Meeting between Federal Reserve Board Staff and Representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce January 24, 2012

Participants: Sean Campbell, David Lynch, Jeremy Newell, and Jim O’Brien (Federal Reserve Board)  
Kristin Angus, Christina Crooks, John Newman, Aaron Pas, Thomas Quaadman, Richard Scott and Andrew Siff (Chamber of Commerce); and Michael Bopp (Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP)

Summary: Staff of the Federal Reserve Board met with representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to discuss the section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce provided Federal Reserve Board staff with a presentation on their views on the potential negative impact of the section 619’s restrictions on (i) the liquidity of U.S. trading markets, particularly with respect to commercial paper and debt and equity securities issued by U.S. companies, (ii) the ability of U.S. companies to raise capital or debt, and (iii) the global competitiveness of U.S. companies.

A copy of the materials provided by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is attached to this summary.
The Volcker Rule

The Volcker Rule bans proprietary trading, and certain investments by banks to limit and regulate the amount of risk they can take on. Proprietary trading occurs when a financial firm uses its own funds to trade financial instruments, such as stocks and currencies for profit and to establish an inventory that enables faster transactions for clients. However, “proprietary trading” is an ambiguous term, that even Chairman Paul Volcker, the rule’s namesake, could not define. With the passage of Dodd-Frank, banks have already been unwinding their prop trading operations, but the proposed rules create a complicated and burdensome compliance system that calls into question any trading undertaken by a bank. The ambiguity of, and implementation issues surrounding the Volcker Rule are likely to have a chilling effect on many legitimate services that banks provide to their clients.

This is not a “Wall Street” issue.

If implemented in its current form, the Volcker Rule will have wide-ranging adverse impacts upon regional and medium-sized banks with severe repercussions on the ability of main street businesses to raise capital in order to expand and create jobs.

The Unintended Consequences of the Volcker Rule

The Volcker Rule may impair market liquidity reducing the ability of companies of all sizes to raise capital.

How will the Volcker Rule impair liquidity? The Volcker Rule will impair the ability of banks to be “market makers” that act as significant buyers and sellers of securities to ensure that borrowers can find investors and investors can find financial investments. To perform this “market making” function banks need to hold inventory, but the Volcker Rule significantly constrains their ability by dictating how banks should manage their inventory. This will reduce the depth and liquidity of our capital markets.
For example, main street businesses rely upon the “market making” activities of banks in order to secure affordable funding in the bond market. Banks provide this service as an incident to underwriting bond issuances. This funding is critical for a wide-range of business activities, from funding payroll to business expansion and R&D. If banks can no longer hold inventory it will be harder for main street businesses to raise capital.

The Volcker Rule will result in higher costs for borrowers.

With the reduced market liquidity imposed by the Volcker Rule, borrowers would need to pay higher rates for debt that they issue in order to compensate investors for the elevated risk that they may not be able to find another buyer if they need to sell.

The Volcker Rule will increase the cost of capital for all companies. These increased costs coupled with administrative burdens will prohibit some mid-size and small companies from entering debt markets. In addition, because Basel III may restrict the ability of those same firms to access bank lending, access to the capital markets will be more important than ever.

The Volcker Rule will restrict trading in proper and allowable business.

The Proposed Rule is inherently complicated and forces regulators to define the intent of a trade. The complexity and vagueness of the Volcker Rule will force banks to adopt the most conservative interpretation of the Rule in order avoid costly and disruptive investigations into whether they are complying with the Rule. The net result will likely be the elimination of perfectly acceptable “market making” activities.

The Volcker Rule will place U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage.

The United States’ major trading partners have rejected the Obama Administration’s request to follow the Volcker Rule putting American companies at a competitive disadvantage. By eliminating a core revenue stream from U.S. banks, the Volcker Rule would effectively reduce the ability for U.S. banks to compete and expand into overseas markets. Additionally, in order to avoid the Volcker Rule, foreign financial firms may curtail U.S. operations further depriving American businesses of capital.

The Volcker Rule will force some non-financial companies to develop and build compliance programs.

Non-financial companies that own banks or financing arms will have to build compliance programs even though they do not engage in proprietary trading. Also, companies that use derivatives as an everyday risk mitigation tool will face increased costs and additional compliance burdens.

The Volcker Rule will likely result in higher bank fees for consumers and businesses.

As discussed above, the cumulative effect of regulatory changes such as the Volcker Rule and Basel III will reduce or eliminate core bank revenues. At the same time, the Volcker Rule will materially increase the costs of regulatory compliance. To continue offering the services and infrastructure consumers expect, American banks in turn would need to increase banking fees for consumers and businesses in order to offset this combination of lost revenue and increasing expenses.
January 17, 2012

Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson  
Secretary  
Board of Governors of the  
Federal Reserve  
20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20551

Mr. Robert E. Feldman  
Executive Secretary  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
550 17th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20429

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy  
Secretary  
100 F Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20549-1090

Office of the Comptroller of the  
Currency  
250 F Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20219

Mr. David Stawick  
Secretary  
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission  
1155 21st Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20583


Dear Ms. Johnson, Mr. Feldman, Ms. Murphy, Mr. Stawick and To Whom It May Concern:

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber") is the world’s largest business federation representing the interests of over three million companies of every size, sector and region. The Chamber created the Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness ("CCMC") to promote a modern and effective regulatory structure for the capital markets to fully function in a 21st century economy. The CCMC welcomes the opportunity to provide input and comment on the proposed rule,
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds ("the Volcker Rule Proposal").

The CCMC supports the intent to limit irresponsible risk taking. Multi-agency efforts to achieve that goal should be coordinated and comprehensive to avoid regulatory overlap and unforeseen adverse consequences upon the economy.

The Chamber has previously written\(^1\) requesting increased cooperation amongst the regulators, extension of time for the comment period, and for a withdrawal and re-proposal of the Volcker Rule proposal once the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") released its portion of the Volcker Rule proposal. The CFTC voted to issue a Volcker Rule proposal on January 11, 2012\(^2\) and provided for a 60 day comment period. The comment period for proposed rule issued by the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") ends on February 13, 2012.\(^3\)

The inconsistency in the comment periods makes it difficult for the stakeholders to analyze the rules and determine the cumulative effect of the various agencies’ different Volcker Rule proposals. Aligning the comment periods will help the business community, including non-financial firms, to provide regulators the informed comments that they need to help them to avoid unnecessary impairment of capital formation by non-financial businesses, especially small and mid-sized companies.

\(^1\) See letters from the U.S. Chamber to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on October 11, 2011 and from the U.S. Chamber to the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on November 17, 2011. The Chamber has asked that the comment period for the Volcker Rule proposal be 150 days.

\(^2\) As of this date the CFTC Volcker Rule proposal has not yet been published in the Federal Register.

\(^3\) The initial date for the end of the comment period for the Federal Reserve, FDIC, SEC and OCC was January 13, 2011, but the comment period was extended on December 23, 2011.
Accordingly, the Chamber respectfully requests that the regulators reconcile all of the comment periods to end with the conclusion of the CFTC comment period. This will help to insure an orderly and fair process for all parties involved.

CCMC is available to discuss these issues with you further.

Sincerely,

[Tom Quaadman]
December 15, 2011

Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson  
Secretary  
Board of Governors of the  
Federal Reserve  
20th Street and Constitution Avenue  
Washington, DC 20551

Mr. Robert E. Feldman  
Executive Secretary  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
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The CCMC supports the intent to limit irresponsible risk taking. We are concerned, however, that the Volcker Rule Proposal does much more than this. In doing so, it poses implementation issues and severe costs and burdens that threaten the efficient, competitive, and dynamic capital markets that foster effective capital formation and the job creation it
engenders. While the CCMC will file additional comment letters\(^1\) on the Volcker Rule Proposal, we write this letter to express concerns regarding the fractured, incomplete, inconsistent, and uncoordinated study of the economic impacts and costs and benefits associated with the proposed rule. We believe that if the flaws in the cost-benefit and economic impact analyses are not addressed, they may lead to the promulgation of a flawed final rule that has severe, unintended consequences for capital formation, the efficiency of capital markets, and the competitiveness of these markets. Accordingly, the Volcker Rule Proposal should:

- Be considered under the requirements of Executive Orders 13563 and 13579 in order to coordinate different requirements across agencies for economic analysis and finalization of rules;

- Be considered an economically significant rulemaking and the public provided with a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the impacts upon the economy as required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 ("Unfunded Mandates Reform Act");

- Be subject to an enhanced Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") regulatory review process; and

- Be considered in the context of other initiatives, such as Basel III, and other pertinent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act") rulemakings, when determining the economic impacts.

The CCMC's concerns are discussed in greater detail below.

Discussion

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\(^1\) The Chamber has already sent two letters concerning this rule making: the first on October 11, 2011 to Secretary Geithner requesting the Financial Stability Oversight Council coordinate the Volcker Rule Proposal rulemaking because of the absence of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and on November 17, 2011 requesting a withdrawal and re-proposal of the Volcker Rule Proposal at such time when all of the regulators could participate together in a joint rulemaking. This letter, as the previous letters, are being submitted for the rulemaking record.
The proposed joint rule to implement the Volcker Rule was published in the *Federal Register* on November 7, 2011 and the comment period is set to close on January 13, 2012. The joint rule was proposed by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") has not joined in the rulemaking, but plans to issue proposed rules at some point in the future.

A. Addressing Differing Standards by Coordinating Cost-Benefit and Economic Impact Analysis under Executive Orders 13563 and 13579

While the Volcker Rule Proposal must follow the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, SEC, and CFTC each have differing legal standards and internal practices for economic analysis when promulgating a rule.

As an Agency of the Treasury Department, the OCC is the one agency involved in the joint Volcker Rule Proposal that is not an independent agency. While the next section of the letter will deal with the "economically significant" standard, the OCC must promulgate rules consistent with the OIRA process and Executive Order 13563.

The Federal Reserve is an independent Agency, but it has avowed that it will seek to abide by Executive Order 13563. Consistent with this approach, the Federal Reserve recently stated that it "continues to believe that [its] regulatory efforts should be designed to minimize regulatory burden consistent with the effective implementation of [its] statutory responsibilities."[2]

The FDIC is an independent Agency, but it has stated that it plans to review the effectiveness of its regulations in accordance with Executive Order 13579. As part of this plan, the FDIC confirmed its obligation to "analyze a proposed rule’s impact on depository institutions, customers of depository institutions, small depository institutions, and industry competition [as well as] the effects on banks and their ability to raise capital."[3]

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The SEC is also an independent Agency, but when promulgating rules, it must consider specific issues designated by the Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange Act"). For example, under Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act, the SEC is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate to advance the public interest in protecting investors and if a regulator's action will promote efficiency, competition and capital formation. Additionally, Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the SEC, when adopting a rule, to take into consideration the impacts of proposed rule upon competition. These requirements apply to those portions of the Proposal, besides the Bank Holding Act, that are related to registered broker dealers and security based swap dealers. Moreover, the Volcker Rule will impact the financing of the very public companies whose investors it is the SEC's primary mission to protect. In addition to these considerations, the SEC is attempting to follow Executive Orders 13563 and 13579 by requesting comment on retrospective analysis of the costs and benefits of its regulations while soliciting comments on means of improving rulemaking.

While the CFTC did not adopt the joint rulemaking or separately issue its portion of the Volcker Rule, it is expected to do so at some point. The CFTC must take several factors into consideration when it analyzes the costs and benefits of proposing a rule. These include considerations related to protecting market participants and the public. The CFTC must also consider whether a rule promotes the considerations of the efficiency, competitiveness, and the financial integrity of futures markets. The CFTC is also obliged to ensure that its rules do not impair the price discovery functions of the markets, and that they are consistent with considerations of sound risk management practices and other public interest considerations.

Therefore, the standards and considerations of costs and benefits and economic impacts vary across the agencies involved in the Volcker Rule Proposal. Given this haphazard and uncoordinated analysis under existing practices, CCMC recommends that all of the agencies involved in the Volcker Rule Proposal establish a common baseline for cost-benefit and economic analysis by using the blueprint established by Executive Orders 13563 and 13579, in addition to other requirements they must follow.

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1 15 USC 78c (f)
2 15 USC 78w (a) (2)
4 1 USC 19.
5 Executive Order 13559 requests that independent agencies follow the requirements of Executive Order 13563.
This would allow meaningful, cumulative analysis that would result in a more coherent final rule with fewer harmful, unintended consequences for America’s capital markets.

Executive Order 13563 places upon agencies the requirement, when promulgating rules to:

1) Propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to justify);

2) Tailor regulations to impose the least burden on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations;

3) Select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity);

4) To the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt; and

5) Identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made to the public.\(^7\)

Additionally, Executive Order 13563 states that “[i]n applying these principles, each agency is directed to use the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as possible.”

Conducting the rulemaking and its economic analysis under this unifying set of principles will facilitate a better understanding of the rulemaking and its impact and give stakeholders a better opportunity to provide regulators with informed comments and information.

\(^7\) Executive Order 13563
B. Economically Significant Rulemaking and OIRA Review

As stated earlier, the OCC is the only agency involved in the rulemaking that is not an independent agency. As such, the OCC must determine pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) if the rulemaking will cost state, local, or tribal governments or the private sector more than $100 million. If it does, the OCC must submit the rulemaking for an enhanced review and provide estimates of future compliance costs, impacts upon the economy—including data on productivity, jobs, and international competitiveness.\(^\text{10}\)

The OCC has stated that the Volcker Rule Proposal is not an economically significant rulemaking\(^\text{11}\). This is an incredible assertion with which we take issue. In contrast to the OCC’s outright rejection of the idea that the Volcker Rule Proposal is an economically significant rule, the SEC has at least requested information from commenter’s before deciding if this is an economically significant rulemaking. Under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREGFA), if a rule is economically significant, the SEC must perform an analysis similar to that required by UMRA.\(^\text{12}\)

We have no doubt that the Volcker Rule Proposal is an economically significant rulemaking, with costs of more than $100 million, requiring enhanced review. Indeed, the agencies themselves estimate that compliance alone will require 6 million hours. The additional issues listed below are merely illustrative, and by no means exhaustive, yet show that the costs are well above the $100 million threshold triggering enhanced review.

The definition of exempt state and municipal securities is narrower under the Volcker Rule provisions of Dodd-Frank than under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. This will subject municipal securities issued by municipalities and authorities to Volcker Rule provisions, impacting underwriting, market making, and subjecting state and local governments to increased financing cost, reduced access to the capital markets, and reduced liquidity in the secondary market. With over $3.6 trillion in outstanding State and Local obligation and revenue bonds, the impacts upon these entities will be well over $100 million. Since these bonds are critical to capital programs such as infrastructure improvements and

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\(^{10}\) See 2 USC 1501, et. seq.

\(^{11}\) See Federal Register Volume 76, No. 215, 68939, Monday, November 7, 2011.

\(^{12}\) It should also be noted that the Small Business Administration recently filed a comment letter taking exception with the cost benefit analysis conducted by the SEC in the Conflict Minerals rulemaking related to Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Accordingly, this SBREGFA review should be taken seriously by regulators.
school construction, these cost impacts upon state and local governments, in a difficult fiscal environment, should be taken into serious consideration by the regulators. For these reasons, the agencies should interpret "obligations of a State or any political subdivision thereof" under the Government Obligations exemption to include all municipal securities as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

While much of the focus of the Volcker Rule Proposal has been on financial institutions, there are significant costs to non-financial companies that have not been contemplated by the regulators. To illustrate these impacts, included as an appendix to this letter is a survey that uses 2010-2011 historic data, of select U.S. financing companies that provide services for non-financial businesses. It appears that the Volcker Rule will impose at least a five basis point increase in bid-ask spreads. In a confidential survey of five large U.S. borrowers, it estimates that under the Volcker Rule Proposal increase in the bid-ask spreads will be closer to 25-50 basis points increasing lending costs from between $742 million and $1.483 billion. In reviewing Volcker Rule impacts upon potential lending strategies for smaller less frequent borrowers, hypothetical scenarios suggest an increase in bid-ask spreads will be closer to 50 and 100 basis points leading to increased lending costs of between $106 million and $211 million.

Also, in discussions with our membership it appears that there will be an impact upon switching transactions—the process whereby a financial institution buys back some of an issuer's older bonds as part of the process for a new issuance. For example, a 10 basis point increase caused by the Volcker Rule would increase the costs of switching transactions by $2.8 million per billion while a 50 basis point increase would drive up costs by nearly $14 million per billion.

Taken together, b. extension, with $8 trillion of corporate debt outstanding and that approximately $7 trillion trades in a year, the incremental transaction costs for investors and financing costs for U.S. companies could total into the tens of billions of dollars.

These discussions with our members provide a snapshot of potential costs facing non-financial companies because of just one provision of the Volcker Rule Proposal. Other provisions will also markedly affect liquidity in the financial markets and will increase the costs associated with raising funds for both financial and non-financial firms throughout the economy.
Additionally, financial companies and non-financial companies that own banks will have to build Volcker Rule Proposal compliance programs that will be costly on a start-up and ongoing basis.

Because there is ample reason to believe that the costs that would be imposed by the proposed Volcker Rule to state and local governments and the economy are well over $100 million, the OCC should submit the proposed rule to an OIRA regulatory review process. The Federal Reserve, FDIC, SEC, and CFTC should also voluntarily submit their portions of the Volcker Rule Proposal for an OIRA regulatory review process.

C. Interaction with Other Initiatives and Regulations

The Volcker Rule Proposal is also not being drafted or considered in a vacuum. It is being developed during a period when the Dodd-Frank Act is being implemented and international capital standards are being re-written—the cumulative impacts of these developments must be viewed on a broad holistic basis.

As just one example, mid-cap and small-cap companies may find it increasingly hard to access debt markets because of widening bid-ask spreads and administrative costs. This will force these companies to access bank lending at the same time that Basel III is attempting to lessen risk in granting loans, through increased capital requirements. Therefore, these companies could be shut out of opportunities to raise capital in both the debt and equity markets.

As another example, the Volcker Rule Proposal is requesting feedback on compensation packages and practices. Yet these same financial regulators are currently considering a rulemaking on incentive compensation designed to lessen inappropriate risk taking. It seems possible that regulators could develop rules or policies that are inconsistent. To avoid conflicting policies, regulators should take into account the incentive compensation rulemaking when examining compensation and proprietary trading. A failure to do so could make compliance difficult, if not impossible.

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1 Currently the SEC, Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit Union Administration and Federal Housing Financing Agency are considering a rulemaking under Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding incentive compensation arrangements.
Again, this is but a small portion of the current universe of Dodd-Frank Act and other financial rulemaking and does not even take into consideration the CFTC's impending Volcker Rule Proposal. Any effort that seeks to ensure that our capital markets remain, efficient, competitive, and accessible must take such collateral considerations into account to allow for logical and consistent rules that provide for a rational means of compliance.

**Conclusion**

CCMC is very concerned that the Volcker Rule Proposal, in its current form, has inadequately considered the costs and benefits associated with the proposed rule. The proposed rule fails to acknowledge its true costs and impacts upon the economy. This has the potential to distort and corrupt analysis of the proposed rule to such a degree that any final rule will be replete with errors, omissions, and unintended consequences. The resultant harm may fall most heavily on non-financial companies of all sizes because a flawed rule is likely to restrict their opportunities for capital formation, which can, in turn, impede job creation and economic recovery.

CCMC is available to discuss these issues with you further.

Sincerely,

David Hirschmann

Attachment

cc: The Honorable Gary Gensler, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
**Annual Term Debt Funding Cost Analysis**

Based on the 2010-2011 historical funding of select large U.S. borrowers and assumed funding strategies for three hypothetical small U.S. borrowers, below is an analysis of the funding cost impact due to a widening of bid / ask spreads.

### Illustrative Funding Cost Analysis: Annual Term Debt Issuance of Select Large U.S. Borrowers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issuer</th>
<th>Weighted Average Maturity</th>
<th>Weighted Average Coupon</th>
<th>Modified Duration</th>
<th>2010-2011 YTD Issuance</th>
<th>2011-2011 YTD Total Cost Impact of +25 bp Increase</th>
<th>2011-2011 YTD Total Cost Impact of +50 bp Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance Company</td>
<td>7.5 Years</td>
<td>3.180%</td>
<td>6.5 Years</td>
<td>$30.4bn</td>
<td>+$498.7mm</td>
<td>+$997.5mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive Finance</td>
<td>5.3 Years</td>
<td>2.267%</td>
<td>4.8 Years</td>
<td>$10.1bn</td>
<td>+$122.1mm</td>
<td>+$244.1mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captive Finance</td>
<td>5.0 Years</td>
<td>2.055%</td>
<td>4.7 Years</td>
<td>$5.8bn</td>
<td>+$68.0mm</td>
<td>+$135.9mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captive Finance</td>
<td>3.5 Years</td>
<td>1.607%</td>
<td>3.4 Years</td>
<td>$5.2bn</td>
<td>+$43.3mm</td>
<td>+$86.5mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Finance</td>
<td>5.8 Years</td>
<td>2.383%</td>
<td>5.3 Years</td>
<td>$0.8bn</td>
<td>+$9.9mm</td>
<td>+$19.8mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$52.3bn</td>
<td>+$742.0mm</td>
<td>+$1,483.8mm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Funding cost analysis includes USD-denominated debt issued since January 1, 2010
(2) Includes floating-rate note coupons at current spreads over Libor

### Illustrative Funding Cost Analysis: Annual Term Debt Issuance of Three Hypothetical Small U.S. Borrowers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Assumed Weighted Average Maturity</th>
<th>Assumed Weighted Average Coupon</th>
<th>Modified Duration</th>
<th>Assumed Annual Funding Capacity</th>
<th>Annual Total Cost Impact of +50 bp Increase</th>
<th>Annual Total Cost Impact of +100 bp Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>5.0 Years</td>
<td>3.750%</td>
<td>4.4 Years</td>
<td>$250mm</td>
<td>+$5.6mm</td>
<td>+$11.1mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.0 Years</td>
<td>4.750%</td>
<td>7.7 Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>5.0 Years</td>
<td>3.875%</td>
<td>4.4 Years</td>
<td>$500mm</td>
<td>+$11.1mm</td>
<td>+$22.2mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.0 Years</td>
<td>4.875%</td>
<td>7.7 Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>5.0 Years</td>
<td>4.000%</td>
<td>4.4 Years</td>
<td>$1,000mm</td>
<td>+$22.1mm</td>
<td>+$44.2mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.0 Years</td>
<td>5.000%</td>
<td>7.7 Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$1,000mm</td>
<td>+$106.0mm</td>
<td>+$211.9mm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Annual total cost impact is calculated based on hypothetical annual funding capacities, weighted average maturities of debt issued and weighted average coupons of debt issued.

www.uschamber.com/ccmc
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The CCMC is concerned that the business community and other stakeholders will not have sufficient time under the current schedule to thoroughly analyze and comment on the proposed rule, Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and
Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson  
Mr. Robert E. Feldman  
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy  
To Whom It May Concern  
November 17, 2011  
Page 2

Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011) ("the Volcker Rule Proposal"). Accordingly, the Chamber respectfully requests:

1) The Volcker Rule Proposal to be withdrawn and re-proposed when the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") publishes a proposed rule on this complex, multidisciplinary, and interlocking rule; and

2) When the Volcker Rule Proposal is re-proposed that the stakeholders be given a 150 day comment period, or in the alternative if there is no withdrawal that the current comment period be extended to 150 days, to conform to comment periods for far less complex rules.

The CCMC's concerns are discussed in greater detail below.

Discussion

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act") contains provisions placing restrictions on proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity activities by financial institutions. These provisions, known as the "Volcker Rule," require a massive administrative effort to implement. The Volcker Rule Proposal was published in the Federal Register on November 7, 2011 and the deadline for submitting comments, ends on January 13, 2012. However, one of the agencies with implementation responsibilities, the CFTC, has not yet offered its contribution to the Volcker Rule Proposal. The issuance of the Volcker Rule Proposal in the absence of CFTC participation creates uncertainty as to whether and how non-financial companies would have to comply with the Volcker Rule, as well as an element of speculation in identifying those aspects of the imposing release that they need to address in comments. This uncertainty as to how certain entities may be affected by the proposed rule—which cannot be clarified until the CFTC proposes Volcker Rule implementation regulations—results in a fundamental lack of clarity and fairness in the regulatory process.
The truncated comment period also raises fundamental questions of fairness and due process, particularly when compared to other less complex rulemakings.

A. Re-Proposal

Implementation of the Volcker Rule could have wide-ranging impacts upon the capital formation and liquidity needed by businesses for daily operations and growth. Accordingly, it is vital that all potentially impacted stakeholders have a robust opportunity for comment. However, it is not even clear to many companies whether they fall within the new regime constructed by the rule. Many businesses, financial and non-financial, that thought they were exempt from the Volcker Rule, are slowly discovering that they may have to comply with certain aspects of the proposed implementing regulations. To take but one example, non-financial firms use derivatives as a crucial risk-mitigation tool—these vehicles are essential to ensuring predictable costs. Yet, under the regime envisioned by the Volcker Rule Proposal, it is not clear whether and how the liquidity of the derivative markets—and, hence, their ability to enter into risk-mitigating swaps will be affected.

The CCMC believes that these concerns are cause for withdrawing the Volcker Rule Proposal and re-issuing proposed regulations in conjunction with the CFTC. Not only will such a process fully comply with the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") by providing an opportunity for meaningful notice and comment by all potentially impacted stakeholders, but it will allow the CFTC to bring its expertise to bear on a complex, multi-disciplinary, and interlocking rule. For example, the CFTC may very well have concerns regarding the Volcker Rule Proposal that if addressed may improve the proposed rule itself.

What is more, Congress has spoken to these concerns in the Dodd-Frank Act and has made clear that agencies should coordinate in implementing the Volcker Rule. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1851. As the CCMC noted in our October 11, 2011, letter to Secretary Geithner, (copy attached) only a fully coordinated rulemaking will allow for meaningful comment, expeditious implementation of final rule makings, and the coordinated rulemaking that Congress clearly intended.
To ensure that all parties understand how they may be affected and that all stakeholders have a meaningful opportunity to comment on the Volcker Rule Proposal, the CCMC respectfully requests that the Volcker Rule Proposal be withdrawn. To avoid the fundamental unfairness and administrative defects that will result from the regulatory process that is currently under way, we ask that all of the relevant agencies re-propose Volcker Rule regulations when they are able to present a unified and coherent vision for this new regulatory regime. This is what Congress and the regulated community expected when the Volcker Rule was enacted. By advancing a unified and coherent proposal, regulators can ensure all affected parties can meaningfully participate in the notice and comment process for Volcker Rule implementing regulations.

B. Extension of Comment Period

The CCMC respectfully requests that the length of the Volcker Rule Proposal comment period be extended to 150 days. The Volcker Rule Proposal propounds 400 questions, many of which are multi-pronged and comprise more than 1,000 questions.

Because of the complexity and massive size of the rule, stakeholders do not have enough time to analyze the Volcker Rule Proposal and comment on it in a meaningful and intelligent manner in this truncated time frame. This lack of a sufficient opportunity for comment not only harms stakeholders and raises serious questions under the APA and deprives your agencies of data needed to effectively and efficiently implement the Volcker Rule.

There is ample precedent for a 150 day comment period (for far less complex rules), such as:

- The opportunity to comment before the U.S. Coast Guard issued final regulations overhauling the rules governing the operation of small passenger vessels of less than 100 tons. The public initially had a 120 day comment period that was extended to 150 days; and
A 150 day comment period on a proposed Environmental Protection Agency rule on geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide.

Agencies have provided 120 day comment periods of rulemaking far less complex than the Volcker Rule on matters such as:

- Regulatory changes that the Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, proposed to the operation of schools on Tribal Lands to comply with the “No Child Left Behind” Act; and

- A 2006 proposed rule by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Risk based Capital Standards Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework.

An extension of time will allow stakeholders to examine the scope of the proposed Volcker Rule regulations and to provide regulators with information that can assist them in crafting the final regulation.

***

It is important that the Volcker Rule be implemented in a fair and judicious manner that does not inhibit the capital formation and the basic liquidity needed to foster economic growth. It is equally important that the process by which the Volcker Rule is implemented is fundamentally fair and transparent insofar as it allows all potential stakeholders to understand the regulatory structure that is being considered, and, accordingly, to engage in meaningful, constructive, and informed comments.

This basic element of fundamental fairness will be absent until the CFTC concludes its work. Consequently, the Volcker Rule Proposal should be withdrawn and re-proposed when all relevant agencies can either join together in a joint rulemaking, or at least publish for comment in a coordinated process their various visions for effectuating the aspects of the Volcker Rule under their respective
jurisdictions. Additionally, given the sheer complexity of the Volcker Rule Proposal, the comment period should be extended to 150 days to provide sufficient time for businesses to analyze it and provide meaningful comment.

Recognizing that the Volcker Rule Proposal may have significant impacts upon the capital formation and liquidity of non-financial companies, the CCMC makes these requests with the hope that regulators will take the time needed to complete and implement the Volcker Rule in a comprehensive, fair, and thoughtful manner. The CCMC is available to discuss these issues with you further.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

David Hirschmann

cc: The Honorable Gary Gensler, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
The Honorable Timothy Geithner  
Secretary  
United States Department of the Treasury  
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20220

Dear Secretary Geithner:

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber") is the world's largest business federation representing the interests of over three million companies of every size, sector, and region. The Chamber created the Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness ("CCMC") to promote a modern and effective regulatory structure for capital markets to fully function in a 21st century economy. Regulatory certainty is an important function of efficient markets and it is important that regulators are appropriately coordinated in the regulatory implementation process regarding what is commonly known as the Volcker Rule.

Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the "Volcker Rule") requires joint implementation of the rule by the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). On October 11, 2011, the FDIC and Federal Reserve approved a proposed rule for public comment, and the SEC is expected to vote on the proposed rule later this week. The OCC is listed in the releases proposed by the FDIC and Federal Reserve as an agency whose staff was involved in the proposed rule. However, the CFTC was not so listed, and does not appear to be coordinating with the other agencies.

Implementation of the Volcker Rule will have broad implications for covered institutions, as it significantly limits institutions’ ability to engage in proprietary trading and have certain interests in, or relationships with, a hedge fund or private equity fund. The Chamber is concerned that the lack of coordination between the CFTC...
and the other responsible agencies injects additional uncertainty into an already fragile economy, and threatens to further endanger the economic recovery.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") possesses authority under Section 112(a) of Dodd-Frank Act to provide a forum for the resolution of any differences in interpretation between the financial regulators, including differences between the regulators responsible for implementing the Volcker Rule. We respectfully request that the FSOC exercise this authority to resolve any differences that exist between the agencies and ensure that their actions in implementing the Volcker Rule are coordinated and regulatory uncertainty is minimized to the greatest extent possible. This authority was central to the creation of the FSOC as a council of regulators, and must be exercised in this case to avoid the injection of further uncertainty into the financial system.

Thank you for your attention to this important issue and we look forward to working with you to provide certainty to America’s job creators.

Sincerely,

David Hirschmann
U.S. Chamber Calls for Extension of Volcker Rule Comment Period

'This is Not Only an Issue of Fairness, but Also Will Provide the Regulators with Informed Input Needed to Avoid Unintended Consequences that Can Harm the Economy,' Hirschmann Says

WASHINGTON D.C.—David Hirschmann, president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber's Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, issued the following statement today on the Volcker Rule proposal from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC):

"Finally, more than two months after the rule was first proposed by four other agencies, all of the regulators have now issued their portion of the Volcker Rule. These rules will impact the ability of non-financial companies to raise capital to grow and create jobs—so we have to make sure to take the time to get this right. We call on the FDIC, SEC, Fed, and the OCC to extend the comment period to mid-March to match the CFTC's comment period. This will give all stakeholders the ability to review the work of five regulators and answer the more than 1,000 questions that are being asked. This is not only an issue of fairness, but also will provide the regulators with informed input needed to avoid unintended consequences that can harm the economy."

Since its inception in 2007, the Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness has led a bipartisan effort to modernize and strengthen the outmoded regulatory systems that have governed our capital markets. The CCMC is committed to working aggressively with the administration, Congress, and global leaders to implement reforms to strengthen the economy, restore investor confidence, and ensure well-functioning capital markets.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world’s largest business federation representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations.
WASHINGTON D.C.—In a letter sent today to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce called on the agencies to withdraw and re-propose the Volcker Rule when all agencies – including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) – join together in a joint rulemaking. The CFTC is currently in the midst of ongoing deliberations to finalize its position on implementation of the Volcker Rule. The Chamber also called for a 150-day comment period.

The enormity of the task of weighing in on the proposal is reflected in the complexity of the proposed rule, which includes 400 major questions that with various subparts stretch out to more than 1,000 questions. Implementation of the rule could also have wide-ranging impacts upon the capital formation and liquidity needed by businesses for daily operations and growth. The Volcker Rule was published in the Federal Register on November 7, 2011 and the comment period closes on January 13, 2012. Other less complex rules, such as Coast Guard regulations for passenger vessels under 100 tons, spanned 150 days.

Since its inception three years ago, the Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness has led a bipartisan effort to modernize and strengthen the outmoded regulatory systems that have governed our capital markets. The CCMC is committed to working aggressively with the administration, Congress, and global leaders to implement reforms to strengthen the economy, restore investor confidence, and ensure well-functioning capital markets.
One overlooked Dodd-Frank Act regulation that non-financial companies should look at is the Volcker Rule banning proprietary trading.

Proprietary trading is when a financial firm uses its own funds, rather than its customer’s funds, to purchase debt instruments, securities, commodities, derivatives, etc for potential profit. This form of trading also allows a firm to be a marketmaker, using its proprietary inventory of stocks and bonds to be sold to clients. Following the 2008 financial crisis, some market observers took the position that proprietary trading encouraged inappropriate risk taking, endangering a firm and the financial system.

On January 21, 2010, President Barack Obama proposed a ban on proprietary trading and named it after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, its chief architect. The Dodd-Frank Act included a broader version of the Volcker Rule, including some firms’ hedge fund and private equity activities. Congress mandated that the Volcker Rule go into effect on July 21, 2012, and included some exceptions for market-making activity done on behalf of customers. On October 11, 2011, four of the five regulators tasked with implementation issued a proposed joint rule, which was published in the Federal Register on November 7, 2011. The comment period will close on January 13, 2012.

The joint rule, spanning 298 pages and over 1,000 questions, was proposed by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) did not join in the rulemaking but is expected to issues rules in the future. There is also a two-year conformance period for the Volcker Rule to go into effect.
While the Volcker Rule is directed at financial firms, those firms provide companies with capital on a daily basis. The potential need for a Volcker Rule compliance program and increased regulatory scrutiny should give counsel pause, and they should start planning to insure a business’s rights are protected and appropriate measures are taken to insure that corporate treasury functions can withstand increased oversight.
4-1-2011

The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets

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THE VOLCKER RULE AND EVOLVING FINANCIAL MARKETS

CHARLES K. WHITEHEAD

The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities—in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past—a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions.

Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge funds. The result is likely to be an increase in overall risk-taking, abs ent market or regulatory restraint. Ring-fencing hedge funds from other parts of the financial system may be increasingly difficult as markets become more interconnected. For example, new capital markets instruments—such as credit default swaps—enable banks to outsource credit risk to hedge funds and other market participants. Doing so permits banks to extend greater amounts of credit at lower cost. A decline in the hedge fund industry, therefore, may prompt a contraction in available credit by banks that are no longer able to manage risk as effectively as before.

In short, even if proprietary trading is no longer located in banks, it may now be conducted by less-regulated entities that affect banks and banking activities. Banks that rely on hedge funds to manage credit risk will continue to be exposed to proprietary trading—perhaps less directly, but now also with less regulatory oversight, than before. The Volcker Rule, consequently, fails to reflect an important shift in the financial markets, arguing, at least initially, for a narrow definition of proprietary trading and a more fluid approach to implementing the Rule.

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* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I appreciate the thoughtful comments provided by James Bishop, Michelle Harner, Linda Lord, Ray Minella, Barak Orbach, and Bradley Sabel, as well as participants in the Capital Markets Board of Turkey and Bogaziçi University—Centre for Economics and Econometrics Financial Seminar Series. I am also grateful to John Siemann for his invaluable research assistance. Any errors are the author’s own. Portions of this Article are derived from Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. Corp. L. 641 (2009), and Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
I. Introduction

Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), commonly known as the “Volcker Rule” (for former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who is credited as its chief architect) (the Volcker Rule or the Rule), prohibits a banking entity from “engaging in proprietary trading” or “acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity fund,” subject to certain exceptions. The Rule also limits similar activities by certain systemically important non-bank financial institutions.


“Banking entity” is defined in section 13(h)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHA), as amended by section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The term includes any insured depository institution (other than certain limited purpose trust institutions), any company that controls an insured depository institution, any company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (see 12 U.S.C. § 3106), and any affiliate of any of the foregoing. Subsequent regulations are expected to further clarify the definition. See Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds & Private Equity Funds 68–69 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker20sec%2020%20V0619%20study%20final%201%202018%20%2011%20rg.pdf (study of the Volcker Rule mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, including a recommendation that the agencies charged with clarifying terms in the Volcker Rule provide definitions consistent with congressional intent). [Hereinafter FSOC Study].


Certain proprietary trading activities are still permitted under the Rule, Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)—including trading in U.S. government securities, id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(A), market-making, id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(B), and hedging to mitigate risk, id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(C)—although the full scope of these permitted activities remains to be finalized. See FSOC Study supra note 2, at 16; see also Public Input for the Study Regarding the Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,758, 61,759–60 (proposed Oct. 6, 2010) (soliciting comments on provisions of the Volcker Rule, including permitted activities). [Hereinafter FSOC, Public Input]. A discussion of permitted market-making and hedging activities appears infra at notes 54–58 and accompanying text. Proprietary trading conducted solely outside the United States by an entity that is not directly or indirectly controlled by a U.S. bank or systemically important firm is excluded from the Volcker Rule. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(H). The Rule also authorizes regulators to carve-out trading activities if they “promote and protect the safety and soundness of” the firm and U.S. financial stability. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(J). An otherwise permitted activity, however, is still prohibited if it will result in “a material conflict of interest” with clients or “a material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies.” Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(2)(A); see also infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. Permitted activities may be subject to additional capital requirements and other limitations if determined to be “appropriate to protect the safety and soundness” of the firms engaged in such activities. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(3); see also infra note 53 and accompanying text.

See 156 CONG. REC. S5894 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley) (describing the rationale behind the Dodd-Frank Act, including subjecting nonbank financial institutions to oversight by the Federal Reserve Board), [hereinafter Merkley Statement]; see also Definitions of “Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities” and “Significant” Non-Bank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 76 Fed. Reg. 7,731, 7,732–33 (pro-

40 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 1
posed Feb. 11, 2011). The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate systemically important non-bank financial institutions for heightened regulation by the Federal Reserve Board. Firms are included "if the Council determines that material financial distress . . . , or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the firm's activities . . . , could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States." Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1); see also Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,555, 4,559-60 (proposed Jan. 26, 2011) (describing proposed criteria to be used in determining whether to subject a nonbank financial firm to Federal Reserve Board supervision and standards). The limitation on proprietary trading and investing in any hedge fund or private equity fund will be implemented through capital requirements and quantitative limits imposed by the Federal Reserve Board. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, §§ 13(a)(2), 13(b)(2).

Why restrict proprietary trading? The answer is far from apparent. Senator Jeff Merkley, a co-sponsor of the Senate version of the Volcker Rule, placed "blame [for the financial crisis] squarely on proprietary trading," citing a Group of Thirty study headed by Chairman Volcker.6 That statement contrasts with Chairman Volcker's own view that "proprietary trading in commercial banks was . . . not central" to the crisis.7 As U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner separately testified, "most of the losses that were material . . . did not come from [proprietary trading] activities."8 Rather, according to Secretary Geithner, many of the most significant losses arose from traditional, bank-like extensions of credit—especially loans related to real estate.9

The evidence regarding proprietary trading is mixed10—but the Rule's ultimate intention was less to cure a particular cause of the financial crisis.

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6 See Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894; see also GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM—A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 27 (Jan. 15, 2009) (noting the "unanticipated and unsustainably large losses in proprietary trading" leading up to the financial crisis). Senator Merkley and co-sponsor Senator Carl Levin also noted the "distortion[caused] by proprietary trading practices" on the U.S. financial markets. See Press Release, Sens. Merkley and Levin, Senators Call on Regulators to Implement Strong Merkley-Levin Provisions, (Oct. 28, 2010), http://merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=BE745FF9-1820-43DF-978E-35809510CBAC (asserting that proprietary trading helped distort the financial markets by encouraging excessive risk-taking among financial firms and fostering a "casino-like" culture amongst market participants) [hereinafter Senators Call]; see also FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that, following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, a number of banking entities closed proprietary trading, hedge fund, and private equity fund businesses "that were a source of losses during the crisis").


9 See id.

10 There is evidence that bank losses resulted primarily from a drop in the value of long-term investments—namely, mortgage-backed securities that banks chose to hold to maturity rather than trade—as well as collateralized debt obligations they repurchased from off-balance-sheet funding vehicles. See RAJHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES 173 (2010) (noting that the tendency of banks to hold mortgage-backed securities, rather than the speculative trading of those securities, resulted in banks suffering losses); Michael Mckenzie, 'Super-senior' CDO Investors Flex Their Muscles, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgate
and more to champion the populist view that commercial banking should be separated from investment banking, increasingly comprised of proprietary trading and principal investments. The Volcker Rule, in effect, was motivated by a desire to return to a traditional banking model—to create a regulatory divide,


12 See Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894. Some have characterized proprietary trading leading up to the crisis as “a mainstay” business of the largest commercial banks. Consequently, the restriction on proprietary trading was understood to effectively separate a significant portion of investment banking from commercial banking. See Skeel, supra note 11, at 87. In addition to the Volcker Rule, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that no federal assistance, including access to Federal Reserve funding and FDIC insurance, may be provided to a “swaps entity,” which includes a swaps dealer, commonly referred to as the “Swap Pushout Rule.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §§ 716(a)–(b), 24 Stat. 1376 (2010). The effect of the Swap Pushout Rule is to “push out” the swaps trading business from many commercial banks, even though he Volcker Rule,
1999. The Rule’s proponents argued that proprietary trading had distracted banks from their fiduciary obligations to clients, as well as from their core function of “safely and soundly providing long-term credit to families and business enterprises.” Traders, instead, benefited from the low-cost, government-subsidized funding of short-term, “speculative activities” that were “far better suited for other areas of the financial markets.” By removing proprietary trading from banking entities, the Rule’s proponents expected utility services, such as taking deposits and making loans, to once again dominate the commercial banking business.

This Article questions whether the Volcker Rule properly takes account of change in the financial markets. In particular, it argues that the Glass-Steagall model reflected in the Volcker Rule is a fixture of the past—a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, which prohibits proprietary trading altogether—swaps trading is still permitted by bank affiliates. Id. § 716(c). Swaps entered into for hedging and other similar risk mitigating activities are not subject to the Swap Pushout Rule. Id. § 716(d). The cost of trading for affected banks is likely to increase due to new regulation that, among other things, takes into account the financial strength of the newly-created swaps entity. Id. § 716(k).


See FOSC STUDY, supra note 2, at 48-49 (noting that combining traditional banking and proprietary trading within one institution creates potential conflicts of interest, especially if loan-related information is transmitted to trading desks); Dixon & Wutkowski, supra note 7.

Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894. See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 48-49 (noting that combining traditional banking and proprietary trading within one institution creates potential conflicts of interest, especially if loan-related information is transmitted to trading desks); Dixon & Wutkowski, supra note 7.

Merkley Statement, supra note 5, at S5894; supra note 7 at 58. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. The Maginot Line was a line of fortifications and other defenses that France constructed along its borders with Germany during the period before World War II. The fortification was based on the success of static, defensive combat in World War I and was intended to provide time for the French army to mobilize in the event of attack. It ultimately proved to be ineffective in World War II, as motorized elements of the German army were able to flank the Maginot Line and proceed directly into France. See Irving M. Gibson, The Maginot Line, 17 J. MODERN HISTORY 130, 141-46 (1945).

17 See Merkley, Statement, supra note 5, at S5894; see also Skeel, supra note 11 at 86.

18 See infra note 182 and accompanying text. The Maginot Line was a line of fortifications and other defenses that France constructed along its borders with Germany during the period before World War II. The fortification was based on the success of static, defensive combat in World War I and was intended to provide time for the French army to mobilize in the event of attack. It ultimately proved to be ineffective in World War II, as motorized elements of the German army were able to flank the Maginot Line and proceed directly into France. See Irving M. Gibson, The Maginot Line, 17 J. MODERN HISTORY 130, 141-46 (1945).
new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions. By failing to do so, the Volcker Rule’s static approach to regulating banks may prove to be ineffective. Worse still, as illustrated below, it may have the unintended effect of causing hedge funds\textsuperscript{20} to increase risk-taking at a time when banks have come to rely on them to help manage credit exposure.\textsuperscript{21}

As a starting point, what will happen to proprietary trading? It could simply decline, but more likely, it will move to less-regulated businesses—\textit{in many cases, hedge funds}\textsuperscript{22}—\textit{that are likely to then incur greater risk.}\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 2–5 (describing broad changes in the financial markets relating to market participants and financial instruments).

\textsuperscript{20} There is no standard definition of “hedge fund,” although a distinctive feature is an organizational structure that helps align shareholder and manager interests and the payment to managers of significant performance-related fees that aim to maximize the fund’s risk-adjusted returns. Those returns often rely on substantial borrowings, derivatives, and complex investment strategies. See \textit{Technical Comm. of the Int’l Org. Sec. Comm’n, Consultation Report: Hedge Funds Oversight} 6–9 (Mar. 2009), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf (providing a list of some of the principal characteristics used by the International Organization of Securities Commissions to determine whether an entity ought to be considered a hedge fund). In addition, hedge funds and their advisers have historically been subject to minimal regulation—often being defined by reference to the federal securities laws from which they were exempt. See \textit{Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital}, 2008 \textit{COLUM. BUS. L. Rev.} 172, 201–16 (2008) (explaining why the structure and operation of modern hedge funds are incompatible with the regulatory regimes under which, but for their unique structure, they would normally need to operate); Troy A. Paredes, \textit{On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission}, 2006 \textit{U. ILL. L. Rev.} 975, 979–83 (2006) (describing the more common structural components of hedge funds and how they assist hedge funds in avoiding more stringent regulation). That regulation, principally by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has increased somewhat following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. See \textit{infra} notes 163–70 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{21} There is a question, which I do not address in this Article, about whether prohibiting banks from engaging in risky activities necessarily increases bank safety. Even “safer” activities can expose a bank to significant risk. Traditional bank lending, for example, can be quite risky if banks choose to extend, and then hold, unsecured “covenant-lite” loans to lower-quality borrowers. See \textit{Rajan, supra note 10, at 173; Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance}, 34 \textit{J. Corp. L.} 641, 676 (2009) (noting that increased default rates for loans with minimal covenant levels reflected the limited protection for lenders) [hereinafter \textit{Whitehead, Evolution}].

\textsuperscript{22} Proprietary traders from Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have already moved to hedge funds. See \textit{Sam Jones, More Goldman Traders to Exit for Funds}, \textit{FIN. TIMES}, Jan. 9, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d8d8836-1c39-11e0-9b56-00144feab49a.html; \textit{Aaron Lucchetti, More Morgan Stanley Team to Exit in Fallout from Volcker Rule}, \textit{WALL. ST. J.}, Jan 11, 2011, at C8 (reporting that Morgan Stanley’s proprietary trading unit will leave Morgan Stanley to form an independent trading firm); \textit{also see Francesco Guerrera & Gillian Tett, Goldman President Warns on Bank Rules}, \textit{FT.COM} (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f753506-2990-11e0-bb9b-00144feab49a.s01=1.html (reporting the view of a senior executive at Goldman Sachs that increased regulation of banks may decrease financial stability as risky activities move from banks to hedge funds and other new market participants).
That risk can be mitigated if traders are subject to a market discipline that takes account of the full cost of their activities. The financial markets, however, are unlikely to compel traders to do so—a negative externality, as market participants focus instead on their investors’ returns rather than on the broader consequences of hedge fund failure.24

Such failure can be industry-wide. Hedge funds can be affected at the same time and in the same way following large adverse shocks to asset and hedge fund liquidity, irrespective of management style.25 Greater coordination, in turn, can magnify any resulting loss of portfolio value.26 Moreover, simply ring-fencing hedge funds may be difficult as markets become increasingly interconnected. Hedge funds, for example, are significant participants in the credit default swaps (CDS) market, which banks and other financial intermediaries use to manage and transfer credit risk.27 Doing so,
for banks, increases the amount of capital available for lending. The Dodd-
Frank Act limits direct counterparty credit risk by requiring banks and hedge
funds, with certain exceptions, to centrally clear standardized swaps. It
does not, however, address the impact on banks if hedge funds, as a group,
are unable to manage bank-originated risk or can do so only at higher cost.
The effect can be significantly greater than the failure of any one fund. It can
also ripple through to other parts of the financial system, resulting in a drop
in available credit if banks—no longer able to rely on risk-taking by hedge
funds—must then limit the amount of new loans they can extend.

In short, even if proprietary trading is no longer located in banks, it may
now be conducted by less-regulated entities that affect banks and banking
activities. Banks that rely on hedge funds to manage credit risk will con-
tinue to be exposed to proprietary trading—perhaps less directly, but now
also with less regulatory oversight, than before. The Volcker Rule, conse-
quently, fails to reflect an important shift in the financial markets: the trans-
fer, in this illustration, of a traditional bank function to new, less-regulated
market participants.

Part II describes the Volcker Rule and its prohibition on proprietary
trading. It also illustrates some of the ambiguities that must still be ad-
dressed in implementing the Rule. Part III explains how change in the finan-
cial markets has enabled new market participants to replicate products and
services provided by traditional intermediaries. Part IV then focuses on the
role of hedge funds in the CDS market—in effect, assuming risks traditionally
managed within banks and other intermediaries, but without the same
level of regulatory oversight. Part V, in turn, briefly considers the resulting

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28 See Whitehead, Evolution, supra note 21, at 658 (explaining that banks, by being able to
to better manage risk through securitization, are able to reduce overall capital costs and may
permit borrowers to enjoy a portion of the savings); see also infra note 147 and accompanying
text.

29 Banks and hedge funds that enter into standardized swaps with each other will generally
be required to place those swaps through a derivatives clearing organization (DCO). Dodd-
(Dodd-Frank Act). DCOs may help limit direct credit exposure. A standardized CDS between
two parties could be cleared and settled through a DCO after the trade is agreed—in effect,
making the DCO the middleman in the trade between the two of them. The DCO must collect
margin as well as implement other risk control mechanisms to limit its exposure to default,
minimizing the risk of direct credit exposure between the two counterparties. Id. § 723(c); see
also Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
http://www.stanford.edu/~duffie/DuffieZhu.pdf (concluding that the effectiveness of cen-
tralized clearing depends on whether the number of clearing participants is sufficiently large rela-
tive to the aggregate exposure on the derivatives being cleared).

30 See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 38 (noting that change in the CDS market
has made it more difficult for banks to ensure that entities to whom the risk is outsourced—
often, hedge funds—ar: properly doing so); see also infra notes 152–62 and accompanying
text.

31 The same may be true for systemically important non-bank financial firms that become
subject to heightened regulation. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
implications of change in the financial markets for implementing the Volcker Rule. It suggests that a static business model—such as contemplated by the Rule—does not properly account for that change, arguing, at least initially, for a narrow interpretation of the Rule and reliance on more fluid means to regulate risk-taking, such as imposing new capital requirements.

II. THE VOLCKER RULE

The Volcker Rule prohibits a banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading or investing in, sponsoring, or having certain other relationships with hedge funds or private equity funds. It also provides for additional capital requirements, quantitative limits, and other restrictions to be imposed on systemically important nonbank financial firms, supervised by the Federal Reserve, that engage in such activities. To provide greater definition, the newly-created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was directed to undertake a study of the Volcker Rule, including recommendations regarding its implementation (the FSOC Study or the Study). The Study was published on January 18, 2011; and, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, implementing regulations must be adopted within nine months after that date (no later than October 18, 2011). Firms will initially have up to two years to comply with the Volcker Rule after implementing rules are issued and may, in total, have up to six years to comply with the new requirements.

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32 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. This Article focuses primarily on the Volcker Rule's direct prohibition of proprietary trading by banking entities, rather than on its regulation of banking entity investments in, and relationships with, hedge funds and private equity funds. The Volcker Rule defines a "hedge fund" and a "private equity fund" broadly to be any entity that would be an investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or any similar funds as the appropriate federal banking agencies, the SEC, or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may, by rule, determine should be treated as a hedge fund or private equity fund. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(h)(2). The limitation on investing in or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity fund has three principal purposes—to ensure banking entities cannot circumvent the Volcker Rule, to confine private fund activities to customer-related services, and to eliminate incentives for banks to bail out funds they sponsor or in which they have significantly invested. See FSOC Study, supra note 2, at 56. More tailored definitions have been left to later rule-making. See id. at 56-70 (describing factors to be considered in regulating banking entity investments in, and relationships with, hedge funds and private equity funds); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 61,758, supra note 4, at 61,758-59 (soliciting comments on provisions of the Volcker Rule, including the definitions of "hedge fund" and "private equity fund").

33 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

34 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(b)(1); see also FSOC Study, supra note 2, at 8-9 (describing the statutory mandate and objectives of the FSOC Study).

35 The full text of the FSOC Study can be found at the corresponding hyperlink, supra note 2.


37 The Volcker Rule takes effect upon the earlier of twelve months after the issuance of final implementing rules and two years after the date the Volcker Rule was enacted (July 21, 2012). Id. sec. 619, § 13(c)(1). Banks then have up to two years to comply, and nonbank financial firms have up to two years to comply after becoming subject to the Volcker Rule. During that time, they can wind down, sell, or otherwise conform their activities, investments,
Authority to adopt the regulations is divided among the principal federal financial regulators, under coordination of the Treasury Secretary as FSOC Chairman.\textsuperscript{38}

As of this Article’s publication, the core regulations implementing the Volcker Rule have not been publicly released for comment. The FSOC Study, however, provides a general idea of what they are likely to address, as well as the open issues regulators must resolve.\textsuperscript{39} Chief among them is defining “proprietary trading.”\textsuperscript{40} The Dodd-Frank Act defines it as engaging as principal for a “trading account . . . in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on [any of the foregoing], or any other security or financial instrument” as determined by the appropriate federal regulator.\textsuperscript{41} “Trading account,” in turn, is defined as “any account used for acquiring or taking positions in securities and [financial] instruments . . . for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements)” and other accounts the regulators may identify.\textsuperscript{42}

The definitions raise some critical questions, which the Study fails to fully resolve. For example, trading activity can vary among markets and by asset class, and so what constitutes a “near term” or “short-term” transaction for one instrument may be quite different for another.\textsuperscript{43} How, if at all, should the Volcker Rule distinguish among them? The Study’s response is

\begin{itemize}
  \item The regulators charged with implementing the Volcker Rule are the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, the SEC, and the CFTC. Each agency must consult and coordinate with the others in order to assure comparability and consistency across the new regulations. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(b)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
  \item The FSOC Study does so principally through ten recommendations, including recommendations that regulators (i) require banking entities to sell or wind down impermissible trading desks and divest themselves of impermissible positions, (ii) perform a supervisory review of trading activity to distinguish between proprietary trading and permitted activities, and (iii) require banking entities to implement a mechanism to identify to regulators which trades are customer-initiated and which are not. See FSOC Study, supra note 2, at 3.
  \item See Richardson et al., supra note 10, at 201–04 (noting that a number of normal banking activities involve banks trading for their own account, even though the activities are ultimately intended to meet client needs).
  \item Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(h)(4).
  \item Id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(6).
  \item Limiting the Volcker Rule to “short-term” transactions is a significant weakness. Longer-term commitments may not be covered—and those transactions are reported to have been a significant source of banking losses during the recent financial crisis. See supra note 10; see also Francesco Guerrera et al., Wall Street to Sidestep “Volcker Rule.” FT.COM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d49f12e-cd03-11df-9912-00144feab9a.html#azz1f5 M56N00 (reporting that banks may avoid the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions by engaging in longer-term “principal investing”).
\end{itemize}
open-ended, cautioning regulators to consider the characteristics, liquidity, and trading volumes of each relevant market, but without defining how to do so.44 It also cautions that measures used to detect impermissible activities are likely to vary based upon the assets and activity in question, requiring a tailored approach to implementing the Rule’s prohibitions.45

In addition, different firms may employ different trading strategies, so that what would be considered proprietary at one firm may not be the same at another. A firm may also vary its approach to trading based on changes in the marketplace. A longer-term investment, for example, may be resold quickly in the face of an increasingly volatile market. How can regulators distinguish between changes in strategy and prohibited transactions? Here, the FSOC Study provides clearer guidance, but still leaves important details to later rule-making. The Study recommends new rules that impose affirmative obligations on the board and CEO, among other things, to implement comprehensive compliance programs that facilitate monitoring and supervision.46 Banks must also develop quantitative measures to assist in identifying which activities are permissible and which are not.47 Trading metrics, the Study notes, can provide a useful guide, but may not be predictive of which trades are the riskiest or whether the bank is engaged in impermissible activity. Consequently, the new measures—rather than being dispositive of compliance—may simply trigger a heightened scrutiny, as well as a “regular dialogue” between regulators and banks.48

Exemptions from the Volcker Rule are the other side of the coin. The Dodd-Frank Act carves out permitted activities that would otherwise be considered proprietary trading.49 Yet, even those activities are prohibited if they would result in a material conflict of interest with clients or materially expose a banking entity to high-risk assets or trading strategies.50 The FSOC Study includes factors that regulators can consider, but with minimal detail.

44 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 24–25. The Study also recommends the use of various metrics to distinguish between permissible activities and proprietary trading. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.

45 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 37 (conceding that quantitative metrics, although helpful in identifying impermissible trading, will invariably produce both “false positives” and “false negatives”). The FSOC Study notes that the Volcker Rule’s language regarding short-term price movements is similar to accounting and other banking standards used to identify short-term assets. For example, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) differentiates short-term “held for trading” assets from those “held to maturity” or “available for sale.” The Study cautions regulators who incorporate the FASB standard into the Volcker Rule to consider how a change in accounting designation could affect an entity’s ability to avoid the prohibition against proprietary trading. See id. at 25.

46 See id. at 33–36 (noting that requiring banks to adopt internal trading controls will produce optimally tailored regulation that properly reflects differences across firms and across different trading units within the same firm).

47 See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.

48 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

49 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 37, 45 (suggesting that regular dialogue with a bank’s managers and other control personnel will assist regulators in understanding specific trading activity by each bank).

50 See FSOC STUDY, supra note 2, at 48–49.
The Study, for example, notes that concerns over conflicts are “elevated” when instruments are complex, highly structured or opaque, illiquid or hard-to-value, require coordination across multiple business units within a bank, or involve significant information asymmetries. In addition, assets or strategies may be high risk if they involve new products with rapid growth, embedded leverage, high volatility, or assets whose values cannot be externally priced or effectively hedged. Identifying which activities fall within these criteria is left to regulators, who may adjust their requirements over time based on information they receive as supervisors and examiners. Likewise, reflecting the potential for heightened risk, permitted activities may be subject to additional capital requirements and other limitations to be set by future regulation.

Among the permitted activities, market-making and hedging are perhaps the most important. Neither term, however, is defined. Drawing a line between speculation and market-making may be particularly difficult. This is worrisome because market-making is essential to capital-raising, helping to fill a temporal gap between sellers and buyers of financial assets. It mirrors a classic bank function—providing liquidity to lenders without affecting borrowers’ access to a stable source of capital—but relying on the capital markets rather than traditional banking channels. To do so, banks intermediate between clients seeking to buy or sell financial assets and those wishing to sell or buy the same assets. A customer can sell assets immediately to a market-maker or postpone her sale until she locates an eager buyer. The risk, of course, is that the price may move against the seller while she waits. Market-makers are prepared to bear that risk—offering immediate liquidity, but typically at a discount from the price the seller might otherwise receive in the future. The market-maker’s gross return is the difference between its purchase price and the higher price at which it later sells the assets it holds. Banks, consequently, are contacted daily to trade billions of dollars of financial instruments. Airlines, for example, can buy oil futures to lock in energy prices; agribusinesses can trade weather derivatives to offset the risk of a bad crop; and traders outside a bank can buy and sell, and sometimes speculate in, financial assets ranging from stocks and bonds to pork bellies and gold. Banks, as a result, may acquire inventory and maintain risk exposures in order to meet (or anticipate) customer demand. Proprietary

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51 See id. at 51 (noting that limits on high-risk activity apply on desk-, business-, and firm-wide levels).
52 See id. at 49–51 (suggesting that, in creating new regulations, regulators must remain focused on the need to prohibit banking entities from profiting from trading that might present heightened conflicts of interest).
53 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13(d)(3).
54 See id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(B).
55 See FSOC, Public Input, supra note 4, at 61,759.
56 See Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J. Fin. 617, 617–18 (1988) (describing the basic principles by which market-making operates); see also infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
traders, likewise, accumulate positions with the expectation of profiting from future transactions. Identifying which trades are a part of market-making and which are proprietary may be quite difficult—both involve principal trading with customers or counterparties, where the firm may gain or lose as a result of short-term changes in asset price.\(^7\)

Hedging is also integral to a bank’s business. A bank may hedge its exposure to financial instruments, including inventory from market-making. It may also hedge interest rate and credit risk as part of its traditional lending business. Hedging risk can be effected in a number of ways, depending on the nature of the risk and the firm’s aggregate exposure. To do so, a bank can buy or sell financial instruments, which may replicate (or mask) proprietary trading. Since a direct link between risk and hedging is not always possible, it may appear to an outsider that a legitimate hedging transaction is, in fact, an impermissible activity. Articulating the difference, however, is left to later rule-making.\(^8\)

As noted earlier, a key recommendation of the FSOC Study is the use of quantitative metrics—objective data points—to aid regulators in separating proprietary trading from permitted activities.\(^9\) Metrics will also help banking entities more easily comply with the Volcker Rule, although they leave open the risk of trading strategies that satisfy quantitative standards but still violate the Rule’s intent. More importantly, the new metrics are likely to require banks to change how they do business in order to comply with the regulators’ definition of permitted activities.\(^10\) By dictating business models, the Volcker Rule may delay the introduction of new instruments and strategies that—while otherwise consistent with the Rule—extend beyond existing indicia of permissible trading, potentially slowing beneficial innovation.\(^11\)

The proposed metrics are fairly comprehensive, although regulators may identify additional measures in the future.\(^12\) They include:

- Revenue-based metrics based on daily trading revenues and profits from particular transactions, measured against historical revenue trends and profits from total trading activity, including data from other banks;\(^13\)

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\(^7\) See FSOC Study, supra note 2, at 18–24 (noting that current market-making often includes elements of proprietary trading and that, coupled with differences in market-making for different assets and markets, delineating between permissible and impermissible trading is challenging).

\(^8\) See id. at 20–21.

\(^9\) See id. at 37 (suggesting that the use of quantitative metrics will assist regulators in distinguishing between permissible and impermissible activities and facilitate the comparison of trading activity across different banks); see also supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.

\(^10\) See FSOC Study, supra note 2, at 5–6.

\(^11\) See id. at 26–27.

\(^12\) See id. at 6, 43.

\(^13\) See id. at 36–38.
• Revenue-to-risk metrics that measure the amount of revenue a bank generates, and the volatility of its earnings, in relation to the risks the bank assumes, with the expectation that permitted activities will have greater revenue-to-risk ratios than proprietary trading;\footnote{See id. at 36, 38–39.}

• Inventory metrics that assess daily trading values against the value of assets held in inventory. Excess inventory, the FSOC Study argues, is more likely to indicate that a trading desk is holding an impermissible proprietary position—although the Study also recognizes that, as a result of differences in liquidity and complexity, values are likely to vary depending on asset class and may need to be determined on a desk-by-desk basis;\footnote{See id. at 37, 39–40.}

• Customer-flow metrics that compare the volume of trading from customer orders against orders initiated by a bank trader, including trading in order to build an inventory (against future customer demand) or hedge an existing position. Regulators may also assess customer order-flow against inventory, as well as determine how much of a trading desk’s revenues are from customer-related business.\footnote{See id. at 37, 41.}

Implementing the new measures is likely to be expensive. The FSOC Study notes that banks will be required to develop new regulatory and supervisory tools beyond their current risk management systems.\footnote{See id. at 31 (noting that current risk management frameworks, because they are designed principally to limit losses, will need to be re-developed to prioritize compliance with the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions). Regulators, as well, will need significant resources in order to hire and train staff with quantitative and market expertise, develop and analyze data, and review information in order to identify prohibited activities. See id. at 43–44.}

In addition, banks must collect and test new data, including metrics to assess industry-wide trading on a desk-by-desk basis, as well as comparing bank trading with hedge fund and other proprietary operations.\footnote{See id. at 42 (noting that regulators, by increasing the diversity of data points it surveys and collects, will have a more accurate representation of the trading activities of banking entities).} Greater detail may improve the usefulness of the new measures, but doing so will also require an assessment of different trading strategies across banks and, within banks, across different business units.\footnote{See id. at 43 (noting that banking activities may mask impermissible trading, is likely to produce false positives).} The FSOC Study, therefore, recommends that each bank be required to devise its own internal program of policies, procedures, and other controls, subject to regulatory review, in order to tailor how the Volcker Rule is implemented.\footnote{See id. at 33–34.}
Regulators, the FSOC Study cautions, must be “flexible and dynamic” in implementing the Rule.\textsuperscript{71} The Study notes that “markets, products and trading activities will continue to evolve,” reflecting change in the financial markets over time.\textsuperscript{72} Regulation will be ineffective if it fails to take account of that change.\textsuperscript{73} Evolution, however, is not confined to proprietary trading. The need for flexibility may be more fundamental—reflecting new relationships in the financial markets—as functions traditionally provided by banks are now also provided by new market participants. The concern, therefore, may extend beyond proprietary trading to whether the core of the Volcker Rule—namely, the divide between proprietary trading and banking—itself fails to take account of change in the financial markets. I begin to address that question in the next Part.

III. EVOLVING FINANCIAL MARKETS

Much of U.S. financial regulation divides traditional intermediaries into categories, as banks, thrifts, broker-dealers, insurance firms, and pension and investment advisers.\textsuperscript{74} Those categories largely reflect the functions, products, and services provided by financial intermediaries in the 1930s and 1940s when many of the regulations were first introduced.\textsuperscript{75} Financial regulation began to evolve in the 1950s as concerns arose that new market participants had begun to overtake traditional intermediaries.\textsuperscript{76} Regulators, for

\textsuperscript{71} Id. at 32.
\textsuperscript{72} See id. at 26.
\textsuperscript{73} See id.


\textsuperscript{75} Types of financial intermediaries are described in Robert Charles Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1605–06 (1975) (dividing financial intermediaries into two broad types based on the source of their funding), and Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisected Financial Services Industry: An Exploration Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 319, 322–31 (1999) (suggesting one means to distinguish among different financial intermediaries is through comparing degrees of diffusion and opaqueness).

example, began to loosen their interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act, largely due to the banks' interest in offering new products and services.\textsuperscript{77} Additional changes were made in response to new market participants and products, in some cases spurred by pressure to stay competitive,\textsuperscript{78} and in others, in order to accommodate new financial practices.\textsuperscript{79} Traditional categories, nevertheless, continue today to frame much of U.S. financial regulation, even though convergence in the financial markets has resulted in similar functions, products, and services appearing across multiple categories.\textsuperscript{80}

Money market funds (MMFs) and finance companies together provide one example. Managing credit risk is at the heart of a bank's traditional function as an intermediary between depositors and borrowers.\textsuperscript{82} A key is its ability to balance depositors' interests in liquid liabilities (deposits) against borrowers' interests in longer-term, illiquid assets (loans), with loan portfolio risks spread across depositors and over time.\textsuperscript{83} MMFs and finance companies replicate that balance, but do so through the capital markets. On the depositor side, MMFs provide investors with many of the conveniences of a bank, such as liquidity and checking services, by managing portfolio investments...

\textsuperscript{77} See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 474-502 (1984) (providing a general survey of the expansion of commercial banks into investment banking and noting the ways in which regulators and courts interpreted that expansion); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 13, at 233-34; see also Richardson et al., supra note 10, at 186-91 (noting how regulators in the 1980s issued a number of administrative rulings that permitted banks to hold and operate wholesale securities subsidiaries).

\textsuperscript{78} See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 727, 737-38, 749 (2009) (noting that the SEC's decision to relax net capital rules for large investment banks was taken, in part, because of changes in European regulation).

\textsuperscript{79} See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 728-29 (1987) (describing how the Comptroller, in response to the proliferation of shared ATMs, altered the traditional definition of bank branches to ensure that their use was permissible).

\textsuperscript{80} As Jamie Dimon, the Chairman and CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, has noted, "A lot of the rules and regulations [we have] are closer to the Civil War than they are to today." Paul Tharp, Ben Sees Treasury as the Bank Cure, N.Y. POST, July 9, 2008, at 31.

\textsuperscript{81} See Whitehead, Reframing, supra note 16, at 21.

\textsuperscript{82} See Bert Scholtens & Dick van Wensveen, A Critique on the Theory of Financial Intermediation, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1243, 1247-48 (2000) (noting that managing risk has always been "the bread and butter of financial intermediaries").

\textsuperscript{83} See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing, 105 J. POL. ECON. 523, 525 (1997) (contending that, even where a certain risk cannot be diversified away, such risk can be averaged (or smoothed) over time, reducing its impact); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 405 (1983) (describing banks' "role of turning illiquid assets into liquid assets"); Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 34-35 (1985) (describing how banks can tailor their portfolios to reduce overall risk and cost).

\textsuperscript{84} See Tamar Frankel, The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 939, 943 (2005) (noting that money market funds (MMFs), which...
against investor withdrawals. On the borrower side, finance companies lend to retail and business customers, relying on MMFs for funding through the sale to them of short-term commercial paper. The result, by placing MMFs and finance companies together, is the functional equivalent of deposit-taking and lending by banks.

Market-making is another example of a traditional bank function being executed through the capital markets. Most securities transactions involve a specialized financial intermediary known as a “market-maker.” A market-maker trades securities as principal on either side of the market—in other words, it is both a buyer and seller of the same securities. If there are more buyers than sellers, or vice versa, the market-maker must adjust its inventory in response to customer demand, as well as change the bid-ask prices in order to rebalance order flow. Market-makers mirror a classic bank function: both span the maturity gap between capital providers (who, as depositors or investors, expect liquidity) and capital users (who require longer-term stability).

There are, of course, important differences between market-makers and traditional banks. For example, a bank’s obligation is evidenced by a contract to pay a fixed return on demand, whereas a market-maker’s obligation is typically enforced through reputation, and price is not agreed in advance. Both, however, facilitate capital-raising by providing investors with

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were not subject to the interest rate caps placed on banks, were able to offer higher interest rates to customers and, at the same time, offer services consistent with traditional banks). MMFs are able to sell assets and raise money quickly, in part due to special requirements that impose strict standards on the credit quality and liquidity of their investment portfolios. See Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)-(4) (2008) (outlining criteria relating to portfolio quality and diversification that MMFs must satisfy); see also REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 31-39 (submitted to the Board of Governors of the Investment Company Inst., Washington, D.C.) (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (describing regulation of MMFs).

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liquidity—the ability to raise cash quickly—without interrupting the end-user's longer-term employment of capital.92

The end of Bretton Woods and the start of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 subjected peacetime businesses to new exchange rate and energy cost volatility. Business managers began to search for cost-effective means to manage risk. Financial market participants saw an opportunity to profit from the creation and trading of new financial instruments that responded to the new demands.93 In many cases, they adopted technologies similar to those used by (but no longer limited to) insurers and banks—namely, the pooling and transferring of financial risk from corporate counterparties to those who, through diversification or otherwise, could manage that risk at lower cost.94 The result was the introduction of new products and services, often replicating those of traditional intermediaries, but offered by new participants or through the capital markets.95 Over time, the growing demand for those instruments resulted in greater liquidity,96 which, in turn, lowered their cost97


93 See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 38 (1994) (explaining that the initial impetus for the creation of MMFs was banking regulation that limited the ability of banks to increase interest rates in a rising interest rate environment); Allen & Santomero, supra note 76, at 1479–80; Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 231, 245–47 (2008) (stating that the growing demand for risk-management instruments increased the liquidity of the risk markets which, in turn, lowered the instruments' cost and permitted financial intermediaries to provide products more carefully tailored to individual clients); James C. Van Horne, Of Financial Innovations and Excesses, 40 J. Fin. 621, 622–24 (1985) (noting that financial innovation, and the offering of new products and services, correlate with the increased market volatility, regulatory changes, and technological improvements that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s).

94 See Allen & Santomero, supra note 76, at 1479–80 (noting that, where a financial institution is holding a transferable risk but has no comparative advantage in managing it, there is no reason for the firm not to transfer it through the capital markets); Van Horne, supra note 93, at 622–28.


96 The Black-Scholes options pricing formula provided a means to value options based on their terms and factors affecting the market price and volatility of the underlying asset. Consequently, even illiquid derivatives could be valued if there was a market for the underlying asset. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637, 640–53 (1973) (explaining the principles and formula that permit the pricing of options through reference to the value of an underlying asset). That pricing model quickly gained hold among traders and risk managers, allowing instruments to be created and valued even where there was no trading market for the derivative itself. See Peter L. Bernstein, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 227 (1992) (dis-

and expanded the scope of risks that could be transferred through the capital markets. Exchange-traded currency and oil price derivatives, for example, overtook less liquid and more costly private instruments that had been popular just a few years earlier. Greater liquidity in the risk markets, and the introduction of new risk management technologies, also permitted the creation of a growing array of private, over-the-counter hedging solutions that were closely tailored to a firm's specific risks.

Of course, in a frictionless world, if a firm chooses to transfer risk, we would expect the premium it pays to mirror the risk-related costs the firm would otherwise incur in raising capital—a zero-sum game, since the risk would now be borne by the transferee's shareholders, who should demand cussing the popularity of the Black-Scholes model among traders); Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733, 734-35 (2002) (describing the effect of the Black-Scholes model on the derivatives market).

See Myron S. Scholes, Global Financial Markets, Derivative Securities, and Systemic Risks, 12 J. Risk & Uncertainty 271, 272 (1996) (noting that frictions limit an innovation's adoption and so successful financial innovations must provide financial services at lower cost). For example, financial intermediaries in the early 1980s typically earned an up-front fee for arranging a plain vanilla swap, plus a spread as high as fifty basis points over the life of the transaction. Less than ten years later, reflecting new entrants and increased competition in the swaps marketplace, the up-front fee was dropped and spreads were reduced to five to ten basis points. See Robert T. Daigler & Donald Stelman, Interest Rate Swaps and Financial Institutions 8-9 (Nov. 1988) (unpublished working paper, on file with author), available at http://www.fiu.edu/~daiglerr/pdf/swaps.pdf.

See Christopher L. Culp, Structured Finance and Insurance 22 (2006); Allen & Gale, supra note 74, at 38-39 (demonstrating why increased liquidity encourages a bank to more effectively manage the different risks it must bear which, in turn, improves its overall level of risk-sharing).

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for example, provided a liquid and standardized alternative to the over-the-counter (OTC) market for foreign exchange derivatives. See Erik Banks, Exchange-Traded Derivatives 129 (2003); Charles W. Smithson, Managing Financial Risk 18-19 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that the introduction of futures contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange opened the forward foreign exchange market to new types of investors). The Chicago Board Options Exchange did the same for options trading. See Robert C. Merton, Continuous-Time Finance 330 (1990) (explaining that the Chicago Board Options Exchange initially permitted trading in call options for twelve companies but later expanded to include both calls and puts on hundreds of stocks). Firms also began to hedge by issuing hybrid instruments that combined traditional debt or equity with foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodity hedging instruments. For example, Mexico's state-owned petroleum company, PEMEX, issued petroleum-linked bonds in 1973. In the mid-1980s, firms began issuing hybrid currency bonds, bonds with embedded foreign exchange options, convertible/exchangeable floating-rate notes, and inverse floating-rate notes. Other firms issued securities whose returns were tied to natural gas, petroleum, and other commodity prices. See Smithson, supra, at 18-23, 320-30.

See Dan Rosen, The Development of Risk Management Software, in Modern Risk Management: A History 135, 136-37 (Sarah Jenkins & Tamsin Kennedy eds., 2003) (noting that the spread of third-party risk management software in the mid 1980s was preceded by hardware that permitted derivatives traders to quickly apply the Black-Scholes model to price their trades).

In general, OTC derivatives become less costly as public risk transfer markets develop that allow financial intermediaries to diversify away their risks across a broader array of counterparties. See Myron S. Scholes, The Future of Futures, in Risk Management Problems & Solutions 349, 365 (William H. Beaver & George Parker eds., 1995) (explaining that the cost of derivatives and other instruments decreased as their increasing importance in risk management strategies resulted in investors being able to more properly price them).
the same returns as the transferor's shareholders. If the risk counterparty, however, is better able to manage risk at lower cost, then, over time, the premium ought to fall below the cost the transferor would otherwise bear if the risk was retained." The implications are significant: as markets have continued to develop, risk transfer instruments—like CDS, in the case of credit risk—have become a lower cost substitute for the in-house management of the same risk. The result, as described in the next Part, is the ability of traditional intermediaries to transfer risk-bearing to new, lower-cost market participants through the capital markets. In effect, new instruments have enabled banks to outsource a core function from an industry subject to close, prudential supervision to new non-bank financial firms, in many cases subject to lower levels of regulation. 103

IV. OUTSOURCING RISK MANAGEMENT

Most corporate debt is private, and most private lenders are banks (although increasingly they include non-banks). 104 Even among public firms, which can access large pools of capital, roughly eighty percent maintain pri-


103 Regulators have long known that traditional intermediaries transfer risk among each other and have encouraged it based on the relative cost of capital. See The Joint Forum, Risk Management Practices and Regulatory Capital: Cross-Sectoral Comparison 46-57 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint04.pdf (outlining the major differences between jurisdictions, including differences in accounting rules, capital requirements, and definitions of capital, that influence intermediaries to transfer risk to other jurisdictions) [hereinafter Joint Forum, Risk Management]; Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227-35 (1997) (describing the use of derivatives to arbitrage financial regulations). Properly structured, capital requirements provided an incentive for intermediaries to transfer risk to lower cost participants in order to optimize risk allocation. See Günter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets: The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations, in The Risks of Financial Institutions 603, 629 (Mark Steven Carey & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2007) (exploring the effect that CDO transactions have on the risk profiles of originating banks) [hereinafter Risks of Financial Institutions]; Wolf Wagner & Ian W. Marsh, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Sector Stability, 2 J. FIN. STABILITY 173, 174-75 (2006) (noting that, although credit risk transfer helps firms diversify away risk, such transfers may also destabilize institutions participating in the credit risk transfer markets). Banks, for example, are subject to high capital costs and so, in order to minimize them, have transferred risky assets to non-bank intermediaries (in many cases, insurance companies) that are less susceptible to financial shocks and, therefore, subject to lower costs. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation, in Risks of Financial Institutions, supra, at 341, 346 (modeling credit risk transfers in complete markets and finding that such transfers can promote efficient risk-sharing and increase overall welfare if properly structured).

vate credit arrangements. Within the traditional framing, lenders tend to rely on covenants to manage a borrower's credit risk. Covenants act as early warning "trip wires," permitting lenders to reassess borrowers and mitigate loss by renegotiating loans upon (or prior to) default. To be effective, however, covenants must be monitored and enforced. Lenders can rely on pre-existing relationships to do so inexpensively. Delegating authority to an intermediary, such as a bank, can further lower costs to the extent the bank is better able to monitor and respond to changes in a borrower's circumstances. Key to such delegation is the bank's ability to obtain quasi-public information about borrowers at lower cost than others. Banks rely on monitoring and long-term relationships to develop that information, without the cost of duplication across multiple lenders.

Historically, that informational advantage limited the banks' ability to resell loans, which partly explains why a liquid private credit market failed to develop before change in the lending business in the 1980s. Less knowledgeable purchasers were likely to discount a loan's value, or attempt to engage in their own costly monitoring of a borrower, resulting in a drop in the price at which the loan could be sold. Consequently, banks were better

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105 See Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 400, 401 (2009) (noting, as well, that roughly only fifteen to twenty percent of public firms have outstanding public debt).
108 See Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 Rev. Fin. Studies 749, 750-53 (2009) (noting that initial covenants are purposefully designed to be overly strict, which permits the lender to control or influence the actions of the borrower); Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 104, at 6-7.
109 Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 104, at 7, 25-26 (noting that, because private debt issues are usually held by a small, sophisticated group of investors, agency costs can be minimized).
110 See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev. Econ. Stud. 393, 393–95 (1984) (developing a model in which a financial intermediary has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending); Fama, supra note 83, at 36–38.
111 Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. Fin. Econ. 323, 323-24 (1975) (noting that the inefficiency of banking markets permits banks to profitably exploit quasi-public information); Fama, supra note 83, at 35–39 (explaining how other market participants, cognizant of the banks' informational advantage, react to bank action); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 106, at 1083–90 (attributing the monitoring advantage enjoyed by banks to special characteristics of the banking sector, including the banks' ability to cross-benchmark different borrowers and press borrowers for more information).
113 Those changes are described infra notes 118–35 and accompanying text.
off if they assessed credit risk and borrower concentrations at the time the loan was made and then held that loan to its maturity. The inability to transfer loans, in turn, reinforced the value to lenders of covenants and monitoring. The business of banking, and the role of banks as intermediaries, began to change in the 1970s and 1980s, driven by increasing bank and non-bank competition, product and other innovation in the marketplace, and changes in financial regulation. New capital requirements, introduced in the late 1980s, were intended to provide banks with a cushion against the risk of loan loss, the possibility of a bank run, and, in light of the banks’ systemic importance, the resulting harm to the real economy. The new and non-price terms of bank loans to facilitate monitoring and limit loan losses. 

See John B. Caouette et al., Managing Credit Risk: The Next Great Financial Challenge 65 (1998) (noting that banks traditionally evaluated only the risk associated with individual loans and were not concerned with selling loans to diversify their exposure at the portfolio level); Edward I. Altman, Corporate Bond and Commercial Loan Portfolio Analysis 1 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 96-41, 1996) (noting that banks, apart from measuring the credit risk related to individual loans, recognize the value of properly measuring credit concentration risks); Paul Glasserman, Probability Models of Credit Risk 1 (2000), available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pglasserman/B6014/Prob_Credit.pdf (noting that increasing complexity in measuring credit risk has encouraged banks to measure credit risk at the portfolio level).


See Lowell L. Bryan, Breaking Up the Bank: Rethinking an Industry Under Siege 22-28 (1988) (noting that banks, in an effort to compensate for losses caused by the expansion of MMFs, adopted a variety of different tactics, including shedding unproductive divisions and expanding into new product areas); Kerry Cooper & Donald R. Fraser, Banking Deregulation and the New Competition in Financial Services Industry 2-17 (1984) (outlining the commercial banks’ decline in market share and the convergence in financial services that blurred the traditional distinction between depository and non-depository financial institutions); Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial Intermediaries Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 271, 276–82 (2001) (explaining how the rise of nonbank financial institutions and new financial products cut into the traditional types of services offered by banks).

See Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1995, Issue 2, at 55, 68–70 (describing key product innovations, including swaps and certain types of futures, that permitted banks to enter into new lines of business).
requirements, however, also made it more expensive for banks to continue the lending business as they had before.\footnote{122} In addition, competing products (such as MMFs) offered attractive alternatives to bank deposits, so that banks could no longer count on depositors to cushion against loan losses.\footnote{123} Banks therefore began to consider new businesses such as trading for their own account and selling new products and services. These new lines of business were not only more profitable than lending but were also not subject to the same levels of credit risk.\footnote{124} In addition, banks began to reassess the lending business—with many turning to a defensive, portfolio-based strategy in order to minimize overall credit costs.\footnote{125}

New technologies also helped banks optimize their loan portfolios.\footnote{126} Banks could more actively buy and sell loans and other credit instruments in order to minimize overall costs.\footnote{127} In addition, competing products such as MMFs offered attractive alternatives to bank deposits, so that banks could no longer count on depositors to cushion against loan losses.\footnote{128} As an alternative credit management strategy, banks began to reassess the lending business—with many turning to a defensive, portfolio-based strategy in order to minimize overall credit costs.\footnote{129}

(Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 01-29, 2001), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1174.pdf (noting that the focus of banking regulation, in light of the harm caused by the Great Depression, is to avoid financial crises through the elimination or control of systemic risk); \citeauthor{kealhofer2006}, Financial Regulation in a System Context, \textit{Brooking Papers on Econ. Activity}, Fall 2008, at 229, 230, 234–35 (explaining the mechanics of a bank run and demonstrating that actions taken by firms to shore-up their own positions to avoid runs may weaken financial market stability).


\footnote{124}{Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 279–81 (noting that banks now derive more than half their income from fee-producing and trading activities, whereas they had traditionally relied on interest rate spreads for roughly eighty percent of their income).}

\footnote{125}{See \citeauthor{allen2002} supra note 83, at 538–41; \citeauthor{berger2001} supra note 119, at 68–69, 80–83; Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 288, 290–91. Actively managing portfolio risk was, at the time, principally limited to equities, with credit risk instead being transferred through traditional (and more costly) instruments like financial guarantees and credit insurance. A liquid market to buy and sell credit risk, as well as the creation of a measure of default risk and correlation across loans, was necessary in order for portfolio risk management to be extended to debt. \citeauthor{caouette2003}, supra note 115, at 231–42, 267–72; \citeauthor{bennett1994}, Applying Portfolio Theory to Global Bank Lending, 8 J. Banking & Fin. 153, 156–57 (1994) (noting that the measurement of covariance across different borrowers is key for efficient portfolio construction).}

\footnote{126}{By 2002, a credit portfolio model developed by quantitative risk management firm KMV, LLC (KMV) had become the most widely used in the banking industry. \citeauthor{hall2000}, \textit{Hall of Fame}, \textit{DerivativesStrategy.com} (Mar. 2000), http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive/20000300feaat.asp (explaining that KMV provides default probabilities, with windows ranging from one to five years, for over 20,000 companies around the world). The KMV model is described in \citeauthor{kealhofer2000}, \textit{Portfolio Management of Default Risk}, KMV (May 2001), available at http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/whitepaper/tr/Portfolio_Management_of_Default_Risk.pdf. Other methods have also been developed in the financial industry.}

\footnote{127}{See \citeauthor{allen2002} supra note 118, at 279–81 (noting that banks now derive more than half their income from fee-producing and trading activities, whereas they had traditionally relied on interest rate spreads for roughly eighty percent of their income).}


\footnote{129}{Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 279–81 (noting that banks now derive more than half their income from fee-producing and trading activities, whereas they had traditionally relied on interest rate spreads for roughly eighty percent of their income).}
order to better manage their credit exposure. Banks also became less interested in holding loans to maturity in light of the ability to enhance returns by selling loan interests to others. The result was a shift in the lending business. Syndicated loans and secondary loan trading, spurred by the leveraged buyout wave that began in the mid-1980s, grew both in aggregate and total number of investors. The new liquidity enabled banks to

deteor to measure a loan portfolio’s risk and return characteristics. See Caouette et al., supra note 115, at 285–99.

See Glantz, supra note 27, at 423–49; Caouette et al., supra note 115, at 4; Bennett, supra note 125, at 156–59 (noting that, for modern portfolio theory to be effective, banks must be able to measure the riskiness of the individual assets comprising a particular portfolio).

See James L. Pierce, The Future of Banking 83 (1991) (noting that, banks, by leveraging expertise, technological efficiencies, and informational advantages, have been able to offer additional financial services that compete with mutual funds); David T. Llewellyn, Banking in the 21st Century: The Transformation of an Industry, in The Future of the Financial System 141, 164, 169 (Malcolm Edie ed., 1996) (describing pressures on banking due to structural and operational change); Allen & Santomero, supra note 118, at 280–82.


In a syndicated loan, one or more “lead banks” negotiate the terms of the loan with the borrower and sell portions to others at the time of origination. See Glenn Yago & Donald McCarthy, The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market: A Primer, MILKEN INST. 14–22 (Oct. 2004), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_primer_1004.pdf (providing a general history of the syndicated loan market). Interests in a loan, whether or not it is syndicated, can also be sold in the secondary market, although secondary trading is dominated by loans to riskier borrowers and non-bank investors. See William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndicated Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1585–90 (2004) (explaining how growth of the syndicated loan market led to the creation of new syndicated loan structures); Yago & McCarthy, supra, at 23–28, 35–37 (documenting the growth in the transfer of loans from the primary to the secondary market and in the trading of syndicated loans from the mid-1980s to 2000s); Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships I (FDIC Ctr. for Research, Working Paper No. WP 2007–04, Mar. 2007) (noting that U.S. banks in 2005 raised over $1.5 trillion through the use of loan syndications). Bank lenders, therefore, can transfer loans at the time of origination, as well as sell all or part of a loan at a later date. A description of the syndicated loan market, and how it differs from the secondary trading market, can be found in Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 632–34 (2007) (contending that the principal differences between the syndicated loan market and the secondary trading market relate to the nature of the relationship between the parties and the quality of the underlying loans).


The market for syndicated loans grew from $137 million in 1987 to over $1 trillion in 2007. Sufi, supra note 130, at 629. Loan trading also grew, from $8 billion in 1991 to $176.3 billion in 2005. See Drucker & Puri, supra note 130, at 1.
minimize credit costs by diversifying their exposure across a range of borrowers.\textsuperscript{134} Likewise, banks that participated in the loan market could hold less capital against riskier loans, which, in turn, produced more profitable loan portfolios.\textsuperscript{135}

Investing in a loan, however, requires the buyer to invest working capital. Consequently, a credit derivatives market also developed,\textsuperscript{136} partly to permit lenders to transfer credit risk without requiring the buyer to make a working capital commitment.\textsuperscript{137} The result was to open up the private credit market to new participants—particularly hedge funds.\textsuperscript{138} At the same time,
using CDS, a bank could buy and sell all or a portion of a borrower's credit risk—managing its credit exposure,\textsuperscript{139} diversifying its portfolio,\textsuperscript{140} and minimizing regulatory capital,\textsuperscript{141} while also maintaining the client relationship.\textsuperscript{142} Since the credit derivatives market is largely private, it is unclear how often lenders use derivatives to hedge credit risk. Total volumes, however, continued to grow throughout 2008, with indications that their use to diversify credit risk is becoming more common.\textsuperscript{143} Moreover, Bank of America estimated that, in 2006, approximately thirteen percent of the CDS market—equal to $3.2 trillion in notional amount—involved the net transfer of credit risk away from banks' loan portfolios.\textsuperscript{144} For banks, the benefits have been substantial\textsuperscript{145}—enabling them to manage and diversify credit risk at lower cost.

A Dangerous Game, \textit{Forbes}, Oct. 16, 2006, at 40 (citing a Greenwich Associates analysis that fifty-eight percent of CDS are traded by hedge funds); Janet Morrissey, \textit{Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?}, Time, Mar. 17, 2008 (noting that an original CDS can be traded fifteen or twenty times).

\textsuperscript{139} See Mengle, supra note 136, at 15–17 (describing the hedging mechanics of CDS and the development of more sophisticated and flexible hedging strategies); Minton et al., supra note 137, at 3–4, 10–11 (explaining that banks that focus on extending loans to commercial and industrial borrowers are more likely to purchase credit risk protection to hedge against borrower default).

\textsuperscript{140} CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 115, at 311–12; GLANTZ, supra note 27, at 532; Minton et al., supra note 137, at 25.

\textsuperscript{141} See Robert F. Schwartz, \textit{Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation}, 12 \textit{FORDHAM J. COMP. & FIN. L.} 167, 175 (2007) (describing the function and use of CDS); Duncan, supra note 137, at 19–20 (explaining the recent development of the loan-only CDS and how it differs from a standard CDS). The market also grew as a result of trading, unrelated to hedging, by banks and other institutions for their own accounts and for clients. See Darrell Duffie, \textit{Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability} 4–5 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255, July 2008) (noting that, from 2001 through 2006, the majority of CDS executed by banks were on behalf of clients who used CDS as a form of investment).

\textsuperscript{142} The importance to a client relationship of holding a loan, even if the credit risk is transferred, was illustrated in the WorldCom securities litigation. There, J.P. Morgan sought to decrease its exposure to WorldCom by entering into CDS without WorldCom becoming aware it had transferred the risk. See In Re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 651–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

\textsuperscript{143} See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, \textit{Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives}, 84 \textit{J. FIN. ECON.} 110, 111 (2007) (suggesting that credit derivatives have been "the most significant and successful financial innovation of the last decade," permitting banks and other financial institutions to withstand high levels of corporate default during 2000–2004); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., \textit{The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives}, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1019, 1034 (2007) (discussing the growth in size and scope of the CDS market, particularly for many of the largest corporations); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, \textit{Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications}, 14 Eur. Fin. Manage. 663, 682–83 (2008) (noting that the growth of the CDS market has caused conflicts for certain creditors who also hold CDS against their borrowers, as it may be more profitable for them if the borrower defaults); Duffie, supra note 141, at 4–5 (noting that, by 2006, the CDS market had an outstanding notional amount of $25 trillion); Debtwire, \textit{North American Distressed Debt Market Outlook 2008} 15 (2008), http://www.debtwire.com/library/marketview?DocID=1083 (finding, in a poll of 101 different hedge fund managers, proprietary trading desks, and other asset managers, that CDS use was the most prevalent hedging strategy).

\textsuperscript{144} See Duffie, supra note 141, at 4–5.

\textsuperscript{145} Those benefits are described in more detail in Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, \textit{Securitization, Risk, and the Liquidity Problem}, in \textit{Structural Change in Banking}, 227, 238–46 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds., 1993) (surveying theories that relate to
than before.\textsuperscript{146} Borrowers have benefited as well. A portion of the gains can be passed on, for example, through increased lending limits or lower interest rates, resulting in an overall decline in a borrower’s real cost of capital.\textsuperscript{147}

The result is that banks can now rely on new instruments, such as CDS, to diversify and transfer credit risk.\textsuperscript{148} New market entrants can invest in the credit risk of a bank’s loan portfolio without extending loans themselves and, having transferred the credit risk, the originator no longer has a direct interest in monitoring the borrowers or managing the transferred exposure. In effect, with CDS, banks can now outsource the management of credit risk to someone else. The Bank of America data indicate that, after banks and securities firms, hedge funds are the second largest group of participants in the CDS market.\textsuperscript{149} Thus, by investing in CDS, hedge funds can assume a core function of intermediation—the management of credit risk—but without the regulation or informational access that characterized such management by banks in the past.\textsuperscript{150}

Banks and hedge funds, therefore, are somewhat tied at the hip. Banks can transfer credit risk, and hedge funds can assist in managing it.\textsuperscript{151} Dislocating the benefits of securitization and the reasons why lenders securitize loans; George Pennacchi, Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital, 43 J. Fin. 375, 375–76 (1988) (noting that some of the benefits afforded by loan sales or securitizations include lower cost financing and improved risk management).

\textsuperscript{144} See Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45, 45–47 (noting that loan syndications, and other forms of secondary intermediation, permit banks to reduce exposure to individual borrowers and reduce unwanted risk concentrations); Rebecca S. Demsetz, Bank Loan Sales: A New Look at the Motivations for Secondary Market Activity 22–23, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, STAFF REPORT NO. 69 (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr69.pdf (noting that loan syndications and other credit risk transfers permit banks to diversify their holdings which, in turn, allows banks to realize benefits—including increased profitability—not available to less diversified banks).

\textsuperscript{145} See A. Burak Guner, Loan Sales and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 687, 713 (2006) (finding that corporate loans that are originated for sale have lower yields than traditional corporate loans because loans intended for sale have a lower cost of funding for banks than traditional loans); Pennacchi, supra note 145, at 375–76 (suggesting that the reduced finance and capital costs that banks can realize through loan sales permit them to lend to a greater number of borrowers, including riskier borrowers).


\textsuperscript{147} See Duffie, supra note 141, at 5; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{148} Hedge funds, like banks, can manage that risk through diversification, see supra notes 134, 140 and accompanying text, but may also choose to speculate on whether a referenced entity’s credit quality will improve or decline. A discussion of the risks of speculation and the systemic issues surrounding credit derivatives is included in Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 143, at 1032–50.

tion in one industry is likely to create problems in the other, with aggregate bank returns to date appearing to have had a more significant impact on hedge funds than vice versa. Part of the effect may have been due to banks (prior to the Volcker Rule) engaging in proprietary trading that competed with hedge funds. Another part may have resulted from banks providing fee-based services to hedge funds that declined when the hedge fund industry slowed. This Article illustrates a third linkage between the two—through the ability of banks to transfer credit risk to hedge fund managers, which can then trade and diversify that risk among other market participants. Doing so has enabled banks to pursue a traditional banking function—namely, the extension of loans—at lower cost. Yet, as a result of its reliance on CDS, a downturn in the hedge fund industry may affect a bank’s ability to extend new loans, resulting in a decline in available credit or an increase in the cost of capital. Stated differently, even though a principal goal of the Volcker Rule is to return banks to traditional banking, the increased risk-taking resulting from the transfer of proprietary trading to hedge funds may still affect a bank’s ability to extend credit.

There is, in fact, a real risk of an industry-wide slowdown among hedge funds. Recent evidence suggests that, under some circumstances, hedge funds may perform in the same way, irrespective of management style, causing an overall decline in hedge fund performance at the same time. Specifically, if there is a reduction in funding—for example, due to creditor concerns over the value of assets that hedge funds post as collateral—managers may be forced to reduce leverage and, in turn, trade fewer assets, resulting in a decline in liquidity. That decline can cause funding to drop even further, creating a downward spiral across the industry that affects most managers in the same way. Greater coordination among hedge funds can,

152 See Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in Risks of Financial Institutions, supra note 103, at 235, 318, 326.
154 See Chan et al., supra note 152, at 90; Billio et al., supra note 153, at 3.
155 See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
157 See Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their Implications for Financial Stability 43–45 (Eur. Cent. Bank Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 34, Aug. 2005), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scppops/ecbopsc34.pdf (noting that hedge funds, due to their high levels of leverage, can quickly suffer significant losses and the lack of liquidity buffers often results in their being forced to liquidate positions, further increasing market volatility).
158 See Boyson et al., supra note 25, at 1814–15.
in turn, amplify any downturn in performance, as traders jointly react to the decline in asset prices.\textsuperscript{160}

Financial regulation helps police the amount of risk that a bank can incur, as well as how that risk is managed. When outsourced to a less-regulated entity, however, the bank must rely on its own protections to ensure proper management. Doing so may be difficult. Chief among the concerns is the risk of opportunism—the possibility that the vendor will shirk on products or services it provides once the outsourcing relationship has been fixed. Firms typically protect themselves through contractual devices that align the vendor’s interests with their own or preserve their right of exit, as well as through close monitoring.\textsuperscript{161} Unlike most outsourcing, however, the bank may not know who is ultimately performing the outsourced function—in this case, managing the transferred risk. In fact, due to the sale and resale of CDS, the risk is most likely shared among a group of investors, making individual monitoring largely unfeasible.\textsuperscript{162}

To be sure, the Dodd-Frank Act expanded hedge fund regulation by, among other things, eliminating the private adviser exemption from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and, with certain exceptions, requiring private fund advisers to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).\textsuperscript{163} As a practical matter, however, the new requirements are likely to do little to affect the hedge fund industry, since many of the largest advisers were already SEC-registered.\textsuperscript{164} Moreover, based on current resources, the

\textsuperscript{160}See Whitehead, supra note 26 at 346–51; see also Jenny Strasburg & Susan Pulliam, Hedge Funds’ Pack Behavior Magnifies Swings in Market Funds, \textit{WALL ST. J.}, Jan. 14, 2011, at A (noting the increased tendency of hedge funds to adopt similar trading strategies, amplifying market swings).


\textsuperscript{162}For example, at the time of its bankruptcy, there were approximately $72 billion in notional amount of CDS tied to Lehman Brothers, with estimates of up to $400 billion in total notional amount linked to it. On a net basis, however, only $5.2 billion was ultimately paid out. Part of the difference reflected trading among market participants, with offsetting trades shrinking the amount of actual risk that was covered by outstanding swaps. See Gordon Platt, Credit Default Swaps Market Outstandings Shrink as Dealers Tear Up Offsetting Agreements, \textit{GLOBAL FIN.}, Dec. 2008, at 68, 70.


\textsuperscript{164}About seventy percent of hedge fund assets were managed by advisers that voluntarily registered with the SEC. See \textit{After Dodging Many Bullets, Hedge Funds Are Back in Regulators’ Sights}, \textit{KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON} (Mar. 18, 2009) http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2185 (noting that many hedge funds were willing to voluntarily register with the SEC in order to attract institutional investor funds).
SEC estimates it will not be able to audit a registered investment adviser more than once every eleven years. The Act also does little to directly address the outsourcing of a traditional bank function. Information the SEC gathers can be provided to the FSOC in order to assist efforts to assess systemic risk. The principal regulator, however, remains the SEC, with a rules-based (rather than prudential) approach to overseeing the industry. The FSOC, with a vote of seven of its ten members, can impose additional Federal Reserve regulation on systemically important non-bank financial firms. Although hedge fund advisers can qualify, the principal focus appears to be on individual firms that are "too big" or "too interconnected" to fail—a group that may include hedge fund advisers, but is less likely to reflect the industry-to-industry relationship between hedge funds and banks described in this Article.

Nevertheless, the FSOC is also charged with identifying risks to U.S. financial stability arising from activities in or outside the financial markets. As part of its mandate, the FSOC must "identify gaps in regulation that could pose risks to" U.S. financial stability, as well as make recommendations to primary regulators to "apply new or heightened standards and safeguards for financial activities or practices that could create or increase risks" among financial firms and markets. Both provisions authorize the FSOC to assess the relationship between banks and hedge funds, including the potential impact of the Volcker Rule on risk-taking by hedge funds and the consequences for bank lending. As discussed in the next Part, that general authority, as well as the FSOC Study, suggests an approach to implementing the Volcker Rule that may help take account of changing financial markets.

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167 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 78, at 776-79 (noting that the SEC’s focus on rules-based regulation leaves it ill-suited to adapt to changes in the financial markets).

168 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.


172 Id. § 112(a)(2)(G) (to be codified a 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(G)).

173 Id. § 112(a)(2)(K) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(K)).
V. IMPLEMENTING THE VOLCKER RULE

As the FSOC Study acknowledges, regulators who implement the Volcker Rule have a narrow tightrope to walk.174 Among the issues to be addressed, first, they must draw a line between permitted activities and proprietary trading. Too narrow a definition of proprietary trading will undercut the Volcker Rule, and too broad a definition may weaken the financial markets.175 Second, in implementing the Rule, regulators must account for differences in assets and markets, as well as among banks and traders. The FSOC Study, therefore, recommends a tailored approach to implementation, relying on banks (subject to regulatory approval) to create their own compliance programs and metrics. In order to minimize the risk of unfair advantage, regulators must also be able to compare trading practices from firm to firm and across different business units.176 And third, the FSOC Study recommends that regulation adapt over time to a fluid and changing marketplace. Innovation can result in strategies that circumvent the Volcker Rule, but innovation can also be slowed, even when consistent with the Rule, if it falls outside of whatever regulatory standards have been introduced.177

Part of the difficulty springs from the rise of new market participants and new means to manage and transfer capital and risk. No doubt, some portion of the shift away from traditional intermediaries has simply reflected differences in regulation—a regulatory arbitrage, as new products and services are created in order to minimize cost.178 Yet, arbitrage alone does not fully explain the change. Many less-regulated firms are able to manage risk more efficiently than traditional intermediaries. Hedge funds, for example, minimize agency costs through a governance structure that helps them compete effectively against others.179 Moreover, the capital markets permit efficient risk-sharing among investors, who can transfer risks to entities that are

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174 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
179 Hedge funds are typically organized as limited partnerships and may employ provisions that restrict management discretion or otherwise grant investors specific rights, including the regular distribution of free cash flow to a fund’s investors. Advisers also often invest their own money in the funds they manage. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 301–02 (2009) (noting that the hedge fund structure closely aligns the interests of the fund manager with those of investors). In addition, a hedge fund adviser’s poor performance may result in liquidation of the fund or difficulty in raising capital for successive funds. See Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 262 (2009) (noting that market discipline, coupled with the tendency of fund managers to invest in the funds they manage, reduces agency costs). Hedge fund advisers also typically charge performance fees for gains in fund performance, but are not required to rebate fees for losses. Public mutual fund advisers, by contrast, may only charge performance fees where gains and losses have a symmetric effect on compensation. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–5(a)(1) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2006); see also Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41,
better able to manage them at lower cost, and so provide a less expensive alternative to traditional intermediaries. Accordingly, a change in regulation—simply freezing the division among financial firms—is unlikely to halt change in the financial markets.

This is, at its heart, the principal problem with the Volcker Rule. The FSOC Study acknowledges the problem, but confines its focus (consistent with the Volcker Rule) to the effect of market change on proprietary trading. Yet, the same concern applies equally to introducing a static divide—between proprietary trading and banking—within changing financial markets. As Justice William O. Douglas, writing about continuity in the law, observed over sixty years ago:

Th[e] search for static security—in the law or elsewhere—is misguided. The fact is that security can only be achieved through constant change, through the wise discarding of old ideas that have outlived their usefulness, and through the adapting of others to current facts. There is only an illusion of safety in a Maginot Line. Social forces like armies can sweep around a fixed position and make it untenable. A position that can be shifted to meet such forces and at least partly absorb them alone gives hope of security.

The same can be said of the financial markets. Bank functions may now be performed by non-bank entities—such as the outsourcing of credit risk management to hedge funds. Financial risk may be bought and sold among new market participants, some of whom may be subject to lower levels of regulation than banks. What this suggests is that regulators must begin to address the banking industry’s exposure to market-based risks. Banking activities may still be affected by proprietary trading—an end-run around the Volcker Rule’s divide—but now through the banks’ reliance on risk outsourcing to hedge funds and the hedge fund industry.

At the same time, because it focuses only on proprietary trading, there are likely to be real limits on the Volcker Rule’s ability to address problems that led up to the financial crisis. The Volcker Rule leaves open the banks’ ability to continue to pursue substantially riskier activities—including, for

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70-77 (2008) (describing the role of the “carried-interest” compensation scheme employed by most hedge funds in reducing agency costs).

180 See Peter A. Diamond, *The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model with Technological Uncertainty*, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 759, 770 (1967) (noting that market mechanisms, because of uncertainty and the possibility for rapid change, are more well-suited to efficiently allocate resources than other nonmarket mechanisms); Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 93 at 243–47 (describing the capital markets’ response to increasing demand for risk mitigation instruments).

181 See *supra* notes 71–73 and accompanying text.


183 See *supra* notes 151–60 and accompanying text.
example, the extension of subprime real estate loans. The Rule also fails to cover longer-term commitments, which were reported to have been a significant source of bank losses—perhaps more significant than losses from short-term trading. In addition, in light of the difficulty in separating proprietary from permitted activities, the Rule may be applied inconsistently from bank to bank, potentially creating arbitrage opportunities that fail to minimize actual risk-taking. Finally, there is a risk the Rule will inadvertently block or limit beneficial activities. The most notable concern is with market-making, which may be restricted by an overly-broad definition of proprietary trading. Innovation, even if consistent with the Rule, may also be slowed if there is a risk it will be perceived by regulators as violating a metric or pattern of trading used to detect impermissible activities.

This argues, at least initially, for a narrow definition of proprietary trading. Consistent with the Volcker Rule, activities that are clearly proprietary should be expressly identified and prohibited. Other activities should be permitted, but subject to continued monitoring and supervision. Federal regulators may, in the interim, direct that certain of the permitted activities be segregated from banks in separately capitalized entities as an additional protection against the impact of trading on bank stability. Over time, with additional data—and a clearer picture of the impact of the new regulation—regulators may then decide to restrict or prohibit additional trading. Some of the adjustments may occur during the period leading up to the Rule’s initial implementation. Others may take place after the Rule has become effective, reflecting a greater need for data, over a longer period, to assess the impact of the new requirements. Doing so gradually would also allow banks and regulators to fine tune the detailed metrics that are likely to be used in separating proprietary from permissible activities. In the meantime, regulators—using the same metrics—could impose capital charges and other quantitative limits that control the impact of those activities on the banking industry, consistent with the approach taken in regulating systemically important non-bank financial firms. A reliance on capital charges and other limits would also be more flexible, allowing regulators, on a step-by-step basis, to assess the follow-on impact of the new restrictions they impose. Hedge funds, for example, may grow more important as additional risk-tak-

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184 See supra notes 9–10, 21 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
189 The FSOC Study identifies activities that would clearly be prohibited under the Volcker Act. See FSOC Study, supra note 2, at 27–28. 
190 This approach would be consistent with the Swap Pushout Rule, which prohibits a commercial bank from engaging in a swaps trading business, but permits it in bank affiliates. See supra note 12. 
191 See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 5, 53 and accompanying text.
ing becomes concentrated in a single industry. Making that assessment over time may be less disruptive than attempting to do so in parallel with the new Volcker Rule requirements.\footnote{193}

There remains an open question about hedge fund regulation. That issue will need to be addressed, in light of the potential impact of hedge funds on the financial markets, irrespective of how the Volcker Rule is implemented. Hedge funds that engage in a credit-related business may become subject to new rules under proposals to regulate the “shadow banking” system.\footnote{194} Implementing them, however, will require a different approach to regulating hedge funds than the capital markets-based approach that has been adopted to date.\footnote{195} That does not necessarily suggest a need to regulate hedge funds in the same way as banks. Different structures, and varying agency and other costs,\footnote{196} may make differences in regulation appropriate, even if the functions are similar.\footnote{197} In that respect, the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the FSOC to regulate new sources of market risk, which could include hedge funds that expose banks to prohibited activities.\footnote{198} Rather than a flat prohibition, however, the FSOC may consider more fluid regulation, like capital charges, that reflect the potential systemic importance of hedge fund failure.\footnote{199}

VI. Conclusion

The Volcker Rule, this Article has argued, fails to properly take account of change in the financial markets. A principal goal of the Rule is to minimize risky trading by banks—by prohibiting banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading—and, therefore, to promote the provision of capital to businesses and consumers. As a result of the Rule, however, many of those trading activities have moved to the hedge fund industry. Properly segregated, transferring risk away from banks may limit the impact of a downturn in hedge fund performance. That fails, however, to take account of new relationships that have developed within fluid financial markets. Over the past

\footnote{193} No doubt, there will be political pressure on federal regulators to implement the Volcker Rule quickly and as comprehensively as possible. See Senators Call, supra note 6. Establishing procedures for implementing the Volcker Rule, including clear milestones, may be one way to demonstrate the regulators’ commitment to doing so, but without the potential side-effects of the rushed introduction of new regulation that may be too broad or not broad enough.


\footnote{195} See supra notes 163–70 and accompanying text.

\footnote{196} See supra note 179 and accompanying text.

\footnote{197} See Congressional Oversight Panel, Special Report on Regulatory Reform 29


\footnote{198} See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.

\footnote{199} See supra notes 5, 53 and accompanying text.
thirty years, new market participants—in many cases, hedge funds—have begun to perform bank-like functions that permit banks to extend more credit or do so at lower cost. By causing proprietary trading to move to the hedge fund industry, banks continue to be exposed to the same risks—perhaps less directly than before, but now in an industry also subject to less regulation.

More generally, the Volcker Rule reflects the problem of imposing a static business model on modern financial markets. No doubt, the Volcker Rule removes proprietary trading from entities with government-subsidized funding. Less clear is whether an alternative method—one that reflects change in the financial markets—would be more effective. Perhaps recognizing the problem, the FSOC Study recommends that regulations implementing the Volcker Rule be dynamic and flexible. The problem, however, is more basic. If the regulatory concern is with proprietary trading, the question should not be whether banks are engaged in proprietary trading, but rather, whether banks and banking activities are exposed to the risks of proprietary trading. Today, the location of those risks extends beyond the banking industry, reflecting an evolving financial system and change in who is conducting bank-like activities. By failing to take that change into account, the Volcker Rule potentially results in new and costly regulation that increases risk-taking among less-regulated entities but may still affect banking activities.
Who’s on First?

by Thomas Quaadman

Jan 18, 2012

If the issues affecting the economy weren’t so serious, the regulatory implementation and concerns surrounding the Volcker Rule would almost have the same comic feel as Abbott & Costello’s famous baseball riff, “Who’s on First.”

In light of the upcoming hearing, let’s give a quick recap of where things stand.

The “Who” in this case involves the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which each issued their portion of the proposed Volcker Rule regulations last October, with their comment period closing on February 13, 2012. The Commodities Future Trading Commission voted out a proposed Volcker Rule regulation last week with a 60 day comment period, but that hasn’t been published yet in the Federal Register.

With these competing comment periods it is almost impossible to thoughtfully decipher what’s on second – the “what” being the hundreds of pages of the proposal, which seeks answers to the more than 1,000 questions that have been posed. Why? Because each regulator deals with a different part of the markets and businesses have to look at each proposal to determine how they interact with each other. That is why the Chamber has written to the regulators asking that they reconcile and extend the comment periods to one fixed date to allow for informed answers and input needed by the regulators to move forward.

The same is true for the cost benefit analysis of the proposed rules. With five different regulators, there are five different legal standards and practices. One need look no further than the question of economic significance to understand why the Chamber has written to the regulators asking that they all abide with President Obama’s Executive Order tasking agencies with using increased economic analysis and choosing the least burdensome means of regulation. On economic significance, cost estimates are coming out of left field and right field – the OCC said the Volcker Rule will not cost the economy more than $100 million, while the SEC said they did not know if the costs will be more than that number.

Later today, Anthony Carfang, of Treasury Strategies will testify to Congress on the Chamber’s behalf outlining our concerns with the Volcker Rule. While everyone has fixated on the financial firms, it is the corporate treasurer that may pay the ultimate price in this game.
Corporate treasurers must use the debt and equity markets on a daily basis to ensure they have cash on hand to pay bills, to raise the capital needed to expand and create jobs, and to mitigate day-to-day financial risk surrounding business operations. The proposed regulations implementing the Volcker Rule will likely cause disruptions to this system of capital formation.

The proposed regulations will increase operational costs, change long-standing business models of banks to act as “market-makers” and impose new administrative burdens, while possibly creating subjective regulatory oversight of thousands of trades by investors who are not engaged in proprietary trading. This may cause main street businesses to pay higher costs to raise capital, force others to go overseas to use financing systems that are less onerous, or as may occur for mid-size and smaller companies—shut them out of certain debt and equity markets entirely. These mid-size and smaller businesses may, at the same time, be barred from certain bank loans because of new lending requirements that are currently being negotiated under the Basel III capital requirements and prevented from using Money Markets if other regulations come through.

Additionally, regional banks and non-financial businesses that own banks or financing arms will have to build and maintain Volcker Rule compliance programs though they have not engaged in proprietary trading.

If this situation were to develop, businesses could have difficulty raising the capital needed for daily activities and long-term growth and job creation.

What it comes down to is this: when the treasurer places the call to raise cash, will anyone answer the phone?

With a firm July 21, 2012 legislative ban on proprietary trading, it is hard to see if these issues can be fixed or if this is a train wreck that ultimately harms non-financial companies from being able to raise money.

Which way will it turn out? Ask the third baseman – I don’t know.
What’s Behind Door #3?

November 17, 2012

by Thomas Quaadman

Washington used to be known for things like the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the Square Deal, but it looks like we are entering an episode of Let’s Make a Deal.

Dodd-Frank includes provisions to ban proprietary trading by banks and large financial institutions, also commonly known as the Volcker Rule. Sounds simple enough until you read the fine print. Right?

Well imagine buying a car and the dealership is still writing up the fine print as they are handing you the keys to the car. It gives you an idea of the process regulators are pushing forward with on the Volcker Rule.

The proposed Volcker Rule was first leaked and then released in October, but not officially published in the Federal Register until November 7th. The comment period closes on January 13, 2012. The Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Securities and Exchange Commission jointly released the rule, but the CFTC took a pass. The Chamber on October 11, 2011 wrote to Secretary Geithner, asking him to use his powers as a member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council to get the regulators on the same page.

To date, the CFTC has still not issued its portion of the Volcker Rule. What does that mean? Plenty.

Many businesses, financial and non-financial, that thought they were exempt from the Volcker Rule, are slowly discovering that they may have to comply with certain aspects of the proposed implementing regulations. To take but one example, non-financial firms use derivatives as a crucial risk-mitigation tool—these vehicles are essential to ensuring predictable costs. Yet, under the regime envisioned by the Volker Rule Proposal, it is not clear whether and how the liquidity of the derivative markets—and, hence, their ability to enter into risk-mitigating swaps — will be affected.

Also, the Volcker Rule, spanning 300 pages and 1,000 questions has a 90 day comment period, but other less complex regulations, such as Coast Guard regulations on passenger vessels under 100 tons, have had a 150 day comment period.
Not being able to determine if you fall under the scope of the rule and not having the time to analyze it or comment on it is not a recipe of fairness.

That is why the **Chamber today wrote to the regulators** asking them to withdraw the proposed Volcker Rule regulations and re-propose them at a time when all of the regulators can put all of their cards on the table. We also asked that they give all stakeholders 150 days to study the proposal and give agencies the benefit of their thoughts.

Who knows the CFTC may actually come out with something to make it better.

Making sure our businesses have access to capital is instrumental to creating the 20 million jobs we need over the next decade. Monty Hall had fun duping game show contestants but the fundamental fairness and evenhandness we are asking for isn’t a laughing matter.

*[Photo via Wikimedia Commons.]*
Can we Cut to the Chase?

October 12, 2012

by Tom Quaadman

In film noir movies, the ending usually comes around the time the protagonist is running from danger down a rain-swept, foggy, dark street. Ultimately the hero saves the day.

So what does the Volcker rule have in common with films such as *D.O.A.*?

The Chamber has opposed the Volcker Rule since it was first announced because it will put American financial services firms at a competitive disadvantage. By banning certain activities it will be more difficult for firms to be market makers and business will migrate overseas making it more difficult for capital formation to occur in the United States. Less capital formation means slower business expansion and fewer opportunities to create jobs.

Last week, a copy of a proposed regulation to enact the Volcker Rule was leaked to the press. In flipping through the Volcker Rule version of the Pentagon Papers it seemed that a disturbing picture was developing, but leaks are often as wrong as they are right.

Well today may be the start of the new week, but the fog around the Volcker Rule has become thicker than pea soup. A *one-page summary analysis* of the proposed rule shows that it raises many more questions than answers and seemingly did not address the potential adverse consequences to American capital markets. Also, the shades of gray fail to provide businesses with the certainty that flows from clear rules and procedures.

Furthermore, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, Comptroller of the Currency and SEC are in the process of issuing a 300 page rule proposal. However, the CFTC is not moving forward at the current time. So by the latest box score 4 of 5 regulators seem to be on the same page, but the fifth is a holdout.

While we can debate the merits of the Volcker Rule (and we will), it is imperative that the regulators be on the same page to provide some certainty to the marketplace. The Chamber sent a *letter* to the Treasury Department, in its role as Chairman of the Financial Stability Oversight Council requesting that it exercise its powers to ensure that regulators are coordinated and working in unison. A failure by
regulators to sign off on a proposal can only mean continued uncertainty, an ongoing inability to properly plan for the long-term and consequently a lack of incentive to deploy capital.

There is an old saying that he who hesitates is lost. Well, it looks like the regulators just hesitated and it is the economy that will lose in the end.

In these uncertain times, our financial system is running down a dark foggy street. If there is a light at the end, is it up to Treasury to save the day, or are our competitors about to run us over?

*Picture via Wikimedia Commons.*
Proposed Volcker Rule Regs: More Questions than Answers

Four of five regulators are proposing rules that would strictly limit market making and development of investment funds by U.S. financial institutions on a global basis.

The rule asks hundreds of policy questions and sub-questions. Taken together, there are 1,400+ questions to be answered during the next 90 days.

Regulatory Overkill...

- Uncertain compliance obligations = economic lethargy
  Amid hundreds of uncertainties final implementation of the rule set for July 21, 2012

- Proposal Not Consensus View of Statutory Regulators
  CFTC proposing its own, different version of proposals to restrict trading and market making

- Choking Credit to American Business
  12% of the private equity used to provide capital to American business originates with banks covered by the proposed rule

- U.S. Competitive Disadvantage
  The United States is the only country implementing restrictions on market making and fund development on a global basis

- Encourages Unregulated “Shadow” Financial System
  Less-regulated institutions will be encouraged to fill the void in face of regulatory uncertainty raised by proposed rule

- Misguided Risk Assessment
  A GAO report found that from 2006-2010 the six largest banks only had a combined loss of $221 million in proprietary investments

“The uncertainties surrounding how the rule will be applied and the compliance/reporting burdens imposed by the rule are likely to place [U.S. institutions] at a competitive disadvantage to firms not constrained by the rule”

- October 7, 2011 Moody’s Investor Services Advisory Note

“If you look at the crisis, most of the losses that were material for the weak institutions - and the strong, relative to capital - did not come from those [proprietary trading] activities”

- Tim Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury

“Particularly proprietary trading in commercial banks was there but not central [to the crisis]”

- Paul Volcker, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010
REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Federal Trade Commission
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department of Treasury
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Reserve
Financial Stability Oversight Council
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
National Credit Union Administration
Federal Housing Finance Agency
Office of Thrift Supervision
State Insurance Regulator
Other

www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com