Heterogeneity in the Marginal Propensity to Consume among U.S. Households, Accessible Data

Figure 1. Mean reported allocation of a one-month income windfall
  Spend Save Pay Debt
Mean Percent (%) 22.35 47.31 30.30

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 2. Distribution of the share of a one-month income windfall allocated to spending
Percentage (%) Share of Respondents
0 47%
5 1%
10 5%
15 1%
20 6%
25 7%
30 9%
35 0%
40 2%
45 0%
50 11%
55 0%
60 2%
65 0%
70 1%
75 1%
80 1%
85 0%
90 1%
95 0%
100 4%

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 3. Mean Allocation by Income and Wealth percentile group

MPC (%) by Normal Income Percentile - 2025

  Spend Save Pay Debt
Bottom 10% 28.3 45.6 26.1
10-20% 25.0 48.4 26.6
20-30% 24.9 45.5 29.5
30-40% 23.7 43.9 32.3
40-50% 22.7 45.0 32.2
50-60% 19.4 45.0 35.5
60-70% 20.5 41.8 37.6
70-80% 19.8 43.5 36.6
80-90% 19.2 53.5 27.3
Top 90-95% 22.2 53.0 24.7
Top 95-99% 18.4 66.6 15.0
Top 1% 14.0 77.5 8.5

MPC (%) by Net Worth Percentile - 2025

  Spend Save Pay Debt
Bottom 10% 24.9 35.3 39.8
10-20% 25.5 46.9 27.5
20-30% 23.6 44.0 32.3
30-40% 23.7 38.2 38.1
40-50% 20.5 44.0 35.4
50-60% 20.8 43.8 35.4
60-70% 19.9 45.1 35.0
70-80% 21.1 52.0 26.8
80-90% 21.7 56.5 21.8
Top 90-95% 22.8 66.4 10.7
Top 95-99% 22.5 65.1 12.4
Top 1% 14.5 79.8 5.7

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 4. Conditional MPC by hand-to-mouth status
  Conditional mean spending allocation (%)
Not Hand-to-Mouth 20.3
Hand-to-Mouth 22.9

Note: Figure plots the conditional marginal propensity to consume (MPC) based on whether a household does or does not have one-half month of normal income in liquid assets (“not hand-to-mouth” or “hand-to-mouth,” respectively), adjusting for normal income.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 5. Conditional MPC by hand-to-mouth status and wealth group
  Not Hand-to-Mouth Hand-to-Mouth
Low Wealth 20.6 23.5
High Wealth 20.5 22.2

Note: Figure plots the conditional marginal propensity to consume (MPC) based on whether a household does or does not have one-half month of normal income in liquid assets (“not hand-to-mouth” or “hand-to-mouth,” respectively) and whether a household’s wealth is below the 30th percentile of the household wealth distribution (“low-wealth”). Conditional MPCs are obtained by regressing MPC on hand-to-mouth status, low wealth status, log normal income, log wealth, and the interaction of hand-to-mouth status with low-wealth status. The key from top to bottom identifies bars within each wealth group in order from left to right.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 6. Conditional MPC by whether a household spent within its budget constraint last year
  Conditional mean spending allocation (%)
Below budget constraint 19.7
At or above budget constraint 21.6

Note: Figure plots the conditional marginal propensity to consume (MPC) based on whether a household’s spending was below its income last year (“below budget constraint”) or a household’s spending exceeded or matched its income last year (“at or above budget constraint”), adjusting for normal income.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 7. Conditional MPC by income uncertainty
  Conditional mean spending allocation (%)
Less certain 21.7
More certain 20.1

Note: Figure plots the conditional marginal propensity to consume (MPC) based on whether a household has a good idea of next year’s income (“more certain”) or a household does not have a good idea of next year’s income (“less certain”), adjusting for normal income.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure 8. Conditional MPC by financial knowledgeability
  Conditional mean spending allocation (%)
Less financially knowledgeable 21.4
More financially knowledgeable 19.9

Note: Figure plots the conditional marginal propensity to consume (MPC) based on whether a household answered all three financial literacy questions in the SCF correctly (“more financially knowledgeable”) or a household answered any of the three financial literacy questions incorrectly (“less financially knowledgeable”), adjusting for normal income.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026).

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Figure A1. Selected average MPC estimates from the literature
Publication Publication Year MPC Estimate(s) (Shares) Horizon (months) Method Shock
Japelli and Pistaferri 2014 0.48 N.A. Survey One month windfall
Christelis et al. 2019 0.4, 0.37 12 Survey One/Three month windfall
Japelli and Pistaferri 2020 0.47 N.A. Survey One month windfall
Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar 2021 0.07 3 Survey $500
Colarieti, Mei, and Stantcheva 2024 0.12, 0.16 3 Survey $1,000, Ten percent income windfall
Colarieti, Mei, and Stantcheva 2024 0.37, 0.46 12 Survey $1,000, Ten percent income windfall
Koşar and Melcangi 2026 0.17 N.A. Survey Ten percent income windfall
Puig 2026 0.48 N.A. Survey $500
SCF MPC FEDS Note 2026 0.22 12 Survey One month windfall
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006 0.2-0.4 3 Natural Experiment Realized 2001 Tax Rebate
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008 0.05, 0.64 12 Statistical Decomposition PSIED imputed from food expenditures in the CEX
Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner 2014 0.18 3 Statistical Decomposition $500 with PSID among other data
Graziani, van der Klaauw, and Zafar 2016 0.137, 0.36 12 Survey/Natural Experiment Realized 2011 payroll tax cut
Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber 2020 0.4 N.A. Survey/Natural Experiment Realized CARES Act stimulus checks
Orchard, Ramey, and Weiland 2021 0.28, 0.12 12 Natural Experiment DiD and macro counter-factuals with 2001 and 2008 rebates
Fagerang, Holm, and Natvik 2021 0.35-0.71 12 Natural Experiment Norwegian lottery wins
Patterson 2023 0.5 12 Statistical Decomposition CEX/PSID/LEHD
Bartik et al. 2024 0.38-0.5, 0.18-0.24 36 RCT Unconditional cash transfer

Note: Whiskers denote a range of estimates from a single study.

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026);2025 SCF, Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006); Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008); Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014); Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014, 2020); Graziani, van der Klaauw, and Zafar (2016); Christelis, Georgarakos, Jappelli, Pistaferri, and van Rooij (2019); Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2020); Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik (2021); Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar (2021); Patterson (2023); Bartik, Rhodes, Broockman, Krause, Miller, and Vivalt (2024); Colarieti, Mei, and Stantcheva (2024); Orchard, Ramey, and Weiland (2025); Koşar and Melcangi (2025); Puig (2026).

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Last Update: October 09, 2026