Part 2: Monetary Policy

Monetary Policy Report submitted to the Congress on June 17, 2022, pursuant to section 2B of the Federal Reserve Act

The Federal Open Market Committee has swiftly raised the target range for the federal funds rate and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate

With inflation far too high, well above the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent objective, and with tight labor market conditions, the Committee raised the target range for the federal funds rate off the effective lower bound in March. The Committee continued to raise the target range in May and June, bringing it to 1-1/2 to 1-3/4 percent following the June meeting (figure 45). The Committee has also indicated that it anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate.

The Committee ceased net purchases of Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities in early March and began the process of significantly reducing its securities holdings on June 1

Reflecting the need to firm the stance of monetary policy amid elevated inflation and tight labor market conditions, the Committee ended net asset purchases in early March and announced its plans for significantly reducing the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet in May.13 Consistent with the Principles for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in January, the May statement outlined the Committee's intention to reduce the Federal Reserve's securities holdings over time in a predictable manner primarily by adjusting the amounts reinvested of principal payments received from securities held in the System Open Market Account (SOMA).14 Specifically, beginning in June, principal payments from securities held in the SOMA will be reinvested to the extent that they exceed monthly caps. For Treasury securities, the cap is initially set at $30 billion per month and after three months will increase to $60 billion per month. For agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, the cap is initially set at $17.5 billion per month and after three months will increase to $35 billion per month.

Reductions in securities holdings will slow and then stop when reserve balances are somewhat above the level the Committee judges to be consistent with efficient implementation of policy in an ample-reserves regime. Once balance sheet runoff has ceased, reserve balances will likely continue to decline at a slower pace—reflecting growth in other Federal Reserve liabilities—until the Committee judges that reserve balances are at the level required for implementing policy efficiently in an ample regime, at which point reserve management purchases of securities would likely begin to maintain ample reserves. The Committee also noted that it is prepared to adjust any of the details of its approach to reducing the size of the balance sheet in light of economic and financial developments.

The FOMC will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook

The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective. In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on inflation and inflation expectations, wages, other measures of labor market conditions, financial and international developments, and public health.

In addition to considering a wide range of economic and financial data and information gathered from business contacts and other informed parties around the country, such as participants in conversations held as part of the Fed Listens initiative, policymakers routinely consult prescriptions for the policy interest rate provided by various monetary policy rules. These rule prescriptions can provide useful benchmarks for the FOMC. Although simple rules cannot capture the complexities of monetary policy and many practical considerations make it undesirable for the FOMC to adhere strictly to the prescriptions of any specific rule, some principles of good monetary policy can be illustrated by these policy rules (see the box "Monetary Policy Rules in the Current Environment").

Changes to the policy rate were implemented smoothly, and the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet was roughly stable

As in the previous tightening cycle and consistent with the implementation of monetary policy in an ample-reserves regime, the Federal Reserve used its administered rates—the interest rate on reserve balances (IORB) and the offering rate at the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility—to implement increases to the target range for the policy rate. The administered rates were effective in raising the effective federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates with the Committee's target range.

The Federal Reserve's balance sheet was roughly stable at $9 trillion, or 36 percent of U.S. nominal GDP, from February through May, and the process to significantly reduce securities holdings began on June 1 (figure 46).15 Reserve balances have fallen from their all-time highs of a little over $4 trillion to around $3.3 trillion because of increasing take-up at the ON RRP. (See the box "Developments in the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet and Money Markets.")

Monetary Policy Rules in the Current Environment

Simple interest rate rules relate a policy interest rate, such as the federal funds rate, to a small number of other economic variables—typically including the current deviation of inflation from its target value and a measure of resource slack in the economy. Policymakers consult policy rate prescriptions derived from a variety of policy rules as part of their monetary policy deliberations without mechanically following the prescriptions of any particular rule.

Recently, inflation has run well above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective, the U.S. economy has been very strong, and labor market conditions have been very tight. Against this background, the simple monetary policy rules considered in this discussion have called for raising the federal funds rate significantly. Starting in March, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began raising the target range for the federal funds rate and indicated that it anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. The FOMC also began the process of significantly reducing the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.

Selected Policy Rules: Descriptions

In many economic models, desirable economic outcomes can be achieved if monetary policy responds in a predictable way to changes in economic conditions. In recognition of this idea, economists have analyzed many monetary policy rules, including the well-known Taylor (1993) rule, the "balanced approach" rule, the "adjusted Taylor (1993)" rule, and the "first difference" rule.1 In addition to these rules, figure A shows a "balanced-approach (shortfalls)" rule, which represents one simple way to illustrate the Committee's focus on shortfalls from maximum employment.2 These rules embody key design principles of good monetary policy, including that the policy rate should be adjusted forcefully enough over time to ensure a return of inflation to the central bank's longer-run objective and to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at levels consistent with that objective.

All five rules feature the difference between inflation and the FOMC's longer-run objective of 2 percent. The five rules use the unemployment rate gap, measured as the difference between an estimate of the rate of unemployment in the longer run ($$ u_t^{LR}$$) and the current unemployment rate; the first-difference rule includes the change in the unemployment rate gap rather than its level.3 All but the first-difference rule include an estimate of the neutral real interest rate in the longer run ($$ r_t^{LR}$$).4

Unlike the other simple rules featured here, the adjusted Taylor (1993) rule recognizes that the federal funds rate cannot be reduced materially below the effective lower bound. To make up for the cumulative shortfall in policy accommodation following a recession during which the federal funds rate is constrained by its effective lower bound, the adjusted Taylor (1993) rule prescribes delaying the return of the policy rate to the (positive) levels prescribed by the standard Taylor (1993) rule until after the economy begins to recover.

Selected Policy Rules: Prescriptions

Figure B shows historical prescriptions for the federal funds rate under the five simple rules considered. For each quarterly period, the figure reports the policy rates prescribed by the rules, taking as given the prevailing economic conditions and survey-based estimates of $$ u_t^{LR}$$ and $$ r_t^{LR}$$ at the time. All of the rules considered called for a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy in response to the pandemic-driven recession. The recent elevated inflation readings imply that the prescriptions for the federal funds rate of simple policy rules in the first quarter of 2022 are well above their pre-pandemic levels, at between 4 percent and 7 percent. Overall, the prescriptions of all simple rules have risen notably over the past few quarters as inflation readings climbed further above 2 percent.

Policy Rules: Limitations

Simple policy rules are also subject to important limitations. One important limitation is that simple policy rules do not take into account the other tools of monetary policy, such as large-scale asset purchases. A second important limitation is that simple rules respond to only a small set of economic variables and thus necessarily abstract from many of the factors that the FOMC considers when it assesses the appropriate setting of the policy rate. Another limitation is that most simple policy rules do not take into account the effective lower bound on interest rates, which limits the extent to which the policy rate can be lowered to support the economy. This constraint was particularly evident in the aftermath of the pandemic-driven recession, when the lower bound on the policy rate motivated the FOMC's other policy actions to support the economy. Finally, simple policy rules generally abstract from the risk-management considerations associated with uncertainty about economic relationships and the evolution of the economy. As a result, the usefulness of simple policy rules can be limited in unusual economic circumstances.5

1. The Taylor (1993) rule was introduced in John B. Taylor (1993), "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (December), pp. 195–214. The balanced-approach rule was analyzed in John B. Taylor (1999), "A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules," in John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 319–41. The adjusted Taylor (1993) rule was studied in David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), "Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66. The first-difference rule is based on a rule suggested by Athanasios Orphanides (2003), "Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the Taylor Rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50 (July), pp. 983–1022. A review of policy rules is in John B. Taylor and John C. Williams (2011), "Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy," in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3B (Amsterdam: North-Holland), pp. 829–59. The same volume of the Handbook of Monetary Economics also discusses approaches other than policy rules for deriving policy rate prescriptions. Return to text

2. The FOMC's revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, released in August 2020, refers to "shortfalls of employment" from the Committee's assessment of its maximum level rather than the "deviations of employment" used in the previous statement. The "balanced-approach (shortfalls)" rule reflects this change by prescribing policy rates identical to those prescribed by the balanced-approach rule at times when the unemployment rate is above its estimated longer-run level. However, when the unemployment rate is below that level, the balanced-approach (shortfalls) rule is more accommodative than the balanced-approach rule because it does not call for the policy rate to rise as the unemployment rate drops further. Return to text

3. Implementations of simple rules often use the output gap as a measure of resource slack in the economy. The rules described in figure A instead use the unemployment rate gap because that gap better captures the FOMC's statutory goal to promote maximum employment. Movements in these alternative measures of resource utilization are highly correlated. For more information, see the note below figure A. Return to text

4. The neutral real interest rate in the longer run ($$ r_t^{LR}$$) is the level of the real federal funds rate that is expected to be consistent, in the longer run, with maximum employment and stable inflation. Like $$ u_t^{LR}$$, $$ r_t^{LR}$$ is determined largely by nonmonetary factors. The first-difference rule shown in figure A does not require an estimate of $$ r_t^{LR}$$. However, this rule has its own shortcomings. For example, research suggests that this sort of rule often results in greater volatility in employment and inflation relative to what would be obtained under the Taylor (1993) and balanced-approach rules. Return to text

5. For example, Taylor (1993) on page 197 noted that "there will be episodes where monetary policy will need to be adjusted to deal with special factors. The Fed would need more than a simple policy rule as a guide in such cases." Return to text

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Developments in the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet and Money Markets

With the Federal Reserve's net asset purchases concluding in March, the size of the balance sheet has been roughly stable at $9 trillion since February 2022 (figures A and B). At its May 2022 meeting, the FOMC announced plans for significantly reducing the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet starting June 1. Balance sheet reduction, along with increases in the target range for the federal funds rate, firms the stance of monetary policy.

A. Balance sheet comparison

Billions of dollars

  6/8/2022 2/16/2022 Change
Assets
Total securities
Treasury securities 5,772 5,739 33
Agency debt and MBS 2,710 2,707 3
Net unamortized premiums 336 350 -14
Repurchase agreements 0 0 0
Loans and lending facilities
PPPLF 19 28 -8
Other loans and lending facilities 37 40 -3
Central bank liquidity swaps 0 0 0
Other assets 47 48 -1
Total assets 8,921 8,911 10
Liabilities and capital
Federal Reserve notes 2,227 2,185 42
Reserves held by depository institutions 3,317 3,797 -480
Reverse repurchase agreements      
Foreign official and international accounts 272 257 14
Others 2,163 1,644 519
U.S. Treasury General Account 627 709 -82
Other deposits 247 251 -5
Other liabilities and capital 69 67 1
Total liabilities and capital 8,921 8,911 10

Note: MBS is mortgage-backed securities. PPPLF is Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility. Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.4.1, "Factors Affecting Reserve Balances."

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Despite the roughly constant total size of the balance sheet, reserves—the largest liability on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet—have continued to fall significantly since February 2022, reflecting growth in take-up at the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility (figure C).1 In addition, the Treasury General Account (TGA)—another volatile liability—rose considerably upon larger than expected tax receipts and peaked just short of $1 trillion on June 2 before retracing the movement.

Usage at the ON RRP facility has risen $496 billion since February 2022 to stand at a record $2.2 trillion at the time of this report. Low rates on repurchase agreements—reflecting abundant liquidity in the banking system and limited Treasury bill supply—have contributed to this increasingly elevated participation. In addition, uncertainty about the magnitude and pace of policy rate increases contributed to a preference for short-duration assets, like those provided by the ON RRP facility. The ON RRP facility is intended to help keep the effective federal funds rate from falling below the target range set by the FOMC, as institutions with access to the ON RRP should be unwilling to lend funds below the ON RRP's pre-announced offering rate. The facility continued to serve this intended purpose, and the set of administered rates—interest on reserve balances (IORB) and the ON RRP offering rate—was effective at raising and maintaining the effective federal funds rate within the target range during the policy rate adjustments that have taken place since March.

Going forward, the planned balance sheet decline will drain reserves from the banking system and add longer-duration assets, which will likely put upward pressure on short-term rates and reduce demand at the ON RRP facility. The Committee will monitor the evolution of reserves and other liabilities to ensure a smooth entry into efficient operation of monetary policy in an ample-reserves regime.

1. Reserves consist of deposits held at Federal Reserve Banks by depository institutions, such as commercial banks, savings banks, credit unions, thrift institutions, and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. Reserve balances allow depository institutions to facilitate daily payment flows, both in ordinary times and in stress scenarios, without borrowing funds or selling assets. Return to text

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Footnotes

 13. See the May 4, 2022, press release regarding the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220504b.htmReturn to text

 14. See the January 26, 2022, press release regarding the Principles for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220126c.htmReturn to text

 15. Although balance sheet reduction started on June 1, the actual reduction in securities holdings has been negligible thus far given the timing of principal payments.
All of the Federal Reserve's emergency credit and liquidity facilities are closed and balances have continued to decline as facilities' assets mature or prepay. A list of credit and liquidity facilities established by the Federal Reserve in response to COVID-19 is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/funding-credit-liquidity-and-loan-facilities.htmReturn to text

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Last Update: August 11, 2022