September 2021

Liquidity Provision and Co-insurance in Bank Syndicates

Kevin F. Kiernan, Vladimir Yankov, Filip Zikes

Abstract:

We study the capacity of the banking system to provide liquidity to the corporate sector in times of stress and how changes in this capacity affect corporate liquidity management. We show that the contractual arrangements among banks in loan syndicates co-insure liquidity risks of credit line drawdowns and generate a network of interbank exposures. We develop a simple model and simulate the liquidity and insurance capacity of the banking network. We find that the liquidity capacity of large banks has significantly increased following the introduction of liquidity regulation, and that the liquidity co-insurance function in loan syndicates is economically important. We also find that borrowers with higher reliance on credit lines in their liquidity management have become more likely to obtain credit lines from syndicates with higher liquidity. The assortative matching on liquidity characteristics has strengthened the role of banks as liquidity providers to the corporate sector.

Keywords: Liquidity Insurance, Liquidity Regulation, Interbank networks, Syndicated Credit Lines

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2021.060

PDF: Full Paper

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Last Update: September 24, 2021