2. Borrowing by Businesses and Households

Vulnerabilities from business and household debt remained moderate

Balance sheets of nonfinancial businesses and households remained solid in aggregate. The level of total private nonfinancial-sector debt continued to grow more slowly than GDP, with the debt-to-GDP ratio falling to levels not seen since the early 2000s (figure 2.1). The drop in the overall debt-to-GDP ratio was driven by declines in the ratios for both the business and household sectors (figure 2.2). Business debt-to-GDP (black line) continued edging down but remained elevated compared to its historical range. The household debt-to-GDP ratio (blue line) also continued declining and remained at more than 25-year lows.

Figure 2.1. The total debt of businesses and households continued to grow more slowly than GDP
Figure 2.1. The total debt of businesses and households continued to grow more slowly than GDP

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Note: The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: January 1980–July 1980, July 1981–November 1982, July 1990–March 1991, March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–April 2020. GDP is gross domestic product.

Source: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts, and Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release Z.1, "Financial Accounts of the United States."

Figure 2.2. Both business and household debt-to-GDP ratios continued to fall
Figure 2.2. Both business and household debt-to-GDP ratios continued to fall

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Note: The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: January 1980–July 1980, July 1981–November 1982, July 1990–March 1991, March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–April 2020. GDP is gross domestic product.

Source: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts, and Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release Z.1, "Financial Accounts of the United States."

For additional context, table 2.1 shows the outstanding amounts and recent historical growth rates of different forms of debt owed by nonfinancial businesses and households as of the fourth quarter of 2025.

Table 2.1. Outstanding amounts of nonfinancial business and household credit
Item Outstanding
(billions of dollars)
Growth,
2024:Q4–2025:Q4
(percent)
Average annual growth,
1997–2025:Q4
(percent)
Total private nonfinancial credit 43,144 3.3 5.3
Total nonfinancial business credit 22,209 3.5 5.7
Corporate business credit 14,183 3.5 5.2
Bonds and commercial paper 8,791 3.2 5.5
Bank lending 1,905 .0 3.3
Leveraged loans1 1,380 12.6 12.9
Noncorporate business credit 8,027 3.4 6.7
Commercial real estate credit 3,368 2.4 5.9
Total household credit 20,935 3.2 4.9
Mortgages 13,767 2.9 4.9
Consumer credit 5,107 3.2 5.0
Student loans 1,842 3.6 7.0
Auto loans 1,562 −.2 5.0
Credit cards 1,324 2.1 3.4
Nominal GDP 31,442 5.4 4.7

Note: The data extend through 2025:Q4. Outstanding amounts are in nominal terms. Growth rates are nominal and are measured from Q4 of the year immediately preceding the period through Q4 of the final year of the period. The table reports the main components of corporate business credit, total household credit, and consumer credit. Other, smaller components are not reported. The commercial real estate (CRE) row shows CRE debt owed by both non-financial corporate and noncorporate businesses as defined in Table L.220: Commercial Mortgages in the "Financial Accounts of the United States." Total household-sector credit includes debt owed by other entities, such as nonprofit organizations. GDP is gross domestic product.

 1. The amount outstanding shows institutional leveraged loans and generally excludes loan commitments held by banks. For example, lines of credit are generally excluded from this measure. Average annual growth of leveraged loans is from 2000 to 2025:Q4, as this market was fairly small before then. Return to table

Source: For leveraged loans, PitchBook Data, Leveraged Commentary & Data; for GDP, Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts; for all other items, Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release Z.1, "Financial Accounts of the United States."

Business debt growth was flat, and debt-servicing capacity was solid overall despite pockets of weakness

The growth rate of nonfinancial business debt adjusted for inflation fell to just below negative 1 percent over the second half of 2025 (figure 2.3). Net issuance of high-yield bonds, unrated bonds, and leveraged loans minus retirements and repayments grew modestly during the second half of 2025, mostly driven by positive leveraged loan issuance (figure 2.4). Private credit, which consists of loans to businesses from nonbank lenders such as private credit funds and BDCs, continued to grow at a solid pace, albeit slower than in previous years.

Figure 2.3. Business debt adjusted for inflation fell moderately during the second half of 2025
Figure 2.3. Business debt adjusted for inflation fell moderately during the second half of 2025

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Note: Nominal debt growth is seasonally adjusted and is translated into real terms after subtracting the growth rate of the price deflator for the core personal consumption expenditures price index.

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release Z.1, "Financial Accounts of the United States."

Figure 2.4. Net issuance of risky debt was modest during the second half of 2025
Figure 2.4. Net issuance of risky debt was modest during the second half of 2025

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Note: The data begin in 2004:Q2. Institutional leveraged loans generally exclude loan commitments held by banks. The key identifies bars in order from top to bottom (except for some bars with at least one negative value).

Source: LSEG, Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database; PitchBook Data, Leveraged Commentary & Data.

Among publicly traded nonfinancial firms, gross leverage—the ratio of debt to assets—continued to edge down through the second half of 2025 but remained high relative to its history (figure 2.5). Net leverage—the ratio of debt less cash to total assets—also remained elevated. The median ICR for non-investment-grade firms stayed low, in the bottom quartile of its historical distribution (figure 2.6). In contrast, ICRs for investment-grade borrowers, which account for nearly 70 percent of all outstanding debt among publicly traded nonfinancial firms, remained robust.

Figure 2.5. Gross leverage of publicly traded nonfinancial firms ticked down but was still high by historical standards
Figure 2.5. Gross leverage of publicly traded nonfinancial firms ticked down but was still high by historical standards

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Note: Gross leverage is an asset-weighted average of the ratio of firms' book value of total debt to book value of total assets. The 75th percentile is calculated from a sample of the 2,500 largest firms by assets. The dashed sections of the lines in 2019:Q1 reflect the structural break in the series due to the 2019 compliance deadline for Financial Accounting Standards Board rule Accounting Standards Update 2016-02. The accounting standard requires operating leases, previously considered off-balance-sheet activities, to be included in measures of debt and assets.

Source: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations based on S&P Global, Compustat.

Figure 2.6. Interest coverage ratios, which indicate firms' ability to service their debt, remained solid
Figure 2.6. Interest coverage ratios, which indicate firms' ability to service their debt, remained solid

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Note: The interest coverage ratio is earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest payments. Firms with leverage less than 5 percent and interest payments less than $500,000 are excluded.

Source: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations based on S&P Global, Compustat.

In contrast with public firms, privately held firms tend to have less access to capital markets and primarily borrow from banks, other institutional investors through the leveraged loan market, and various other providers of private credit. Privately held firms account for roughly 60 percent of the total outstanding debt of U.S. nonfinancial firms. Riskier debt owed by privately held firms—primarily leveraged loans and private credit—has continued to grow at a solid pace, albeit slower than in previous years, and currently makes up about 10 percent of total outstanding nonfinancial business debt.

Gross leverage—the ratio of debt to assets—of privately held firms with commercial and industrial loans from banks dropped and remained below pre-pandemic levels (figure 2.7). However, debt-servicing capacity remained low for some of these firms, especially those with elevated leverage and high use of floating-rate debt combined with a short-duration maturity structure.

Figure 2.7. Firms with commercial and industrial bank loans lowered their leverage
Figure 2.7. Firms with commercial and industrial bank loans lowered their leverage

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Note: The figure shows the weighted median leverage of nonfinancial firms that borrow using commercial and industrial loans from the 23 banks that have filed in every quarter since 2013:Q1. Leverage is measured as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets of the borrower, as reported by the lender, and the median is weighted by committed amounts.

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form FR Y-14Q (Schedule H.1), Capital Assessments and Stress Testing.

For leveraged loans, the share of newly issued loans to large corporations with debt multiples—defined as the ratio of debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization—of 4 or more increased moderately and remained above the historical median (figure 2.8). Gross and net leverage ratios were largely unchanged from the previous report at levels above their historical medians. In terms of debt-servicing capacity, the median ICR for leveraged loan borrowers stayed near its historical low. Further, while the volume-weighted default rate on leveraged loans stayed below its historical median, defaults including distressed exchanges—which reflect distressed loans that have been renegotiated between the borrower and the lender—remained relatively high (figure 2.9).

Figure 2.8. Newly issued leveraged loans with debt-to-EBITDA multiples of 4 or more increased moderately and stayed above the historical median
Figure 2.8. Newly issued leveraged loans with debt-to-EBITDA multiples of 4 or more increased moderately and stayed above the historical median

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Note: Volumes are for large corporations with earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) greater than $50 million and exclude existing tranches of add-ons and amendments as well as restatements with no new money. The key identifies bars in order from top to bottom.

Source: LSEG, Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database; PitchBook Data, Leveraged Commentary & Data.

Figure 2.9. The realized default rate on leveraged loans remained well below its previous peaks
Figure 2.9. The realized default rate on leveraged loans remained well below its previous peaks

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Note: The data for the realized default rate begin in December 1998; the data including distressed exchanges begin in December 2016. The default rate is calculated as the amount in default over the past 12 months divided by the total outstanding volume of loans that are not in default at the beginning of the 12-month period. The default rate including distressed exchanges is calculated as the number of issuers in default or distressed exchange over the past 12 months divided by the total number of issuers that are not in default at the beginning of the 12-month period. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–April 2020.

Source: PitchBook Data, Leveraged Commentary & Data.

In private credit markets, loan defaults remained at relatively low levels, but the elevated usage of payment-in-kind (PIK) provisions indicates some borrowers may face repayment difficulties.4

Credit was flat to small businesses, and delinquencies remained above pre-pandemic levels

According to the March 2026 National Federation of Independent Business's Small Business Economic Trends Survey, the share of firms that borrow regularly has flattened out since the beginning of the year following a protracted decline.5 According to data from the Small Business Lending Survey from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, measures of small business loan originations were little changed during the second half of 2025, and banks continued to tighten credit standards.6 Over the past two years, interest rates on small business loans have declined in line with the broader interest rate environment but remain near the top of the range observed since 2008. Short-term (up to 90 days) delinquency rates edged down but remained above pre-pandemic levels. Long-term (more than 90 days) delinquency rates have leveled off recently but also remained elevated compared to levels before the pandemic.

Outstanding household debt adjusted for inflation was little changed

Outstanding household debt adjusted for inflation continued to be roughly flat, as it has been over the past two years. While the majority of that debt is owed by households with prime credit scores, the share currently owed by households with a subprime credit rating has risen modestly, reflecting in part the rise in consumer delinquencies and the resulting migration of some borrowers from the prime and near-prime credit score categories to the subprime credit score category (figure 2.10). The ratio of total required household debt payments to total disposable income (the household debt service ratio) inched up since the previous report.

Figure 2.10. Household debt was largely unchanged
Figure 2.10. Household debt was largely unchanged

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Note: Subprime are borrowers with an Equifax Risk Score less than 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores are measured contemporaneously. Student loan balances before 2004 are estimated using average growth from 2004 to 2007, by risk score. The data are converted to constant 2025 dollars using the consumer price index.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax; consumer price index, Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics.

Mortgage credit risk remained low

Mortgage debt accounted for roughly three-fourths of total household debt. Housing leverage—measured as outstanding mortgage loan balances relative to home values—remained subdued (figure 2.11). When measured relative to either market prices (blue line) or an estimate of home values from a model using rents and other market fundamentals (black line), outstanding mortgage balances continued to sit well below previous peaks. New mortgage extensions ticked up modestly for borrowers with prime credit scores (the group with the largest share) and were flat for borrowers with near-prime or subprime credit scores over the past year (figure 2.12).

Figure 2.11. Measures of housing leverage stayed significantly below their peak levels
Figure 2.11. Measures of housing leverage stayed significantly below their peak levels

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Note: Housing leverage is estimated as the ratio of the average outstanding mortgage loan balance for owner-occupied homes with a mortgage to (1) current home values using the Zillow national house price index and (2) model-implied house prices estimated by a staff model based on rents, interest rates, and a time trend.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax; Zillow, Inc., Real Estate Data; Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics.

Figure 2.12. New mortgage extensions were largely unchanged
Figure 2.12. New mortgage extensions were largely unchanged

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Note: The figure plots the year-over-year change in balances for the first quarter of each year among those households whose balance increased over this window. Subprime are borrowers with an Equifax Risk Score less than 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores were measured 1 year ago. The data are converted to constant 2025 dollars using the consumer price index. The key identifies bars in order from left to right.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax; consumer price index, Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics.

The overall mortgage delinquency rate ticked up in the fourth quarter of last year but remained at the lower end of its historical distribution (figure 2.13). Overall mortgage delinquency rates stayed low due to large home equity cushions and strong underwriting standards (figure 2.14). However, some distress is evident among a small subset of borrowers who purchased homes with low down payments in recent years, especially among borrowers with FHA and VA loans, as slower house price growth leaves some of them with little equity cushion. As of the fourth quarter of 2025, the early payment delinquency rate—the share of balances becoming delinquent within one year of mortgage origination—among near- and subprime borrowers remained somewhat above the median of its historical distribution.

Figure 2.13. Mortgage delinquency rates remained close to the low end of their historical distribution
Figure 2.13. Mortgage delinquency rates remained close to the low end of their historical distribution

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Note: Loss mitigation includes tradelines that have a narrative code of forbearance, natural disaster, payment deferral (including partial), loan modification (including federal government plans), or loans with no scheduled payment and a nonzero balance. Delinquent loans in both series are loans reported to the credit bureau as at least 30 days past due.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax.

Figure 2.14. Very few homeowners had negative equity in their homes
Figure 2.14. Very few homeowners had negative equity in their homes

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Note: The data extend through December 2025 for all outstanding first-lien mortgages. Negative equity is defined as a combined loan-to-value ratio greater than 100 percent.

Source: Credit Risk Insight Servicing McDash/Equifax; Federal Reserve Board staff calculations.

Consumer delinquencies remained high by historical standards

Consumer debt, consisting primarily of student, auto, and credit card loans, accounted for the remaining one-fourth of household debt. Balances were broadly unchanged in inflation-adjusted terms for student and auto loans and edged up for credit card loans relative to the previous report (figure 2.15).

Figure 2.15. Consumer debt balances were largely unchanged for student and auto loans but moved up for credit cards
Figure 2.15. Consumer debt balances were largely unchanged for student and auto loans but moved up for credit cards

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Note: The data are converted to constant 2025 dollars using the consumer price index. Student loan data begin in 2005:Q1.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax; consumer price index, Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics.

The average maturity of auto loans at origination for used cars remained near historical highs for most borrowers (figure 2.16). On balance, longer-maturity loans tend to have higher default risks, partly because such loans have a higher risk of falling deep into a negative equity position. The share of all auto loan balances in delinquent status inched up from the previous report and remained elevated at the 90th percentile of its historical distribution (figure 2.17).

Figure 2.16. The average maturity of loans at origination for used cars remained elevated
Figure 2.16. The average maturity of loans at origination for used cars remained elevated

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Note: Loans are for used auto vehicles only. Subprime are borrowers with a VantageScore less than 601; near prime are from 601 to 660; prime are greater than 660. The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff.

Source: Experian Velocity.

Figure 2.17. Auto loan delinquencies stayed well above the historical median
Figure 2.17. Auto loan delinquencies stayed well above the historical median

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Note: Delinquent includes loans reported to the credit bureau as at least 30 days past due. The data for auto loans are reported semiannually by the Risk Assessment, Data Analysis, and Research Data Warehouse until 2017, after which they are reported quarterly. The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax.

The stock of outstanding credit card debt shifted slightly to subprime borrowers over the past year, driven in large part by prime and near-prime borrowers transitioning into the subprime rating category (figure 2.18). Credit card delinquency rates edged down in the fourth quarter of 2025 but remained elevated relative to the past 10 years (figure 2.19). The stabilization of credit performance has been broad based, with delinquency rates leveling off across credit score and income groups.7 The overall increase in credit card delinquencies since early 2022 was attributable primarily to elevated delinquencies among borrowers with nonprime credit scores and reflected in large part looser underwriting standards and large growth in inflation-adjusted revolving credit over the pandemic period.

Figure 2.18. Credit card balances across borrowers were up slightly
Figure 2.18. Credit card balances across borrowers were up slightly

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Note: Subprime are borrowers with an Equifax Risk Score less than 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores are measured contemporaneously. The data are converted to constant 2025 dollars using the consumer price index.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax; consumer price index, Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics.

Figure 2.19. Credit card delinquencies leveled off at their long-term median
Figure 2.19. Credit card delinquencies leveled off at their long-term median

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Note: Delinquency measures the fraction of balances that are at least 30 days past due, excluding severe derogatory loans, which are delinquent and have been charged off, foreclosed, or repossessed by the lender. The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax.

The outstanding stock of student loan debt remained below its pre-pandemic level, and delinquencies stayed high, but within the range seen over the past decade. The high levelof delinquencies reflected the resumption of student loan repayments and reporting of delinquent loans to credit bureaus that began in October 2024. However, student loan borrowers have not yet shown much greater difficulty in meeting their non-student loan debt payments relative to the overall population.

 

References

 

 4. PIK provisions allow borrowers to defer interest payments by adding them to the loan principal, which preserves liquidity but could indicate credit quality deterioration. Return to text

 5. This survey's data are available on the National Federation of Independent Business's website at https://www.nfib.com/surveys/small-business-economic-trendsReturn to text

 6. This survey's data are available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's website at https://www.kansascityfed.org/surveys/small-business-lending-survey/Return to text

 7. Income and credit score are not strongly correlated; see Rachael Beer, Felicia Ionescu, and Geng Li (2018), "Are Income and Credit Scores Highly Correlated?" FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 13), https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2235Return to text

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Last Update: May 28, 2026