Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS)
March 2026
The Practice of U.S. Monetary Policy Independence from Martin to Greenspan
Abstract:
Central bank independence is a major area of study, but the economic literature has been characterized by numerous misstatements regarding how U.S. monetary policy independence has operated over time. Against this backdrop, this paper lays out major elements of the practice of central bank independence in the United States in the period from 1951 to 2006—a time span that encompasses the William McChesney Martin, Jr., through Alan Greenspan tenures as the head of the Federal Reserve. Many documentary materials and policymaker quotations not considered in previous research on U.S. monetary policy are highlighted. The analysis covers both institutional aspects (statutory objectives, formalities of Federal Reserve structure, and conventions followed in regularizing the central bank’s interactions with the legislative and executive branches) and the conceptual basis for independence, as expressed by leading Federal Reserve officials, particularly Chairs. It is shown—with heavy reliance on their own words—how Federal Reserve Chairs have characterized the position of the central bank within the governmental structure of the United States and how they have set out the case for monetary policy independence. What emerges is that successive Chairs over the decades made essentially the same, three-part, economic case for independence. This case does not rely on the arguments associated with economic research on time inconsistency.
Keywords: Federal Reserve Chairs, central bank independence, monetary policy objectives
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2026.014
PDF: Full Paper
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