Cybersecurity and Financial System Resilience Report

September 2021

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
About the Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve System, the central bank of the United States, is composed of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) and 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks). The Federal Reserve performs five general functions to promote the effective operation of the U.S. economy and, more generally, the public interest. The Federal Reserve

- **conducts the nation’s monetary policy** to promote maximum employment and stable prices in the U.S. economy;
- **promotes the stability of the financial system** and seeks to minimize and contain systemic risks through active monitoring and engagement in the U.S. and abroad;
- **promotes the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions** and monitors their impact on the financial system as a whole;
- **fosters payment and settlement system safety and efficiency** through services to the banking industry and the U.S. government that facilitate U.S.-dollar transactions and payments; and
- **promotes consumer protection and community development** through consumer-focused supervision and examination, research and analysis of emerging consumer issues and trends, community economic development activities, and the administration of consumer laws and regulations.

The Board—an agency of the federal government located in Washington, D.C.—is the governing body of the Federal Reserve System. It is run by seven members, or “governors,” who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Board guides the operation of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the core functions described above and has broad oversight responsibility for the operations and activities of the Reserve Banks. This authority includes oversight of the Reserve Banks’ examination and supervision of financial institutions;¹ the Reserve Banks’ provision of financial services to depository institutions and the federal government; and the Reserve Banks’ lending to depository institutions to ensure liquidity in the financial system.


¹ Supervised institutions include bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, state member banks, U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks, and certain financial market utilities.
Overview

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021\(^2\) (the CAA) requires the Board to submit annual reports focused on cybersecurity to Congress over the next seven years. The CAA calls for a description of measures the Board has undertaken to strengthen cybersecurity within the financial services sector and with respect to the Board’s functions as a regulator, including the supervision and regulation of financial institutions and third-party service providers. Pursuant to the CAA, this report is organized in three main sections covering

- the Board’s policies and procedures related to cybersecurity risk management, including with respect to the Board’s supervision and regulation of financial institutions, the Board’s administration of its internal information security program, and the Reserve Banks’ information security program;
- Board activities to address cybersecurity risks, including those carried out through our supervision of financial institutions, through the Board’s own programs and initiatives, and through those of the Reserve Banks as a provider of critical payment and settlement services; and
- current and emerging cyber threats that may pose a risk to the resilience of the financial system.

As described in the report, the Board views cybersecurity as a high priority for the Federal Reserve System and Board-supervised institutions. The Board and the Reserve Banks maintain robust information security programs and engage and coordinate on cybersecurity issues with numerous critical stakeholders including the federal banking agencies, other government agencies, and industry. These efforts include actively monitoring cybersecurity threats and responding, as appropriate, to incidents that could affect the operations of the Board, the Reserve Banks, or supervised institutions.

Board Policies and Procedures for Cybersecurity Risk Management

The Board recognizes the increasing and evolving nature of cybersecurity threats to the financial system. Accordingly, the Board’s supervision and regulation of financial institutions encompasses review and monitoring of institutions’ cybersecurity risk management and information technology programs. As part of its safety and soundness supervision, the Board issues cybersecurity-related regulations and guidance, examines and monitors supervised institutions’ cybersecurity risk management posture, and collects data on cyber incidents (along with the other federal financial regulatory agencies) to monitor trends in the financial services sector. Additionally, the Board and the Reserve Banks secure their internal information and information assets through robust cybersecurity risk management programs. The Board follows the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) requirements, and the Reserve Banks also employ a framework based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) standards and guidance.

Board Supervisory Policies and Procedures

The Board’s supervisory policies and examination procedures are aimed at reducing the risk of cybersecurity threats to the financial system through effective cybersecurity practices at supervised institutions. The Board issues and publishes rules and guidance for supervised institutions regarding IT, cybersecurity, operational resilience, and other related topics.\(^3\)

The Board and other regulatory agencies also publish interagency guidance on various aspects of information security risk within the financial services sector. For example, the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards impose requirements on banking organizations to develop and implement administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to promote the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information.\(^4\)

In addition, the Board utilizes general safety and soundness guidelines to mitigate cyber risk.\(^5\) These guidelines require banks to have internal controls and information systems appropriate to the size of the institution and to the nature, scope, and risk of its activities and that provide for, among other requirements, effective risk assessment and adequate procedures to safeguard and


\(^4\) See 12 C.F.R. part 208, appendix D-2; 12 C.F.R. part 225, appendix F.

manage assets. The safety and soundness standards also require banks to have internal audit systems that provide for adequate testing and review of information systems. See table 1 for recent Board actions and actions in collaboration with other financial regulatory agencies to promote cybersecurity.

Additionally, the FFIEC, of which the Board is a member, publishes joint statements to help financial institutions identify and manage their risks and cybersecurity preparedness. For example, on April 30, 2020, the FFIEC issued a statement to address the use of cloud computing services and security risk management principles in the financial services sector. The statement highlights examples of risk management practices for a financial institution’s safe and sound use of cloud computing services and safeguards to protect customers’ sensitive information from risks that pose potential consumer harm. The statement also provides a list of government and industry resources and references to assist financial institutions using cloud computing services.

Further, the Board’s domestic regulatory, supervisory, and oversight framework for financial market infrastructures (FMIs) consists of the Board’s Regulation HH and part I of the Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk (PSR policy). Regulation HH imposes risk management standards on “financial market utilities” (FMUs) that the Financial Stability Oversight Council has designated as systemically important under title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act (title VIII). Part I of the PSR policy sets out risk-management standards for certain FMIs that are not subject to Regulation HH, including payment and settlement systems operated by the Reserve Banks. The risk-management standards in Regulation HH and the PSR Policy reflect the relevant international standards for these FMIs—the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, or PFMI issued by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and the International Organization of Security Commissions (CPMI-IOSCO). Several of these standards are relevant to the management and mitigation of cyber risk, including standards related to governance, operational risk (including cybersecurity risks), and comprehensive risk management.

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8 See 12 C.F.R. part 234. The risk-management standards in Regulation HH apply to designated FMUs for which the Board is the lead supervisory agency, while comparable CFTC and SEC regulations apply to other designated FMUs.
9 The term “FMI” is defined under title VIII and generally refers to payment, clearing, and settlement systems. The term “FMU” is used internationally. FMUs are a subset of FMIs—in particular, the term FMU includes trade repositories while the term FMU does not.
The Board and other FFIEC agencies issued the interagency guidance titled “Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems” to provide financial institutions with examples of effective risk management principles and practices for access and authentication. The guidance applies to all institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve, including those with $10 billion or less in consolidated assets.

The guidance highlights risk management practices that support oversight of identification, authentication, and access solutions as part of an institution’s information security program. The guidance acknowledges significant risks associated with the cybersecurity threat landscape that reinforce the need for financial institutions to effectively authenticate users and customers to protect information systems, accounts, and data. The guidance brings together existing regulations and guidance to assist the largest and most complex firms with the development of comprehensive approaches to operational resilience. Appendix A to the paper presents a collection of sound practices focused on cyber risk management—providing firms with information on how to detect, defend against, and respond to common cyber threats, such as data destruction, theft, malware, or denial of service.

### Table 1. Recent Board and interagency actions to promote cybersecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>October 30, 2020</td>
<td>The Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued “Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience.” This paper brings together existing regulations and guidance to assist the largest and most complex firms with the development of comprehensive approaches to operational resilience. Appendix A to the paper presents a collection of sound practices focused on cyber risk management—providing firms with information on how to detect, defend against, and respond to common cyber threats, such as data destruction, theft, malware, or denial of service.</td>
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<td>January 12, 2021</td>
<td>The Board, FDIC, and OCC proposed computer-security incident notification requirements for banking organizations and their bank service providers. The proposed rule would require a banking organization to notify its primary federal regulator of an incident that could disrupt, degrade, or impair its business operations no later than 36 hours after the event occurred. The proposed rule would also require bank service providers to notify affected banking organizations immediately after experiencing an incident that could disrupt, degrade, or impair the provider’s services for four or more hours. The timely notification of incidents would enhance federal banking agencies’ ability to assess and quickly respond to potential risks such incidents may pose to the supervised entity and the banking system as a whole. The comment period for this proposed rule closed on April 12, 2021; the federal banking agencies are currently evaluating the comments received.</td>
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<td>June 30, 2021</td>
<td>The Board published Supervision and Regulation letter (SR letter) 21-11 notifying supervised institutions that the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued the “FFIEC Architecture, Infrastructure, and Operations Examination Handbook,” one of the 11 booklets that compose the FFIEC Information Technology Examination Handbook (IT Handbook). The booklet provides guidance to examiners when assessing the risk profile and adequacy of an entity’s information technology architecture, infrastructure, and operations.</td>
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<td>July 13, 2021</td>
<td>The Board, FDIC, and OCC proposed and requested comment on third-party risk management guidance designed to help banking organizations manage risks associated with third-party relationships, including relationships with financial technology-focused entities. Banking organizations that engage third parties to provide products or services or to perform other activities remain responsible for ensuring that such outsourced activities are conducted in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, including consumer protection laws. The proposed guidance is intended to assist banking organizations in identifying and addressing the risks associated with third-party relationships and responds to industry feedback requesting consistency among the agencies with respect to third-party risk management guidance. Insufficient management of third-party risks could lead to systemic vulnerabilities. A cyber incident or an operational outage at a commonly used third party may result in spillover effects or may have significant systemic implications in the financial services sector. The comment period for the proposed guidance closes on October 18, 2021.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 11, 2021</td>
<td>The Board and other FFIEC agencies issued the interagency guidance titled “Authentication and Access to Financial Institution Services and Systems” to provide financial institutions with examples of effective risk management principles and practices for access and authentication. The principles and practices address business and consumer customers, employees, and third parties that access digital banking services and financial institution information systems. The guidance highlights risk management practices that support oversight of identification, authentication, and access solutions as part of an institution’s information security program. The guidance acknowledges significant risks associated with the cybersecurity threat landscape that reinforce the need for financial institutions to effectively authenticate users and customers to protect information systems, accounts, and data.</td>
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The Board’s FMI supervisory teams also utilize other relevant cybersecurity risk guidance, such as the CPMI-IOSCO’s *Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures* (Cyber Resilience Guidance),\(^{11}\) to supplement the PFMI operational risk management expectations. Additionally, following a rise in incidents where threat actors exposed weak cybersecurity practices at firms that participate in FMIs, the CPMI published a strategy on reducing the risk of wholesale payments fraud related to endpoint security.\(^{12}\)

**Board Internal Policies and Procedures**

The Board has developed, documented, and implemented a comprehensive and robust agency-wide security program to protect the information and the information systems that support its operations and assets. The Board’s information security program complies with federal information security requirements as established by FISMA and NIST standards and guidance issued in accordance with FISMA.

The Board’s program includes technical, operational, and/or procedural controls to address access, telecommunications and network security, governance and risk management, software development, authentication and authorization, information security architecture and design, operations security, business continuity and disaster recovery planning, and physical (environmental) security that meet or exceed the standards established by FISMA. The Board’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) performs an annual independent evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the Board’s information security program and practices which includes an evaluation of the effectiveness of information security controls for select Board systems.

In addition to administering the agency’s information security program, the Board also oversees the cyber risk management posture of the Reserve Banks. The Reserve Banks have a comprehensive, risk-based information security program that is informed by NIST standards and guidance and industry best practices. The Reserve Banks, as an operator of critical financial services, proactively provide tools and communications aimed at mitigating cyber risks that their financial services customers must manage. Additionally, Federal Reserve Operating Circular No. 5, *Electronic Access* sets forth the information security requirements applicable to institutions accessing Reserve Bank services, such as the Fedwire Funds Service, the Fedwire Securities Service,

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FedACH, and the National Settlement Service.\textsuperscript{13} Under Operating Circular No. 5, institutions are required to implement technical, operational, managerial, and procedural controls designed to protect the security of the IT environment, including systems and processes that are used to access Reserve Bank services and applications.

Board Activities to Address Cybersecurity Risks

The Board’s activities help ensure the policies, procedures, rules, and guidance for supervised institutions and internal agency functions are successfully implemented. The Board’s approach includes appropriate staffing, training, and resources for bank examiners. The Board also works with its OIG on continually improving cybersecurity supervisory activities and enhancing the Board’s internal processes. Lastly, the Board’s activities involve interagency, intergovernmental, industry, and international collaboration.

Supervisory Activities

The Federal Reserve conducts examinations and monitoring of cybersecurity risk management, governance, and controls at supervised institutions. It also examines and monitors, under the authorities of the Bank Service Company Act (BSCA), the services performed on behalf of financial institutions by their service providers. The Federal Reserve’s supervision activities in this area promote the resilience of the financial system to protect against cyber incidents and other hazards, safeguard critical infrastructure, and address emerging technology risks. The Federal Reserve examination staff use the ma, which is informed by NIST standards and guidance along with other sources, in conducting cybersecurity and other technology related examinations.

Examiners evaluate cybersecurity with consideration of the business model and activities conducted by supervised institutions as part of a risk-based supervision program. The scope of examinations is set as part of a multiyear supervisory plan that considers key cybersecurity risks, the industry landscape, and other factors such as emerging technologies. As part of these evaluations, examiners consider business-line controls, risk management practices, assurance functions, and governance activities performed by the firm’s senior management and board of directors.

For the eight U.S. global systemically important banks, the Federal Reserve conducts joint cybersecurity examinations, or coordinated cyber reviews, with the OCC and FDIC. Additionally, for Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC) and Large and Foreign Banking Organization (LFBO) firms, the Federal Reserve conducts horizontal cybersecurity examinations.

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15 A LISCC firm is a firm that is supervised under the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee supervisory program. Current LISCC firms are Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup, Inc., The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, and Wells Fargo & Company. An LFBO firm refers to a foreign banking organization with combined U.S. assets of $100 billion or more that is supervised under the Large and Foreign Banking Organization supervisory program.
across institutions to promote consistency, establish range of practice, and, as appropriate, issue common supervisory findings when weaknesses are present.

For community banking organizations (under $10 billion in assets) and regional banking organizations ($10 to $100 billion in assets), the Uniform Rating System for Information Technology (URSIT) is the primary mechanism to evaluate cybersecurity. If deficiencies in an institution’s cybersecurity program are identified, examiners may issue supervisory findings. Firms are expected to promptly address findings to ensure appropriate protection against cyber threats.

For community banking organizations and regional banking organizations, the Board follows a risk-focused approach that assigns examination resources to higher-risk areas of each bank’s operations and ensures that banks maintain risk management capabilities appropriate to their size and complexity. Cybersecurity practices are evaluated with standardized procedures through regular safety and soundness examinations. For state-member banks, these examinations are often conducted jointly with state banking regulators. The Federal Reserve along with the FDIC and state banking authorities use the Information Technology Risk Examination Program (InTREx), which provides supervisory staff with risk-focused and efficient examination procedures for assessing IT and cybersecurity risks at supervised institutions.

The Board expects financial institutions to effectively manage risks associated with their third-party service providers. In addition to financial institutions’ own risk management practices, the BSCA provides authority for the federal banking agencies to regulate and examine certain services performed by third parties on behalf of insured depository institutions and their affiliates. The agencies jointly supervise a subset of third-party technology service providers through an inter-agency technology service provider supervision program, which incorporates a risk-based process for selecting service providers included in the program. As part of these supervisory activities, the agencies issue reports of examination, communicate supervisory findings, and may take enforcement actions. Where appropriate, the report of examination is distributed on a confidential basis to the technology service provider as well as the provider’s client financial institutions to assist with their ongoing monitoring of third-party risk.

In addition, the Federal Reserve’s consumer compliance supervision program complements the IT and cybersecurity reviews conducted by safety and soundness examiners to ensure that supervised institutions maintain systems and processes to protect customers’ sensitive personal financial information. Through this program, Federal Reserve examiners evaluate the effectiveness of supervised institutions’ compliance with consumer financial privacy laws and regulations.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{16}\) Examples include Regulation P (12 C.F.R. part 1016.) and the “red flags” rule under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681.).
For the FMU portfolio, the Board’s Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems works closely with staff at the New York and Chicago Reserve Banks, as well as at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to supervise designated FMUs’ operational and cyber risk management programs. The Board regularly sets supervisory priorities for and examines (and participates in CFTC- and SEC-led examinations of) designated FMUs’ operational risk management frameworks.\textsuperscript{17} The Board also reviews proposed changes to designated FMUs’ rules, procedures, and operations, including proposed changes that would materially affect a designated FMU’s operational and cyber risk management. Several PFMI standards that address cyber risk (including standards related to governance, operational risk, and comprehensive risk management), as well as the Cyber Resilience Guidance, provide common reference points for the three regulatory agencies in their supervision and oversight of the designated FMUs.

The Federal Reserve uses the ORSOM (Organization, Risk Management, Settlement, Operational Risk and Information Technology, and Market Support, Access, and Transparency) rating system in its assessment of designated FMUs. The rating system facilitates discussion of the FMU’s condition with the FMU’s management and board of directors. For a designated FMU for which the Board is the supervisory agency under title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, supervisory staff explain to the FMU the factors that determine that FMU’s rating, including operational risks and information technology, which covers cyber risk.\textsuperscript{18}

Furthermore, as part of our supervisory activities, the Federal Reserve has established processes and programs to monitor and share information involving cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents across the Federal Reserve System and the financial services sector. Additionally, the Federal Reserve monitors cybersecurity developments and events across the financial services sector including the payment, clearing, and settlement systems. The Federal Reserve proactively alerts examination staff to imminent cyber threats or vulnerabilities including ransomware, malware, and distributed denial of service (DDoS). These alerts provide examination staff the context to proceed with the appropriate Federal Reserve supervisory actions.

**Industry Efforts to Respond to Cybersecurity-Related Findings**

Cyber risk and technology management are important areas of supervisory concern. As part of the Board’s safety and soundness supervision, Federal Reserve supervisors examine and monitor the information security practices and cybersecurity programs of supervised institutions and may issue supervisory findings notifying supervised institutions of identified deficiencies. The

\textsuperscript{17} Under section 807(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board may, at its discretion, participate in any title VIII examination led by the SEC or CFTC. 12 U.S.C § 5466(d)(2).

\textsuperscript{18} For designated FMUs that are primarily supervised by the CFTC or SEC, Federal Reserve supervisory staff communicate assessments of the FMU’s cyber risk management to the CFTC or SEC, as appropriate.
Federal Reserve requires supervised institutions to respond appropriately to cybersecurity-related supervisory findings and take proactive steps to mitigate cyber risk.

When institutions do not address findings in an appropriate period of time, the Board has tools such as enforcement actions to ensure institutions operate in a safe and sound manner and safeguard critical infrastructure. The Board has observed improvement in cybersecurity practices over the past several years resulting from efforts to address supervisory findings as well as proactive steps taken by the institutions. However, continued vigilance from all parties is necessary.

**Staffing, Training, and Deployment of Examiner Resources**

The Federal Reserve maintains an experienced, trained complement of supervision staff with IT expertise, including individuals with expertise in cybersecurity. Federal Reserve examiners assess supervised institutions’ cyber and information security practices, risk management, and controls to ensure that institutions implement appropriate and effective safeguards to mitigate cyber risk. For large domestic firms, examiners are assigned on a firm-by-firm basis, and for foreign entities and smaller domestic institutions, examiners are assigned on a portfolio basis.

The Federal Reserve has established frameworks to direct the recruitment, hiring, and assignment of examiners, including IT and cybersecurity risk specialists. The Federal Reserve conducts training to ensure examiners remain prepared to address the latest threats to the financial services sector and regularly updates its training program to ensure readiness to address current and prospective threats. The Federal Reserve has an online and mobile learning platform with an extensive catalogue of IT and information security training, which is available to all staff. In addition, Federal Reserve examiners frequently participate in conferences and training events to gain perspective from external cybersecurity practitioners. The Federal Reserve has examiner affinity groups that serve as useful forums to share information and institutional knowledge of cyber resilience issues, including committees that address operational resilience matters across the portfolios supervised by the Federal Reserve.

**Board OIG Efforts Related to Supervisory Activities**

In 2017, the OIG conducted an evaluation to assess the Board’s cybersecurity examination approach and to determine whether the Board was providing effective oversight of supervised institutions’ information security controls and cybersecurity risk for select oversight areas. The OIG identified opportunities to enhance the Board’s approach. In response to the OIG’s recommendations, the Board established a robust governance process, set clearer expectations for examiners, and implemented process improvements for monitoring significant vulnerabilities. Among

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the measures taken were the establishment of an executive committee which sets strategic direction and provides input into the design and execution of the Federal Reserve’s IT supervision program. In addition, the Board made improvements to the Federal Reserve’s monitoring of cybersecurity incidents, including greater information sharing between internal groups at the Board, and an improved process for alerting examiners of cyber incidents.

In 2020, the OIG issued a report identifying opportunities for the Board to enhance cybersecurity supervision of LISCC firms. In response to the OIG’s recommendation for more structured training, the Board created a formal interim training plan for LISCC cybersecurity examiners that is in place for 2021. The Board is currently developing a new cybersecurity training plan that will be applicable to examiners across the Federal Reserve beginning in 2022. This new training plan is expected to incorporate supervision, risk management, and technical cybersecurity skills as well as address emerging risks and best practices across the financial services sector.

Reserve Bank Activities

In addition to administering the Board’s internal information security program, the Board also supervises the IT operations of the Reserve Banks. The Reserve Banks maintain an information security program based on NIST standards and guidance. The Reserve Banks continue to take measures to ensure they have robust protective measures for their critical operations. The Reserve Banks remain vigilant about their cybersecurity posture, investing in risk-mitigation initiatives and programs and continuously monitoring and assessing cybersecurity risks to operations and protecting systems and data. The Reserve Banks continue to implement cybersecurity initiatives to enhance identity and access management capabilities; enhance the ability to respond to evolving cybersecurity threats with agility, decisiveness, and speed by streamlining decision-making during a cybersecurity incident; and improve continuous monitoring capabilities of critical assets.

The Reserve Banks have also focused their efforts on bolstering the security of the U.S. payment system. For example, in 2021, the Reserve Banks implemented a new FedACH processing platform to improve the efficiency and reliability of their current FedACH operations. The Reserve Banks also continue to enhance the resiliency and information security posture of the Fedwire Funds, National Settlement Service, and Fedwire Securities Service through a multiyear initiative to respond to environmental threats and cyber threats.

Additionally, in response to the evolving security threat landscape, the Reserve Banks announced in 2020 the implementation of a new information security program for FedLine Solutions, which

provides financial institutions direct electronic access to the Reserve Banks’ payment services.\(^{21}\)

As part of this new program, financial institutions that use FedLine Solutions must conduct an annual assessment of their compliance with the Reserve Banks’ FedLine security requirements and submit an attestation that they have completed the assessment. To the extent any deficiencies or gaps are identified in the self-assessment, institutions must develop a remediation plan to address such deficiencies.

**Coordination Activities**

Due to the high degree of interconnectedness of the global financial system, the Board is an active participant and leader in domestic and international forums addressing the cyber resiliency of the financial services sector. The Board closely coordinates with other domestic and international agencies, governance bodies, financial regulators, and industry, to share information and best practices as well as publish guidance for regulated entities.

**Intergovernmental Coordination**

To strengthen risk management practices across the financial services sector and reduce the impact of cyber-related incidents, the Board coordinates with partners through the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWGFM), the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC), and the FFIEC.

The Board is a member of the PWGFM, whose mission is to enhance the integrity, efficiency, orderliness, and competitiveness of the nation’s financial markets and their ability to maintain investor confidence. A significant part of this mission is related to cyber and other operational risks. The Board has actively contributed to the group including recent cyber initiatives such as studying vulnerabilities across the financial services sector and participating in principal- and senior staff-level cyber exercises.

The Board is also a member of the FBIIC, which is chartered under PWGFM. The FBIIC is composed of federal and state financial regulatory agencies that supervise banking, investment, and insurance firms and is chaired by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The FBIIC coordinates and shares information with respect to security issues that may impact the financial services sector and has established protocols to respond to incidents affecting institutions supervised by FBIIC members.

The Board participates in the FBIIC’s periodic cyber exercises that include participation from the regulatory agencies, financial institutions, and trade associations. These exercises have proved

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useful in advancing incident management and information sharing protocols across the financial services sector. Additionally, through participation in these exercises, the Board has improved its ability to respond to, in coordination with other financial regulators, potential operational disruptions in the financial services sector’s critical infrastructure. These exercises also have led to the creation of private sector-led and public sector-supported initiatives to enhance cyber resiliency. These include an initiative aiming to enable participating financial institutions to store critical customer account data in a secure industry-standard format, and capabilities to proactively identify, analyze, and coordinate activities to mitigate systemic risk to the U.S. financial system (and other critical infrastructure) from cyber threats.

In addition, as a member of the FFIEC, which is an interagency body that promotes uniformity and consistency in the examination of financial institutions across its members, the Board actively coordinates with FFIEC members on cybersecurity risk management issues. The Board contributes to the efforts of the FFIEC in responding to cyber incidents affecting institutions supervised by FFIEC members. The Board also contributes to the FFIEC’s efforts and supports ongoing dialogue on cybersecurity issues and opportunities to improve consistency in examination approaches.

**Public/Private Sector Coordination**

The Board participates in various industry-led initiatives to enhance cybersecurity risk management. For example, the Board is a member of the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), the global financial industry’s resource for cyber and physical threat intelligence analysis and sharing. The Board encourages its supervised institutions to incorporate threat monitoring programs and participate in information sharing organizations such as the FS-ISAC.

Through the FBIIC, the Board also coordinates with the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council, a nonprofit body composed of over 70 members from across the financial services industry whose mission is to strengthen the resiliency of the financial services sector. This partnership focuses on improving the financial services sector’s ability to rapidly respond to and recover from significant cybersecurity incidents, thereby reducing the potential for such incidents to threaten the stability of the financial system and the broader economy.

**International Coordination**

The Board leads or contributes to cybersecurity activities undertaken by groups such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) (and its joint efforts with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the Group of Seven (G-7).
The Board’s Vice Chair of Supervision is the current chair of the FSB. In light of the threat cyber incidents pose to the global financial system, the FSB has assumed a key role in promoting cybersecurity risk management standards. To that end, the FSB in October 2020 published a toolkit to provide financial institutions with a set of effective practices to respond to and recover from a cyber incident to limit any related financial stability risks.

The BCBS acts as the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. The Board’s Deputy Director of Supervision and Regulation served as the chair of the BCBS Operational Resilience Group (ORG). In March 2021, the BCBS issued the Principles for Operational Resilience and the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk, which the ORG was charged with drafting. These documents highlight the importance of sound operational risk management, including cyber risk management, and are aligned with guidance released by the Board on operational resilience.

Through the CPMI-IOSCO, the Board has played a key role in the development of the PFMI and related guidance for FMIs, including the Cyber Resilience Guidance. The CPMI-IOSCO Working Group on Cyber Resilience has promoted implementation of the guidance across member jurisdictions and engaged with private sector firms to better understand operational risks and cybersecurity risk management.

Given the rapidly evolving nature of cyber risks and the cross-border and cross-sector relevance of cyber threats, the G-7 ministers and central bank governors established a working group consisting of cybersecurity experts to facilitate coordination among jurisdictions and with the private sector. The mandate of the group is to identify the main cybersecurity risks in the financial services sector and propose actions to be taken in this area. As part of the working group’s efforts, the Board participated in and executed a simulation exercise in 2019 with member jurisdictions as well as international financial services sector participants. The G-7 financial authorities have published a number of G-7 “Fundamental Elements” guidelines on topics such as cybersecurity exercise planning (October 2020), statement on ransomware (October 2020), threat-based penetration testing (October 2018), and third-party cyber risk management (October 2018).

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22 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Operational Resilience (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, March 2021), [https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d516.pdf](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d516.pdf).
23 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revisions to the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, March 2021), [https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d515.pdf](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d515.pdf).
24 See SR 20-24 letter.
Board Internal Activities

The Board promotes effective cybersecurity risk management through active collaboration and coordination across Board functions and stakeholders. The Board’s Office of the Chief Operating Officer (OCOO) facilitates activities to enable information flow and raise awareness of cyber risk issues, provides mechanisms for the efficient and timely exchange of critical information across business, IT, and information security functions, and supports the coordination of cross-functional perspectives among Board stakeholders on cyber policy issues. This collaboration includes discussion and analysis of current and emerging threats and incidents.

The Board’s approach to cybersecurity involves remaining vigilant about our cybersecurity posture, investing in risk-mitigation initiatives and programs, protecting systems and data, and continuously monitoring and assessing cybersecurity risks to our operations. The Board’s information security program, which complies with federal information security requirements as established by FISMA and NIST standards and guidance, includes protection of information assets against advanced persistent threats (APTs), malware, insider risks, and DDoS attacks, and other risks. These protections are provided in a layered approach to provide interlocking prevention, detection, response, remediation, and recovery capabilities as described below.

At the preventive layer, the Board has deployed technologies such as firewall, proxy, and application gateway on the perimeter to manage access to and from the Board’s network. Preventative capabilities are enhanced by incorporating threat intelligence from the public and private sectors. In addition, users are required to complete annual security awareness training. Periodic security reminder articles are posted on the Board’s intranet. The Board also regularly conducts phishing exercises to raise awareness among users. Users who fail the exercises are required to complete phishing awareness training.

With respect to detection, the Board leverages a comprehensive security information and event management platform that ingests and indexes log data from various network and endpoint sources for correlation, including, but not limited to, telemetry from the prevention technologies noted above. In addition to log data, the Board leverages various technologies to actively analyze email and web traffic to detect potential malicious content.

With regard to response, the Board has an experienced team of incident responders that monitor and investigate any suspicious activity on the Board’s network. If suspicious activity is determined to be malicious, a cyber incident notification and escalation process is followed. In the event an incident outstrips the capabilities of the Board’s incident response team, the Board has an established relationship with the larger Federal Reserve System incident response team to provide assistance as needed. The Board also has a retainer agreement with an external incident response service provider to provide additional expertise and surge capacity as needed.
As response efforts transition to remediation, the Board has subject matter experts that can be leveraged to assist with remediation efforts on various technologies deployed throughout the enterprise. For use cases where the remediation is driven by patching vulnerabilities, the Board has a robust patch management program that includes the regular scanning of its environment for vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the Board works with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to leverage its offering to regularly scan externally facing web assets for vulnerabilities and corresponding remediation. Similarly, the Board established a vulnerability disclosure policy pursuant to Binding Operational Directive 20-01 for these externally facing web assets.

As an incident moves to the recovery stage, the Board has established a multi-layered approach. For IT services, such as email, that require high availability, the Board has established “hot” duplicate services that can be leveraged with minimal business disruption. In addition, a “warm” contingency remote site is maintained which includes data backups. These backups support the Board Recovery Time Objective for its services.

The Board continues to be mindful of the need to regularly assess the maturity, efficacy, and readiness of various technologies and capabilities described above as it relates to the Board’s overall cybersecurity posture. To that end, the Board regularly assesses its cybersecurity posture via a combination of self-initiated activities, such as annual compromise assessments, annual penetration tests, annual data exfiltration exercises, and tabletop exercises. As a result, the Board continues to mature and evolve its cybersecurity capabilities.

**Board OIG Assessment of the Board’s Progress in Implementing Key FISMA Information Security Program Requirements**

To support the annual independent evaluation of agency information security programs by Inspectors General (IGs) under FISMA, DHS publishes FISMA reporting metrics. These metrics direct IGs to evaluate the effectiveness of agency information security programs across a variety of attributes grouped into eight security domains. These domains align with the five security functions defined by the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework): *identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover*. Pursuant to the FISMA reporting metrics, IGs assess the effectiveness of each of the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework function areas using a maturity model spectrum. The five levels of the IG FISMA maturity model are: ad hoc (level 1), defined (level 2), consistently implemented (level 3), managed and measurable (level 4), and

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optimized (level 5). Within the context of the maturity model, a level 4 information security program is considered as operating at an effective level of security. The Board OIG’s 2020 assessment of its overall information security program rated the program as continuing to operate effectively at a level 4 maturity.\(^3\)

**The Board’s Ongoing Efforts to Strengthen Its Information Security Program**

The Board takes a continuous improvement approach to strengthening its information security program across the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework function areas. The Board’s chief information security officer (CISO) manages a Plan of Actions and Milestones process that ensures plans are developed in response to any finding or weakness identified in security and privacy control implementations. This process is used to track and report on the remediation of findings and implementation recommendations issued by the OIG and weaknesses identified through internal testing of controls.

The Board’s CISO coordinates with members of the FFIEC and with CISA in response to cybersecurity directives. The CISO reports directly to CISA and the Office of Management and Budget in response to cybersecurity directives and executive orders. Lasty, the CISO is continually working to improve the Board’s security program and may establish tactical and strategic initiatives to enhance existing cybersecurity and privacy processes.

The CISO serves a critical role assessing risk and acting in the best interest of the agency by eliminating threats. The Board’s information security and IT staff continually monitor for new threats and vulnerabilities that may be identified and communicated by cybersecurity researchers, vendors, information sharing and analysis centers, and CISA. The CISO leads any response to cyber threats and vulnerabilities that may be identified by CISA and may require remediation. Informal consultation and benchmarking on key cybersecurity issues is conducted with other regulatory agencies including the FFIEC agencies.

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Current or Emerging Threats to the Resilience of the Financial System

The Board actively monitors cyber risks and emerging threats through the supervisory process, internal Federal Reserve programs and resources, and coordination with government agencies and the private sector. Given the highly interconnected nature of the financial services sector and its dependencies on critical service providers, all participants in the financial system face cyber threats. Current or emerging threats that the Board is focused on include:

- **Malware**: The presence of advanced persistent threats results in malicious cyber incidents that are often difficult to identify or fully eradicate. At times, these incidents may spread rapidly, and have potentially systemic consequences. Destructive malware risk to financial institutions predominantly involves ransomware incidents.
  - **Ransomware**: Ransomware has increased sharply in both number of victims and amount of ransom paid to threat actors. Ransomware can pose a threat to the operational and financial resilience of all institutions but may disproportionately affect small community and regional banking organizations that may not have sufficient resources to protect their systems against sophisticated actors.
  - **Ransomware as a Service (RaaS)**: Similar to traditional ransomware, RaaS is an increasing concern with added sophistication, speed of proliferation, and difficulty of attribution. RaaS allows threat actors to create “franchised” threat offerings. Sophisticated threat actors license the use of their software to other malicious actors, often for a percentage of the ransom. This new threat model allows less sophisticated threat actors greater opportunity to impact businesses. Organizations that refuse to pay the ransom often need to rebuild infrastructure to bring business operations back online.

- **Supply chain risk**: Another increasing trend is a type of exploitation where a threat actor compromises trusted software through a vendor or third party. Coupled with ransomware, supply chain compromise can impact the financial system through legitimate connections with third-party service providers. Recent breaches at software providers highlight the interdependency often associated with third-party vendor management and automated software updates being applied.

- **Sophisticated DDoS threats**: DDoS threats are an established area of concern. Financial institutions are a target of distributed incidents intended to disrupt services and negatively affect business functions. These incidents can convey political statements by nation-state groups, serve as misdirection for other incidents, or simply be harassment tactics used by lower skilled threat actors. DDoS incidents against the U.S. financial services sector have been prevalent for years, and mitigation and protection services are typically able to prevent, or greatly
reduce, the risk to financial institutions, third parties, and other organizations. The impact of these attacks can be varied, often affecting the ability of a targeted firm to provide services and conduct business as usual, presenting a unique challenge to operational resilience.

- **Increased sophistication in cyber threats**: Growing complexity and sophistication of cyber threat organizations is an additional area of concern due to the potential effect of the number and severity of cyber threats to the financial system. With the increasing connectivity and shared communication of vulnerable software, threat actors leverage this knowledge to create shared information. Threat actors often share information and tactics to increase their effectiveness. While increasing cyber threat sophistication is not a new problem, the increasing information sharing is an emerging concern because it reduces the window of opportunity to prevent incidents once a vulnerability is discovered.

The Board recognizes the systemic risk posed by cyber threats to the financial system. As such, cyber risk mitigation and cyber resilience initiatives continue to be high priorities for the Federal Reserve.
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