Accessible Material
December 2011 Tealbook A Tables and Charts†
Risks and Uncertainty
Alternative Scenarios
Measure and scenario | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015-16 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H2 | |||||
Real GDP | |||||
Extended Tealbook baseline | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 3.9 |
European crisis with severe spillovers | 2.5 | -3.5 | -1.2 | 2.9 | 5.4 |
Faster European recovery | 2.6 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.6 |
Homegrown recession | 2.6 | -3.6 | 1.6 | 3.7 | 5.3 |
Faster snapback | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
Greater supply-side damage | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 3.0 |
Further disinflation | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 3.9 |
Unemployment rate1 | |||||
Extended Tealbook baseline | 8.8 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 7.8 | 6.4 |
European crisis with severe spillovers | 8.8 | 10.4 | 11.8 | 11.7 | 9.2 |
Faster European recovery | 8.8 | 8.3 | 7.4 | 6.8 | 5.5 |
Homegrown recession | 8.8 | 11.0 | 11.7 | 11.3 | 8.4 |
Faster snapback | 8.8 | 8.2 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.3 |
Greater supply-side damage | 8.8 | 8.5 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 7.6 |
Further disinflation | 8.8 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 7.0 |
Total PCE prices | |||||
Extended Tealbook baseline | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
European crisis with severe spillovers | 1.5 | -1.2 | -.1 | 1.3 | 2.2 |
Faster European recovery | 1.5 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
Homegrown recession | 1.5 | 1.2 | .3 | -.2 | -.3 |
Faster snapback | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 |
Greater supply-side damage | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Further disinflation | 1.5 | .7 | .2 | .1 | .0 |
Core PCE prices | |||||
Extended Tealbook baseline | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
European crisis with severe spillovers | 1.6 | .2 | .4 | 1.1 | 1.9 |
Faster European recovery | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
Homegrown recession | 1.6 | 1.3 | .5 | -.2 | -.3 |
Faster snapback | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.9 |
Greater supply-side damage | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Further disinflation | 1.6 | .8 | .4 | .1 | .0 |
Federal funds rate1 | |||||
Extended Tealbook baseline | .1 | .1 | .1 | .4 | 2.7 |
European crisis with severe spillovers | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .3 |
Faster European recovery | .1 | .1 | .1 | 1.4 | 3.7 |
Homegrown recession | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 |
Faster snapback | .1 | .3 | .6 | 1.4 | 2.8 |
Greater supply-side damage | .1 | .1 | .9 | 1.8 | 3.5 |
Further disinflation | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 |
1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period. Return to table
Forecast Confidence Intervals and Alternative Scenarios
Confidence Intervals Based on FRB/US Stochastic Simulations
Figure: Real GDP
Line chart, by 4-quarter percent change, 2008 to 2016. There is a horizontal line at zero. There are nine series, Extending Tealbook baseline, European crisis with severe spillovers, Faster European recovery, Homegrown recession, Faster snapback, Greater supply-side damage, Further disinflation, 70 percent interval and 90 percent interval. Extending Tealbook baseline begins in 2008:Q1 at about 2 and generally decreases to about -5.1 by 2009:Q2. It then generally increases to about 3.5 by 2010:Q3 and then generally decreases to about 1.5 by 2011:Q3. By 2015:Q4 it has generally increased to about 4.2 and by 2016:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 3.65. European crisis with severe spillovers begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.6 and generally decreases to about -4.05 by 2013:Q1. It then generally increases to about 5.7 by 2016:Q4. Faster European recovery begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.6 and generally increases to about 4.0 by 2013:Q1. It then generally decreases to about 3.5 by 2014:Q1 and then generally increases to about 4.2 by 2015:Q4. By 2016:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 3.1. Homegrown recession begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.6 and generally decreases to about -3.7 by 2012:Q4. It then generally increases to about 5.5 by 2016:Q4. Faster snapback begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.6 and generally increases to about 3.5 by 2013:Q1. It then generally decreases to about 3.0 by 2013:Q3 and then generally increases to about 3.6 by 2015:Q2. By 2016:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 2.8. Greater supply-side damage begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.6 and generally increases to about 2.0 by 2012:Q1. It then generally decreases to about 1.8 by 2013:Q1 and then generally increases to about 3.0 by 2016:Q4. Further disinflation begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.6 and generally increases to about 2.4 by 2012:Q3. It then generally decreases to about 2.0 by 2013:Q4 and then generally increases to about 4.0 by 2016:Q4. The other two series track each other closely throughout the chart with the 70 percent interval beginning in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widening out to about 2.0 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4. The 90 percent interval begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.2 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widens out to about 3.5 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4.
Figure: Unemployment Rate
Line chart, by percent, 2008 to 2016. There are nine series, Extending Tealbook baseline, European crisis with severe spillovers, Faster European recovery, Homegrown recession, Faster snapback, Greater supply-side damage, Further disinflation, 70 percent interval and 90 percent interval. Extending Tealbook baseline begins in 2008:Q1 at about 4.9 and generally increases to about 10.1 by 2009:Q4. It then generally decreases to about 8.9 by 2011:Q1 and then generally increases to about 9.15 by 2011:Q3. It then generally decreases to about 6.5 by 2016:Q4. European crisis with severe spillovers begins in 2011:Q3 at about 9.15 and generally decreases to about 8.8 by 2011:Q4. It then generally increases to about 11.9 by 2014:Q1 and then generally decreases to about 9.25 by 2016:Q4. Faster European recovery begins in 2011:Q3 at about 9.15 and generally decreases to about 5.5 by 2016:Q4. Homegrown recession begins in 2011:Q3 at about 9.15 and generally decreases to about 8.8 by 2011:Q4. It then generally increases to about 11.6 by 2013:Q4 and then generally decreases to about 8.5 by 2016:Q4. Faster snapback begins in 2011:Q3 at about 9.15 and generally decreases to about 6.3 by 2016:Q4. Greater supply-side damage begins in 2011:Q3 at about 9.15 and generally decreases to about 7.6 by 2016:Q4. Further disinflation begins in 2011:Q3 at about 9.15 and generally decreases to about 7.0 by 2016:Q4. The other two series track each other closely throughout the chart with the 70 percent interval beginning in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widening out to about 1.12 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4. The 90 percent interval begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.2 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widens out to about 1.75 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4.
Figure: PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy
Line chart, by 4-quarter percent change, 2008 to 2016. There is a horizontal line at zero. There are nine series, Extending Tealbook baseline, European crisis with severe spillovers, Faster European recovery, Homegrown recession, Faster snapback, Greater supply-side damage, Further disinflation, 70 percent interval and 90 percent interval. Extending Tealbook baseline begins in 2008:Q1 at about 2.3 and generally increases to about 2.45 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about 1.4 by 2009:Q3 and then generally increases to about 1.75 by 2010:Q1. By 2010:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 0.9 and by 2012:Q1 it has generally increased to about 1.75. It then generally decreases to about 1.4 by 2014:Q3 and then generally increases to about 1.6 by 2016:Q4. European crisis with severe spillovers begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.7. It then generally decreases to about -0.1 by 2013:Q1 and then generally increases to about 2.15 by 2016:Q4. Faster European recovery begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.7 and generally increases to about 1.75 by 2012:Q1. It then generally decreases to about 1.65 by 2012:Q3 and then generally increases to about 2.1 by 2013:Q2. By 2016:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 1.6. Homegrown recession begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.7 and generally decreases to about -0.4 by 2015:Q4. It then generally increases to about -0.2 by 2016:Q4. Faster snapback begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.7 and generally decreases to about 1.45 by 2012:Q3. It then generally increases to about 2.0 by 2016:Q4. Greater supply-side damage begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.7 and generally increases to about 1.75 by 2012:Q1. It then generally decreases to about 1.6 by 2012:Q3 and then generally increases to about 2.3 by 2016:Q4. Further disinflation begins in 2011:Q3 at about 1.7 and generally decreases to about -0.05 by 2016:Q4. The other two series track each other closely throughout the chart with the 70 percent interval beginning in 2011:Q3 at about 0.05 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widening out to about 1 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4. The 90 percent interval begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widens out to about 1.5 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4.
Figure: Federal Funds Rate
Line chart, by percent, 2008 to 2016. There are nine series, Extending Tealbook baseline, European crisis with severe spillovers, Faster European recovery, Homegrown recession, Faster snapback, Greater supply-side damage, Further disinflation, 70 percent interval and 90 percent interval. Extending Tealbook baseline begins in 2008:Q1 at about 3.2 and generally decreases to about 0.13 by 2010:Q1. It remains relatively stable here until 2014:Q2. It then generally increases to about 2.65 by 2016:Q4. European crisis and severe spillovers begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.13 and remains stable here until 2016:Q3. It then generally increases to about 0.1 by 2016:Q4. Faster European recovery begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.13 and remains stable here until 2013:Q4. By 2016:Q4 it has generally increased to about 3.75. Homegrown recession begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.13 and remains stable here until 2016:Q4. Faster snapback begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.13 and remains stable here until 2012:Q3. It then generally increases to about 2.8 by 2016:Q4. Greater supply-side damage begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.13 and remains relatively stable here until 2013:Q1. It then generally increases to about 3.45 by 2016:Q4. Further disinflation begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.13 and remains relatively stable here until 2016:Q4. The other two series track each other closely throughout the chart with the 70 percent interval beginning in 2014:Q2 at about 1.5 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widening out to about 2 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4. The 90 percent interval begins in 2014:Q2 at about 1.6 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline and widens out to about 3 percent both lesser and greater than the Extended Tealbook baseline by 2016:Q4.
Selected Tealbook Projections and 70 Percent Confidence Intervals Derived from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors and FRB/US Simulations
Measure | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Real GDP (percent change, Q4 to Q4) | ||||||
Projection | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 3.7 |
Confidence interval | ||||||
Tealbook forecast errors | 1.2-2.2 | .6-4.0 | .7-4.2 | … | … | … |
FRB/US stochastic simulations | 1.3-2.1 | .9-4.0 | .7-4.3 | 1.2-5.2 | 1.8-6.1 | 1.5-5.9 |
Civilian unemployment rate (percent, Q4) | ||||||
Projection | 8.8 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 7.8 | 7.1 | 6.4 |
Confidence interval | ||||||
Tealbook forecast errors | 8.7-8.9 | 7.9-9.3 | 7.0-9.4 | … | … | … |
FRB/US stochastic simulations | 8.7-8.9 | 7.9-9.3 | 7.1-9.2 | 6.6-9.1 | 6.0-8.5 | 5.4-7.8 |
PCE prices, total (percent change, Q4 to Q4) | ||||||
Projection | 2.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
Confidence interval | ||||||
Tealbook forecast errors | 2.3-2.8 | .1-2.6 | .0-2.4 | … | … | … |
FRB/US stochastic simulations | 2.3-2.8 | .4-2.5 | .0-2.4 | .1-2.7 | .2-2.8 | .2-2.9 |
PCE prices excluding food and energy (percent change, Q4 to Q4) | ||||||
Projection | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
Confidence interval | ||||||
Tealbook forecast errors | 1.5-2.0 | .8-2.2 | .6-2.2 | … | … | … |
FRB/US stochastic simulations | 1.6-1.9 | .8-2.2 | .6-2.3 | .4-2.3 | .5-2.4 | .5-2.5 |
Federal funds rate (percent, Q4) | ||||||
Projection | .1 | .1 | .1 | .4 | 1.7 | 2.7 |
Confidence interval | ||||||
FRB/US stochastic simulations | .1-.1 | .1-1.0 | .1-1.7 | .1-2.6 | .1-3.8 | .7-4.7 |
Note: Shocks underlying FRB/US stochastic simulations are randomly drawn from the 1969-2009 set of model equation residuals.
Intervals derived from Tealbook forecast errors are based on projections made from 1979-2009, except for PCE prices excluding food and energy, where the sample is 1981-2009.
… Not applicable. The Tealbook forecast horizon has typically extended about 2 years. Return to table
Tealbook Forecast Compared with Blue Chip
(Blue Chip survey released November 10, 2011)
Figure: Real GDP
Line chart, by percent change, annual rate, 2008 to 2012. There is a horizontal line at zero. There are two series, Blue Chip consensus and Staff forecast. Blue chip consensus begins in 2008:Q1 at about -1.9 and generally increases to about 1.5 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about -9.2 by 2008:Q4 and then generally increases to about 4 by 2010:Q1. By 2011:Q1 it has generally decreased to about 0.3 and by 2012:Q4 it has generally increased to about 2.5. Staff forecast begins in 2008:Q1 at about -1.9 and generally increases to about 1.5 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about -9.2 by 2008:Q4 and then generally increases to about 4 by 2010:Q1. By 2011:Q1 it has generally decreased to about 0.3 and by 2011:Q4 it has generally increased to about 3.3. It then generally decreases to about 2.0 by 2012:Q2 and then generally increases to about 3.0 by 2012:Q4. There is a shaded area that represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages. It begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus and widens out to about 1 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q1 and remains generally stable here until 2012:Q4.
Figure: Real PCE
Line chart, by percent change, annual rate, 2008 to 2012. There are two series, Blue Chip consensus and Staff forecast. Blue chip consensus begins in 2008:Q1 at about -1.0 and generally increases to about 0 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about -5.2 by 2008:Q4 and then generally increases to about 2.4 by 2009:Q3. By 2009:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 0.3 and by 2010:Q4 it has generally increased to about 3.5. It then generally decreases to about 0.5 by 2011:Q2 and then generally increases to about 2.3 by 2011:Q3. By 2012:Q1 it has generally decreased to about 1.8 and by 2012:Q4 it has generally increased to about 2.4. Staff forecast begins in 2008:Q1 at about -1.0 and generally increases to about 0 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about -5.2 by 2008:Q4 and then generally increases to about 2.4 by 2009:Q3. By 2009:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 0.3 and by 2010:Q4 it has generally increased to about 3.5. It then generally decreases to about 0.5 by 2011:Q2 and then generally increases to about 2.9 by 2012:Q4. There is a shaded area that represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages. It begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus and widens out to about 1.0 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q1. It then narrows to about 0.8 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q4.
Figure: Unemployment Rate
Line chart, by percent, 2008 to 2012. There are two series, Blue Chip consensus and Staff forecast. Blue chip consensus begins in 2008:Q1 at about 5 and generally increases to about 10 by 2009:Q4. It then generally decreases to about 9.6 by 2010:Q2 and remains constant here until 2010:Q4. By 2011:Q1 it has generally decreased to about 8.9 and by 2011:Q2 it has generally increased to about 9.05. It remains constant here until 2012:Q1 and then generally decreases to about 8.97 by 2012:Q4. Staff forecast begins in 2008:Q1 at about 5 and generally increases to about 10 by 2009:Q4. It then generally decreases to about 9.6 by 2010:Q2 and remains constant here until 2010:Q4. By 2011:Q1 it has generally decreased to about 8.9 and by 2011:Q2 it has generally increased to about 9.05. It then generally decreases to about 8.7 by 2012:Q4. There is a shaded area that represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages. It begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus and widens out to about 0.6 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q4.
Figure: Consumer Price Index
Line chart, by percent change, annual rate, 2008 to 2012. There are two series, Blue Chip consensus and Staff forecast. Blue chip consensus begins in 2008:Q1 at about 4.4 and increases to about 6.5 by 2008:Q3. It then decreases to about -9.5 by 2008:Q4 and then increases to about 3.8 by 2009:Q3. By 2010:Q2 it has generally decreased to about -0.6 and by 2011:Q1 it has generally increased to about 5.2. It then generally decreases to about 2.0 by 2011:Q4 and remains relatively stable here until 2012:Q4. Staff forecast begins in 2008:Q1 at about 4.4 and increases to about 6.5 by 2008:Q3. It then decreases to about -9.5 by 2008:Q4 and then increases to about 3.8 by 2009:Q3. By 2010:Q2 it has generally decreased to about -0.6 and by 2011:Q1 it has generally increased to about 5.2. By 2011:Q4 it has generally decreased to about 0.8 and by 2012:Q1 it has generally increased to about 1.6. It then generally decreases to about 1.3 by 2012:Q4. There is a shaded area that represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages. It begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.1 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus and widens out to about 1.3 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2011:Q4. It then generally narrows to about 0.8 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q4.
Figure: Treasury Bill Rate
Line chart, by percent, 2008 to 2012. There are two series, Blue Chip consensus and Staff forecast. Blue chip consensus begins in 2008:Q1 at about 2.02 and generally decreases to about 0.02 by 2009:Q4. It generally increases to about 0.1 by 2010:Q3 and then generally decreases to about 0 by 2011:Q3. By 2012:Q4 it has generally increased to about 0.1. Staff forecast begins in 2008:Q1 at about 2.02 and generally decreases to about 0.02 by 2009:Q4. It generally increases to about 0.1 by 2010:Q3 and then generally decreases to about 0 by 2011:Q3. It then generally increases to about 0.08 by 2012:Q4. There is a shaded area that represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages. It begins in 2011:Q4 at about 0.01 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus and widens out to about 0.15 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q4.
Figure: 10-Year Treasury Yield
Line chart, by percent, 2008 to 2012. There are two series, Blue Chip consensus and Staff forecast. Blue chip consensus begins in 2008:Q1 at about 3.65 and generally increases to about 3.9 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about 2.7 by 2009:Q1 and then generally increases to about 3.7 by 2010:Q1. By 2010:Q3 it has generally decreased to about 2.75 and by 2011:Q1 it has generally increased to about 3.5. It then generally decreases to about 2.25 by 2011:Q4 and then generally increases to about 2.8 by 2012:Q4. Staff forecast begins in 2008:Q1 at about 3.65 and generally increases to about 3.9 by 2008:Q2. It then generally decreases to about 2.7 by 2009:Q1 and then generally increases to about 3.7 by 2010:Q1. By 2010:Q3 it has generally decreased to about 2.75 and by 2011:Q1 it has generally increased to about 3.5. It then generally decreases to about 2.05 by 2012:Q1 and then generally increases to about 2.7 by 2012:Q4. There is a shaded area that represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages. It begins in 2011:Q3 at about 0.05 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus and widens out to about 0.75 percent both lesser and greater than the Blue Chip consensus by 2012:Q4.
Note: The yield is for on-the-run Treasury securities. Over the forecast period, the staff's projected yield is assumed to be 15 basis points below the off-the-run yield.
† Note: Data values for figures are rounded and may not sum to totals. Return to text