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Fiscal Positions and Government Bond Yields in OECD Countries

Joseph W. Gruber and Steven B. Kamin**

NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to International Finance Discussion Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be cleared with the author or authors. Recent IFDPs are available on the Web at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/. This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at http://www.ssrn.com/.


Abstract:

We examine the impact of fiscal positions, both the level of debt and the fiscal balance, on long-term government bond yields in the OECD. In order to control for the endogenity of fiscal positions to the business cycle we utilize forward projections of fiscal positions from the OECD's Economic Outlook. In a panel regression over the period from 1988 to 2007, we find a robust and significant effect of fiscal performance on long-term bond yields. Our estimates imply that the marginal effect of the projected deterioration of fiscal positions associated with the recent financial crisis is to add about 60 basis points to U.S. bond yields by 2015, with effects on other G7 bond yields generally being smaller.

Keywords: Fiscal policy, fiscal balances, government debt, interest rates

JEL classification: E43, E62


I.  Introduction

As is well known, the global financial crisis has left a deep imprint on the fiscal position of the advanced economies. Figure 1 shows that fiscal deficits in the G-7 countries widened to 5 - 15 percent of GDP in 2009, and OECD forecasts have these deficits shrinking only slightly this year and next. In consequence, as shown in Figure 2, the net general government debt of these countries is projected to rise to their highest levels in many decades (with the exception of Canada). Even before the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, policymakers and market participants had begun to focus on the potential effects of deteriorating fiscal positions on government bond yields and, by extension, private capital formation and economic growth. More recently, these concerns have become all the more acute.

There are a plethora of reasons why larger government deficits or debts might boost sovereign yields:

In spite of--or, perhaps, because of--the many reasons that fiscal imbalances might boost interest rates, it is difficult in practice to identify an obvious effect of the former on the latter. Figure 3 shows that, notwithstanding the trend rise in government debt/GDP ratios for most G7 countries in the past several decades, long-term government bond yields have trended down; a picture of real bond yields would show similar movements.

Moreover, the rise in deficits and debts that has taken place most recently--during the global financial crisis - has not had any obvious effect on bond yields, either. Figure 4 compares the changes in expected fiscal balances for OECD countries with changes in their long-term government bond yields. The x-axis measures the change between 2007 and 2009 in the OECD's two-year-ahead projection of the fiscal balance.1 The y-axis measures the change in the long-term government bond yield between 2007 Q4 and 2009 Q4, the periods when the fiscal projections were made.

The black line indicates the expected downward sloping relationship: countries with less deterioration in fiscal balances experienced smaller increases in bond yields. However, that downward slope depends entirely on two outliers, Greece and Ireland. Absent those observations, as shown by the red dotted line, there is no relationship between the two variables. Similarly, as shown in Figure 5, the existence of a positive relationship between increases in projected government net debt ratios and increases in bond yields also depends entirely on the observations for Greece and Ireland.

Clearly, identifying a consistent effect of fiscal imbalances on bond yields requires a more complete econometric exercise that controls for a range of other influences on yields. In this paper, we build upon an extensive literature on this topic to estimate the impact of fiscal deficits and debts on long-term government bond yields for two different sets of advanced economies: the OECD economies and the G-7 countries. Following on Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004), we estimate cross-country panel regressions on annual data to explain bond yields with measures of fiscal imbalances and various control variables. As in Laubach (2009), Engen and Hubbard (2005), and, in an international context, Chinn and Frankel (2005), we use forecasts of government deficit and debt variables, rather than their actual values, as explanatory variables in the model; this approach helps us address some of the econometric problems that make it difficult to identify an effect of fiscal performance on bond yields. We then use the estimated coefficients to gauge the likely effect of the projected future expansion of fiscal deficits and debts on bond yields around the world.

To summarize our key findings, first, we were able to estimate statistically significant effects of forecasted government deficits and debts on long-term bond yields that were remarkably robust, considering the mixed evidence uncovered by prior research. For the G-7 panel, a 1 percentage point rise in the ratio of the structural fiscal deficit to GDP boosts bond yields by 15 basis points in the long run, and a 1 percentage point rise in the net debt ratio boosts yields 2 basis points. These effects are just a little smaller than those estimated by Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2005) for the United States alone. For the larger OECD panel, estimated fiscal effects on yields are about half those estimated for G7 countries.

Second, the expansion of fiscal deficits and debts since the onset of the financial crisis and recession should exert material effects on bond yields in the medium to long term. Based on our econometric estimates, coupled with fiscal projections published in the October 2010 IMF World Economic Outlook, we calculated the marginal effect on bond yields in the G7 countries resulting from the prospective change in fiscal positions between 2007 and 2015. By 2015, U.S. long-term sovereign yields are projected to be about 60 basis points higher than they would be if fiscal positions remain at their 2007 levels. The marginal effect of changing fiscal positions on most other G7 countries should be smaller, reflecting some combination of smaller increases in debt and greater progress in narrowing fiscal deficits in the IMF forecasts. For Japan, our estimates suggest that further fiscal deterioration will push up yields by 90 basis points, but insofar as our model does a poor job explaining Japanese yields, we put little weight on this estimate.

The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews several econometric issues that complicate the identification of the effect of fiscal performance on bond yields, and it explains how we address those issues. Section III describes our econometric methodology and reviews our core results, while Section IV reviews the results of a broad range of alternative estimations designed to assess robustness and to address specific questions about how and why fiscal performance affects bond yields. Section V describes simulations based on our core estimates that gauge the effect of the recent deterioration in fiscal performance on recent and prospective bond yields. Section VI concludes.

II.  Econometric Issues

Other papers present reviews of the lengthy literature on the effect of fiscal performance on interest rates, so we will not repeat these summaries here.2 However, some key issues complicating the identification of fiscal effects on interest rates are worth highlighting.

To begin with, both fiscal performance and interest rates are endogenous with respect to the business cycle. A cyclical downturn in real GDP, for example, tends to lead to a reduction in the fiscal balance (widening of the deficit) as tax revenues erode and the government spends more on unemployment compensation and other income support. At the same time, interest rates decline as the monetary authorities loosen policy and the demand for money and credit declines. This introduces a spurious positive correlation between the fiscal balance and interest rates that may obscure the underlying structural negative effects discussed above.

A number of ways to control for this endogeneity have been employed by previous researchers. In their analyses of U.S. interest rates, Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2005) abstract from current conditions by using as explanatory variables five-year-ahead projections of fiscal variables rather than their current values, and also by using as their dependent variable the longer-term bond yields implied by forward markets to hold five years ahead rather than current longer-term yields. Additionally, many researchers use some measure of GDP growth or the output gap as an explanatory variable to control for business conditions, as well as a measure of short-term interest rates. Finally, taking advantage of the similarity of macroeconomic conditions within Europe, Nickel, Rother, and Rulke (2009) and Attinasi, Checherita, and Nickel (2009) focus on the impact of fiscal conditions on the spreads between yields in various European nations and those on German bonds.

In our research, we draw on a number of these approaches to control for endogeneity. We do not employ the forward interest rates utilized by Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) as the dependent variable, as these are not available for a large number of countries. (We do assess their importance in an alternative specification using fewer countries.) However, as in those studies, we employ future projections of the deficits and debts, specifically two-year-ahead projections calculated by the OECD. We also, like others, use measures of short-term interest rates, inflation, and GDP growth as controls for current cyclical conditions. Moreover, to more fully abstract from current conditions and to better line up with the longer-term expectations relevant to long-term yields, we use the OECD's two-year-ahead projections for inflation and GDP growth in our equations. Finally, we use the OECD calculations of the primary and structural balance, rather than the overall balance, as measure of the fiscal balance. The primary balance excludes interest payments, thus reducing endogeneity with respect to interest rates, and the structural balance measure seeks to exclude the effects of deviations of output from potential.

A second issue that arises in estimating the effect of fiscal balances on interest rates is the relatively subtle effect they appear to exert over short time periods, as noted in the introduction. Although Laubach, Engen and Hubbard, and others have identified significant effects for the United States, results for individual foreign countries have been less consistent. Chinn and Frankel (2005) and Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) address this problem by pooling countries into panel data sets, thereby increasing the number of observations available to identify fiscal effects, albeit at the expense of imposing the restriction that these fiscal effects are the same across countries. In our research, we verify that time series analysis of individual countries do not yield precise estimates of the impact of fiscal variables on interest rates, and focus on panel regression estimates.

A third issue arises specifically in the context of the panel data approach. In principle, governments running larger fiscal deficits would be considered less creditworthy and thus have to pay higher interest rates. However, it is also true that if governments are considered more creditworthy for other reasons--their established record of timely repayment, the growth performance of their economy, or their political stability--they will be charged lower interest rates by the market. This, in turn, could lead them to expand their deficits as a result, leading to a negative correlation between deficits and interest rates rather than the positive correlation that would be generally assumed. Accordingly, the simultaneous correlation of both interest rates and fiscal performance with an omitted variable--underlying perceptions of creditworthiness--could bias estimates away from finding a fiscal effect on interest rates. This is apparent in Figures 6 and 7, which show no apparent relationships between the levels of fiscal balances and debts and the levels of long-term bond yields. (Recall that Figures 4 and 5 focused on changes in these variables between 2006 and 2009.) To address this problem, we use country-specific fixed effects in our model, so that estimates of fiscal effects essentially are based on the changes in fiscal variables over time rather than comparisons across country averages.3

Finally, over the last several decades, interest rates around the world have trended downward, as evidenced in Figure 3. No consensus on the explanation for this downtrend exists, but analysts point to several possible factors: declines in inflation and inflation uncertainty, the effect of the global saving glut in increasing the availability of capital, and demographic changes enhancing the demand for long-term safe assets. To control for these factors, we introduce fixed period effects into our model estimation.

III.  Basic Methodology and Results

Methodology

Table 1 summarizes the specification of our core model. Each regression is represented by a separate column. The data are annual, and all data (including projections) are drawn from the December editions of the OECD's Economic Outlook Database. (See data appendix for details.) The dependent variable in all cases is the long-term (usually 10 year) interest rate on government bonds during the fourth quarter of the year--this timing is designed to coincide with the calculation and dissemination of the OECD's two-year projections each December. The control variables include: a short-term interest rate (usually the three-month interbank rate) averaged over the fourth quarter; the lagged dependent variable, introduced to account for persistence in the long-term yield; the two-year ahead projected rate of real GDP growth; the two-year ahead projected rate of CPI inflation; and the constant term and fixed period and country effects, not shown. This selection of control variables is broadly similar to that employed by Warnock and Warnock (2006), albeit without the data on foreign capital inflows that represent the focus of their analysis.

The OECD's two-year-ahead projections of four different measures of fiscal performance are utilized and included separately in the equations: gross government debt: net government debt, which subtracts the value of government assets; the primary balance, which excludes interest payments; and the structural balance, which excludes estimated effects on fiscal performance of deviations of GDP from its potential level. We follow the lead of most researchers in entering debt and deficit variables separately into the equations, as their multicollinearity reduces the precision of the estimates. However, we also estimate specifications incorporating both types of variables simultaneously (Table 11).

In all cases, the model is estimated over the period 1988 through 2007. The starting point of the sample is dictated by data availability. The end-point was chosen to precede most of the global financial crisis, and also to allow two years of post-estimation-sample data to be used for out-of-sample evaluation. Equations 1 through 4, labeled "Full panel," were estimated using data for 19 OECD countries.4 Equations 5 through 8 used data only for the G-7 economies.

Results

By and large, the estimation results are consistent with our expectations and statistically significant. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are reasonably modest, in the .3 to .4 range, suggesting that other variables are explaining most of the variation in long-term interest rates. The coefficients on the short-term interest rate, inflation, and GDP growth are all positive and significant. Finally, the coefficients on the fiscal balance and debt variables are of the appropriate sign and statistically significant.

In their panel data study of OECD countries, Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) found effects of debt on interest rates only for countries with above-average levels of debt. Our finding of a straightforward linear relationship between fiscal debt and interest rates may owe to our use of projected rather than actual debt levels. We also find fiscal effects in the G-7 countries to be considerably larger than those in the OECD more generally. This could reflect that bond yields in the G-7 countries may be more market-driven than those in some of the smaller, less advanced OECD economies.

Reassuringly, our estimates of the magnitude of fiscal effects, especially in the G-7 economies, are broadly in line with those of previous researchers. For example, Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) find that a percentage point rise in the debt/GDP ratio boosts forward yields on the order of 3-4 basis points. For the G-7 countries, we find that a one percentage point rise in the net debt ratio boosts yields by 2 basis points in the long run.5 Similarly, Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) find that a one percentage point rise in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP boosts yields some 19 - 29 basis points, while our estimate for the G-7 countries of the long-run effect of a rise in the primary and structural balances is about 15 basis points.

The smaller fiscal effects on interest rates estimated in our panel compared with the U.S. times series regressions in Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) do not seem attributable to larger effects in the United States than in other countries. We re-estimated the equations shown in Table 1, but without data for the United States, and the results were broadly similar. More likely, the difference reflects that the latter researchers use a forward yield, whereas we use a current 10-year yield. As the near-term part of the term structure of interest rates is probably less responsive to fiscal surprises than farther out on the curve, the current 10-year yield does not move as much as the forward yield.

IV.  Alternative Specifications and Robustness Tests

Contemporaneous Independent Variables

In our baseline regressions most independent variables, including GDP growth, inflation, and fiscal variables, are included as two-year ahead projections under the assumption that long-term interest rates are impacted more by prospective fiscal policy and economic conditions than current conditions. In order to test the importance and accuracy of this assumption, we reran our baseline regressions with current rather than projected variables.

As reported in Table 2, current GDP and inflation generally do not have a significant impact on long-term yields (particularly in the equations with debt measures), suggesting that long-term macroeconomic prospects are more important for the determination of long-term yields than current economic conditions. The coefficients on the current levels of debt (both net and gross) are for the most part not significantly different from zero. Current fiscal balance variables largely remain significant, but with slightly smaller coefficients than in the regressions in Table 1. The continued significance of the fiscal balances likely reflects the persistence of balances and the subsequent tight correlation of current and prospective balances.

Five-year Five-year Forward Interest Rates

As mentioned previously, one difference between our approach and that of Laubach (2009) is our use of the current 10-year yield as the dependent variable versus Laubach's use of five-year forward yields. By cutting off the front-end of the term structure, Laubach was attempting to look at the non-cyclical component of long-term rates. By using the current ten-year rate we have implicitly included the front-end of the term structure in our analysis.

Using a smaller sample of countries for which we have the five-year five-year forward yield (that is, the five-year yields expected to prevail five years ahead), we examine the importance of this difference in dependent variables in Table 3. For comparison, the first four columns of Table 5 repeat our baseline regressions with the smaller sample of countries but still using the 10-year yield, while the last four columns report results with the five-year five-year forward yields. We find that the estimated fiscal impact is not much different, although the coefficients are no longer significant. One thing to note is that with the forward interest rates, the short-term rate is no longer significant, as might be expected given that the near-end of the term structure is no longer relevant. All told, the use of forward yields does not seem essential to identify fiscal effects on bond yields, at least for this multi-country sample.

Removing Inflation from the Control Variables

As discussed earlier, one possible channel through which increased fiscal deficits and debt can impact interest rates is by increasing inflation expectations. Thus, including projected inflation as an independent variable could potentially lead us to underestimate the impact of the fiscal variables as a portion of the estimated impact of inflation on yields may in fact be attributable to fiscal policy.

However, this does not appear to be the case. As reported in Table 4, removing projected inflation from the regression generally decreases the size of the coefficients on the fiscal variables relative to our baseline regression results in Table 1. The lower estimated fiscal coefficients argue against inflation expectations being an important channel for the transmission of fiscal policy into interest rates and instead suggest that the cyclical correlation of low inflation and fiscal policy expansion has historically outweighed any effect that fiscal policy may have on inflation expectations.

The impact of fiscal policy on inflation expectations is tested directly in Table 5, which reports results from regressions with the OECD's two-year ahead projected inflation as the dependent variable. The fiscal balance variables are not significant determinants of expected inflation. Some specifications with fiscal debt positions do have significant coefficients, but with the wrong sign.

Removing GDP and Short-term Interest Rates from the Control Variables

As noted earlier, the endogeneity of fiscal positions, GDP growth, and interest rates with respect to the business cycle may give rise to a spurious positive correlation between fiscal balances and bond yields, even though, absent cyclical variations, improved fiscal positions should be associated with lower yields. Therefore, to control for cyclical effects in our baseline estimations (Table 1), we added short-term interest rates and projections of GDP growth as explanatory variables. However, this may have the effect of biasing downward the coefficient on fiscal positions, because it shuts down a mechanism by which fiscal expansion, for example, may affect bond yields: by providing macroeconomic stimulus that pushes up GDP growth and short-term interest rates.

Accordingly, Table 6 examines the impact on our regression results of not including GDP growth or short-term rates as control variables. The coefficients are in general a bit smaller and less significant than those in Table 1, suggesting that the endogenity of GDP growth and short-term rates to fiscal policy is not downwardly biasing our original estimates.

Non-linearities

Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004), among others, suggest that the impact of fiscal variables on interest rates is non-linear: these variables exert little effect on yields when fiscal performance is good, but a greater effect when performance is poor and investors are more concerned about the future fiscal outlook. We test for this possibility in Table 7 by augmenting our baseline regressions with squared terms on the fiscal variables (adjusted to preserve the sign of the original non-squared variable). The signs on the squared terms generally have the wrong sign. Rather than intensifying the impact of a deficit or debt as might be expected, the squared terms generally have the opposite sign of the straight fiscal variables, implying that the impact on the interest rate becomes more muted as the level of deficits and debt increase. Accordingly, while the non-linearity hypothesis seems plausible, it receives little support from our data.

Country-Specific Time Series Regressions

Our methodology raises the question of whether the panel data regressions unduly restrict coefficients to be the same across countries, and whether it might be better to model countries separately. Tables 8 and 9 report the results of time series regressions for individual G7 countries, examining the effects of net debt and the structural balance respectively. For the time series regressions we include a time trend in order to capture the downward trend in interest rates over the estimation period. The results are generally weak, as coefficients often have the wrong sign or are insignificant, suggesting that cross-country variation is important for identifying the fiscal impact. Looking at the regression results, the results are strongest for Italy in terms of the impact of net debt. The coefficients on the structural balance have the correct sign, and are quite large in a number of cases; however, they are insignificant with the exception of France.

The Impact of Foreign Fiscal Policy

The advent of very large fiscal deficits globally raises the concern that bond yields in particular countries may rise not only because of the fiscal deterioration in those countries, but because of the pressure on global savings of fiscal deterioration in the rest of the world. Global capital flows make it possible that interest rates in any particular country are impacted not only by domestic fiscal policy but also by fiscal policy in other countries. The anticipated impact of foreign policy on domestic rates is contingent on the mechanism through which fiscal policy is affecting interest rates more broadly. If "crowding out" or "portfolio balance" are the operative transmission channels, then it seem likely that higher debt or deficits overseas would compete for domestic funds and drive up domestic interest rates independent of domestic fiscal policy. If instead, larger debt or deficits overseas lead to increased fears of a foreign default, i.e. higher foreign sovereign risk, it is possible that looser foreign fiscal policy could have a negative impact on domestic yields as investors seek the relative safety of domestic assets.

Table 10 examines the effect of foreign fiscal policy on domestic yields by augmenting the baseline regression with foreign fiscal variables; for each country, these are constructed as the sum of foreign (to that country) fiscal variables divided by the sum of foreign GDP. Unlike our baseline regressions, these regressions do not contain time fixed effects. As the foreign fiscal variables are similar across many of the countries in our sample, particularly for the smaller countries in our OECD panel, we dropped the time fixed effect to avoid problems of collinearity.

The results shown in Table 10 are mixed. The level of foreign debt does not appear to be important for the determination of domestic yields. The coefficients on foreign balances are significant but vary in sign across the primary balance and structural balance, with the foreign primary balance actually driving up domestic yields and the structural balance having a larger negative impact on domestic yields than the domestic structural balance. All told, the evidence does not provide strong support for the role of global fiscal measures in affecting bond yields.

V.  Model Simulations

Ex-post historical simulations

How well does the baseline model explain the actual evolution of interest rates? Using the coefficients from the basic panel regression with the G-7 sample estimated through 2000, we construct dynamic simulations of G7 interest rates going forward. Figure 8 shows the simulations using the model with net debt while Figure 9 uses the model with the structural deficit. In constructing the simulations we held our estimates of period and country fixed effects constant at their 2000 levels.

By and large, both of these models do a reasonable job of tracking actual movements in bond yields, particularly given that the figures display fully dynamic simulations implemented over lengthy time periods.6 To be sure, there are some sizeable errors by the end of the simulation period in a number of countries--Canada for the model using net debt, Italy for the model using the structural fiscal balances--but even in these cases, the models capture the broad contours of the interest rate paths. The key exception is the failure of the model with net debt to explain Japanese bond yields--it predicts substantial increases in these yields as net debt accumulated, whereas actual yields declined further. Consistent with many commentaries on this subject, it is clear that issuance of Japanese government debt does not boost required yields to anywhere near the same extent as in other countries. This may be due to the home bias of Japanese investors, the entrenched nature of deflation, or some other factor not captured by our model.

Projected impact of fiscal deterioration

Table 12 uses our econometric estimates to assess the marginal impact on G7 bond yields of the projected deterioration in the fiscal position between 2007 and 2015. The projections are derived from the October 2010 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO). They show increases in the net debt of the G7 countries ranging from only 9 percent of GDP for Canada to 72 percent for Japan. Changes in structural balances are more mixed, in the sense that relative to 2007, by 2015 they are projected to be somewhat higher (lower deficits) in the United Kingdom, a bit lower in Canada, Germany, and Italy, and considerably lower in Japan and the United States.

In assessing the effect of these projected changes in bond yields, we faced the challenge of reconciling our estimates for the effect of debt ratios on yields with our estimates for the effect of fiscal balances. In principle, changes in fiscal balances have implications for debt ratios, and vice-versa. Therefore, their movements are not independent, and one cannot simply add the estimated effect of changes in net debt to the estimated effect of changes in fiscal balances. Instead, and at the cost of some multicollinearity, we chose to estimate a set of equations that include both debt and balance measures as explanatory variables.

As shown in Table 11, the resultant coefficient estimates are generally smaller and often less statistically significant, as we would expect. Even so, the estimates are in the same ballpark as those shown in Table 1. Accordingly, to calculate the marginal effect on G7 bond yields of projected fiscal movements, we used the estimates shown in column 8, which are based on the net debt and structural balance measures. These calculations take into account not only the coefficients on those two variables, but also that on the lagged dependent variable, which captures the persistence of bond yields over time and their dynamic response to shocks.

Turning to the results shown in Table 12, for the United States, the rise in net debt and deterioration of the structural fiscal balance lead to a marginal effect on bond yields of 62 basis points, holding all else equal. This is not an alarmingly large effect, but at the same time, held over many years, it may be sufficient to reduce the pace of capital formation and thus economic growth by a material extent. The estimated effects on the bond yields of most other G7 countries are considerably smaller, as more progress in fiscal consolidation leads to smaller increases in debt.

Japan is the one exception, with the structural balance projected to deteriorate even more than in the United States, and the net debt projected to rise much more rapidly. As a result, fiscal deterioration pushes Japanese bond yields up 90 basis points. However, based on the failure of the model to track historical Japanese yields, as discussed above, we are inclined not to put much weight on these results.

The estimates for Japan offer a cautionary reminder about the limitations of this type of analysis. The regression allows county-specific differences in the level of interest rates, due to the inclusion of fixed country effects, but sets the marginal impact equal across countries. It is possible that idiosyncratic aspects of the Japanese situation, including country-specific institutional arrangements might impact the marginal impact of fiscal variables. Certainly up to this point, Japan has been able to finance its large debt at low interests, a feature captured in the model by the country fixed effect, and it is possible that the institutional arrangements that have kept Japanese interest rates low in the past will continue to operate, a possibility ignored by the model forecast.

VI.  Conclusion

Using a large panel dataset of OECD countries, we have identified a robust and significant impact of fiscal performance on long-term bond yields. Based on our estimates, by 2015, yields could be 60 basis points higher in the United States than would have been the case in the absence of the projected increases in debts and deficits since the advent of the financial crisis. Excluding Japan, whose bond yields are not well-explained by our model, bond yields in other G7 countries would be up by lesser amounts. All told, these estimates point to a material, but not overwhelmingly large, impact of the global fiscal deterioration on bond yields.

In addition to assessing the magnitude of the effect of fiscal performance on bond yields, we also explored the various channels through which that effect might have occurred. We are inclined to discount the possibility that changes in fiscal performance affected yields through their effect on perceived default risk, as the G7 governments in our sample were considered highly creditworthy. 7 Our econometric results provide no evidence for the view that concerns about inflationary effects underlie the linkage between fiscal deficits and bond yields: we identify such a linkage even controlling for projected inflation; removing projected inflation as an explanatory variable does not affect our estimation results; and there is little evidence of a direct effect of fiscal performance on inflation expectations in our sample. Finally, we found no support for the concern that bond yields might experience an especially large increase because fiscal deficits around the world had all widened simultaneously--once a country's own fiscal performance is taken into account, the fiscal performance of the remaining countries in the sample had no robust, significant effect on that country's bond yields.

Bibliography

Ardagna S., F. Caselli, and T. Lane (2004) "Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries" CEPR Discussion Paper #4661

Aisen A. and D. Hauner (2008) "Budget Deficits and Interest Rates: A Fresh Perspective" IMF Working Paper WP/08/42.

Attinasi M, C. Checherita, and C. Nickel (2009) "What Explains the Surge in Euro Area Sovereign Spreads During the Financial Crisis of 2007 - 2009" ECB Working Paper #1131.

Chinn, M. and J. Frankel (2005) "The Euro Area and World Interest Rates" unpublished working paper.

Engen, E. and R. G. Hubbard (2005) "Government Debt and Interest Rates" in M. Gertler and K. Rogoff, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, Cambridge: MIT Press 2005

International Monetary Fund (2009), "Companion Paper--The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies after the 2008 Crisis," Washington, DC, March 6.

Laubach T. (2009) "New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt", Journal of the European Economic Association 7 p 858-885.

Nickel C., P. Rother, and J. Rulke (2009) "Fiscal Variables and Bond Spreads: Evidence from Eastern European Countries and Turkey" ECB Working Paper #1101.

OECD (2009), "Chapter 3: The Effectiveness and Scope of Fiscal Stimulus" in OECD Economic Outlook Interim Report, March.

Warnock, F.E. and V. C. Warnock (2006), "International Capital Flows and U.S. Interest Rates," NBER Working Paper 12560, October.

Data Appendix

All data, with the exception of forward interest rates, were taken from the OECD's December Economic Outlook starting with the 1988 edition.

Long-Term Interest Rates: For most countries the long-term rate was the 10 -year government bond yield. The rates were daily averages, with the exception of Canada (average of last Wednesday of each month), Japan, Australia, Denmark (end of month rates), France, and Ireland (last Friday of each month).

Short-Term Interest Rates: For most countries the short-term rate recorded in the Economic Outlook is the 3-month interbank interest rate. For Greece, prior to 2001 the 12-month Treasury rate was used. The rates are daily averages, with the exception of Denmark and Ireland, which are the average of the end-of-month rate, and Canada, which is the average of Wednesday rates.

Five-Year Five-Year Forward Interest Rates: Kindly provided by Clara Vega.

GDP: Real GDP.

Inflation: As measured by the deflator for private consumption.

Gross Debt: General government gross financial liabilities.

Net Debt: General government net financial liabilities.

Primary Balance: General government primary balances through 2007. Sum of general government financial balances and general government net debt interest payments for 2008 and 2009.

Structural Balance: General government structural balance through 2001. Cyclically-adjusted general government primary balance from 2002 to 2008. General government underlying primary balance in 2009.

Figure 1. Fiscal Balances for G-7 Countries

Figure 1: The title of the figure is Fiscal Balances for G-7 Countries. There are seven panels, all of which show the fiscal balance for a different OECD country. All panels are measured as a percent of that specific country’s GDP. All panels go from 1980 through 2010, the last year being a projection. For the y-axis, the graphs range from -15 to 5.
The first panel is the United States. The balance for the United States starts stays roughly between 0 and -5 percent up until the mid 90s. The line then slopes up to peak in the early 2000s at a little about 0 percent. The line then moves down and dips to about -5 percent but then peaks back up again sometime after 2005 to an amount around -2.5 percent. The line then slopes down heavily to below -10 percent and is projected to bound back up a bit above -10 percent in 2010.
The second panel, to the right of the US graph, shows the fiscal position of Germany. The rate for Germany roughly stays between 0 and -5 percent throughout the time series except has a very quick, severe dip in the mid 90s to about -10 percent. The graph for Germany, like the panels for all other countries, shows a quick dip at the period of the global financial collapse.
The third panel is the United Kingdom. The line mostly travels up from 1980 to around 1990, peaking at about 0 percent. The line then travels down for a few years, bottoming out somewhere between -5 and -10 percent. The line then travels up until the mid 2000s, peaking at a little below 5 percent. The line then slopes down for a few years and stops at around -3 percent and roughly flattens out for a few years. In the late 2000s, the line takes a severe dip down to a value only slightly about -15 percent. The line predicts a slight movement up in the year 2010.
The fourth panel is for Japan. The line mostly climbs up from 1980 to the early 90s, starting at a value of about -5% and peaking at a value of around 2.5 percent. The graph then mostly travels down in the 90s, bottoming out at a value below -10%. The line spikes up quickly, and jumps around throughout the 2000s, mostly with a positive slope. The line has a quick downward tick at the beginning of the recession and is predicted to go even lower in 2010 to a value slightly above -10 percent.
The fifth panel shows Italy. The value for Italy dips in the early 80s to slightly below -10 percent. The graph then mostly climbs to peak at a value slightly below 0 percent in the early 2000s. The value dips and then stays mostly flat until the late 2000s where it peaks up to its early 2000 level. At the start of the recession, the value quickly slops down, and then remains flat through 2010 at around -5 percent.
The sixth panel is for Canada. The line starts at a little above -5 percent and mostly slopes down until the mid 80s. The graph then hops up to peak in the late 80s at slightly above a value of -5 percent. It then slopes down to a value a bit above -10 percent. The line then mostly climbs to a value of about 3 percent in the early 2000s. The line moves around a bit but stays mostly flat at about 2 percent until right before the recession. The line then sharply declines to about -5 percent. The value is expected to tick up a little bit in 2010.
The final panel is France. The line starts at around 0 percent. It stays mostly flat until the early 90s, where it dips down to below -5 percent. It then climbs up until the early 2000s, peaking at a value of a little below 0 percent. It then stays mostly flat, with a heavy dip down right at the recession. It dips to a value a bit above -10 percent, and is expected to tick up a bit in 2010.

Figure 2. Government Net Debt for G-7 Countries

Figure 2: The tile of the Figure is Government Net Debt for G-7 Countries. There are seven panels, each showing a different G-7 country. The panels display net debt as a percent of GDP for each country. The graphs go from 1980 to 2010 on the x-axis. For the y-axis, the range goes from -10 to about 120.
The first panel is the United States. The net debt for the country is mostly climbing throughout the time series. It stays at a value slightly above 20 percent and finishes at a projected value just below 80 percent.
The second panel shows Germany. The net debt for Germany also mostly climbs throughout the time series. The value starts at slightly above 0 percent and climbs to end at a projected value slightly above 50 percent.
The third panel is the United Kingdom. The value begins at about 30 percent and stays roughly flat until the late 80s. It then dips down to below 0 percent and stays there until the early 90s. The value then begins to climb and finishes at a projected value of around 70 percent.
The fourth panel is Japan. Its initial value is about 20 percent of GDP and it mostly climbs throughout the time series. It ends at a projected value of slightly above 110 percent in 2010.
The fifth panel is Italy. It begins at a value slightly below 50 percent. It mostly climbs throughout the series. In the late 90s, it peaks around 110 percent and the falls a little bit, where it remains fairly flat, until it closes at a projected value of a little below 110 percent.
The sixth panel is for Canada. The line starts at around 20 percent of GDP and climbs until the mid 90s to peak at a value a bit below 80 percent. The line then trails down until the late 2000s to a value of about 20 percent. It then climbs up and is expected to continue climbing to somewhere between 30 and 40 percent of GDP in 2010.
The seventh panel is for France. The value starts a bit below 0 percent of GDP. It mostly climbs throughout the entire time series. It has a sharp jump up in the late 2000s and is projected to be somewhere between 50 to 80 percent of GDP in 2010.

Figure 3. Long-Term Interest Rates for G-7 Countries

Figure 3: The title of the figure is titled Long-term Interest Rates for G-7 Countries. The panels go from 1980 to 2009. The y-axis is measured in percentage points. The range on the y-axis is from 2 to 22, except for Japan which goes from 0 to 22.
The first panel is the United States. The line starts at about 12 percent and is very bumpy throughout the entire time series. However, overall, its slope is mostly negative. It ends at a value of around 3 percent.
The second panel is for Germany. The series starts at a bit under the 10 percent mark and travels down at most points. The series ends at a bit above 2 percent.
The third panel is the UK. The series starts at around 14 percent. It dips slightly and then ticks up quickly to a value of about 16 percent. The series then mostly travels downward until it closes at a value of about 3 percent.
The fourth panel is for Japan. The interest rate value starts somewhere between 8 and 10 percent. It climbs down until somewhere in the 90s, where it peaks up to a value of 8 percent, after falling to a low of somewhere near 4 percent. After this peak, the series mostly trails down until the late 90s where it stops at a value slightly above 0 percent. The series stays roughly flat through the rest of the years shown.
The fifth panel is for Italy. The series starts with a value of around 14 percent and then peaks up a few years later to nearly 22 percent. The series then trails mostly downward. There are points in the late 80s and mid 90s where the series climbs a bit. Around 1995, the series takes a steep dive down to somewhere around 3 percent. The series climbs a little bit mostly stays flat around this value through 2009.
The sixth panel is for Canada. The line starts somewhere between 10 and 14 percent. It peaks in the early 80s somewhere near 18 percent but then mostly slopes downward for the rest of the series. It finishes out at a value of a bit above 2 percent.
The seventh panel is for France. It starts at a value of 14 percent and peaks up to a bit below 18 percent in the early 80s. It then mostly travels downward for the rest of the time shown and finishes at a value of slightly above 2 percent.

Figure 4. Change in Long Term Interest Rate and Fiscal Balances

Figure 4: This figure is a scatter plot. The title of the graph is Change in Long Term Interest Rate and Fiscal Balance. The x-axis is titled Change in Projected Fiscal Balance 2007-2009. The x-axis goes from -14 to 2. The y-axis is titled Change in Q4 Long-Term Interest Rate 2007-2009. The scale for the y-axis is -1.2 to 0.6. The figure shows two different trend lines. One shows the trend line associated with all of the values. The equation for this line is y=-0.0675x – 1.0645. It has an R squared value of 0.1722. Its t-statistic is -1.88. The second line shows what happens to the correlation when Ireland and Greece are removed from the dataset. The equation for this second line is y=0.0089x – 0.6709. The R squared value is 0.0085. The t-statistic is 0.36.

Figure 5. Change in Long Term Interest Rate and Net Debt

Figure 5: This figure is a scatter plot. The title of the graph is Change in Long Term Interest Rate and Net Debt. The x-axis is titled Change in Projected Net 2007-2009. The x-axis goes from 0 to 60. The y-axis is titled Change in Q4 Long-Term Interest Rate 2007-2009. The scale for the y-axis is -1.2 to 0.6. The figure shows two different trend lines. One shows the trend line associated with all of the values. The equation for this line is y=0.0184x – 1.0053. It has an R squared value of 0.2561. Its t-statistic is 2.42. The second line shows what happens to the correlation when Ireland and Greece are removed from the dataset. The equation for this second line is y=-0.0018x-0.6923. The R squared value is 0.0058. The t-statistic is 0.30.

Figure 6. Long Term Interest Rate and Fiscal Balances

Figure 6: This figure is a scatter plot. The title of the graph is Long Term Interest Rate and Fiscal Balances. The x-axis is titled Level of Fiscal Balance 2009. The x-axis goes from -15 to 15. The y-axis is titled Long-Term Interest Rate 2009q4. The scale for the y-axis is 0 to 6. The figure shows two different trend lines. One shows the trend line associated with all of the values. The equation for this line is y=0.0044x + 3.8541. It has an R squared value of 0.006. Its t-statistic is 0.098. The second line shows what happens to the correlation when Ireland and Greece are removed from the dataset. The equation for this second line is y=0.0476x+3.9282. The R squared value is 0.0604. The t-statistic is 0.982.

Figure 7. Long Term Interest Rate and Net Debt

Figure 7: This figure is a scatter plot. The title of the graph is Long Term Interest Rate and Net Debt. The x-axis is titled Level of Net Debt/GDP 2011 (Projected). The x-axis goes from -150 to 150. The y-axis is titled Long-Term Interest Rate 2009q4. The scale for the y-axis is 0 to 6. The figure shows two different trend lines. One shows the trend line associated with all of the values. The equation for this line is y=-0.004x + 3.977. It has an R squared value of 0.0623. Its t-statistic is -1.06. The second line shows what happens to the correlation when Ireland and Greece are removed from the dataset. The equation for this second line is y=-0.0058x + 3.8943. The R squared value is 0.1438. The t-statistic is -1.59.

Figure 8. Net Debt Dynamic Simulations for G-7 Countries

Figure 8: The figure is titled Net Debt Dynamic Simulations for G-7 Countries. There are two lines for each graph. One is a solid line which shows the actual long-term interest rate for each country. The second one is a dashed red line which shows the dynamic simulation for each panel. The x-axis goes from 2000 to 2009. The y-axis goes from 2 to 6 and is measured in percentage points. The only exception is Japan, where the y-axis range is from 0 to 4.
The first panel is for the United States. The actual long-term interest rate starts somewhere between 5 and 6 percent. It trends down to about 4 percent in 2002. It begins to mostly climb until 2007, where is drops down to a bit over 3 percent. It ticks back up in 2009 and is somewhere between 3 and 4 percent. The simulation starts at the same point and goes down until 2002, where it flattens until about 2004. It then climbs up until 2006, where it then trends down through 2009. It ends up predicting a slightly higher interest rate than is actually observed in 2009.
The second panel is for Germany. The actual interest rate series starts out slightly above 5 percent. It trails mostly downward to hit a low of somewhere between 3 and 4 percent in 2005. It then climbs up to about 4 percent in 2007. It then tracks back down, ending at a value of a bit above 3 percent. The dynamic simulation line follows a similar pattern except predicts a slightly lower value for each interest rate from 2000 until 2004. The simulation also ticks up in 2004 as opposed to 2005. The simulation also begins to start tracking down again in 2008, as opposed to 2009. The simulation predicts roughly the same exact value for the 2009 interest rate as what actually occurred.
The third panel is for the United Kingdom. The actual rate starts at slightly above 5 percent. It falls through 2002 then peaks up again to a bit above 5 percent in 2003. It falls again through 2005, turns back up through 2007 and then falls to a final value somewhere a bit below 4 percent. The dynamic simulation starts at around the same predicts lower than observed interested rates from the beginning through 2004. The line’s slope is positive from 2002 to 2007. From the period past 2004, the simulation predicts slightly higher interest rates than are observed. The line peaks somewhere between 5 and 6 percent in 2007 and then sharply turns downward. It ends up predicting a slightly lower value than is actually observed in 2009.
The fourth panel is for Japan. The actual interest rate starts at a bit below 2 percent. It dips to a value of about 1 percent in 2002 and then climbs a bit. The value stays somewhere between 1 and 2 percent for the rest of the time series. The dynamic simulation starts at about 2 percent but then climbs all the way to a bit under 4 percent at the end of the series (with mostly a positive slop throughout the years shown).
The fifth panel shows Italy. The actual interest rate starts at somewhere between 5 and 6 percent. It mostly trails straight down until 2005, where it bottoms out at somewhere between 3.5 and 4 percent. It then goes back until it hits a value somewhere around 4.5 in 2008. Finally, it dips down to close at a value of about 4 percent. The dynamic simulation for Italy mostly tracks the actual series through 2003. Then, it predicts higher than observed values through 2007 (staying somewhere between 4.5 and 5 percent throughout this time). Finally, the two lines cross in 2008 and the simulation predicts a slightly lower value in 2009 than was observed.
The sixth panel shows Canada. The actual interest rate line stars at a value somewhere a bit below 6 percent. It mostly trails down until 2005, where it flattens out at around 4 percent. It roughly stays here until 2007. In 2008, the value observed is a bit above 3 percent, where it remains in 2009. The simulation starts at about the same point as the actual interest rate series. The simulation also trails down until 2005 but predicts lower values for all periods (ending in 2005 at around 3 percent). The line then ticks back up, hitting a value of around 3.5 percent in 2007. The simulation then trails down to end at a value slightly above 2 percent in 2009.
The seventh panel shows France. The actual interest rate series starts a bit above 5 percent. It mostly falls until 2003, hitting a value of about 4.5 percent. Its slope then turns much more negative, hitting about 3.5 percent in 2005. It then ticks up to a bit over 4 percent in 2007. Finally, it turns down again, hitting a value of around 3.5 percent in 2009. The dynamic simulation roughly tracks the actual series through 2002, then predicts a lower than observed value in 2003. It mostly trails up until 2007, predicting slightly higher than observed interest rates throughout this period. In 2007, the simulation predicts a value slightly below 5 percent. It then ticks down, predicting a slightly higher than observed value for the interest rate in 2009.

Figure 9. Structural Deficit Dynamic Simulations for G-7 Countries

Figure 9: The figure is titled Structural Deficit Dynamic Simulations for G-7 Countries. There are two lines for each graph. One is a solid line which shows the actual long-term interest rate for each country. The second one is a dashed red line which shows the dynamic simulation for each panel. The x-axis goes from 2000 to 2009. The y-axis goes from 2 to 6 and is measured in percentage points. The only exception is Japan, where the y-axis range is from 0 to 4.
The first panel is for the United States. The actual long-term interest rate starts somewhere between 5 and 6 percent. It trends down to about 4 percent in 2002. It begins to mostly climb until 2007, where is drops down to a bit over 3 percent. It ticks back up in 2009 and is somewhere between 3 and 4 percent. The simulation starts at about the same point and goes down to a value below 4 percent in 2001. It stays roughly flat through 2002. It ticks back up and crosses the actual interest rate series in 2004. It then predicts higher than observed values until 2009 where it predicts roughly the same value as observed.
The second panel is for Germany. The actual interest rate series starts out slightly above 5 percent. It trails mostly downward to hit a low of somewhere between 3 and 4 percent in 2005. It then climbs up to about 4 percent in 2007. It then tracks back down, ending at a value of a bit above 3 percent. The dynamic simulation line follows a similar pattern except predicts a slightly lower value for each interest rate from 2000 to 2004. The simulation also ticks up in 2004 as opposed to 2005, predicting roughly the same interest rate as observed in the latter year. The simulation roughly tracks the series through 2007, although predicts a slightly higher value than observed in that year. The simulation then travels downward to predict a slightly lower value than observed in 2009.
The third panel is for the United Kingdom. The actual rate starts at slightly above 5 percent. It falls through 2002 then peaks up again to a bit above 5 percent in 2003. It falls again through 2005, turns back up through 2007 and then falls to a final value somewhere a bit below 4 percent. The dynamic simulation line follows a similar pattern except predicts a slightly lower value for each interest rate from 2000 until 2002. The simulation ticks up in 2002 and crosses the actual interest rate series roughly in 2003. It then predicts higher than observed values through 2007, where it peaks at a bit below 6 percent. It then ticks down, predicting a slightly lower value than is observed in 2009.
The fourth panel is for Japan. The actual interest rate starts at a bit below 2 percent. It dips to a value of about 1 percent in 2002 and then climbs a bit. The value stays somewhere between 1 and 2 percent for the rest of the time series. The dynamic simulation starts at roughly the same point as the actual series. It then dips down to slightly above 0 percent in 2001 and stays roughly flat through 2002. It then ticks up to cross the actual series in 2003. The simulation predicts higher than observed interest rates until 2007, where it crosses the actual series again. It predicts a lower interest rate than observed in 2008, a value of about 1 percent. It then ticks up to predicts a slightly higher than observed value in 2009.
The fifth panel shows Italy. The actual interest rate starts at somewhere between 5 and 6 percent. It mostly trails straight down until 2005, where it bottoms out at somewhere between 3.5 and 4 percent. It then goes back until it hits a value somewhere around 4.5 in 2008. Finally, it dips down to close at a value of about 4 percent. The dynamic simulation for Italy mostly tracks the actual series through 2003. Then, it predicts higher than observed values through 2007 (staying roughly around 5 percent). Finally, the two lines cross around 2008 and the simulation predicts a value a substantial amount lower than actually observed in 2009 (approximately 3 percent).
The sixth panel shows Canada. The actual interest rate line stars at a value somewhere a bit below 6 percent. It mostly trails down until 2005, where it flattens out at around 4 percent. It roughly stays here until 2007. In 2008, the value observed is a bit above 3 percent, where it remains in 2009. The simulation starts above the actual series, at a value near 6 percent. It then goes down to about 4.5 percent in 2001. It ticks back up and follows the actual interest rate series fairly closely from 2002 to 2004. It then ticks back up and predicts higher then observed interest rate values through 2007, where it peaks at a value above 5 percent. It then goes downward and finishes with a slightly higher than observed value in 2009.
The seventh panel shows France. The actual interest rate series starts a bit above 5 percent. It mostly falls until 2003, hitting a value of about 4.5 percent. Its slope then turns much more negative, hitting about 3.5 percent in 2005. It then ticks up to a bit over 4 percent in 2007. Finally, it turns down again, hitting a value of around 3.5 percent in 2009. The dynamic simulation roughly tracks the actual series through 2002, then predicts a lower than observed value in 2003. It mostly trails up until 2007, predicting mostly a slightly higher than observed interest rates throughout this period. In 2007, the simulation predicts a value right around 5 percent. It then ticks down, predicting a slightly lower than observed value for the interest rate in 2009.

Table 1. Baseline Regressions

 Full Panel: 1Full Panel: 2Full Panel: 3Full Panel: 4G-7 Countries: 5G-7 Countries: 6G-7 Countries: 7G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.314
11.015
0.317
9.938
0.237
5.663
0.276
8.145
0.325
5.849
0.317
6.047
0.337
5.150
0.314
4.058
Long-term IR (lag)
0.379
8.233
0.365
7.244
0.445
7.767
0.305
7.025
0.369
3.582
0.338
3.293
0.379
3.616
0.257
2.922
GDP
0.091
1.683
0.104
1.690
0.086
1.666
0.110
2.059
0.285
2.873
0.268
2.865
0.320
2.918
0.231
2.755
Inflation
0.210
3.422
0.237
3.545
0.184
2.879
0.197
3.065
0.210
2.098
0.237
2.253
0.253
1.937
0.326
3.460
Gross Debt
0.004
2.436
 
 
 
0.010
3.142
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.004
2.135
 
 
 
0.012
3.376
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.035
-2.119
 
 
 
-0.108
-2.328
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.055
-2.430
 
 
 
-0.112
-2.462
#Obs
347
319
344
276
140
140
133
105
R^2
0.975
0.975
0.968
0.965
0.973
0.974
0.972
0.971
SER
0.449
0.447
0.457
0.348
0.494
0.486
0.498
0.379

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 2. Contemporaneous Independent Variables

 Full Panel: 1Full Panel: 2Full Panel: 3Full Panel: 4G-7 Countries: 5G-7 Countries: 6G-7 Countries: 7G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.310
10.005
0.322
9.688
0.231
5.600
0.287
8.156
0.283
4.741
0.287
4.807
0.293
4.445
0.265
3.296
Long-term IR(lag)
0.417
7.737
0.416
6.996
0.496
7.982
0.308
6.179
0.463
3.986
0.456
3.927
0.495
4.327
0.377
3.431
GDP
-0.006
-0.221
-0.005
-0.154
-0.022
-1.253
0.000
-0.021
-0.040
-0.779
-0.035
-0.736
0.014
0.309
0.018
0.399
Inflation
0.028
1.335
0.026
1.164
0.046
2.061
0.055
2.259
0.049
1.521
0.049
1.564
0.093
2.288
0.137
2.829
Gross Debt
0.001
0.585
 
 
 
0.003
1.223
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.002
0.875
 
 
 
0.005
1.793
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.022
-1.545
 
 
 
-0.077
-2.448
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.061
-3.350
 
 
 
-0.078
-2.501
        
#Obs
347
319
344
276
140
140
133
105
R^2
0.973
0.973
0.971
0.965
0.970
0.970
0.970
0.967
SER
0.466
0.470
0.466
0.351
0.525
0.523
0.513
0.406

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
All variables are contemporaneous
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 3. 5-Year Forward Interest Rates

 G-5 Countries 10-Year Rate: 1G-5 Countries 10-Year Rate: 2G-5 Countries 10-Year Rate: 3G-5 Countries 10-Year Rate: 4G-5 Countries Forward Rate: 5G-5 Countries Forward Rate: 6G-5 Countries Forward Rate: 7G-5 Countries Forward Rate: 8
Short-term IR
0.238
5.567
0.235
5.726
0.224
4.804
0.187
3.526
0.048
0.907
0.040
0.792
0.080
1.526
0.100
1.074
Long-term IR(lag)
0.383
5.160
0.361
4.900
0.379
4.747
0.464
4.265
0.560
5.845
0.540
5.588
0.621
5.659
0.513
4.100
GDP
0.174
3.215
0.162
3.080
0.159
2.718
0.107
1.747
0.122
1.284
0.116
1.290
0.169
1.577
0.251
1.741
Inflation
0.063
1.105
0.083
1.375
0.040
0.692
0.184
2.682
0.112
1.206
0.127
1.385
0.126
1.310
0.069
0.454
Gross Debt
0.005
2.947
 
 
 
0.005
1.517
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.006
3.040
 
 
 
0.006
1.564
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.028
-1.428
 
 
 
-0.060
-1.472
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.069
-2.234
 
 
 
-0.083
-1.538
#Obs
95
95
90
70
95
95
90
70
R^2
0.989
0.989
0.988
0.984
0.957
0.958
0.959
0.949
SER
0.291
0.289
0.299
0.281
0.510
0.508
0.500
0.515

Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
5 cross-sections and 19 periods (1988 - 2006).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G5 include Canada, Germany, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 4. Removing Inflation

 Full Panel: 1Full Panel: 2Full Panel: 3Full Panel: 4G-7 Countries: 5G-7 Countries: 6G-7 Countries: 7G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.321
10.133
0.331
9.191
0.233
5.216
0.285
7.666
0.345
5.650
0.339
5.786
0.350
4.893
0.343
3.842
Long-term IR(lag)
0.395
7.949
0.394
6.970
0.476
7.748
0.301
6.699
0.394
3.638
0.373
3.414
0.418
3.809
0.270
2.856
GDP
0.059
1.031
0.075
1.161
0.081
1.551
0.109
1.964
0.249
2.650
0.224
2.535
0.267
2.481
0.242
2.857
Inflation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gross Debt
0.002
1.330
 
 
 
0.009
3.023
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.002
1.261
 
 
 
0.011
3.125
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.024
-1.575
 
 
 
-0.092
-2.003
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.047
-2.106
 
 
 
-0.095
-2.235
#Obs
347
319
344
276
140
140
133
105
R^2
0.973
0.973
0.970
0.964
0.972
0.972
0.970
0.968
SER
0.465
0.468
0.470
0.356
0.506
0.501
0.514
0.402

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 5. Projected Inflation as Dependent Variable

 Full Panel: 1Full Panel: 2Full Panel: 3Full Panel: 4G-7 Countries: 5G-7 Countries: 6G-7 Countries: 7G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.047
1.431
0.054
1.476
0.047
1.699
0.063
2.327
0.098
2.583
0.100
2.623
0.091
2.348
0.060
1.120
Inflation (lag)
0.348
4.485
0.352
4.141
0.680
8.238
0.473
6.638
0.370
2.902
0.366
2.883
0.356
2.768
0.355
3.240
GDP
-0.044
-0.560
-0.005
-0.056
0.046
0.608
0.031
0.435
-0.063
-0.488
-0.071
-0.558
-0.097
-0.781
0.057
0.490
Gross Debt
-0.005
-2.226
 
 
 
-0.001
-0.207
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
-0.004
-1.977
 
 
 
-0.002
-0.636
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.009
-0.270
 
 
 
0.032
1.015
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.020
-0.907
 
 
 
0.028
1.055
#Obs
334
305
353
281
133
133
133
105
R^2
0.805
0.802
0.866
0.848
0.880
0.880
0.881
0.857
SER
0.569
0.545
0.653
0.409
0.518
0.517
0.515
0.391

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 19 periods (1989 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 6. Removing GDP and the Short IR

 Full Panel: 1Full Panel: 2Full Panel: 3Full Panel: 4G-7 Countries: 5G-7 Countries: 6G-7 Countries: 7G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Long-term IR(lag)
0.671
13.783
0.642
11.176
0.680
13.802
0.564
9.948
0.677
6.044
0.646
5.691
0.690
5.915
0.529
4.777
GDP
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inflation
0.255
3.083
0.303
3.266
0.163
2.329
0.249
3.142
0.291
2.084
0.309
2.147
0.281
1.719
0.407
3.156
Gross Debt
0.001
0.749
 
 
 
0.003
1.366
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.004
1.941
 
 
 
0.007
2.171
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.014
-0.740
 
 
 
-0.041
-0.860
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.049
-1.866
 
 
 
-0.103
-1.943
#Obs
347
319
344
276
140
140
133
105
R^2
0.960
0.960
0.959
0.951
0.961
0.962
0.959
0.960
SER
0.567
0.564
0.551
0.414
0.592
0.584
0.600
0.441

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 7. Exploring Non-Linearities

 Full Panel: 1Full Panel: 2Full Panel: 3Full Panel: 4G-7 Countries: 5G-7 Countries: 6G-7 Countries: 7G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.312
11.022
0.323
10.139
0.247
5.928
0.276
8.038
0.353
6.163
0.315
5.882
0.338
5.118
0.269
3.471
Long-term IR(lag)
0.379
8.258
0.350
7.131
0.424
7.414
0.305
7.006
0.350
3.526
0.335
3.266
0.382
3.638
0.263
3.193
GDP
0.095
1.757
0.121
1.999
0.093
1.878
0.110
2.059
0.293
3.044
0.265
2.675
0.301
3.029
0.263
3.280
Inflation
0.207
3.343
0.258
3.802
0.195
3.018
0.196
3.091
0.193
1.933
0.238
2.264
0.244
1.852
0.335
3.488
Gross Debt
0.002
0.366
 
 
 
0.039
2.718
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.012
3.973
 
 
 
0.010
0.657
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.112
-4.154
 
 
 
-0.142
-1.765
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.052
-1.239
 
 
 
0.047
0.579
Gross Debt^2
0.00001
0.510
 
 
 
-0.0001
-2.319
 
 
 
Net Debt^2
 
-0.00006
-3.775
 
 
 
-0.00002
0.133
 
 
Primary^2
 
 
0.010
4.318
 
 
 
0.008
0.685
 
Structural^2
 
 
 
-0.001
-0.069
 
 
 
-0.030
-2.161
#Obs
347
319
344
276
140
140
133
105
R^2
0.975
0.976
0.973
0.965
0.975
0.974
0.972
0.974
SER
0.449
0.440
0.446
0.349
0.484
0.488
0.499
0.362

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 8. Time Series Regressions - Net Debt

 CanadaFranceGermanyItalyJapanUKUS
Short-term IR
0.368
2.071
0.089
1.125
0.136
1.382
0.666
4.486
0.477
8.160
0.371
3.560
0.313
2.212
Long-term IR(lag)
-0.066
-0.176
-0.058
-0.244
-0.110
-0.804
-0.004
-0.039
0.228
1.766
-0.051
-0.240
-0.416
-2.072
GDP
0.355
0.496
0.470
0.694
0.850
3.505
1.677
3.393
0.498
1.810
1.369
4.336
0.405
1.302
Inflation
-0.083
-0.355
0.407
0.849
1.017
3.872
0.966
3.429
-0.254
-1.065
0.468
1.328
0.420
2.025
Gross Debt
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net Debt
-0.001
-0.058
-0.088
-2.399
0.019
1.185
0.066
2.584
-0.014
-1.799
0.016
0.869
0.022
0.808
Primary Balance
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time Trend
-0.222
-2.308
-0.182
-1.943
-0.109
-3.013
0.135
1.523
0.073
1.372
-0.168
-2.341
-0.236
-4.122
#Obs
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
R^2
0.925
0.945
0.951
0.982
0.972
0.961
0.942
SER
0.702
0.595
0.445
0.637
0.373
0.548
0.446

Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.

Table 9. Time Series Regressions - Structural Balance

 CanadaFranceGermanyItalyJapanUKUS
Short-term IR
0.204
1.630
0.263
1.185
0.165
1.021
0.728
3.245
0.807
4.393
0.647
3.124
0.320
1.282
Long-term IR(lag)
-0.204
-0.723
-0.091
-0.288
-0.152
-0.621
-0.118
-0.414
0.209
1.349
-0.145
-0.446
-0.429
-2.139
GDP
0.316
0.396
0.856
1.061
0.779
2.524
1.324
1.212
0.546
3.068
1.886
5.355
0.245
0.810
Inflation
-0.063
-0.201
0.485
0.763
0.961
1.963
0.720
0.620
-0.037
-0.191
-0.264
-0.349
0.365
0.653
Gross Debt
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural Balance
-0.306
-1.634
-0.565
-2.032
-0.283
-0.636
-0.310
-1.454
-0.097
-1.590
-0.043
-0.319
-0.046
-0.390
Time Trend
-0.240
-3.040
-0.174
-1.354
-0.102
-1.421
-0.020
-0.069
-0.035
-0.811
-0.226
-2.385
-0.217
-3.056
#Obs
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
R^2
0.900
0.846
0.895
0.964
0.947
0.930
0.883
SER
0.587
0.673
0.492
0.694
0.314
0.488
0.483

Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
15 periods (1993 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.

Table 10. Impact of the Debts and Deficits of Others

  Full Panel: 1 Full Panel: 2 Full Panel: 3 Full Panel: 4 G-7 Countries: 5 G-7 Countries: 6 G-7 Countries: 7 G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.387
11.665
0.375
9.867
0.328
8.215
0.488
9.863
0.388
6.919
0.361
6.420
0.380
6.518
0.512
6.372
Long-term IR (lag)
0.339
9.431
0.304
7.516
0.378
9.687
0.150
3.387
0.339
5.672
0.326
5.344
0.331
5.603
0.155
2.156
GDP
0.389
4.230
0.402
4.236
0.330
3.793
0.544
5.742
0.602
3.943
0.573
3.868
0.585
4.096
0.608
4.313
Inflation
0.406
5.163
0.403
4.907
0.394
4.792
0.351
3.174
0.328
2.541
0.359
2.758
0.322
2.320
0.309
1.890
Gross Debt
0.011
3.104
 
 
 
0.012
2.634
 
 
 
Net Debt
 
0.010
3.170
 
 
 
0.013
2.554
 
 
Primary Balance
 
 
-0.075
-2.862
 
 
 
-0.117
-3.025
 
Structural Balance
 
 
 
-0.125
-3.325
 
 
 
-0.167
-3.333
Foreign Gross
-0.003
-0.491
 
 
 
-0.006
-0.581
 
 
 
Foreign Net
 
-0.018
-1.778
 
 
 
-0.015
-1.044
 
 
Foreign Primary
 
 
0.107
3.018
 
 
 
0.087
1.766
 
Foreign Structural
 
 
 
-0.546
-6.943
 
 
 
-0.482
-5.001
#Obs
347
319
344
276
140
140
133
105
R^2
0.920
0.920
0.904
0.859
0.929
0.931
0.925
0.907
SER
0.777
0.779
0.822
0.684
0.745
0.738
0.759
0.635

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 11. Baseline Regressions Pairing Combined Debts and Deficits

  Full Panel: 1 Full Panel: 2 Full Panel: 3 Full Panel: 4 G-7 Countries: 5 G-7 Countries: 6 G-7 Countries: 7 G-7 Countries: 8
Short-term IR
0.306
10.479
0.311
9.263
0.293
7.716
0.300
7.658
0.356
5.374
0.352
5.551
0.319
4.098
0.320
4.108
Long-term IR (lag)
0.381
8.362
0.375
7.011
0.291
6.552
0.302
6.163
0.343
3.262
0.313
3.002
0.250
2.844
0.239
2.726
GDP
0.112
1.823
0.121
1.791
0.112
1.983
0.122
1.794
0.380
3.267
0.374
3.340
0.243
2.832
0.244
2.915
Inflation
0.204
3.025
0.224
2.990
0.202
2.989
0.222
3.152
0.259
2.024
0.279
2.142
0.315
3.312
0.326
3.448
Gross Debt
0.003
1.874
 
0.002
1.143
 
0.007
2.455
 
0.003
0.884
 
Net Debt
 
0.001
0.729
 
0.000
 
0.010
3.005
 
0.005
1.657
Primary Balance
-0.031
-1.714
-0.028
-1.354
 
-0.006
-0.091
-1.959
-0.084
-1.888
 
 
Structural Balance
 
 
-0.044
-1.981
-0.056
-2.418
 
 
-0.097
-2.131
-0.084
-1.822
#Obs
331
305
267
248
133
133
105
105
R^2
0.974
0.974
0.966
0.967
0.973
0.974
0.972
0.972
SER
0.443
0.456
0.348
0.347
0.489
0.481
0.380
0.377

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 12. Marginal Impact of Fiscal Variables

CountryChange in Net Debt (% of GDP)* 2007-2015Change in Structural Balance (% of GDP)* 2007-2015Net Debt & Structural Balance Model (Effects are measured in basis points)
Canada
9
-0.8
16
France
25
1.3
-5
Germany
12
-1.2
22
Italy
12
-0.6
12
Japan
72
-4.8
90
UK
38
1.4
2
US
42
-3.4
62

*Source: October 2010 World Economic Outlook


Footnotes

**  The authors are Section Chief, Trade & Quantitative Studies, and Deputy Director of the International Finance Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington DC 20551 U.S.A. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected]. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System. William DeHaven and Robert Sockin provided superb research assistance. Return to text

1.   More specifically, it measures the OECD's projection of the 2011 fiscal balance that it made in 2009, minus the projection of the 2009 balance that it made in 2007. Return to text

2.   See, among others, Engen and Hubbard (2005), OECD (2009), and IMF (2009). Return to text

3.   Of course, it is possible that changes in perceived credit worthiness over time could also affect interest rates and fiscal performance, such as took place after several European countries joined the euro zone. This effect would not be captured by our fixed effects, but likely only applies to a small part of our panel dataset. Return to text

4.   The full sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. Return to text

5.   The short run effect is 1.2 basis points, but taking into account feedback effects onto the level of the lagged dependent variable, the long run effect is 2 basis points. Return to text

6.   In a fully dynamic simulation, the predicted value of the bond yield for one period is used for the value of the lagged dependent variable in the subsequent period. Return to text

7.   It is also worth noting that estimates from other studies examining the effect of fiscal conditions on bond yields in the United States are poor empirical estimates of the likely impact of sovereign risk, as fears of sovereign default in the United States were essentially non-existent over his sample period.  Return to text


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