

**Meeting Between Staff of the Federal Reserve Board and
Representatives of American Express Company
August 14, 2025**

Participants: Norah Barger, David Lynch, Juan Climent, Francisco Covas, Andrew Willis, Marco Migueis, Ben Ranish, Cecily Boggs, Christopher Appel, Matthew McQueeney, and Mark Buresh (Federal Reserve Board)

Kerri Bernstein, Lee Anderson, and Amy Weiss (American Express)

Summary: Staff of the Federal Reserve Board met with representatives of American Express regarding several topics, including the agencies' Basel III endgame notice of proposed rulemaking. The American Express representatives discussed the potential impact of the proposal on American Express and expressed views regarding specific potential changes, as reflected in the attached materials provided by American Express.

Attachment

Regulatory Reform Discussion

August 14, 2025




The previous proposal had a disproportionate impact on AXP's capital requirements



Basel final rules should not disproportionately impact AXP

Industry Estimated RWA Increase under Previous Basel III Endgame Proposal¹



Note:

1. All impacts except for Morgan Stanley ("MS") from Barclays estimates. MS impact based on Goldman Sachs estimates.


2. Sourced from "Regulatory Capital Rule: Large Banking Organizations and Banking Organizations With Significant Trading Activity" published September 18, 2023.

Basel III Endgame – Operational Risk

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Operational Risk: Anatomy of Card Business

Card businesses are supported by similar processes, face similar operational risks, and generate similar types of revenues. Although the types of revenues are largely similar, the composition of revenue could differ significantly across different card products.




Note:

1. The trademarks, logos and service marks used on this slide and throughout this presentation are the property of their respective owners.

A Comparison of Card Business Models


Even within similar card products, dissimilar accounting approaches and revenue mixes would drive different capital requirements under the proposed rules attributable to providing credit and charge cards. Properly designed risk-based capital rules should assign similar capital charges to similar products with similar risk profiles regardless of the types of revenue the products generate or permissible accounting determinations.



Revenue Mix



J.P.Morgan




Revenue Mix

Note:

1. Sourced from AXP and JPM's 2024 10-Ks and JPM's 2024 FR Y-9C.

Different outcomes for same underlying operational risks

AXP's GAAP accounting reflects gross card revenues, which results in a meaningfully higher service fee revenue stream versus peers whose GAAP accounting nets card expenses from its service fee revenues. The differentiated treatment of revenue earned through the same product would result in significantly different capital requirements for comparable products with similar underlying operational risks.




Note:

1. Capital estimates are illustrative and represent the CET1 requirement for each firm, assuming:
 - i. Net Interest Yield of 10%
 - ii. 15% Business Indicator Component (BIC)
 - iii. 1.0 Internal Loss Multiplier (ILM)
 - iv. CET1 target of 8% for both firms
2. Sourced from AXP's and JPM's 2024 FR Y-9C.


Operational Risk: Proposed Solutions

We recommend the Agencies to consider aligning the treatment of Interest and Services components with respect to the netting of revenues and expenses and/or subjecting the Services Component to a cap to mitigate the disproportionate impact.

Option 1: Net Card Revenues and Expenses



Option 2: Cap² Service Component



Notes:

1. Card and Card Related-Fee Revenue.

2. This concept was included in "Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document: Standardized Measurement Approach for Operational Risk". June 2016, paragraph 20.

3. Financial Component Indicator is not listed as it is immaterial for AXP.

Basel III Endgame – Credit Risk

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Charge authorization fundamentally differs from credit card

Any concern regarding a sudden ramp-up in spending on charge cards is substantially mitigated – if not eliminated – by the dynamic authorization process for charge cards. Rather than assigning a credit limit and generally permitting spend up to that limit provided the account is otherwise in good standing, each transaction by a charge card is evaluated and can be declined based on multiple factors, including out-of-pattern spending.



Each transaction is individually underwritten

Example: \$5,000 transaction - **DECLINED¹** ❌

Product:	Platinum Charge Card
Transaction Amount:	\$5,000
Current Account Balance:	\$1,000
Credit Limit:	No Pre-Set Spending Limit
FICO:	725
Approve/Decline Rationale:	Out-of-Pattern Spending

Example: \$5,000 transaction - **APPROVED** ✓

Product:	Blue Cash Everyday
Transaction Amount:	\$5,000
Current Account Balance:	\$1,000
Credit Limit:	\$10,000
FICO:	725
Approve/Decline Rationale:	Within Contractual Limit

Note:

1. For illustrative purposes only. Credit underwriting decisions are made on a transaction-by-transaction basis.

Charge card does not have off-balance sheet (“OBS”) commitment under Basel

Under the Basel Standards, capital is required for OBS exposure where there is a contractual commitment to extend credit. Charge cards do not provide an equivalent to a committed line of credit because charge card transactions are dynamically authorized, and each transaction is individually underwritten. The card member is not entitled to spend any additional amount beyond their current spend, and we can disrupt and decline any problematic or out-of-pattern spending.

Basel Standards on Off-Balance Sheet Exposure¹


Off-balance sheet items will be converted into credit exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors (“CCF”). In the case of commitments, the committed but undrawn amount of the exposure would be multiplied by the CCF. For these purposes, commitment means any contractual arrangement that has been offered by the bank and accepted by the client to extend credit, purchase assets or issue credit substitutes.

<u>Product</u>	<u>Key Terms and Conditions</u>	<u>Off-Balance Sheet Commitment</u>
 Charge Card	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ No pre-set spending limit▪ No commitment to extend credit▪ Point of sale authorization	
 Credit Card	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Contractual arrangement to extend credit up to a committed, communicated line	

Note:

1. “Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III: Finalizing Post-Crisis Reforms”. December 2017, page 25.

The 10X proxy “Total Limit” for charge card is significantly higher than credit card industry average and is not based on data ...




Note:

1. Source: Federal Reserve Board of New York Household Debt Data 2019–Q2'25.

2. Based on methodology prescribed under Proposal – Avg Balance over prior 8 quarters x 10 less current outstanding.

... and produces an OBS exposure and corresponding capital requirements that are 2X those of credit cards



Note:

1. ~5x Multiplier based on historical industry average. Source: Federal Reserve Board of New York Household Debt Data 2019–Q2'25.

2. Based on methodology prescribed under Proposal – Avg Balance over prior 8 quarters x 10 less current outstanding.

3. Off-balance sheet items will be converted into credit exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors ("CCF"); Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III: Finalizing Post-Crisis Reforms. December 2017, page 25.

Charge cards present approximately half the risk of credit cards but under the previous proposal would be assigned a capital charge approximately twice as high

Illustrative only	Credit Card	Charge Card
On-Balance Sheet	\$100	\$100
Limit	~5x based on Industry Average	10x based on Proxy “Total Limit”
Total “Limit”	\$500 (\$100 x 5)	\$1,000 (\$100 x 10)
Off-Balance Sheet Notional Amount	\$400 (\$500 - \$100)	\$900 (\$1000 - \$100)
Credit Conversion Factor Prescribed in Proposal (“CCF”)	10%	10%
Off-Balance Sheet Exposure	\$40 (\$400 x 10%CCF)	\$90 (\$900 x 10%CCF)
Risk Weight ¹	55%	55%
Off-Balance Sheet Risk Weighted Asset (“RWA”)	\$22 (\$40 x 55%)	\$50 (\$90 x 55%)
Ratio of Off-Balance Sheet RWA	2.3x	
Historical Write-off Rate²		
Peak	12.9%	5.4%
Average	4.0%	1.8%


Note:

1. Assumes Credit Card & Charge Card are both Transactors for RWA comparison purpose.

2. Quarterly AXP write-off rate from 2008-2024 for US Consumer and Small Business. Competitor data sourced from quarterly earnings of issuers: JPMorgan, Citi (NA Branded), Bank of America, Capital One (Domestic), Discover, U.S. Bancorp, Wells Fargo, and Synchrony.

Credit conversion factor (“CCF”) for unused credit line should be adjusted based on historical data

If the Agencies decide to retain a proxy for the charge “OBS Exposure”, historical data suggests the current 10% CCF is over-calibrated for lower-risk charge card products and should be at most low single digits.




Note:

1. Source: Federal Reserve Board of New York Household Debt and Credit Report.

Off-balance sheet (“OBS”) Exposure Rule: Proposed Solutions

- We recommend aligning with Basel Standards and eliminate the proxy methodology for OBS exposures on charge cards to reflect their actual product design or use historical data to set the proxy.
- At minimum, we recommend to treat charge card no worse than credit card. This can be achieved by reducing the proxy multiplier and setting the credit conversion factor (“CCF”) based on historical data.



Note:

1. ~5x represents multiplier of credit card.

2. Off-balance sheet items will be converted into credit exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors (“CCF”); Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis Reforms. December 2017, page 25

Requested Action: Basel III Endgame

- We remain committed to continued engagement and stand ready to provide additional data or otherwise support any supplementary analyses the Agencies may pursue.
- We applaud the Agencies' efforts to consider different business models as they rethink the prior Basel proposal. Given AXP's distinct business model, sustained results, and low risk profile, AXP should not experience a greater increase in requirements than the industry.

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