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<channel rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/feeds.xml">
  <title>FRB Finance and Economics Discussion Series Working Papers</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/feeds.xml</link>
  <description>Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than acknowledgment) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.</description>
  <items>
    <rdf:Seq>
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201007/201007abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201006/201006abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201005/201005abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201004/201004abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201003/201003abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201002/201002abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201001/201001abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200949/200949abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200948/200948abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200947/200947abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200945/200945abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200944/200944abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200943/200943abs.html" />
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200942/200942abs.html" />
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  </items>
  <dc:date>2009-10-19T18:15:08-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <dc:publisher>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</dc:publisher>
</channel>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201007/201007abs.html">
  <title>2010-07: The Mechanics of a Graceful Exit: Interest on Reserves and Segmentation in the Federal Funds Market</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201007/201007abs.html</link>
  <description>Morten L. Bech and Elizabeth Klee. To combat the financial crisis that intensified in the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve injected a substantial amount of liquidity into the banking system.  The resulting increase in reserve balances exerted downward price pressure in the federal funds market, and the effective federal funds rate began to deviate from the target rate set by the Federal Open Market Committee.  In response, the Federal Reserve revised its operational framework for implementing monetary policy and began to pay interest on reserve balances in an attempt to provide a floor for the federal funds rate.  Nevertheless, following the policy change, the effective federal funds rate remained below not only the target but also the rate paid on reserve balances.  We develop a model to explain this phenomenon and use data from the federal funds market to evaluate it empirically.  In turn, we show how successful the Federal Reserve may be in raising the federal funds rate even in an environment with substantial reserve balances.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-02-02T17:05:44-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>The Mechanics of a Graceful Exit: Interest on Reserves and Segmentation in the Federal Funds Market</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-02-02T17:05:44-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Federal funds</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>segmentation</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>interest on reserves</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>corridor system</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>exit strategy</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-07: The Mechanics of a Graceful Exit: Interest on Reserves and Segmentation in the Federal Funds Market</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201007/201007.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Morten</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Bech</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Morten Bech</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Federal Reserve Bank of New York</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Elizabeth</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Klee</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Elizabeth Klee</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Morten L. Bech and Elizabeth Klee</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-02-02T17:05:44-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-07</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>E4</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>E58</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G28</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201006/201006abs.html">
  <title>2010-06: The Finances of American Households in the Past Three Recessions: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201006/201006abs.html</link>
  <description>Kevin B. Moore and Michael G. Palumbo. The downturn in economic activity in the U.S. that began in December 2007 (as determined by researchers with the National Bureau of Economic Research) has been noticeably deeper and has already lasted considerably longer than the prior two recessions--those beginning in July 1990 and in March 2001. In addition, a key difference between the current and the past two recessions is the extent to which consumer spending and residential investment have dropped since late 2007--that is, the extent to which the household sector appears to have "led" the drop in aggregate economic activity in this recession. This paper uses household-level data from the Federal Reserve Board's series of Surveys of Consumer Finances to document three factors that appear to have contributed to greater financial stress in the household sector in the current downturn compared with the prior two: 1) substantial and widespread reductions in home values that resulted in sizable erosions of home equity and net worth for many homeowners; 2) markedly expanded holdings of corporate equity among middle-income households which lost significant market value, on net, as stock prices sunk; and, 3) greater debt on household balance sheets and overall financial vulnerability around the onset of the 2008-09 recession, particularly for those in the middle of the income distribution.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-02-02T16:57:20-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>The Finances of American Households in the Past Three Recessions: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-02-02T16:57:20-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Household net worth</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>consumer finances</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>business cycle</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>recession</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-06: The Finances of American Households in the Past Three Recessions: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201006/201006.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Kevin</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Moore</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Kevin Moore</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Michael</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Palumbo</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Michael Palumbo</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Kevin B. Moore and Michael G. Palumbo</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-02-02T16:57:20-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-06</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>E21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>E32</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>D32</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201005/201005abs.html">
  <title>2010-05: Constant Proportion Debt Obligations: A Post-Mortem Analysis of Rating Models</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201005/201005abs.html</link>
  <description>Michael B. Gordy and S&#248;ren Willemann. In its complexity and its vulnerability to market volatility, the CPDO might be viewed as the poster child for the excesses of financial engineering in the credit market. This paper examines the CPDO as a case study in model risk in the rating of complex structured products. We demonstrate that the models used by S&amp;P and Moody's would have assigned very low probability to the spread levels realized in the investment grade corporate credit default swap market in late 2007, even though these spread levels were comparable to those of 2002. The spread levels realized in the first quarter of 2008 would have been assigned negligibly small probabilities. Had the models put non-negligible likelihood on attaining these high spread levels, the CPDO notes could never have achieved investment grade status. We conclude with larger lessons for the rating of complex products and for modeling credit risk in general.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-01-27T14:23:06-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Constant Proportion Debt Obligations: A Post-Mortem Analysis of Rating Models</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-01-27T14:23:06-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Credit risk</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>securitization</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>structured credit</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>rating agencies</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-05: Constant Proportion Debt Obligations: A Post-Mortem Analysis of Rating Models</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201005/201005.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Michael</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Gordy</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Michael Gordy</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Søren</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Willemann</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Søren Willemann</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Barclays Capital</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Michael B. Gordy and S&#248;ren Willemann</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-01-27T14:23:06-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-05</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>G24</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G17</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201004/201004abs.html">
  <title>2010-04: Income Taxes, Compensating Differentials, and Occupational Choice: How Taxes Distort the Wage-Amenity Decision</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201004/201004abs.html</link>
  <description>Hui Shan and David Powell. The link between taxes and occupational choices is central for understanding the welfare impacts of income taxes. Just as taxes distort the labor-leisure decision, they also distort the wage-amenity decision. Yet, there are no estimates of the full response on this margin. When tax rates increase, workers favor jobs with lower wages and more non-taxable amenities. We introduce a two-step methodology which uses compensating differentials to characterize the tax elasticity of occupational choice. We estimate a significant compensated elasticity of 0.05, implying that a 10% increase in the net-of-tax rate causes workers to change to a 0.5% higher wage job.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-01-22T09:07:30-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Income Taxes, Compensating Differentials, and Occupational Choice: How Taxes Distort the Wage-Amenity Decision</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-01-22T09:07:30-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Income taxes</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>occupational choice</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>compensating differentials</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-04: Income Taxes, Compensating Differentials, and Occupational Choice: How Taxes Distort the Wage-Amenity Decision</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201004/201004.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>David</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Powell</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>David Powell</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>RAND Corporation</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Hui</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Shan</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Hui Shan</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Hui Shan and David Powell</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-01-22T09:07:30-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-04</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>H24</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>H31</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>J24</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201003/201003abs.html">
  <title>2010-03: The Impact of Low-Skilled Immigration on the Youth Labor Market</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201003/201003abs.html</link>
  <description>Christopher L. Smith. The employment-to-population rate of high-school aged youth has fallen by about 20 percentage points since the late 1980s. The human capital implications of this decline depend on the reasons behind it.  In this paper, I demonstrate that growth in the number of less-educated immigrants may have considerably reduced youth employment rates. This finding stands in contrast to previous research that generally identifies, at most, a modest negative relationship across states or cities between immigration levels and adult labor market outcomes.  At least two factors are at work: there is greater overlap between the jobs that youth and less-educated adult immigrants traditionally do, and youth labor supply is more responsive to immigration-induced changes in their wage.  Despite a slight increase in schooling rates in response to immigration, I find little evidence that reduced employment rates are associated with higher earnings ten years later in life. This raises the possibility that an immigration-induced reduction in youth employment, on net, hinders youths' human capital accumulation.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-01-11T16:23:51-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>The Impact of Low-Skilled Immigration on the Youth Labor Market</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-01-11T16:23:51-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Youth employment</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>immigration</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-03: The Impact of Low-Skilled Immigration on the Youth Labor Market</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201003/201003.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Christopher</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Smith</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Christopher Smith</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Christopher L. Smith</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-01-11T16:23:51-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-03</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>J13</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>J23</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>J24</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>J61</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201002/201002abs.html">
  <title>2010-02: The Rigidity of Labor: Processing Savings and Work Decisions Through Shannon's Channels</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201002/201002abs.html</link>
  <description>Antonella Tutino. This paper argues that constraining people to choose consumption and labor under finite Shannon capacity produces results in line with U.S. business cycle data. My model has a simple partial equilibrium setting in which risk averse consumers keep high labor supply and low consumption profile at early stage of life to hedge against wealth fluctuations. They rationally choose to keep consumption and labor unchanged until they collect enough information. I find that at high frequency consumption appears to be more sluggish than labor supply. However, when people decide to change consumption they do so by a large amount. This combination leads to higher variance of consumption with respect to labor supply. My model also finds high persistence and strong comovement of consumption and employment and delayed response of consumption and labor with respect to wealth. Furthermore, my framework generates endogenously a wedge between marginal rate of substituition and marginal rate of transformation or wages. Such wedge is bigger and more volatile the lower information flow.
These findings suggest that rational inattention offers a promising avenue to bridge the gap between theory and U.S. business cycle data.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-01-11T16:23:46-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>The Rigidity of Labor: Processing Savings and Work Decisions Through Shannon's Channels</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-01-11T16:23:46-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Rational inattention</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>savings</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>labor</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>decisionmaking</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-02: The Rigidity of Labor: Processing Savings and Work Decisions Through Shannon's Channels</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201002/201002.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Antonella</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Tutino</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Antonella Tutino</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Antonella Tutino</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-01-11T16:23:46-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-02</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>D81</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>D91</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>E21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>C63</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201001/201001abs.html">
  <title>2010-01: Evolving Macroeconomic Perceptions and the Term Structure of Interest Rates</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201001/201001abs.html</link>
  <description>Athanasios Orphanides and Min Wei. We explore the role of evolving beliefs regarding the structure of the macroeconomy in improving our understanding of the term structure of interest rates within the context of a simple macro-finance model. Using quarterly vintages of real-time data and survey forecasts for the United States over the past 40 years, we show that a recursively estimated VAR on real GDP growth, inflation and the nominal short-term interest generates predictions that are more consistent with survey forecasts than a benchmark fixed-coefficient counterpart. We then estimate a simple term structure model under the assumption that the investors' risk attitude is driven by near-term expectations of the three state variables. When we allow for evolving beliefs about the macroeconomy, the resulting term structure model provides a better fit to the cross section of yields than the benchmark model, especially at longer maturities, and  exhibits better performance in out-of-sample predictions of future yield movements.
</description>
  <dc:date>2010-01-11T16:23:37-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Evolving Macroeconomic Perceptions and the Term Structure of Interest Rates</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2010-01-11T16:23:37-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Macro term structure model</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>recursive VAR</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>survey forecasts</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>anticipated utility</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2010-01: Evolving Macroeconomic Perceptions and the Term Structure of Interest Rates</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201001/201001.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Athanasios</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Orphanides</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Athanasios Orphanides</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Central Bank of Cyprus</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Min</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Wei</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Min Wei</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Athanasios Orphanides and Min Wei</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2010-01-11T16:23:37-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2010-01</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>E43</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>E44</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>E47</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G12</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200949/200949abs.html">
  <title>2009-49: Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200949/200949abs.html</link>
  <description>Jane Dokko, Brian Doyle, Michael T. Kiley, Jinill Kim, Shane Sherlund, Jae Sim, and Skander Van den Heuvel. We examine the role of monetary policy in the housing bubble.  Our review examines the setting of monetary policy in the middle of this decade, the impetus from monetary policy to the housing market, and other factors that may have contributed to the run-up, and subsequent collapse, in house prices.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-12-28T13:55:55-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-12-28T13:55:55-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Bubbles</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>monetary policy</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>house prices</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-49: Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200949/200949.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Jane</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Dokko</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Jane Dokko</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Brian</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Doyle</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Brian Doyle</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Michael</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Kiley</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Michael Kiley</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Jinill</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Kim</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Jinill Kim</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Shane</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Sherlund</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Shane Sherlund</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Jae</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Sim</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Jae Sim</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Skander</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Van den Heuvel</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Skander Van den Heuvel</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Jane Dokko, Brian Doyle, Michael T. Kiley, Jinill Kim, Shane Sherlund, Jae Sim, and Skander Van den Heuvel</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-12-28T13:55:55-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-49</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>E5</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>R21</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200948/200948abs.html">
  <title>2009-48: A Dynamic Analysis of Consolidation in the Broadcast Television Industry</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200948/200948abs.html</link>
  <description>Jessica C. Stahl. This paper estimates a dynamic oligopoly model in order to separately identify the demand-side and cost-side advantages of consolidation in the broadcast television industry.  I exploit an exogenous change in regulation that led to significant industry consolidation.  Using revenue and ownership data for broadcast stations over the past ten years, I estimate the effect of ownership changes on revenue.  I recover costs by examining patterns in ownership changes that are left unexplained by revenue estimation.  I model firms' purchasing decisions as a dynamic game, and estimate the game using a two-step estimation method recently developed by Bajari, Benkard &amp; Levin (2007).  This is the first paper to estimate a model of merger activity in a dynamic, strategic setting.  I find that there are both revenue and cost advantages to consolidation, but they operate through different mechanisms.  Access to a wider audience enables firms to increase per-station advertising revenue, while simply owning more stations enables firms to reduce per-station operating costs.  A firm's ability to realize these benefits is affected by its stations' network
affiliations, locations and viewers.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-12-15T09:32:08-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>A Dynamic Analysis of Consolidation in the Broadcast Television Industry</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-12-15T09:32:08-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Dynamic oligopoly</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>structural estimation</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>market structure</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-48: A Dynamic Analysis of Consolidation in the Broadcast Television Industry</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200948/200948.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Jessica</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Stahl</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Jessica Stahl</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Jessica C. Stahl</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-12-15T09:32:08-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-48</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>L13</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>L22</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>L40</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>L82</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200947/200947abs.html">
  <title>2009-47: Information Sharing and Stock Market Participation: Evidence from Extended Families</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200947/200947abs.html</link>
  <description>Geng Li. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we document that, controlling for observable characteristics, household investors' likelihood of entering the stock market within the next five years is about 30 percent higher if their parents or children had entered the stock market during the previous five years. Because even family members who live far away from each other tend to communicate frequently, despite the fact that interactions among people living close geographically have declined with the rise of alternative social channels, we argue that these findings highlight the significance of information sharing regarding household financial decisions. In addition, focusing on the sequential patterns of stock market entry, we explicitly take into account the time needed for information to be shared and disseminated among family members. Our finding that one member's entry positively influences future entries of other family members at distinct stages of the life cycle allows us to largely rule out the hypothesis that the observed correlations in stock market entries are primarily caused by common preferences shared by family members. Furthermore, because we do not find similar sequential patterns in stock market exits, our results do not support the hypothesis of herding behavior.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-11-18T16:10:52-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Information Sharing and Stock Market Participation: Evidence from Extended Families</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-11-18T16:10:52-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Information sharing</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>stock market participation</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>extended families</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-47: Information Sharing and Stock Market Participation: Evidence from Extended Families</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200947/200947.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Geng</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Li</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Geng Li</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Geng Li</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-11-18T16:10:52-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-47</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>D14</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>D83</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G11</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946abs.html">
  <title>2009-46: Firm Volatility and Banks:  Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946abs.html</link>
  <description>Ricardo Correa and Gustavo A. Suarez. This paper exploits the staggered timing of state-level banking deregulation in the United States during the 1980s to study the causal effect of banking integration on the volatility of non-financial corporations.  We find that firm-level employment, production, sales, and cash flows are less volatile after interstate banking deregulation, particularly for firms that have limited access to external finance.  This finding suggests that bank-dependent firms exploit wider access to finance after deregulation to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks.  In fact, short-term credit becomes less pro-cyclical after out-of-state bank entry is permitted.  Finally, lower volatility in real-side variables after deregulation translates into lower idiosyncratic risk in stock returns.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-11-18T16:10:44-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Firm Volatility and Banks:  Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-11-18T16:10:44-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Bank deregulation</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>firm volatility</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>external finance</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>idiosyncratic volatility</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-46: Firm Volatility and Banks:  Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Ricardo</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Correa</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Ricardo Correa</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Gustavo</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Suarez</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Gustavo Suarez</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Ricardo Correa and Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-11-18T16:10:44-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-46</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>G21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G32</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200945/200945abs.html">
  <title>2009-45: Household Response to the 2008 Tax Rebates: Survey Evidence and Aggregate Implications</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200945/200945abs.html</link>
  <description>Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro, and Joel Slemrod. Only about one-fifth of respondents in the Reuters/University of Michigan survey report that the 2008 tax rebates led them to mostly increase spending, while over half said it would lead them to mostly pay off debt.  Of those in the mostly-spend category, the response was swift, with over 80 percent reporting increasing their spending within three months of receiving their rebate.  Older households, households with higher wealth and higher income, and those expecting future income growth were generally more likely to spend the rebates.  A review of other surveys confirms the general pattern of results and suggests that small changes in survey design do not have a major effect on the distribution of responses.

The distribution of survey answers corresponds to an aggregate MPC after one year of about one-third.  The paper combines this survey-based estimate of the MPC and the survey-based estimate of the timing of spending to show that the rebates help explain the aggregate movements in saving, spending, and debt in 2008. Because the rebate was large and distributed over a short period, we estimate that it had a non-trivial effect on total spending in the second and third quarters of 2008.  Nonetheless, the results imply that the rebates provided only a modest stimulus to spending per dollar of rebate.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-11-12T14:35:18-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Household Response to the 2008 Tax Rebates: Survey Evidence and Aggregate Implications</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-11-12T14:35:18-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Tax rebates</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>marginal propensity to consume</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>survey responses</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-45: Household Response to the 2008 Tax Rebates: Survey Evidence and Aggregate Implications</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200945/200945.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Claudia</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Sahm</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Claudia Sahm</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Matthew</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Shapiro</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Matthew Shapiro</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>University of Michigan and NBER</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Joel</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Slemrod</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Joel Slemrod</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>University of Michigan and NBER</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro, and Joel Slemrod</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-11-12T14:35:18-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-45</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>C83</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>E21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>H31</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200944/200944abs.html">
  <title>2009-44: Assessing the Systemic Risk of a Heterogeneous Portfolio of Banks During the Recent Financial Crisis</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200944/200944abs.html</link>
  <description>Xin Huang, Hao Zhou, and Haibin Zhu. This paper extends the approach of measuring and stress-testing the systemic risk of a banking sector in Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) to identifying various sources of financial instability and to allocating systemic risk to individual financial institutions. The systemic risk measure, defined as the insurance cost to protect against distressed losses in a banking system, is a risk-neutral concept of capital based on publicly available information that can be appropriately aggregated across different subsets. An application of our methodology to a portfolio of twenty-two major banks in Asia and the Pacific illustrates the dynamics of the spillover effects of the global financial crisis to the region. The increase in the perceived systemic risk, particularly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, was mainly driven by the heightened risk aversion and the squeezed liquidity. The analysis on the marginal contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk suggests that ``too-big-to-fail" is a valid concern from a macroprudential perspective of bank regulation.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-11-02T10:05:47-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Assessing the Systemic Risk of a Heterogeneous Portfolio of Banks During the Recent Financial Crisis</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-11-02T10:05:47-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Systemic risk</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>macroprudential regulation</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>portfolio distress loss</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>credit default swap</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>dynamic conditional correlation</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-44: Assessing the Systemic Risk of a Heterogeneous Portfolio of Banks During the Recent Financial Crisis</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200944/200944.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Xin</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Huang</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Xin Huang</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Hao</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Zhou</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Hao Zhou</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Risk Analysis Section, Federal Reserve Board</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Haibin</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Zhu</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Haibin Zhu</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Bank for International Settlements, Asia-Pacific Office</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Xin Huang, Hao Zhou, and Haibin Zhu</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-11-02T10:05:47-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-44</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>G21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G28</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G13</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200943/200943abs.html">
  <title>2009-43: Designing Loan Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis and the Making Home Affordable Program</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200943/200943abs.html</link>
  <description>Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang, and Eileen Mauskopf. Delinquencies on residential mortgages and home foreclosures have risen dramatically in the past couple of years. The mortgage losses triggered a broad-based financial crisis and severe recession, which, in turn, exacerbated the initial financial distress faced by homeowners. Although servicers increased their loss mitigation efforts as defaults began to mount, foreclosures continued to occur in cases where both the borrower and investor would be better off if such an outcome were avoided.  The U.S. government has engaged in a number of initiatives to reduce such foreclosures.  This paper examines the economic underpinnings of the Administration's loan modification program, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).  We argue that HAMP should help many borrowers avoid foreclosure, as its key features--a standardized protocol, incentive fees for servicers, and a requirement that the first lien mortgage payment be reduced to 31 percent of gross income--alleviate some of the previous obstacles to successful modifications.  That said, HAMP is not well-suited to address payment problems associated with job loss because the required modification in such cases would often be too costly to qualify for the program.  In addition, the focus of the program on reducing the payments associated with the mortgage rather than the principal of the mortgage may limit its effectiveness when the homeowner's equity is sufficiently negative.  In this case, recent government efforts to establish a protocol for short sales should be a useful tool in avoiding costly foreclosure.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-10-27T18:15:57-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Designing Loan Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis and the Making Home Affordable Program</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-10-27T18:15:57-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Mortgage</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>mortgage-servicers</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>mortgage-modification</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>foreclosures</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>HAMP</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>GSEs</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-43: Designing Loan Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis and the Making Home Affordable Program</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200943/200943.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Larry</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Cordell</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Larry Cordell</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Karen</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Dynan</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Karen Dynan</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Brookings Institute</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Andreas</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Lehnert</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Andreas Lehnert</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Nellie</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Liang</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Nellie Liang</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Eileen</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Mauskopf</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Eileen Mauskopf</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang, and Eileen Mauskopf</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-10-27T18:15:57-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-43</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>G01</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>G28</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>H40</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>H20</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>H00</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>H81</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200942/200942abs.html">
  <title>2009-42: Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market</title>
  <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200942/200942abs.html</link>
  <description>Hui Shan. Reverse mortgages allow elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth without having to sell or move out of their homes. However, very few eligible homeowners have used reverse mortgages to achieve consumption smoothing until recently when the reverse mortgage market in the United States witnessed substantial growth. This paper examines 1989-2007 loan-level reverse mortgage data and presents a number of findings. First, I show that recent reverse mortgage borrowers are significantly different from earlier borrowers in many respects. Second, I find that borrowers who take the line-of-credit payment plan, single male borrowers, and borrowers with higher house values exit their homes sooner than other reverse mortgage borrowers. Third, I combine the reverse mortgage data with county-level house price data to show that elderly homeowners are more likely to purchase reverse mortgages when the local housing market is at its peak. This finding suggests that the 2000-05 housing market boom may be partially responsible for the rapid growth of reverse mortgage markets. Lastly, I show that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage limits, which cap the amount of housing wealth that an eligible homeowner can borrow against, have no effect on the demand for reverse mortgages. The findings have important implications to both policy-making and the economics of housing and aging.
</description>
  <dc:date>2009-10-19T18:15:08-05:00</dc:date>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <cb:paper>
    <cb:simpleTitle>Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market</cb:simpleTitle>
    <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-10-19T18:15:08-05:00</cb:occurrenceDate>
    <cb:keyword>Reverse mortgages</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>housing</cb:keyword>
    <cb:keyword>aging</cb:keyword>
    <cb:resource>
      <cb:title>2009-42: Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market</cb:title>
      <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200942/200942.pdf</cb:link>
      <cb:description>PDF version</cb:description>
    </cb:resource>
    <cb:person type="author">
      <cb:givenName>Hui</cb:givenName>
      <cb:surname>Shan</cb:surname>
      <cb:nameAsWritten>Hui Shan</cb:nameAsWritten>
      <cb:role>
        <cb:affiliation>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</cb:affiliation>
      </cb:role>
    </cb:person>
    <cb:byline>Hui Shan</cb:byline>
    <cb:publicationDate>2009-10-19T18:15:08-05:00</cb:publicationDate>

    <cb:issue>2009-42</cb:issue>
    <cb:JELCode>E21</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>J14</cb:JELCode>
    <cb:JELCode>R21</cb:JELCode>
  </cb:paper>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>
