Accessible Version
How is Geopolitical Fragmentation Reshaping U.S. Foreign Direct Investment? Accessible Data
Figure 1. U.S. Outward FDI to Select EMEs, percent of total outbound DI, annual averages
Percent of total U.S. outward DI
| Country | ODI share for 2014-2017 | ODI share for 2022-2023 |
|---|---|---|
| UAE | 0 | 0 |
| China | 2 | 2 |
| Hong Kong | 1 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 0 | 0 |
| India | 1 | 1 |
| Morocco | 0 | 0 |
| Mexico | 2 | 3 |
| Poland | 0 | 0 |
| Vietnam | 0 | 0 |
Source: BEA data on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
Figure 2. U.S. Outward FDI in Advanced Manufacturing, percent of total U.S. outward advanced manufacturing FDI, annual averages
Percent
| Country | ODI share for 2014-2017 | ODI share for 2022-2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Canada | 9 | 9 |
| China and Hong Kong | 12 | 7 |
| Major Asia | 18 | 17 |
| Major Europe | 16 | 21 |
| Mexico | 2 | 4 |
| United Kingdom | 10 | 13 |
Note: The major European countries used in this graph are Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Belgium and Austria. The advanced Asian economies are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Advanced manufacturing is computed by summing the following industries: computer and electronic product manufacturing; electronic equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing; machinery manufacturing; transportation equipment manufacturing; and chemical manufacturing.
Source: BEA data on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
Figure 3. Allocation of U.S. MNE Activities in Select Major EMEs, percent of total
Left panel: Percent of total MOFA CapEx. Right panel: Percent of total MOFA employment
| Country | Year | Percent of total MOFA CapEx | Percent of total MOFA Employment |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 2009 | 4 | 9 |
| China | 2010 | 5 | 10 |
| China | 2011 | 4 | 11 |
| China | 2012 | 4 | 11 |
| China | 2013 | 4 | 11 |
| China | 2014 | 4 | 12 |
| China | 2015 | 5 | 12 |
| China | 2016 | 6 | 12 |
| China | 2017 | 6 | 12 |
| China | 2018 | 6 | 12 |
| China | 2019 | 5 | 9 |
| China | 2020 | 6 | 9 |
| China | 2021 | 7 | 9 |
| China | 2022 | 6 | 9 |
| India | 2009 | 1 | 5 |
| India | 2010 | 1 | 6 |
| India | 2011 | 1 | 7 |
| India | 2012 | 1 | 7 |
| India | 2013 | 1 | 8 |
| India | 2014 | 1 | 8 |
| India | 2015 | 2 | 8 |
| India | 2016 | 2 | 9 |
| India | 2017 | 2 | 9 |
| India | 2018 | 3 | 9 |
| India | 2019 | 2 | 10 |
| India | 2020 | 2 | 10 |
| India | 2021 | 3 | 11 |
| India | 2022 | 3 | 12 |
| Mexico | 2009 | 3 | 9 |
| Mexico | 2010 | 3 | 9 |
| Mexico | 2011 | 3 | 9 |
| Mexico | 2012 | 3 | 9 |
| Mexico | 2013 | 3 | 9 |
| Mexico | 2014 | 3 | 9 |
| Mexico | 2015 | 4 | 10 |
| Mexico | 2016 | 4 | 10 |
| Mexico | 2017 | 5 | 10 |
| Mexico | 2018 | 5 | 10 |
| Mexico | 2019 | 4 | 10 |
| Mexico | 2020 | 4 | 10 |
| Mexico | 2021 | 5 | 11 |
| Mexico | 2022 | 5 | 11 |
Note: Measures presented are the country-specific percentages of total activities by majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs) of U.S. multinationals.
Source: BEA data on the Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises, 2009-2022.
Figure 4. Comparing U.S. exposure to China through DI and MNE data
Billions of 2017 USD
| Year | DI position | MNE assets | MNE net equity | DI flows | MNE CapEx | MNE R&D |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 61 | 216 | 69 | -8 | 7 | 2 |
| 2010 | 66 | 234 | 78 | 6 | 9 | 2 |
| 2011 | 59 | 268 | 87 | -2 | 9 | 2 |
| 2012 | 59 | 284 | 97 | -1 | 9 | 2 |
| 2013 | 64 | 310 | 109 | 8 | 9 | 2 |
| 2014 | 85 | 386 | 144 | 11 | 10 | 3 |
| 2015 | 95 | 402 | 155 | 6 | 10 | 4 |
| 2016 | 99 | 419 | 159 | 9 | 11 | 3 |
| 2017 | 105 | 441 | 163 | 8 | 12 | 4 |
| 2018 | 105 | 452 | 170 | 6 | 12 | 4 |
| 2019 | 105 | 424 | 168 | 7 | 10 | 4 |
| 2020 | 111 | 462 | 183 | 9 | 10 | 4 |
| 2021 | 105 | 471 | 189 | -1 | 12 | 5 |
| 2022 | 104 | 438 | 185 | 7 | 10 | 5 |
| 2023 | 104 | 4 |
Sources: BEA data on Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises, and BEA data on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. Converted to 2017 dollars using the U.S. GDP deflator.
Figure 5. Domestic Shares of U.S. MNE Activities
Domestic share
| Year | Industry | CapEx, domestic share | Employment, domestic share |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2009 | High-tech | 1 | 1 |
| 2009 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2010 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2010 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2010 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2011 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2011 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2011 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2012 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2012 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2012 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2013 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2013 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2013 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2014 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2014 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2014 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2015 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2015 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2015 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2016 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2016 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2016 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2017 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2017 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2017 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2018 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2018 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2018 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2019 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2019 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2019 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2020 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2020 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2020 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2021 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2021 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2021 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
| 2022 | All industries | 1 | 1 |
| 2022 | High-tech | 1 | 0 |
| 2022 | Advanced manufacturing | 1 | 1 |
Notes: The share of each variable is computed as the amount reported by the U.S. parent and its domestic subsidiaries (consolidated) divided by itself and the amount reported by majority-owned foreign affiliates. Advanced manufacturing is computed by summing the following manufacturing industries: computer and electronic products; electronic equipment, appliances, and components; machinery; transportation equipment; and chemicals. High-tech is computed by summing: computer and electronic product manufacturing; pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing; data processing, hosting, and related services; and computer systems design and related services. The vertical line marks 2018, when both trade conflicts and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act took effect.
Source: BEA data on Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises.
Figure 6. Foreign sourcing share of U.S. MNEs' intermediate inputs
Import share
| Foreign cost share | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | |
| All industries | 0.10276 | 0.11292 | 0.11931 | 0.12157 | 0.11842 | 0.10563 | 0.10432 | 0.10279 | 0.09583 | 0.09439 | 0.08491 | 0.08244 | 0.0853 | 0.08386 |
| Computer and electronic product manufacturing | 0.1781 | 0.19574 | 0.17483 | 0.16964 | 0.1678 | 0.19706 | 0.19393 | 0.20457 | 0.19099 | 0.19677 | 0.16978 | 0.16639 | 0.16631 | 0.16006 |
| Advanced manufacturing | 0.1968 | 0.2046 | 0.20793 | 0.20904 | 0.20873 | 0.21223 | 0.21911 | 0.22609 | 0.20582 | 0.21088 | 0.20525 | 0.20605 | 0.22206 | 0.21595 |
Notes: The share of each variable is computed as the ratio of goods imports by U.S. multinationals and their domestic subsidiaries to their expenditures on intermediate inputs, which are computed as the difference between sales and value added. Advanced manufacturing is computed by summing the following manufacturing industries: computer and electronic products; machinery; transportation equipment; and chemicals. This graph omits electrical equipment, appliance and component manufacturing, for which BEA obscured the data before 2014.
Source: BEA data on Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises.