpublished.
- [23] Feigenbaum, James J. and Andrew B. Hall. 2015. "How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition." *Journal of Politics*, forthcoming.
- [24] Feng, Ling, Zhiyuan Li and Deborah L. Swenson. "Trade Policy Uncertainty and Exports: Evidence from China's WTO Accession." NBER Working Paper 21985.
- [25] Freeman, R., Katz, L., 1991. "Industrial Wage and Employment Determination in an Open Economy," in *Immigration, Trade and Labor Market*, edited by John M. Abowd and Richard B. Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [26] Gilbert, John and Reza Oladi. 2012. Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China. *Public Choice*, 150: 745-769.
- [27] Groizard, Jose L., Priya Ranjan and Jose Antonio Rodriguez-Lopez. 2012. "Input Trade Flows." Unpublished.

- [28] Haberman, Maggie. Donald Trump Says He Favors Big Tariffs on Chinese Imports. Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/01/07/donald-trump-says-he-favors-big-tariffs-on-chinese-exports/?_r=0.
- [29] Hahn, Jinyong, Petra Todd, and Wilbert Van der Klaauw. 2001. Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design. *Econometrica*, 69(1): 201-209.
- [30] Handley, Kyle. 2014. "Exporting Under Trade Policy Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence." *Journal of International Economics* 94(1): 50-66.
- [31] Handley, Kyle and Nuno Limao. 2014. "Policy Uncertainty, Trade and Welfare: Evidence from the U.S. and China." Mimeo.
- [32] Heise, Sebastian, Justin R. Pierce, Georg Schaur and Peter Schott. 2015. "Trade Policy and the Structure of Supply Chains." Mimeo.
- [33] Imbens, Guido and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2012. Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator. *Review of Economic Studies*, 79(3): 933-959.
- [34] Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn and Stephen Weymouth. 2016. Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on U.S. Presidential Voting. NBER Working Paper 21899.
- [35] Karol, David. 2012. Congress, the President and Trade Policy in the Obama Years. Working Paper, University of Maryland.
- [36] Khandelwal, Amit K., Peter K. Schott and Shang-Jin Wei. 2013. "Trade Liberalization and Embedded Institutional Reform: Evidence from Chinese Exporters." *American Economic Review* 103 (6): 2169-95.
- [37] Kleibergen, Frank and Richard Paap. 2006. Generalized Reduced Rank Tests Using the Singular Value Decomposition. *Journal of Econometrics* 133(1):97-126.
- [38] Kriner, Douglas L. and Andrew Reeves. 2012. The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2), 348-366.
- [39] Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J. Butler. 2004. Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3): 807-859.
- [40] Lee, David S. 2008. Randomized Experiments from Non-random Selection in U.S. House Elections. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142: 675-697.

- [41] Lee, David S. and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48: 281-355.
- [42] Lee, David S. and David Card. 2008. Regression Discontinuity Inference with Specification Error. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142(2): 655-674.
- [43] Lichtblau, Eric. 2011. Senate Nears Approval of Measure to Punish China Over Currency Manipulation. *New York Times* October 6, 2011.
- [44] Mayda, Anna Maria, Giovanni Peri and Walter Steingress. 2016. "Immigration to the U.S.: A Problem for the Republicans or the Democrats?" NBER Working Paper 21941.
- [45] McCrary, Justin. 2008. Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142: 698-714.
- [46] Mion, Giordano and Like Zhu. 2013. "Import Competition From and Outsourcing to China: A Curse or a Blessing for Firms." *Journal of International Economics* 89(1): 202-215.
- [47] Pierce, Justin R. and Peter K. Schott. 2012. A Concordance Between U.S. Harmonized System Codes and SIC/NAICS Product Classes and Industries. *Journal of Economic and Social Measurement* 37(1-2): 61-96.
- [48] Pierce, Justin R. and Peter K. Schott. 2016. "The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment." *American Economic Review*. Forthcoming.
- [49] Pierce, Justin R. and Peter K. Schott. 2015. "Trade Liberalization and Mortality: Evidence from U.S. Counties." Mimeo.
- [50] Pindyck, Robert S. 1993. "Investments of Uncertain Cost." *Journal of Financial Economics* 34 (1): 53-76.
- [51] Porter, Jack. 2003. Estimation in the Regression Discontinuity Model. Unpublished, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
- [52] Revenga, Ana L. 1992. Exporting Jobs?: The Impact of Import Competition on Employment and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107(1): 255-284.
- [53] Sachs, J.D., Shatz, H.J. 1994. "Trade and Jobs in U.S. Manufacturing," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1994(1): 1-69.
- [54] Sanger, David E. and Sewell Chan. 2010. Eye on China, House Votes for Greater Tariff Powers. *New York Times*, September 29.
- [55] Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. What Determines Trade-Policy Preferences? *Journal of International Economics* 54(2001): 267-292.

- [56] Schlozman, Kay Lehman and Sidney Verba. 1979. *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class and Political Response*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- [57] Stromberg, Stephen. 2016. “What Should Worry Clinton about Sanders’s Michigan Win.” *The Washington Post*, PostPartisan. Available online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/09/what-should-worry-clinton-about-sanderss-michigan-win/>.
- [58] Utar, Hale and Luis B. Torres Ruiz. 2013. “International Competition and Industrial Evolution: Evidence from the Impact of Chinese Competition on Mexican Maquiladoras.” *Journal of Development Economics* 105: 267-287.
- [59] Wright, John R. 2012. Unemployment and the Democratic Electoral Advantage. *American Political Science Review*, 106(4): 685-702.

County Attribute	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Median Household Income	3138	31.28	8.63	11.21	77.35
Percent Bachelor	3138	9.03	4.22	0.00	40.30
Percent Graduate	3138	4.48	2.74	0.00	29.70
Percent Non-White	3138	12.85	15.85	0.00	94.90
Percent Veteran	3138	14.79	2.77	4.20	29.00
Percent 65+	3138	14.86	4.46	0.70	37.70

Notes: Table summarizes the distribution of various county attributes in 1990 according to the 1990 Decennial Census.

Table 1: County Attributes in 1990

VARIABLES	Demovote	Demovote	Demovote	Dem Win	S2Dem	S2Rep	Turnout
Post x NTR Gap _c	-0.0367 0.037	0.1363*** 0.0421	0.1808*** 0.0468	0.2282** 0.1038	0.2287** 0.0894	-0.2668* 0.1559	0.1444*** 0.0203
Post x Median HHI in 1990 _c		0.0224 0.0415	0.0207 0.0416	-0.2065* 0.1062	-0.1104 0.083	0.7161*** 0.1445	-0.3501*** 0.0185
Post x Percent Bachelors in 1990 _c		0.6873*** 0.0989	0.6933*** 0.099	1.9581*** 0.2535	0.4063* 0.2216	-2.2729*** 0.3818	0.6360*** 0.0453
Post x Percent Graduate in 1990 _c		0.0742 0.1282	0.0717 0.1283	-0.0181 0.3208	0.6157* 0.3357	0.3172 0.3962	-0.3889*** 0.0606
Post x Percent Non-White in 1990 _c		-0.019 0.0212	-0.0178 0.0214	-0.049 0.0431	0.1231** 0.0542	-0.0334 0.0471	-0.0652*** 0.0078
Post x Percent Over 65 in 1990 _c		-0.1923** 0.0747	-0.1909** 0.0747	-0.4723*** 0.1653	0.0546 0.1232	0.7587*** 0.2511	-0.1173*** 0.0296
Post x Percent Veteran in 1990 _c		0.0913 0.0964	0.0927 0.0963	-0.0718 0.2227	-0.0468 0.1838	-0.1163 0.3204	0.4357*** 0.0435
NTR _{ct}			134.3901** 64.0184	242.1227 157.9343	-365.8972* 187.6653	-202.3025 293.4735	84.6800** 33.6302
MFA Exposure (China) _{ct}			0.0823 0.2586	1.1879* 0.6895	-0.1262 0.6688	-3.1393*** 1.1028	0.1129 0.1375
MFA Exposure (ROW) _{ct}			-0.2942 0.584	-3.0604** 1.5275	0.1219 1.4646	7.5136*** 2.4494	-0.3302 0.307
Observations	31,106	31,106	31,106	31,106	16,891	11,105	19,400
R-squared	0.6321	0.638	0.6381	0.5769	0.3778	0.464	0.8367
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Period	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010
Drops	none	none	none	none	Lag D Win	Lag R Win	none
FE	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t
Clustering	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
Mean Dependent Variable in 2000	40	40	40	35	7	13	65

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results for Democrat vote share in county c in year t as well as dummy variables for whether the Democrat wins, whether there is a switch to a Democrat, whether there is a switch to a Republican, and turnout. Sample period is even years from 1992 to 2010. Turnout data are missing for 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2008. The first covariate is the DID term of interest, an interaction of a post-PNTR dummy with counties' weighted average NTR gap. The next six covariates interact a post-PNTR dummy variable with county demographic attributes. The remaining covariates account for the weighted average import tariff imposed on the county's industrial structure as well as the elimination of quantitative restrictions on apparel and clothing imports from China and rest of world (ROW). Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 2: PNTR and County-Level Voting for Democrats (Baseline Results)

VARIABLES	Demovote	Dem Win	S2Dem	S2Rep	Turnout
Post x NTR Gap _c	0.1297**	0.1688	0.1980*	-0.0288	0.1333***
	0.0556	0.1234	0.1115	0.1713	0.0231
Post x NTR Gap _{cz}	0.1269*	0.1476	0.0671	-0.7098***	0.0275
	0.0656	0.1485	0.1211	0.2184	0.0271
Post x Median HHI in 1990 _c	0.0198	-0.2075*	-0.1102	0.7309***	-0.3505***
	0.0417	0.1062	0.0831	0.1445	0.0185
Post x Percent Bachelors in 1990 _c	0.7214***	1.9908***	0.4203*	-2.4190***	0.6417***
	0.0994	0.2561	0.2226	0.3838	0.0456
Post x Percent Graduate in 1990 _c	0.0294	-0.0673	0.5885*	0.5021	-0.3968***
	0.1287	0.3263	0.3395	0.3987	0.061
Post x Percent Non-White in 1990 _c	-0.0186	-0.0499	0.1230**	-0.0219	-0.0653***
	0.0214	0.0431	0.0542	0.047	0.0078
Post x Percent Over 65 in 1990 _c	-0.1981***	-0.4806***	0.0524	0.8478***	-0.1189***
	0.0748	0.165	0.123	0.2526	0.0296
Post x Percent Veteran in 1990 _c	0.1072	-0.0549	-0.04	-0.2159	0.4386***
	0.0963	0.2227	0.1839	0.3201	0.0436
NTR _{ct}	130.5171**	237.6186	-369.8527**	-197.8596	83.8817**
	64.0094	157.7789	187.5737	291.6341	33.6393
MFA Exposure (China) _{ct}	0.0704	1.1741*	-0.1317	-3.1582***	0.1086
	0.259	0.6905	0.6692	1.0976	0.1376
MFA Exposure (ROW) _{ct}	-0.2657	-3.0273**	0.135	7.5179***	-0.3206
	0.5856	1.5302	1.4657	2.4431	0.3071
Observations	31,106	31,106	16,891	11,105	19,400
R-squared	0.64	0.58	0.38	0.46	0.84
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Period	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010
Drops	none	none	Lag D Win	Lag R Win	Lag R Win
F-Test p-value	0.00	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.00
FE	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t
Clustering	c	c	c	c	c
Mean Dependent Variable in 2000	40	35	7	13	13

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results for Democrat vote share in county c in year t as well as dummy variables for whether the Democrat wins, whether there is a switch to a Democrat, whether there is a switch to a Republican, and turnout. Sample period is even years from 1992 to 2010. Turnout data are missing for 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2008. The first covariate is the DID term of interest, an interaction of a post-PNTR dummy with counties' weighted average NTR gap. The next six covariates interact a post-PNTR dummy variable with county demographic attributes. The second covariate is an interaction of post-PNTR dummy with the average NTR gap for all other counties in the county's commuting zone (z), as defined by the U.S. Census. The remaining covariates account for the weighted average import tariff imposed on the county's industrial structure as well as the elimination of quantitative restrictions on apparel and clothing imports from China and rest of world (ROW). Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 3: PNTR and County-Level Voting for Democrats (Own- and Commuting Zone Exposure)

VARIABLES	Democrat Vote Share		
	President	Senator	Governor
Post x NTR Gap _c	0.0482*** 0.0137	0.005 0.0327	0.1459*** 0.0411
Post x Median HHI in 1990 _c	0.1318*** 0.0127	0.0721** 0.0301	-0.1115*** 0.0372
Post x Percent Bachelors in 1990 _c	0.7235*** 0.0309	0.2652*** 0.0731	-0.1071 0.085
Post x Percent Graduate in 1990 _c	0.0416 0.0413	0.2021** 0.0981	0.7926*** 0.1167
Post x Percent Non-White in 1990 _c	0.0464*** 0.0051	-0.0618*** 0.012	-0.0657*** 0.0158
Post x Percent Over 65 in 1990 _c	0.0462** 0.0203	0.0513 0.0479	-0.2306*** 0.0573
Post x Percent Veteran in 1990 _c	0.2614*** 0.0295	0.3062*** 0.0697	0.2013** 0.0811
NTR _{ct}	38.5936** 19.0301	23.5015 50.5806	-26.0241 60.3636
MFA Exposure (China) _{ct}	0.3469*** 0.1015	0.3941* 0.2182	-0.6620** 0.2775
MFA Exposure (ROW) _{ct}	-1.4643*** 0.2273	-1.1000** 0.4886	0.783 0.6166
Observations	15,558	21,129	13,599
R-squared	0.902	0.5974	0.5721
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS
Period	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010
Drops	none	Lag D Win	Lag R Win
FE	c,t	c,t	c,t
Clustering	c	c	c
Mean Dependent Variable in 2000	40	43	49

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results for Democrat vote share in county c in year t for the noted elections. Sample period is even years from 1992 to 2010. Presidential and gubernatorial elections occur every four years, but the latter do not occur on the same year for all states. Senatorial elections occur every six years, with approximately one-third of senators up for election in any given election year. The first covariate is the DID term of interest, an interaction of a post-PNTR dummy with counties' weighted average NTR gap. The next six covariates interact a post-PNTR dummy variable with county demographic attributes. The remaining covariates account for the weighted average import tariff imposed on the county's industrial structure as well as the elimination of quantitative restrictions on apparel and clothing imports from China and rest of world (ROW). Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 4: Exposure to PNTR and Democrat Votes for Other Offices

VARIABLES	Demovote	Dem Win	S2Dem	S2Rep	Turnout
Post x NTR Gap _c	0.1677** 0.0663	0.088 0.2091	0.3430* 0.1844	0.2532 0.266	0.2613*** 0.0532
Post x Median HHI in 1990 _c	0.2441*** 0.0499	0.3147 0.2114	-0.0627 0.1739	0.1598 0.1971	-0.1399*** 0.0424
Post x Percent Bachelors in 1990 _c	0.195 0.1337	0.6119 0.6287	0.4027 0.556	-0.7748 0.5708	0.3432*** 0.1226
Post x Percent Graduate in 1990 _c	0.3779* 0.1976	1.213 0.7433	1.6720** 0.6568	-0.2864 0.5868	-0.0721 0.1542
Post x Percent Non-White in 1990 _c	0.0849*** 0.0234	0.0658 0.0682	0.3030** 0.1239	-0.2160** 0.0847	-0.0011 0.0247
Post x Percent Over 65 in 1990 _c	0.4150*** 0.1216	-0.0932 0.3313	0.3272 0.2971	0.0681 0.5014	-0.1222 0.1187
Post x Percent Veteran in 1990 _c	-0.1481 0.169	0.3357 0.5163	-0.5157 0.5975	-1.1701** 0.5827	0.4892*** 0.1692
NTR _{ct}	220.8378** 96.6562	350.7267 241.519	399.7431 378.6588	-188.5725 514.1284	38.2166 71.439
MFA Exposure (China) _{ct}	0.2074 0.2855	1.6709* 0.882	-0.3721 0.7632	-4.2083*** 1.5258	-0.1765 0.2092
MFA Exposure (ROW) _{ct}	-0.9198 0.6498	-5.3377*** 1.9277	-0.3715 1.6925	10.5115*** 3.3655	0.1547 0.4527
Observations	31,106	31,106	16,891	11,105	19,400
R-squared	0.7373	0.6691	0.436	0.5185	0.8549
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Period	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010	1992(2)2010
Drops	none	none	Lag D Win	Lag R Win	none
FE	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t	c,t
Clustering	c	c	c	c	c
Weighting	Population	Population	Population	Population	Population
Mean Dependent Variable in 2000	49	51	15	8	66

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results for Democrat vote share in county c in year t as well as dummy variables for whether the Democrat wins, whether there is a switch to a Democrat, whether there is a switch to a Republican, and turnout. Sample period is even years from 1992 to 2010. Turnout data are missing for 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2008. The first covariate is the DID term of interest, an interaction of a post-PNTR dummy with counties' weighted average NTR gap. The next six covariates interact a post-PNTR dummy variable with county demographic attributes. The remaining covariates account for the weighted average import tariff imposed on the county's industrial structure as well as the elimination of quantitative restrictions on apparel and clothing imports from China and rest of world (ROW). Regressions are weighted by county population in 1990. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 5: PNTR and County-Level Voting for Democrats (Weighted Regression)

	Pro-Trade Vote Share		
	[1]	[2]	[3]
Democrat	-0.173***	-0.179***	-0.149***
	0.007	0.033	0.030
Observations	4,294	4,296	4,296
R2	0.59	.	0.15
Covariates	Yes	No	No
Fixed Effects	State, Congress	.	State, Congress
Bandwidth	.	100%	.
Estimation Technique	Linear	Non-Parametric	Polynomial 3

Notes: Table summarizes the results of Representative-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat. Covariates include the district-year level demographic attributes and Representative-year level attributes described in Section 5 of the text. Estimates for these covariates are suppressed. Polynomial 3 refers to inclusion of third order polynomials as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 6: Effect of Democrat Affiliation on Districts' Voting for Pro-Trade Bills

	Pro-Economic Assistance Vote Share		
	[1]	[2]	[3]
Democrat	0.435***	0.324***	0.325***
	0.009	0.027	0.0358
Observations	4,292	4,294	4,294
R2	0.61	.	0.36
Covariates	Yes	No	No
Fixed Effects	State, Congress	.	State, Congress
Bandwidth	.	100%	.
Estimation Technique	Linear	Non-Parametric	Polynomial 3

Notes: Table summarizes the results of Representative-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-economic assistance votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat. Covariates include the district-year level demographic attributes and Representative-year level attributes described in Section 5 of the text. Estimates for these covariates are suppressed. Polynomial 3 refers to inclusion of third order polynomials as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 7: Effect of Democrat Affiliation on Districts' Voting for Pro-Economic Assistance Bills

	Pro-Trade Vote Share		Pro-Economic Assistance Vote Share	
	1992-2000	2002-2010	1992-2000	2002-2010
Democrat	-0.051	-0.304***	0.277***	0.395***
	0.033	0.050	0.045	0.055
Observations	2,138	2,158	2,137	2,157
R2	0.05	0.26	0.19	0.57
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Fixed Effects	State, Congress	State, Congress	State, Congress	State, Congress
Bandwidth
Estimation Technique	Polynomial 3	Polynomial 3	Polynomial 3	Polynomial 3

Notes: Table summarizes the results of Representative-year-level non-parametric regression discontinuity estimations of the share of pro-trade or pro-economic assistance votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat. Covariates include the district-year-level demographic attributes and Representative-year-level attributes described in Section 5 of the text (not displayed). Polynomial 3 refers to inclusion of third order polynomials as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table 8: Pro-Free Trade and Pro-Economic Assistance Voting Before and After PNTR




Figure 1: U.S. Imports from China and Rest of World (ROW)





Figure 2: Post-War U.S. Manufacturing Employment



Notes: Figure summarizes the mean and inter-quartile range of the share of votes won by Democrats across U.S. counties in elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, by year. The mean, standard deviation, median and interquartile range for 2000, the election closest to the passage of PNTR, are 40, 23, 38 and 25 to 57 percent .

Figure 3: Distribution of Democrat Vote Share




Figure 4: Distribution of NTR Gap Across Industries





Figure 5: Distribution of NTR Gap Across Industries and Counties



Notes: Figure compares counties' NTR gap to the average NTR gap of the other counties in their commuting zone. Dashed lines indicate the median county-level NTR gap, which is 5.8 percent.

Figure 6: Correlation of Own-County and Commuting Zone Exposure




Figure 7: Simple DID View of the Shift Towards Democrats (Own-County Exposure)






Figure 8: Regression Discontinuity Intuition



Notes: Unit of analysis is a district-year pair across the years 1992 to 2010. Figure displays the discontinuity of the share of pro-trade votes (vertical axis) versus the Democrat vote share margin of victory (horizontal axis). A triangular kernel is used for local linear regressions. Shading represents the 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure 9: Democrats' Votes On Trade Bills



Notes: Unit of analysis is a district-year pair across the years 1992 to 2010. Figure displays the discontinuity of the share of pro-redistribution votes (vertical axis) versus the Democrat vote share margin of victory (horizontal axis). A triangular kernel is used for local linear regressions. Shading represents the 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure 10: Democrats' Votes On Economic Assistance Bills

Appendix

This appendix contains additional empirical results referenced in the main text.

A Legislator Voting Behavior

Figure A.1 displays the McCrary (2008) test of whether there is a discontinuity in the density of Democrats’ winning margin over Republicans. The estimate of the discontinuity is 0.003 with a standard error of 0.125, indicating that there is not a statistically significant discontinuity. Figures A.2 to A.10 examine the distributions of each of the district-level attributes included in the legislative voting regressions in Section 5, plotted against the Democrat margin of victory. As discussed there, none of these distributions exhibit discontinuities at the cutoff point at which the Democrat margin of victory is 0.

B Approaches for Estimating Regression Discontinuity Coefficient

The nonparametric approach is a “local linear” estimation that uses observations within a window of width w on both sides of the cutoff point and assumes that $g(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$ are linear, with potentially different slopes on the two sides of the cutoff point. We implement this approach using the procedure developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2014) to calculate the optimal bandwidth w^* , and estimate analytical standard errors using the procedure developed in Porter (2003). In robustness checks, we examine whether our estimates are sensitive to different bandwidths, e.g., halving and doubling w^* , as in Lee and Lemieux (2010). As indicated in Table A.1, we obtain similar results in both cases for both sets of bills.

Parametric estimation, by contrast, uses all of the observations over the domain of the assignment variable and assumes high-order polynomial functions of $g(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$. In the main text, we implement this approach using third-order polynomial functions with potentially different coefficients on the two sides of the cutoff point. Following Lee and Card (2008), we calculate standard errors clustered at the assignment variable level. Here, we report results using second- and fourth-order polynomials to examine the sensitivity of our estimates to using third order polynomials. As indicated in Table A.2, we obtain similar results in both cases.

Appendix Tables and Figures

	Pro-Trade Vote Share		
	[1]	[2]	[3]
Democrat	-0.173***	-0.179***	-0.149***
	0.007	0.033	0.030
Observations	4,294	4,296	4,296
R2	0.59	.	0.15
Covariates	Yes	No	No
Fixed Effects	State, Congress	.	State, Congress
Bandwidth	.	100%	.
Estimation Technique	Linear	Non-Parametric	Polynomial 3


Notes: Table summarizes the results of Representative-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat. Covariates include the district-year level demographic attributes and Representative-year level attributes described in Section 5 of the text. Estimates for these covariates are suppressed. Polynomial 3 refers to inclusion of third order polynomials as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table A.1: RD Results: Alternate Bandwidths

	Pro-Trade Vote Share		
	[1]	[2]	[3]
Democrat	-0.173***	-0.179***	-0.149***
	0.007	0.033	0.030
Observations	4,294	4,296	4,296
R2	0.59	.	0.15
Covariates	Yes	No	No
Fixed Effects	State, Congress	.	State, Congress
Bandwidth	.	100%	.
Estimation Technique	Linear	Non-Parametric	Polynomial 3


Notes: Table summarizes the results of Representative-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat. Covariates include the district-year level demographic attributes and Representative-year level attributes described in Section 5 of the text. Estimates for these covariates are suppressed. Polynomial 3 refers to inclusion of third order polynomials as instruments. Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table A.2: RD Results: Alternate Polynomial Functions



Notes: Figure displays the McCrary (2008) test of whether there is a discontinuity in the density of Democrats' winning margin over Republicans. This test rejects manipulation because the discontinuity estimate (i.e., the gap between counties in the treatment versus control group around the margin of zero) is -0.003 with a standard error of 0.125.

Figure A.1: RD Identifying Assumption Density Test



Notes: Unit of analysis is a district-year pair across the years 1992 to 2010. Figure displays the log of district population (vertical axis) versus the Democrat vote share margin of victory (horizontal axis). A triangular kernel is used for local linear regressions. Shading represents the 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A.2: RD Identifying Assumption: Population




Figure A.3: RD Identifying Assumption: Household Income




Figure A.4: RD Identifying Assumption: Per Capita Income




Figure A.5: RD Identifying Assumption: Black or African American Population Share




Figure A.6: RD Identifying Assumption: College or Above Share




Figure A.7: RD Identifying Assumption: Veteran Share




Figure A.8: RD Identifying Assumption: Unemployment Rate




Figure A.9: RD Identifying Assumption: 18 to 25 Share




Figure A.10: RD Identifying Assumption: Over 65 Share