Small Business and Entrepreneurship during an Economic Recovery

Presented by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation

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The Importance of Access to Capital for Business Innovation

Moderator: Traci Mach, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Who Seeks and Who Receives? Implications of Demand for and Access to Financial Capital by Young Firms

Sheryl Winston-Smith, Temple University, Fox School of Business

Bank Capital Ratios and the Structure of Nonfinancial Industries Seung Jung Lee, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System


Discussant: Clinton B. Gwin, President, Pathway Lending

Who Seeks and Who Receives: Access to Capital in a Changing Economic Environment

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Small Business and Entrepreneurship during an Economic Recovery, November 10th, 2011 "Every individual that we can inspire, that we can guide, that we can help to start a new company, is vital to the future of our economic welfare."

- Ewing Kauffman



Motivation: Access to Financing

- Young firms and financial resources
 - Mix equity and debt sources (Cole, 2008; Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009; Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006; Gompers & Lerner, 2006)
 - Most do not receive VC financing (Shane,2008), (Berger and Udell,1998), (Cole 2008)
 - Banks provide critical growth capital
 - Most important source of debt (Robb and Robinson, 2010)
 - Banks provide 40% of financing at startup (2004)
 - Increasingly important: 70% by 2009
 - High-tech firms
 - Entrepreneurs face strong incentives to acquire non-dilutive financing (Winton & Yeramilli, 2008; Ueda, 2004)
- Adverse financial shock magnifies information asymmetry

Research questions

- What is the impact of the financial crisis on:
- Access to capital
 - Decision to apply for a bank loan?
 - Likelihood of receiving a bank loan?
 - Role of subjective measures/behavior in financing decision?
 - What are the implications for innovation and economic growth?



Banks and new firm financing

Ease financial constraints for new firms

- Deregulation and new entrepreneurial activity (Black and Strahan, 2002)
- Substantial role in new firm formation (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008); Kerr and Nanda (2009)
- External sources of financing
 - Information asymmetry and importance of tangible assets (Berger and Udell, 1998)
 - Significance of outside debt in new firms' capital structure (Robb and Robinson, 2010)



High-Tech Firms

Banks and high-tech firms

- Bank loans increase as information asymmetry decreases (Winston Smith, 2010)
- Increases innovation (Benfratello et al. 2010)
- Bank loans and exit by acquisition
- Less risky continuation strategy (Winton and Yerramilli, 2008)



Prior empirical studies

Selected based on financial choices...

Firms which have received venture capital financing

(Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; Gaba & Meyer, 2008; Gompers & Lerner, 2003; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Kogut, Urso, & Walker, 2007; Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007; Lerner, 1994)

Firms relying largely on external debt

(Landier & Thesmar, 2009), others

Pre-IPO behaviour

(Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2009), others

- Or limited sample...
 - High-tech only (which focus on VC, for most part) or
 - Exclude high-tech entirely (which focus on banks/debt, for most part)

Empirical Setting

- Data: Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS)
 - Ongoing, longitudinal study of new businesses in US
 - Stratified random sample of new businesses started in 2004
 - ➢ Eligibility for inclusion→ NOT HAVE PRIOR TO 2004: EIN/schedule C income/legal form/state UI or FICA taxes prior to 2004
- Baseline Survey (2004) conducted in 2005
 - Annual follow-ups: Calendar years 2005-2009
 - ▶ N = 4,928 firms at baseline
- Access through NORC data enclave (confidential data)
 - Microdata
 - Industry detail
 - Continuous variables, rather than categorical



The Foundation of Entrepreneurship

Sample Characteristics

Sample Characteristics									
2007, 2008, 2009									
		All		High-Tech			Non-High Tech		
Panel A: Outcomes	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009
Applied for New Loan	12.0%	12.5%	12.1%	15.7%	15.1%	15.8%	11.8%	12.4%	11.8%
Always Approved for Loan	70.7%	66.4%	60.9%	51.6%	58.4%	60.5%	72.3%	67.1%	60.9%
Revenue (millions)	0.48	0.55	0.57	0.46	0.65	0.70	0.48	0.54	0.56
Profit (millions)	0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.26	-0.04	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.02
Panel B: Behavioral Characteristics									
Did not apply out of Fear	15.6%	18.5%	21.0%	13.6%	17.9%	18.2%	15.7%	18.6%	21.2%
High Credit Score	52.8%	53.0%	53.0%	61.8%	62.2%	62.2%	52.3%	52.4%	52.4%

Sample Characteristics

Firm Characteristics	All	High Tech	Non High Tech
Comparative Advantage	61.6%	70.6%	61.1%
Product	51.0%	50.9%	51.0%
Home base	49.3%	53.4%	49.1%
High Tech	5.6%	100.0%	0.0%
Rural	16.5%	9.7%	16.8%
Owner Characteristics			
Black	8.7%	9.5%	8.7%
Female	30.6%	15.3%	31.6%
Hours Worked by Owner	42.5	42.7	42.4
Owner Age	44.9	44.7	44.9
College Degree or Higher	48.6%	72.2%	47.2%
Previous Industry Experience	43.8%	60.1%	42.8%
Previous Startup	42.4%	47.3%	42.1%

2007	All	, 2008, 200						
2007			Ц					
2007			High-Tech			Non-High Tech		
	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009
52.3%	57.9%	60.7%	52.6%	57.9%	59.8%	52.3%	57.9%	60.7%
21.4%	18.7%	16.9%	28.7%	27.6%	25.8%	21.0%	18.2%	16.4%
34.5%	35.1%	34.9%	27.2%	25.3%	23.9%	34.9%	35.8%	35.7%
11.1%	9.1%	8.2%	13.4%	14.3%	14.2%	11.0%	8.8%	7.9%
54.1%	57.3%	57.4%	48.8%	52.4%	49.5%	54.4%	57.6%	57.9%
0.841	0.824	0.797	0.938	1.052	0.947	0.834	0.809	0.787
0.115	0.105	0.099	0.109	0.108	0.117	0.115	0.104	0.098
6.4%	5.8%	6.5%	4.8%	3.2%	7.1%	6.5%	5.9%	6.4%
14.8%	15.0%	13.2%	11.4%	12.7%	14.2%	14.9%	15.1%	13.1%
6.2%	7.0%	6.0%	8.6%	9.0%	8.4%	6.1%	6.9%	5.9%
14.6%	11.6%	10.7%	23.9%	22.6%	22.8%	14.1%	10.9%	10.0%
	4122			540			3582	
2 3 1 5 5 ((1 ((21.4% 34.5% 54.1% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1%	21.4%18.7%34.5%35.1%1.1%9.1%54.1%57.3%54.1%57.3%0.8410.8240.1150.1056.4%5.8%4.8%15.0%6.2%7.0%4.6%11.6%	21.4%18.7%16.9%34.5%35.1%34.9%34.5%35.1%34.9%1.1%9.1%8.2%34.1%57.3%57.4%34.1%57.3%57.4%0.8410.8240.7970.1150.1050.0996.4%5.8%6.5%4.8%15.0%13.2%6.2%7.0%6.0%4.6%11.6%10.7%	21.4%18.7%16.9%28.7%34.5%35.1%34.9%27.2%1.1%9.1%8.2%13.4%54.1%57.3%57.4%48.8%0.8410.8240.7970.9380.1150.1050.0990.1096.4%5.8%6.5%4.8%4.8%15.0%13.2%11.4%6.2%7.0%6.0%8.6%4.6%11.6%10.7%23.9%	21.4%18.7%16.9%28.7%27.6%34.5%35.1%34.9%27.2%25.3%1.1%9.1%8.2%13.4%14.3%54.1%57.3%57.4%48.8%52.4%0.8410.8240.7970.9381.0520.1150.1050.0990.1090.1086.4%5.8%6.5%4.8%3.2%4.8%15.0%13.2%11.4%12.7%6.2%7.0%6.0%8.6%9.0%4.6%11.6%10.7%23.9%22.6%	21.4%18.7%16.9%28.7%27.6%25.8%34.5%35.1%34.9%27.2%25.3%23.9%1.1%9.1%8.2%13.4%14.3%14.2%34.1%57.3%57.4%48.8%52.4%49.5%0.8410.8240.7970.9381.0520.9470.1150.1050.0990.1090.1080.1176.4%5.8%6.5%4.8%3.2%7.1%4.8%15.0%13.2%11.4%12.7%14.2%6.2%7.0%6.0%8.6%9.0%8.4%4.6%11.6%10.7%23.9%22.6%22.8%	21.4%18.7%16.9%28.7%27.6%25.8%21.0%34.5%35.1%34.9%27.2%25.3%23.9%34.9%1.1%9.1%8.2%13.4%14.3%14.2%11.0%34.1%57.3%57.4%48.8%52.4%49.5%54.4%0.8410.8240.7970.9381.0520.9470.8340.1150.1050.0990.1090.1080.1170.1156.4%5.8%6.5%4.8%3.2%7.1%6.5%4.8%15.0%13.2%11.4%12.7%14.2%14.9%6.2%7.0%6.0%8.6%9.0%8.4%6.1%4.6%11.6%10.7%23.9%22.6%22.8%14.1%	21.4%18.7%16.9%28.7%27.6%25.8%21.0%18.2%34.5%35.1%34.9%27.2%25.3%23.9%34.9%35.8%1.1%9.1%8.2%13.4%14.3%14.2%11.0%8.8%34.1%57.3%57.4%48.8%52.4%49.5%54.4%57.6%0.8410.8240.7970.9381.0520.9470.8340.8090.1150.1050.0990.1090.1080.1170.1150.1046.4%5.8%6.5%4.8%3.2%7.1%6.5%5.9%4.8%15.0%13.2%11.4%12.7%14.2%14.9%15.1%6.2%7.0%6.0%8.6%9.0%8.4%6.1%6.9%4.6%11.6%10.7%23.9%22.6%22.8%14.1%10.9%



Startup Capital and Subsequent New Financial Injections (2004-2009)											
		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	2009
Owner Equity	\$	32,612	\$	16,728	\$	12,858	\$	10,304	\$	10,218	\$ 8,676
Insider Equity	\$	1,929	\$	1,539	\$	846	\$	577	\$	551	\$ 833
Outsider Equity	\$	18,232	\$	20,097	\$	16,308	\$	11,522	\$	5,477	\$ 10,371
Owner Debt	\$	4,884	\$	4,595	\$	4,058	\$	4,173	\$	4,675	\$ 3,034
Insider Debt	\$	6,704	\$	5,847	\$	5,346	\$	4,815	\$	3,386	\$ 10,118
Outsider Debt	\$	51,474	\$	47,430	\$	54,405	\$	73,480	\$	47,435	\$ 75,605
Total Financial	\$	115,835	\$	96,235	\$	93,821	\$	104,870	\$	71,741	\$ 108,636
Owner Equity		28.2%		17.4%		13.7%		9.8%		14.2%	8.0%
Insider Equity		1.7%		1.6%		0.9%		0.5%		0.8%	0.8%
Outsider Equity		15.7%		20.9%		17.4%		11.0%		7.6%	9.5%
Owner Debt		4.2%		4.8%		4.3%		4.0%		6.5%	2.8%
Insider Debt		5.8%		6.1%		5.7%		4.6%		4.7%	9.3%
Outsider Debt		44.4%		49.3%		58.0%		70.1%		66.1%	69.6%
Total Financial		100.0%	1	LOO.0%	1	100.0%		100.0%	1	LOO.0%	100.0%
Source: KFS microdat	a										



Model and empirical analysis

Observable financial and performance measures

Extent of credit constraint, revenue in previous year
Behavioral characteristics

▶ risk, fear of denial

(1) loan demand = $\beta_{0+} \beta_1$ growth + β_2 constrained + β_3 behavioral + β_4 firm + β_5 entrepreneur + ϵ

(2) loan approval = $\delta_{0+} \delta_1$ growth + δ_2 asymmetry + δ_3 firm + δ_4 entrepreneur + μ



First Stage, Loan application

	High Tech Firms		
VARIABLES	Only	All Firms	All Firms
First Stage Results			
Fear of denial	0.705***	0.636***	0.633***
	(0.155)	(0.0580)	(0.0580)
Bank Loans/Total Financial Capital	0.708*	0.399***	0.394***
	(0.412)	(0.0760)	(0.0757)

Dependent variable: Loan(s) always approved

	High Tech Firms		
VARIABLES	Only	All Firms	All Firms
Second Stage Results			
High Tech Industry		-0.0778	-0.236**
		(0.0718)	(0.108)
Previous Startup Experience	0.0807	-0.0914**	-0.101**
	(0.131)	(0.0407)	(0.0402)
High Credit Score	0.209*	-0.0169	-0.0512
	(0.114)	(0.0410)	(0.0434)
High-Tech X High Credit Score			0.450***
			(0.109)
Intellectual Property	-0.143	-0.105**	-0.0910*
	(0.137)	(0.0471)	(0.0501)
High Tech X Intellectual Prop.			-0.235**
			(0.106)



Dependent variable: Loan(s) always approved

	High Tech Firms		
VARIABLES	Only	All Firms	All Firms
Second Stage Results Continued			
R&D Employment	0.0248	-0.127***	-0.126***
	(0.220)	(0.0469)	(0.0465)
Have Trade Credit	-0.183*	0.0277	0.0245
	(0.100)	(0.0428)	(0.0420)
Log of Employment	-0.00783	-0.0110	-0.0110
	(0.0609)	(0.0250)	(0.0246)
Log of Assets	-0.270	0.00466	0.00624
	(0.202)	(0.0374)	(0.0381)
Insider financing/Total Financial Capital	-0.746**	-0.310***	-0.304***
	(0.324)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Has business credit card	-0.171*	-0.0981**	-0.0940**
	(0.0973)	(0.0413)	(0.0412)
Has business credit line	-0.173*	0.106***	0.110***
	(0.0943)	(0.0394)	(0.0391)
2008 Year Dummy	0.0320	-0.0751	-0.0803*
	(0.0917)	(0.0472)	(0.0472)
2009 Year Dummy	0.00760	-0.121**	-0.122**
	(0.158)	(0.0480)	(0.0480)



Conclusions

- KFS provides a window into the impact of the financial crisis on access to bank loans by young firms
 - Pre-crisis vs. post-crisis
- Kauffman Firm Survey
 - Crisis hits in critical window of new/young firm lifecycle
 - Understanding the impact of financial shock at key point



Conclusions and Policy Implications

- Credit markets tightened in 2008 and 2009
- Relationship between information transparency and entrepreneurs' ability to secure adequate financial capital
 - Very important for <u>high tech firms</u>, which are typically more information-opaque
 - Tangible assets do not seem to matter as much as credit score
 - Implications for innovation and economic growth



Comments/Questions?

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Thank you!





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