Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS)
November 2023 (Revised March 2026)
Debt Flexibility
Rhys Bidder, Nicolas Crouzet, Margaret M. Jacobson, and Michael Siemer
Abstract:
How flexible are corporate loans after origination? Theory predicts coordination problems should make syndicated loans harder to modify than single-bank loans. We show the opposite. Using comprehensive regulatory data, we document that syndicated loans are modified frequently and respond to borrower distress, while single-lender loans are half as likely to be modified. This gap is not explained by covenants or performance pricing. Instead, syndicated loans are monitored more intensively. We show theoretically and empirically how fixed monitoring costs generate scale economies: larger loans justify continuous monitoring enabling flexible renegotiation, while smaller borrowers receive arm’s-length contracts with limited scope for modifications.
Keywords: Corporate debt, Renegotiation, SME lending, Relationship lending
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2023.076r1
PDF: Full Paper
Original Paper: PDF | Accessible materials (.zip)
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