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## MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
By the staff Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

## Recent developments

(1) M2 is estimated to have increased at a 10 percent annual rate in June, bringing its growth for the March-to-June period to just around $8 \frac{1}{2}$ percent at an annual rate-a bit below the objective for these months established by the Comittee in March. By June, M2 had grown about 9 percent from its February-March ' 83 base, and was somewhat above the midpoint of this year's longer-run range for the aggregate. Shifts into MMDA balances from outside M2 appear to have slowed markedly, at least as judged by the recent cessation of growth in MMDAs. With issuance of CDs by banks and thrift institutions stronger than expected, M3 is estimated to have expanded at around a $10 \frac{1}{4}$ percent annual rate in June, and at an $8 \frac{1}{2}$ percent annual rate from March to June, somewhat above the FOMC's 8 percent objective for these months set in March. By June, M3 was at the upper end of the Comittee's $6 \frac{1}{2}$ to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ percent range for 1983.
(2) Ml expanded at about a $10 \frac{1}{2}$ percent annual rate in June, and growth from the fourth quarter to June was at about a $13 \frac{3}{4}$ percent annual rate, well above the FOMC's range of 4 to 8 percent for the year. Although MI velocity continued to decline substantially in the first quarter, more recently in the second quarter mi velocity showed only a relatively small deciline, as the upward impact on M 1 demand of reductions in interest rates in 1982 faded. In May and June, all major components of this aggregate, including demand deposits, increased substantially, suggesting that recent strength has in some degree reflected growing transactions needs for money balances.

KEY MONETARY POLICY AGGREGATES
(Seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth)

|  | 1983 |  |  |  | Longer-run base to June 1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Apr. | May | June | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mar. } \\ & \text { to } \\ & \text { June } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Money and Credit Aggregates |  |  |  |  |  |
| M1 | -2.7 | 26.3 | 10.4 | 11.4 | 13.8 |
| H2 | 3.0 | 12.8 | 10.0 | 8.6 | 9.0 |
| M3 | 3.5 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 8.4 | 9.6 |
| Domestic nonfinancial debt | 9.8 | 10.8 | 13.1 | 11.4 | 10.6 |
| Bank credit | 8.7 | 10.7 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 10.4 |
| Reserve Measures ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nonborrowed reserves ${ }^{3}$ | 5.0 | 3.0 | 8.1 | 5.4 | 4.8 |
| Total reserves | 8.8 | -1.9 | 15.0 | 7.3 | 5.9 |
| Monetary base | 7.3 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 9.2 | 9.8 |
| Memo: (Millions of dollars) <br> Adjustment and seasonal borrowing | 605 | 437 | 679 | - | - |
| Excess reserves | 476 | 449 | 513 | - | - |

1. The base for M1, M3, and reserves is QIV '82, for M2 is February-March 1983, and for bank credit and domestic nonfinancial debt is December '82.
2. Growth rates of reserve measures are adjusted to remove the effects of discontinuities resulting from phased changes in reserve ratios under the Monetary Control Act.
3. Includes special borrowing and other extended credit from the Federal Reserve.
(3) The debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors is estimated to have grown at about a 13 percent annal rate in June. The acceleration of growth from the $10 \frac{1}{4}$ percent average rate of April and May was due to a surge in federal borrowing, as the Treasury sought not only to cover large continuing needs for funds but also to build up its cash balance. The debt of private nonfinancial sectors increased at almost an 8 percent annual rate in June, a bit above the pace of earlier this year. For the year to date, total domestic nonfinancial debt has increased at around a $10 \frac{1}{2}$ percent annual rate, a little faster than GNP, but just above the midpoint of the FOMC's $8 \frac{1}{2}$ to $11 \frac{1}{2}$ percent long-run range. Bank credit increased at almost a 10 percent annual rate in June, close to the average of the previous two months. Loan growth picked up somewhat in June from the pace of April and May; real estate lending strengthened further and business loans showed the first substantial increase since January.
(4) After decining in May, total reserves grew at a 15 percent annual rate in June, reflecting primarily robust expansion in required reserves needed against transactions deposits and also some growth in excess reserves. However, nonborrowed reserves (including extended credit ${ }^{l /}$ ) increased less--rising by 8 percent-as adjustment plus seasonal borrowing rose to an average of $\$ 679$ million. The federal funds rate traded in an $B \frac{3}{4}$ to 9 percent range for most of the period since the last meeting, up only slightly from earlier weeks. Most recently, funds have been trading around 9 to $9-1 / 8$ percent, though higher rates have been associated with temporary pressures related to the semi-annual statement

[^1]date and long holiday weekend. The level of borrowing incorporated in the reserve paths had been set at $\$ 350$ million initially following the FOMC meeting, and was later raised to \$400-500 million. Nonetheless, the demand for borrowing has remained unusually strong-as has the demand for excess reserves--relative to the prevailing spread of the funds rate over the discount rate, and borrowing has consistently exceeded these levels (and was particularly large over the period encompassing the statement date and long holiday weekend).
(5) Other short-term market interest rates have risen about 75 basis points further over the intermeeting period, in part reflecting the tightening in the reserve market but also in some degree in anticipation of a further such tightening given the strength of incouing data on money and economic activity. Long-term taxable bond rates have also risen about 75 basis points since the May FOMC meeting, while the rate on conventional fixed-rate mortgages has increased one-half of a percentage point.
(6) The weighted average value of the dollar has risen by $2 \frac{1}{2}$ percent on balance since the May FOMC meeting, mainly in association with increases in dollar interest rates. At its peak in mid-June the dollar on a weighted average basis was silghtly above its previous November 1982 peak.

- The announce-
ment of a record U.S. trade deficit for May has had iittle apparent effect on dollar exchange rates.


## Monetary and credit targets for 1983 and 1984

(7) A major issue in the re-evaluation of the longer-run monetary and credit ranges earlier established for 1983 is the probable inconsistency between the range for M1 and those for the other monetary and credit aggregates. It would take virtually zero growth from June to December for M1 expansion over the year 1983 to come in around the lipper limit of its current 4 to 8 percent longer-run range. The projected strength of nominal GNP suggests considerably stronger demand for M1 than that, given something like present interest rate levels, or even rates somewhat higher.
(8) Against that background, two alternatives are shown below for the monetary and credit aggregates in 1983. Alternative I reproduces the present ranges. Alternative II differs only by including an MI range that has greater odds of being consistent with the broader aggregates. Upward adjustments in growth ranges are not suggested for the broader aggregates, even though recent experience suggests the possibility that expansion of M2 and particularly MB over the year is more likely to be in the upper half of their ranges rather than near their midpoints as earlier anticipated. It is not expected that the recent decision by DIDC to eliminate ceiling rates on time deposits (but not on regular NOW and savings accounts) by October 1 will have any very significant impact on growth of M2 and M3, since time deposit expansion has for some time already been in forms either without ceiling or with ceilings indexed to market rates.

|  | Alt. I | Alt. II |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| MI | 4 to 8 | 7 to 11 |
| M2 $/ /$ | 7 to 10 | 7 to 10 |
| M3 | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Total credit | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ to $11 \frac{1}{2}$ | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ to $11 \frac{1}{2}$ |

(9) The implications of these targets for annual growth rates of the aggregates over the second half of 1983 are shown in the last two columns of the table below. It should be noted that a considerable slowing in Ml growth over the balance of the year is needed if even the upper end of the alternative II M1 range is to be achieved. Growth in the broader monetary and credit aggregates would not need to be as different in the second half of this year relative to the first half for growth to fall within their present longer-run ranges. The table below shows second half growth rates consistent with expansion of $M 2$ and $M 3$ for the year in the upper half of their ranges and expansion of total credit at its midpoint.


[^2](10) At this meeting the Committee will also be considering tentative target ranges for 1984. The principal question would appear to be whether to retain current ranges or lower them. It is not expected that financial innovations or regulatory changes will tend to increase the demand for the broader aggregates (given income and interest rates) next
year. Indeed, M2 may grow a little less relative to income than is expected during the 1983 longer-run target period as residual shifts into MMAA become negligible next year. Against that background, and with an unusually large and rising high employment federal deficit for the second year of an economic recovery in prospect, and increase in monetary growth ranges would probably raise the odds on a strengthening in inflationary pressures and expectations.
(11) The current longer-run ranges for the aggregates are wide enough to encompass lower actual growth rates in 1984 than in 1983. Thus, one option (Alternative $I$ in the table below) for the Comittee--in addition to simply retaining the present ranges--would be to retain the ranges but Indicate that actual growth for 1984 was expected to be lower in the ranges than it had been in 1983. Our staff GNP projections for 1984--which show slower growth in nominal and real GNP--presume that expansion of M2 next year is $\frac{1}{2}$ percentage point slower than the $8 \frac{1}{2}$ percent or so assumed for this year (from the February/March ' 83 base). Yet another option (Alternative II) would be to lower all of the longer-run ranges for the broader aggregates by $\frac{1}{2}$ percentage point. A variant on this option (Alternative III) would be to lower only the upper limits of the ranges by $\frac{1}{2}$ point (or possibly 1 point), on the thought that reductions in the lower limits would tend to bring them to "unrealistic" rates in relation to the economic outlook.

|  | Alt. I | Alt. II | Alt. III |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| M1 | 4 to 8 | 4 to 8 | 4 to $7 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| M2 | 7 to 10 | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ | 7 to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| M3 | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ | 6 to 9 | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ to 9 |
| Total credit | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ to $11 \frac{1}{2}$ | 8 to 11 | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ to 11 |

(12) Alternative II does not include a lower M1 range than is currently in place. But the 4 to 8 percent range would represent a considerable reduction from likely growth this year, or from this year's range if the Comittee chose to raise it. Ml demand this year was augmented by the upward adjustment of cash balances induced by the lower level of market rates that developed as inflation ebbed; such a lagged effect is not anticipated next year, and the velocity of M1 may develop along lines more consistent with earlier postwar cyclical and secular patterns. Of course, there are still large unknowns. Super NOW accounts bearing market rates may come increasingly to affect the behavior of $M 1$, and we remain uncertain about how the public's attitudes toward these accounts as well as regular NOW accounts are being influenced by transactions needs, interest rates, and broad considerations of wealth and liquidity. It should also be noted that if a sizable further decine in short-term interest rates happens to occur, a large further rise in Ml could develop, invoiving growth rates higher than in the alternatives presented, as market rates come near to the regulatory ceiling on regular Now accounts. 1 /
(13) The credit aggregate next year is likely to grow a iittle more slowly than this year. This moderation is consistent with the staff's forecast of slightly slower nominsl GNP growth, but as in 1983, credit growth is likely to exceed the expansion of nominal income. The growth in federal debt is expected to slow next gear (the dollar volume of net Treasury borrowing should remain about the same as 1983), while private credit expansion remains close to this year's pace. Credit usage by nonfederal sectors is expected to be moderated by drop-off in

1/ Factors influencing the income velocity of M1-and also M2-are analyzed in a staff memorandum accompanying this blue book.
borrowing by state and local governments, whose bond issuance in recent quarters has been boosted by the effects of the decine in interest rates and the anticipation of bond registration requirements. Household borrowing is expected to expand about as rapidly as in 1983, but business borrowing is expected to increase substantially from its depressed pace of this year, as the rise in spending for fixed capital and inventories outpaces
a fairly strong profit performance.

Monetary strategies over the next few years
(14) To provide additional perspective for longer-run policy decisions, the table on the next page shows projected impacts on real GNP, prices, and interest rates of alternative approaches to the monetary aggregates over the next several years. Strategy 1 reproduces the staff's basic GNP forecast for this year and next (assuming $8 \frac{1}{2}$-percent M2 growth this year and 8 percent next) and also shows projections through 1985 and 1986 that assume successive $\frac{1}{2}$ point reductions in M2 growth. Strategy 2 assumes more rapid money growth over the period through 1986, in this case a continued $8 \frac{1}{2}$ percent M2 growth. Strategies 3 and 4 represent an effort to depict policy approaches that show contrasts in the timing of restraint and ease over the course of economic recovery. Strategy 3 aims at a relatively stringent policy over the balance of this year and next while easing off in 1985 and 1986; strategy 4 aims at the reverse approach of easing over the balance of this year and next, and tightening In the last two years shown. Strategy 3 assumes a reduction in M2 growth to around $7 \frac{3}{4}$ percent in 1983 and 1984 and an acceleration to around $8 \frac{1}{2}$ percent on average over the next two years, while strategy 4 assumes an acceleration of M2 growth to around 9 percent in 1983 and 1984 and a deceleration to around $7 \frac{1}{2}$ percent in the next two years; in both strategies M2 growth was constrained to average a little over 8 percent over the 4-year period. Differences between GNP, prices, and interest rates in strategy 1 and those in other strategies are based largely on model results, as is the extension of strategy 1 into 1985 and 1986.
(15) The steady $\frac{1}{2}$ point reduction of M2 growth under strategy 1 is accompanied by a gradual deceleration in growth of real GNP and some further improvement in price performance. The 3-month Treasury bill rate

## Estimated Impacts of Alternative Longer-run Policy Strategies

Real GNP (\% increase QIV/QIV)

1. Gradually declining M2 in 1983-86 $\quad 5.5 \quad 4.2 \quad 3.1 \quad 2.8$
2. Unchanged M2 at 8.5 percent each year

1983
1984
1985
1986

| 1. Gradua1ly declining M2 in 1983-86 | 5.5 | 4.2 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. Unchanged M2 at 8.5 percent each <br> year | 5.5 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 4.4 |
| 3. S1ower M2 in 1983-84; faster M2 <br> in 1985-86 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.7 |
| 4. Faster M2 in 1983-84; slower M2 |  |  |  |  |
| in 1985-86 |  |  |  |  |

Implicit deflator (\% increase QIV/QIV)

| 1. | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2. | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| 3. | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 3.2 |
| 4. | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 |

Unemployment rate (QIV average)

| 1. | 9.4 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 8.0 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2. | 9.4 | 8.5 | 7.7 | 6.9 |
| 3. | 9.5 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 7.4 |
| 4. | 9.3 | 8.2 | 7.5 | 7.2 |

Treasury bill rate (QIV average)

| 1. | 9.5 | 8.5 | 8.9 | 8.6 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2. | 9.5 | 8.0 | 7.8 | 7.0 |
| 3. | 10.7 | 8.5 | 7.6 | 6.6 |
| 4. | 8.2 | 7.0 | 8.4 | 8.3 |

[^3]declines over 1984, following a small rise during the second half of this fear, but shows no further decline subsequently. By contrast, the faster M2 growth of atrategy 2 promotes further declines in the bill rate and faster growth in real GNP than strategy 1 over the whole 4 -year period. No significant pick-up in inflation from the current rate is indicated, given the structural characteristics of our model, but one may question whether the more rapid drop in the unemployment rate and rise in plant capacity utilization under this alternative would not induce a more prompt reemergence of wage and price pressures, given the degree of economic inefficiency in much marginal plant capacity, desires by labor to make up for recent wage concessions, and general fears of re-emerging inflation on the part of consumers and business.
(16) Strategies 3 and 4 depict alternative courses of events depending on whether monetary policy is front-loaded or not. The earlier imposition of restraint under strategy 3 appears to involve no less real growth over the 4 -year period than does the front-loading of ease under strategy 4. However, strategy 3 entails a better price performance throughout the period. Interest rates decline under this strategy after a substantial further rise in the latter half of 1983 and by 1985 and 1986 are lower than under strategy 4. Of course, looking beyond 1986, a slowing in monetary growth would be needed under strategy 3 to avoid a later acceleration in price increases.

Policy alternatives for the short run
(17) The table below shows alternative specifications for the monetary aggregates and federal funds rate ranges for the June to September period. (More detailed data for the alternatives, including their relation to the current longer-run ranges, are shown in the charts and table on the following pages. The quarterly interest rate path consistent with the staff's GNP projection is shown in Appendix I.)

$$
\text { Alt. A Alt. B } \quad \text { Alt. C }
$$

Growth from June to Sept.

| M2 | 9 | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ | 8 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| M3 | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ | 8 | $7 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| M1 | $7 \frac{3}{2}$ | 6 | $4 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Unds rate range | 6 to 10 | 7 to 11 | 8 to 12 |

(1B) The specifications of Alternative A contemplate no further tightening of money market conditions over the next few months. A federal funds rate range of 6 to 10 percent is shown for this alternative, the same as in the directive adopted at the last meeting. However, a federal funds rate in the upper half of that range-around 9 percent or a little higher--would be contemplated. Recent experience with borrowing at the discount window would suggest that borrowing would tend to be in the $\$ 450$ to 600 million range. From June to September, nonborrowed and total reserves would be expected to expand at annual rates of about $5 \frac{1}{2}$ and 4 percent, respectively.
(19) M2 growth under this alternative will probably slow from the rapid May-June pace, but should remain in the upper part of the FOMC's longer-run range for that aggregate. The small increases in interest rates that have developed since early May may act to restrain M2 growth a little,

Chant 1
Actual and Targeted M2


Chart 2

## Actual and Targeted M3



Chart 3

## Actual and Targeted M1



## Alternative Levels and Growth Rates for Key Monetary Aggregates

|  | M2 |  |  | M3 |  |  | M1 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Alt. A | Alt. B | A1t. C | A1t. A | Alt. B | Alt. C | Alt. A | A1t. B | Alt. C |
| 1983--April | 2075.1. | 2075.1 | 2075.1 | 2454.5 | 2454.5 | 2454.5 | 496.5 | 496.5 | 496.5 |
| May | 2097.3 | 2097.3 | 2097.3 | 2477.6 | 2477.6 | 2477.6 | 507.4 | 507.4 | 507.4 |
| June | 2114.7 | 2114.7 | 2114.7 | 2498.6 | 2498.6 | 2498.6 | 511.8 | 511.8 | 511.8 |
| July | 2131.2 | 2130.7 | 2130.2 | 2517.3 | 2516.8 | 2516.3 | 516.3 | 516.1 | 515.9 |
| August | 2146.8 | 2145.2 | 2143.7 | 2534.5 | 2532.7 | 2530.9 | 518.9 | 517.8 | 516.8 |
| September | 2162.5 | 2159.8 | 2157.2 | 2551.8 | 2548.7 | 2545.6 | 521.4 | 519.5 | 517.6 |
| Growth Rates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Monthly |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1983--Apr11 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | -2.7 | -2.7 | -2.7 |
| May | 12.8 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 26.3 | 26.3 | 26.3 |
| June | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.4 |
| July | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.8 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 8.5 | 10.6 | 10.1 | 9.6 |
| August | 8.8 | 8.2 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 7.6 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 4.0 | 2.1 |
| September | 8.8 | 8.2 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 7.6 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 3.9 | 1.9 |
| June to September | 9.0 | 8.5 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 4.5 |
| Quarterly Average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1983--Q1 | 20.3 | 20.3 | 20.3 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 14.1 |
| Q2 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 12.2 |
| Q3 | 9.8 | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 10.8 | 10.0 | 9.2 |
| Memo: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth QIV '82 to September '83 | $9.1{ }^{1 /}$ | 8.91 | 8.71/ | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 12.1 | 11.6 | 11.1 |

1/ The base for M2 is February/March 1983.
despite the projected relatively strong expansion in personal income and nominal GNP, but in addition M2 growth may be restrained by the further slowing of shifts into MMDA accounts that appear to be signaled by data of recent weeks. Kainly reflecting the behavior of M2, M3 growth is also expected to slow from the pace of the last two months. Banks and thrift institutions may continue to rely more heavily than in the early part of this year on issuance of large CDs, as loan demands tend to strengthen in reflection of the more rapid pace now evident in economic recovery.
(20) Under alternative A, M1 growth is anticipated to slow much more substantially than growth in the other aggregates. In large part, this is because MI demand is no longer expected to be buttressed by the lagged impact of last year's sharp declines in interest rates. Indeed, the recent rise in short-term rates should begin to have a restraining effect on MI. The assumed MI growth in this alternative would be consistent, given our GNP projection, with about no change in its income velocity in the third quarter, $\underline{I}^{\prime}$ in contrast to the decines in velocity that have generally characterized the past aeveral quarters. Such a turn-around in velocity would not be unexpected during the course of a cyclical expansion. However, as noted earlier, large uncertainties surround estimates of M1 demand, given the change in its composition as NOW accounts have become an increasingly important component of the aggregates. Should the public continue to place a substantial amount of savings in components of M1, and over the next few weeks some of the tax cut may well be lodged in such deposits, the velocity of Ml could continue to fall-with MI

[^4]growth faster-at current levels of interest rates. On the other hand, the large build-up in MI balances of the past several quarters could well support a rapid expansion in GNP without much further increase in M1 should confidence generated by continuing favorable economic news entail a substantial reduction in demand for liquidity.
(21) Given recent market rate adjustments, it would seem most likely that interest rates would generally remain near current levels under alternative $A$ or decline some. In large degree, market rate increases in recent days seem to have been in anticipation of a further tightening of monetary policy. The 3 -month Treasury bill rate might be in an $8 \frac{3}{2}$ to 9弪 percent range over the next several weeks. Markets will remain exceptionally sensitive, however, given the unexpected strength of the economy, and the level of rates will be atrongly influenced by assessment of the meaning for monetary policy over the next few months of incoming economic news and the Federsl Reserve's decisions about longer-run targets. If and as short-term interest rates tend to stabilize, long-term rates may tend to decline from current levels.
(22) The total debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors is expected to increase at about a 9 percent rate over the third quarter, less than in the second quarter. While actual Treasury offerings will be larger in the third quarter, they are expected to slow on a seasonally adjusted basis from the very rapid second-quarter pace, when the Treasury built up its cash balances by a substantial amount. Tax exempt offerings are expected to remain well below the second-quarter pace, which had been influenced by the desire to avoid registration requirements that took effect on July 1. Business borrowing is likely to fall more on banks
relative to bond markets than it had in the second quarter. However, some pick-up in bond offerings from the relatively moderate June pace might be expected, particularly if the bond market shows signs of a decline in yields.
(23) Alternative $B$ encompasses a further increase in pressures on bank reserve positions in an effort to increase the odds that growth in the broad monetary aggregates will remain within their longer-run target ranges and to exert even more restraint on growth of M1. This alternative would involve borrowing from the discount window in the $\$ 850$ million to $\$ 1$ billion range (given the present discount rate), and the federal funds rate might be expected to move well into the $9 \frac{1}{2}$ to 10 percent area. Total reserves are likely to expand at about $2 \frac{1}{2}$ percent annual rate over the June to September period. Nonborrowed reserves would be about flat if the level of borrowing rose to the range specified.
(24) Although market interest rates have probably to some extent discounted the further tightening in policy envisioned by this alternative, the 3 -month Treasury bill rate would likely rise further to the $9 \frac{1}{4}$ to $9 \frac{3}{4}$ percent area, and longer-term rates would move still higher, at least in the short run. The rise in long-term rates would tend to discourage bond market financing, diverting additional loan demand to short-term market sectors. This, together with the rise in short-term market rates, would put substantial upward pressure on the prime loan rate. Mortgage loan rates would probably advance further to the neighborhood of $13 \frac{2}{2}$ percent, which would be a new high for the year.
(25) M1 growth could be expected to slow to about 6 percent from June to September under this approach and, assuming the market pressures of alternative $B$ were maintained through year-end, to expand at a somewhat
slower pace in the final months of the year. If this occurred, Ml growth for the year (QIV ' 82 to QIV '83) would be in the vicinity of $10 \frac{1}{2}$ percent. M2 is expected to grow at an $8 \frac{1}{2}$ percent annual rate from June to September under this alternative--which would bring this aggregate back toward the midpoint of its longer-run range. While thrift deposit flows might be about the same as under alternative $A$, higher deposit costs would once again begin to eliminate the earnings of a large number of S\&Ls and MSBs, exerting upward pressure on mortgage rates.
(26) Alternative $C$ involves an approach that would exert relatively strong restraint on the aggregates and credit markets over the near-term. M1 growth might be lower than 10 percent for the year and growth of M2 over the year would probably be somewhat below the midpoint of its longer-run range. Under this approach, federal funds would be expected to rise to $10 \frac{1}{2}$ percent or $s 0$ over the near-term. With the level of borrowing at the discount window expanding to about $\$ 1 \frac{1}{4}$ billion and market interest rates rising, the current level of the discount rate would be called into question, as indeed it also would under alternative $B$. Total reserves would change little from June to September, and nonborrowed reserves would drop by about 5 percent at an annual rate if borrowing rose as apecified.
(27) Under this alternative, given the restraint on reserve positions, Ml would be expected to expand at only a $4 \frac{1}{2}$ percent annual rate, while M2 and M3 would both increase at 8 percent rates, over the June to September period. The 3 -month bill rate would rise substantially--to about 10 to $10 \frac{1}{2}$ percent-and the bank prime rate might move up to perhaps 12 percent. Longer-term yields would also show marked increases. The dollar would probably tend to rise substantially in foreign exchange markets,
and the viability of international debt positions of a number of major borrowing countries would come further into question. Earaings pressures on thrifts would be very substantial. However, the projected interest rate levels producing these pressures would probably slow the economy and credit demands substantially by winter, so that a drop in interest rates would be expected at least by the early part of next year consistent with tentative longer-run monetary and credit targets for that year.

## Directive language

(28) Given below is draft directive language related to the Comittee's decisions on the longer-run ranges (draft language for the operating paragraph is shown in paragraph (29)). Suggested deletions of language are shown in strike-through form with suggested additions in caps and certain alternatives bracketed.

The Federal Open Market Committee seeks to foster monetary and financial conditions that will help to reduce inflation further, promote e-reswmptien-ef growth in output on a sustainable basis, and contribute to a sustainable pattern of international transactions. At its meeting in February the Comittee established growth ranges for monetary and credit aggregates for 1983 in furtherance of these objectives. The Committee recognized that the relationships between such ranges and ultimate economic goals have been less predictable over the past year; that the impact of new deposit accounts on growth ranges of monetary aggregates cannot be determined with a high degree of confidence; and that the availability of interest on large portions of transaction accounts, declining inflation, and lower market rates of interest may be reflected in some changes in the historical trends in velocity. A substantiet-shife-af-funds-into-Mz-from-market-tnstrumenter-in-ełuding-łarge-eertificates-of-deposit-not-inezaded-in-Mz - -association-with-the-ertraordinariky-rapdd-buizd-ap-of-money market-depeste-aceounter-dísterted-growth-in-that-aggregate-dering the-first-quartery

In establishing growth ranges LAST FEBRUARY for the aggregates for 1983 against this background, the Comittee felt that growth in M2 might be more appropriately measured after the period of highly aggressive marketing of money market deposit accounts had subsided. The Committee also felt that a somewhat wider range was appropriate for monitoring M. These-growth-yanges-were-te-be reviewed-4n-the-opyingt-and-altered - f-evidenee-at-that-timer--The-6omattee-reviewed-the-ranges-at this-meeting-and-decided-not-te-change-them-at-this-time s-pending further-review-at-the-fuly-meetingr With these understandings, the Comittee established the following growth ranges: for the period from February-March of 1983 to the fourth quarter of 1983, 7 to 10 percent at an annual rate for M2, taking into account the probability of some residual shifting into that aggregate from nonM2 sources; and for the period from the fourth quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of $1983,6 \frac{1}{2}$ to $9 \frac{1}{2}$ percent for MB, which appeared to be less distorted by the new accounts. For the same period a tentative range of 4 to 8 percent was established for MI, assuming that Super NOW accounts would draw only modest amounts of funds
from sources outside M1 and assuming that the authority to pay interest on transaction balances was not extended beyond presently eligible accounts. An associated range of growth for total domestic nonfinancial debt was estimated at $8 \frac{1}{2}$ to $11 \frac{1}{2}$ percent. these ranges were reviewed at the may meeting and LEFT UNCHANGED, PENDING FURTHER REVIEW IN JULY.
at this meeting, the committee reaffirmed the longer-run RANGES ESTABLISHED EARLIER FOR GROWTH IN M2, M3, [M1 1], AND TOTAL DOMESTIC NONFINANCIAL DEBT IN 1983 [WITH GROWTH IN THE BROADER monetary aggregates expected to be in the upper part of their RANGES]. [WITH REGARD TO M1, THE COMMITTEE, TARING ACCOUNT OF the rapid growth in the first half of 1983 assoctated with the CONTINUED DECLINE IN VELOCITY AND ANTICIPATING A DECELERATION in growth over the second half of the year, established a range OF TO PERCENT FOR THE YEAR AS A WHOLE.] THE COMMITTEE ALSO agreed on Tentative growth ranges for the period from the fourth Quarter of 1983 to the fourth quarter of 1984 OF _ to _ percent FOR M2, _ TO _ PERCENT FOR M3, AND _ TO _ PERCENT FOR M1. THE ASSOCIATED RANGE FOR TOTAL DOMESTIC NONFINANCLAL DEBT FOR NEXT year has set at _ TO _ percent.

In implementing monetary policy, the Comittee agreed that substantial weight would continue to be placed on behavior of the broader monetary aggregates. expeeting-thet-distortions-in-Mz from-the-inttiak-adjustment-te-the-new-deposit-aceounes-witi sbater The behavior of MI will continue to be monitored, with the degree of weight placed on that aggregate over time dependent on evidence that velocity characteristics are resuming more predictable patterns. [or THE COMMITTEE ALSO AGREED TO INCREASE the weight of mi in policy implementation with the degree of WeIght dependent on the strengit of evidence that this aggregate WAS RESUMING A MORE PREDICTABLE RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER KEY ECONOMIC MAGNITUDES]. Debt expansion, while not directly targeted, will be evaluated in judging responses to the monetary aggregates. The Coumittee understood that policy implementation would involve continuing appraisal of the relationships between the various measures of money and credit and nominal GNP, including evaluation of conditions in domestic credit and foreign exchange markets.
(29) Draft language for the operational paragraph is shown
below. Since the proposed language refers to alternative approaches for
a new quarter, the old language (wich referred to the second quarter)
is not shown.
The Comittee seeks in the short run to [increase (alt. C), increase somewhat (alt. B), or maintain (alt. A)] the existing degree of reserve restraint. The action is expected to be
associated with growth of M2 and M3 at annual rates of about _ and _ percent respectively from June to September. The Comittee anticipates that a deceleration in M1 growth to an annual rate of around _ percent will be consistent with its third-quarter objectives for the broader aggregates. [Depending in part on evidence about the strength of economic recovery, lesser restraint would be acceptable in the context of a significant shortfall in growth of the aggregates from current expectations, while somewhat greater restraint would be acceptable should the aggregates expand more rapidly.] The Chairman may call for Comittee consultation if it appears to the Manager for Domestic Operations that pursuit of the monetary objectives and related reserve paths during the period before the next meeting is likely to be associated with a federal funds rate persistently outside a range of _ to _ percent.

## Appendix I

|  |  |  | Interest Rates Consistent with the Greenbook GNP Projection (quarterly averages, in percent) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Federal Funds | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 3-month } \\ & \text { T-bill } \end{aligned}$ | Recent Aaa Utility | Fixed Rate Mortgage |
| 1983 | Q2 | (actual) | 8.80 | 8.40 | 11.55 | 12.76 |
|  | Q3 |  | 97 | 93 | 12-1/8 | $13 \frac{1}{2}$ |
|  | Q4 |  | 93 | 93/2 | $12 \frac{3}{4}$ | 13-3/8 |
| 1984 | Q1 |  | $9 \frac{3}{4}$ | 97 | 12 | 133 |
|  | Q2 |  | $9 \frac{1}{4}$ | $8 \frac{3}{4}$ | 113 | 13 |
|  | Q3 |  | 9 | 812 | 1112 | 123 |
|  | Q4 |  | 9 | 82 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 113 | 123 |

Selocted Interest Ratos
percent
July 11. 1983


Net Changes in System Holdings af Securties:
Mililons of dollars, not seasonally adjusted
July 11, 1983

| Pariod | Treasury billa not change2 | Treasury coupona nol purchases ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |  |  | Federal agencles nel purchaseat |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Net change } \\ & \text { outright } \\ & \text { holdings } \\ & \text { tolatif } \end{aligned}$ | Not Rped |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { within } \\ & \text { i-year } \end{aligned}$ | 1.5 | 510 | over 10 | total | $\begin{aligned} & \text { within } \\ & \text { 1-year } \end{aligned}$ | 1.5 | 510 | over 10 | total |  |  |
| 1978 | 970 | 1.184 | 4.188 | 1,526 | 1,063 | 7.962 | -47 | 45 | 104 | 26 | 127 | 8.724 | -1.774 |
| 1979 | 6,243 | 603 | 3,456 | 523 | 454 | 5,035 | 131 | 317 | 5 | - | 454 | 10,290 | -2,597 |
| 1980 | -3.052 | 912 | 2.138 | 703 | 811 | 4,564 | 217 | 398 | 29 | 24 | 668 | 2,035 | 2.462 |
| 1981 | 5.337 | 294 | 1.702 | 393 | 379 | 2,768 | 133 | 360 | -- | - | 494 | 8.491 | 684 |
| 1982 | 5.698 | 312 | 1.794 | 388 | 307 | 2,803 | - | - | - | - | - | . 613 | 1.461 |
| 1982-attr. I | -4,329 | 20 | 50 | -- | - | 70 | - | - | -- | - | - | -4,371 | -999 |
| II | 5,585 | -68 | 570 | 81 | 52 | 635 | -- | - | - | - | - | 6.208 | -5.375 |
| III | 150 | 71 | 891 | 113 | 123 | 1.198 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.295 | 1.855 |
| IV | 4,292 | 88 | 485 | 194 | 132 | 900 | - | - | $\sim$ | - | -- | 5.179 | -20 |
| 1983-qtr. I | -1.403 | 73 | - | 26 | - | - | - | - | - | -- | - | -1.425 | -3,325 |
| 11 | 5,116 | 173 | 595 | 326 | 108 | 1,203 | - | -- | -* | $\cdots$ | $\cdots$ | 6.208 | -793 |
| 1983-JJan. | -2,883 | - | - | - | -- | -- | - | - | - | - | - | -2,892 | -6,127 |
| Feb. |  | - | - | - | - | -- | - | - | - | - | - | 216 1.250 | 2.971 -168 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Apr. | 2,880 | - | - | -- | - | - | -- | $\sim$ | - | - | - | 2.873 | 2,971 |
| May | 516 | 173 | 595 | 326 | 108 | 1,203 | -- | -- | - | - | - | 1.718 | -3,041 |
| June | 1,721 | -- | - | - | - | - | -- | - | - | - | - | 1.617 | -723 |
| 1983--4pr. 6 | 47 | $\cdots$ | - | - | - | - | -- | -- | - | - | - | 47 | 2,084 |
| 13 | 68 | -- | -- | - | - | -- | - | - | - | - | $\cdots$ | 61 | -1,440 |
| 20 | 2.193 | -- | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.191 | 1.288 |
| 27 | 190 | - | - | - | - | - | -- | - | - | - | - | 190 | 2,390 |
| May | 430 | - | -- | - | - | - | -- | -- | - | - | - | 430 | -3,579 |
| 11 | -- | -- | - | - | -- | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -1,462 |
| 18 | 136 | 173 | 595 | 326 | 108 | 1,203 | - | - | - | $\cdots$ | -- | 1,339 | 3,089 |
| 25 | 337 | - | -- | -- | - | -- | - | - | -- | - | - | 337 | -883 |
| June 1 | 43 | - | -- | - | - | - | -- | - | -- | - | - | 43 | 4.160 |
| 8 | 254 | -- | - | -- | -- | - | - | -- | - | - | - | 254 | -4.144 |
| 15 | 1.182 | -- | - | -- | - | - | - | - | -- | - | - | 1,078 | -2,160 |
| 22 | 59 | $\cdots$ | -- | -- | $\cdots$ | -- | -- | - | - | - | $\cdots$ | 59 | 3,813 |
| 29 | 104 | -- | -- | - | - | -* | - | - | - | - | -- | 104 | -3.245 |
| July 6 | 267 | - | -- | - | - | _-7 | - | - | - | - | -- | 267 | 3.081 |
| Levin--July 6 | 61.9 | 19.5 | 34.0 | 11.7 | 17.1 | 82.3 | 2.8 | 4.4 | 1.2 | . 5 | 8.9 | 153.1 | - |
| 1 Change from end-ol-period to and-of-period. <br> 2 Outright transactions in manket and with forsign accounts, and nedemptions ( -1 in bill auctions. <br> 3 Outright transactions in market and with foraign accounts, and mort-term notes acquired in axchange for mauring bilts. Excludes redamptions, maturity shifth, rollovers of maturing coupon isauss, and dircet Treatury borrowing from the Syatem. <br> 4 Ouzright trensections in market and with formign accounts only. Excludes redemptions and maturity shifts. |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 In addition to the net purchases of mecurities, aleo reflects changes in System holdings of benkers' acceptances, direct Treesury borrowing from the System and redemptions (-) of agency and Tree sury coupon inauses. <br>  trensections ( +1 . <br> On July 6, the Syatea purchand $\$ 975$ aillion of Ireasury coupon lancea for delivery on July 7. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Pariod | Mol ${ }^{1}$ Total | Cash ponilions |  |  |  |  | Fonward and Futures Poedtiont |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Treasury bills | Treasury coupons |  | foderal agancy | private shortierm | Treasury bllis | Trasury coupone |  | Pederal egency | private short-Iterm |
|  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { under } \\ & 1 \text { your } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { over } \\ & 1 \text { year } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { under } \\ & 1 \text { year } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { over } \\ & 1 \text { your } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| $\begin{gathered} 1982--\mathrm{High} \\ \text { Lor } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 49,437 \\ -18,698 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11,156 \\ & -2,699 \end{aligned}$ | 772 -747 | $\begin{aligned} & 9,456 \\ & 1,005 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.275 \\ & 2,955 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 16,658 \\ 6,758 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 8,032 \\ -11,077 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 36 \\ -77 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -687 \\ -4.699 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -526 \\ -2.715 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 703 \\ -7.196 \end{array}$ |
| 1983-High | 20,875 | 13,273 | 473 | 7.108 | 6.067 | 15.658 | 280 | 14 | -1,490 | -1,012 | -5,144 |
| Low | -382 | 1,323 | -687 | -929 | 4.013 | 8,839 | -10,310 | -95 | -3.225 | -3.382 | -7.512 |
| Juan | 22,317 | 7.286 | -462 | 4.253 | 2.976 | 11.749 | -6,194 | 3 | -2.679 | -1,405 | -3,210 |
| July | 18,722 | 5,768 | -583 | 4.029 | 2.872 | 14.530 | -1,403 | 16 | -3.452 | -1.195 | -1,860 |
| Aug. | 23,611 | 1.330 | -632 | 4.258 | 3,556 | 14,698 | 6,240 | -29 | -2,796 | -1,508 | -1,508 |
| Sapt. | 16,497 | 275 | -534 | 2.366 | 4.416 | 12.787 | 3,158 | -21 | -1,286 | -2,405 | -2,259 |
| Det. | 18,136 | 2.044 | 109 | 2,643 | 5.251 | 13.360 | 5,285 | -14 | -1,644 | -2.405 | -5,493 |
| Nov. | 17,310 | 3,653 | -593 | 4.170 | 5.680 | 11,821 | 1,461 | -9 | -3,219 | -2,372 | -4,468 |
| Dac. | 18,874 | 8.732 | 428 | 5,654 | 5,949 | 14,046 | -5,519 | -29 | -2,898 | -2.443 | -5,046 |
| 1983--Jan. | 13,042 | 9,962 | -232 | 4.950 | 5.125 | 13,166 | -7.782 | -50 | -2.766 | -2,654 | -6,677 |
| Pab. | 16.651 | 10,534 | -628. | 4.087 | 4.455 | 11.477 | -3.631 | -70 | -1,807 | -2,099 | -5.867 |
| Mar. | 15,855 | 9,544 | 3 | 1,852 | 4,855 | 12.087 | -1.737 | -4 | -2,476 | -1,970 | -6.299 |
| Apr. | 9.199 | 7.775 | -371 | 1.610 | 5.278 | 11.753 | -7.515 | -9 | -2.480 | -1.458 | -5.836 |
| May | 5.361 | 4.412 | 10 | 1,813 | 5,719 | 10.938 | -7.033 | * | -2,628 | -1.607 | -6. 263 |
| June | 8,263* | 3.618* | 65* | 121** | 5,627* | 9.786* | -550* | -23* | -744* | -1,453 | -4.383* |
| May 4 | 12.700 | 8.345 | -118 | 3,522 | 5,647 | 13.965 | -9,644 | -7 | -2.616 | -1.012 | -5,389 |
| 11 | 9,350 | 6.886 | 97 | 4,831 | 5,581 | 12,513 | -10,310 | 7 | -3,034 | -1,522 | -5,699 |
| 18 | 5,840 | 5,405 | 93 | 1,717 | 6,067 | 10,602 | -7.501 | 14 | -3,000 | -1,921 | -5,636 |
| 25 | -382 | 1.323 | -90 | -929 | 5,697 | 8.839 | -3.791 | -11 | -2,276 | -1.656 | -7.490 |
| Jume $\frac{1}{8}$ | 8.744 | 32 4.537 | ${ }^{48}$ | -715 -252 | 5,296 5,545 | 9,115 | $-2,962$ -398 | -10 -10 | -1.471 -903 | -1.711 -1.712 | -7.295 -8.002 |
| 15 | 9.135 | 5.527* | 25******* | -276* | 6,132* | $8.979{ }^{\text {8, }}$ | 378*******) | -30* | -1,169* | -2,227 | -8.204* |
| 22 | 7,020* | 2.577* | 7* | 502* | 5,424* | 10,120* | -783* | -32* | -527* | -1,609* | -8.657* |
| 29 | 7,826* | 1,901* | 54* | 1,599* | 5,529* | 9.943* | -974* | -26* | -304* | -1,008* | -8,809* |
| $\begin{array}{r} \text { July } 6 \\ 13 \\ 20 \\ 27 \end{array}$ | 5,163* | 414* | 133* | -26* | 5,523 ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ | 10,473* | -1,377* | -6* | -545* | -749* | -8,699* |

NOTE: Government securities deater cesh positions conalst of secuities already delivered, com-
milmenta to buy (sell) eecurities on an outright basis for Immediate delivery (5 busineas days or (eas).
and cortain "when-iseued" securlice for delayed delivery (more than 5 bueinese days). Futures and for-
ward positions inciude all other commitumente lovolving delayed deltren; futures contrecte ere arrang-
od on organired exchanges.

1. Cash plus fonward plue futwree poallone in Treamury, federal egency, and private abort-term
securties.

- 8 trictiy conficiontlal


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic format. All scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced tilting) and lightly cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other blemishes caused after initial printing).
    ${ }^{2}$ A two-step process was used. An advanced optimal character recognition computer program (OCR) first created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive, staff checked and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and tables were not reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.

[^1]:    1/ Boosted by borrowing by Seafirst, extended credit rose from an average of $\$ 513$ milition in May to $\$ 958$ million in June. This borrowing was repaid in early July.

[^2]:    I/ For M2, the base period for growth rates is always February/March ' 83 instead of QIV '82.
    2/ Total credit growth rates are calculated using the last month of each period.

[^3]:    Note: For a more detailed description of the strategies, see paragraph (14) of the text.

[^4]:    If On a quarterly average basis M1 growth in the third quarter under alternative A would be around $10 \frac{3}{4}$ percent at an annual rate.

