Meeting Between Staff of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Representatives of The Clearing House (TCH)
April 8, 2015

Participants: Connie Horsley, David Lynch, Tom Boemio, Juan Climent, Kevin Tran, Tim Geischecker, Matt McQueeney, Christine Graham, and David Alexander (Federal Reserve Board)

Margot Schwadron, Kevin Korzeniewski, and Amrit Sekhon (OCC)

Ben Bosco and Stephanie Efron (FDIC)

David Wagner, David Pozin, and Jarryd Anderson (TCH); Andy Gladin and Lauren Wansor (Sullivan & Cromwell); Anna Shender, Eugene Rabinovich, Julie, Kestenman, and Ruth Arnold (Bank of America); Winnie Honeycutt (BB&T), Jack Xu (BNY Mellon), Bill Kugler and Sebastian Astrada (Capital One); Sridhar Iyer and Yingli Xie (Citi Group); Liz Ewing and Sarah Lantz (Goldman Sachs); Miroslaw Fec and Iresh Mehta (HSBC); Beth Cleland and Edward Mayfield (JP Morgan); Andrew Nash and Grace Gao (Morgan Stanley); Ellice Adisubrata and Kerry Massey (MUFG Union Bank); Madeleine Thomey and Reggie Imamura (PNC); Jim Reilly (TD Bank); Luke Wippler (US Bank); Craig Lowder, Eric Painter, Jasmin Barnes, Ken Anthonis, Pete Tran, Ramesh Adiga, and Tim Becker (Wells Fargo)

Summary: On April 8, 2015, staff of the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (collectively, the agencies) participated in a conference call with representatives of The Clearing House (TCH) to discuss the agencies’ proposed technical amendments to the regulatory capital rule. Representatives of TCH requested that for purposes of the agencies’ development of the interagency final rule, the agencies consider extending several of the proposed changes, applicable only to the advanced approaches rule as proposed, to the standardized approach contained in subpart D of the regulatory capital framework. TCH also suggested that the agencies expand the zero percent risk weight to transactions cleared on behalf of clients that would not meet the eligibility criteria in sections 3(a)(3) and (3)(a)(4) of the regulatory capital framework for a cleared transaction, to the extent that the clearing member does not guarantee the performance of the CCP and has no payment obligation to the clearing member client in the event of a CCP default.